Logo des Repositoriums
  • English
  • Deutsch
Anmelden
Keine TU-ID? Klicken Sie hier für mehr Informationen.
  1. Startseite
  2. Publikationen
  3. Publikationen der Technischen Universität Darmstadt
  4. Zweitveröffentlichungen
  5. Effective Notification Campaigns on the Web: A Matter of Trust, Framing, and Support
 
  • Details
2021
Zweitveröffentlichung
Konferenzveröffentlichung
Verlagsversion

Effective Notification Campaigns on the Web: A Matter of Trust, Framing, and Support

File(s)
Download

sec21_slides_maass_0.pdf
CC BY 4.0 International
Format: Adobe PDF
Size: 571.01 KB
Download

sec21-maass.pdf
CC BY 4.0 International
Format: Adobe PDF
Size: 1.93 MB
TUDa URI
tuda/8099
URN
urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-205745
DOI
10.26083/tuprints-00020574
Autor:innen
Maass, Max ORCID 0000-0001-9346-8486
Stöver, Alina
Pridöhl, Henning
Bretthauer, Sebastian
Herrmann, Dominik
Hollick, Matthias ORCID 0000-0002-9163-5989
Spiecker, Indra
Kurzbeschreibung (Abstract)

Misconfigurations and outdated software are a major cause of compromised websites and data leaks. Past research has proposed and evaluated sending automated security notifications to the operators of misconfigured websites, but encountered issues with reachability, mistrust, and a perceived lack of importance. In this paper, we seek to understand the determinants of effective notifications. We identify a data protection misconfiguration that affects 12.7 % of the 1.3 million websites we scanned and opens them up to legal liability. Using a subset of 4754 websites, we conduct a multivariate randomized controlled notification experiment, evaluating contact medium, sender, and framing of the message. We also include a link to a public web-based self-service tool that is run by us in disguise and conduct an anonymous survey of the notified website owners (N=477) to understand their perspective.

We find that framing a misconfiguration as a problem of legal compliance can increase remediation rates, especially when the notification is sent as a letter from a legal research group, achieving remediation rates of 76.3 % compared to 33.9 % for emails sent by computer science researchers warning about a privacy issue. Across all groups, 56.6 % of notified owners remediated the issue, compared to 9.2 % in the control group. In conclusion, we present factors that lead website owners to trust a notification, show what framing of the notification brings them into action, and how they can be supported in remediating the issue.

Sprache
Englisch
Fachbereich/-gebiet
20 Fachbereich Informatik > Sichere Mobile Netze
Forschungsprojekte und Grants
DFG-Graduiertenkollegs > Graduiertenkolleg 2050 Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users (Projektende 30.09.2024)
DDC
000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik
Institution
Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt
Ort
Darmstadt
Veranstaltungstitel
30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)
Veranstaltungsort
Virtual event
Startdatum der Veranstaltung
11.08.2021
Enddatum der Veranstaltung
13.08.2021
Buchtitel
Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium
Startseite
2489
Endseite
2506
ISBN
978-1-939133-24-3
Verlag
USENIX Association
Publikationsjahr der Erstveröffentlichung
2021
PPN
491481829
Zusätzliche Infomationen
Presentation: 11 slides
Zusätzliche Links (Organisation)
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21

  • TUprints Leitlinien
  • Cookie-Einstellungen
  • Impressum
  • Datenschutzbestimmungen
  • Webseitenanalyse
Diese Webseite wird von der Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt (ULB) betrieben.