Fuchs, Andreas (2022)
Engineering Trustworthy Systems by Minimizing and Strengthening their TCBs using Trusted Computing.
Technische Universität Darmstadt
doi: 10.26083/tuprints-00019676
Ph.D. Thesis, Primary publication, Publisher's Version
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Item Type: | Ph.D. Thesis | ||||
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Type of entry: | Primary publication | ||||
Title: | Engineering Trustworthy Systems by Minimizing and Strengthening their TCBs using Trusted Computing | ||||
Language: | English | ||||
Referees: | Waidner, Prof. Dr. Michael ; Bormann, Prof. Dr. Carsten | ||||
Date: | 2022 | ||||
Place of Publication: | Darmstadt | ||||
Collation: | x, 127 Seiten | ||||
Date of oral examination: | 17 May 2021 | ||||
DOI: | 10.26083/tuprints-00019676 | ||||
Abstract: | The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) describes the part of an IT system that is responsible for enforcing a certain security property of the system. In order to engineer a trustworthy system, the TCB must be as secure as possible. This can be achieved by reducing the number, size and complexity of components that are part of the TCB and by using hardened components as part of the TCB. Worst case scenario is for the TCB to span the complete IT system. Best case is for the TCB to be reduced to only a strengthened Root of Trust such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM). One such very secure HSMs with many capabilities is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This thesis demonstrates how the TCB of a system can be largely or even solely reduced to the TPM for a variety of security policies, especially in the embedded domain. The examined scenarios include the policies for securing of device resident data at rest also during firmware updates, the enforcement of firmware product lines at runtime, the securing of payment credentials in Plug and Charge controllers, the recording of audit trails over attestation data and a very generic role-based access management. In order to allow evaluating these different solutions, the notion of a dynamic lifecycle dimension for a TCB is introduced. Furthermore, an approach towards engineering such systems based on a formal framework is presented. These scenarios provide evidence for the potential to enforce even complex security policies in small and thus strong TCBs. The approach for implementing those policies can often be inspired by a formal methods based engineering process or by means of additive functional engineering, where a base system is expanded by increased functionality in each step. In either case, a trustworthy system with high assurance capabilities can be achieved. |
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Status: | Publisher's Version | ||||
URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-196767 | ||||
Classification DDC: | 000 Generalities, computers, information > 004 Computer science | ||||
Divisions: | 20 Department of Computer Science > Security in Information Technology | ||||
Date Deposited: | 02 May 2022 11:02 | ||||
Last Modified: | 08 Aug 2022 13:06 | ||||
URI: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/19676 | ||||
PPN: | 495503827 | ||||
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