Demougin, Dominique ; Helm, Carsten (2009)
Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits.
Report, Primary publication, Publisher's Version
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| Item Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Type of entry: | Primary publication |
| Title: | Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 19 August 2009 |
| Place of Publication: | Darmstadt |
| Series: | Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics |
| Series Volume: | 191 |
| Corresponding Links: | |
| Abstract: | Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher level of unemployment benefits improves the worker's position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated workers affect this trade-off. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Unemployment benefits, incentive contracts, Nash bargaining, moral hazard, globalisation |
| Status: | Publisher's Version |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47352 |
| Additional Information: | JEL - Classification : J65, D82, J41, E24; Erstellt März 2008 |
| Classification DDC: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Divisions: | 01 Department of Law and Economics 01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete 01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2009 12:21 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Aug 2024 09:41 |
| URI: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/4735 |
| PPN: | 378263285 |
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