Nikolopoulos, Georgios M. ; Fischlin, Marc (2022):
Information-Theoretically Secure Data Origin Authentication with Quantum and Classical Resources. (Publisher's Version)
In: Cryptography, 4 (4), MDPI, e-ISSN 2410-387X,
DOI: 10.26083/tuprints-00017447,
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Item Type: | Article |
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Origin: | Secondary publication DeepGreen |
Status: | Publisher's Version |
Title: | Information-Theoretically Secure Data Origin Authentication with Quantum and Classical Resources |
Language: | English |
Abstract: | In conventional cryptography, information-theoretically secure message authentication can be achieved by means of universal hash functions, and requires that the two legitimate users share a random secret key, which is at least twice as long as the tag. We address the question of whether quantum resources can offer any advantage over classical unconditionally secure message authentication codes. It is shown that a broad class of symmetric prepare-and-measure quantum message-authentication schemes cannot do better than their classical counterparts. |
Journal or Publication Title: | Cryptography |
Volume of the journal: | 4 |
Issue Number: | 4 |
Publisher: | MDPI |
Collation: | 10 Seiten |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | quantum cryptography, data origin authentication, data integrity, message authentication |
Classification DDC: | 000 Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft > 004 Informatik 500 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik > 530 Physik |
Divisions: | 20 Department of Computer Science > Cryptography and Complexity Theory 05 Department of Physics > Institute of Applied Physics |
Date Deposited: | 07 Feb 2022 12:40 |
Last Modified: | 02 May 2022 12:07 |
DOI: | 10.26083/tuprints-00017447 |
Corresponding Links: | |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-174475 |
SWORD Depositor: | Deep Green |
URI: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/17447 |
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