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Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

Helm, Carsten ; Neugart, Michael (2009)
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information.
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Item Type: Report
Type of entry: Primary publication
Title: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information
Language: English
Date: 19 August 2009
Place of Publication: Darmstadt
Series: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
Series Volume: 192
Abstract:

With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Uncontrolled Keywords: Asymmetric information, coalition governments, policy reform
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47340
Additional Information:

JEL - Classification : D72, D78, D82; Erstellt Mai 2008

Classification DDC: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Divisions: 01 Department of Law and Economics
01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete
01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik
Date Deposited: 19 Aug 2009 12:17
Last Modified: 25 Oct 2023 09:51
URI: https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/4734
PPN: 378263137
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