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Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

Helm, Carsten and Neugart, Michael :
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information.
In: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, 192.
[Report], (2008)

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Item Type: Report
Title: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information
Language: English
Abstract:

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Series Name: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
Volume: 192
Uncontrolled Keywords: Asymmetric information, coalition governments, policy reform
Classification DDC: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
Divisions: 01 Law and Economics
01 Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete
01 Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik
Date Deposited: 19 Aug 2009 12:17
Last Modified: 26 Jan 2016 15:16
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47340
Additional Information:

JEL - Classification : D72, D78, D82

Additional Information:

JEL - Classification : D72, D78, D82

URI: http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/4734
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