Helm, Carsten ; Neugart, Michael (2009)
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information.
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Item Type: | Report |
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Type of entry: | Primary publication |
Title: | Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information |
Language: | English |
Date: | 19 August 2009 |
Place of Publication: | Darmstadt |
Series: | Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics |
Series Volume: | 192 |
Abstract: | With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter. |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Asymmetric information, coalition governments, policy reform |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47340 |
Additional Information: | JEL - Classification : D72, D78, D82; Erstellt Mai 2008 |
Classification DDC: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Divisions: | 01 Department of Law and Economics 01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete 01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik |
Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2009 12:17 |
Last Modified: | 25 Oct 2023 09:51 |
URI: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/4734 |
PPN: | 378263137 |
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