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**CONSTRUAL LEVEL AND ITS INFLUENCE ON OUTCOMES
AND PROCESSES IN SINGLE AND MULTIPLE INTEGRATIVE
NEGOTIATIONS**

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Abstract

Even though many people do not realize it, everybody is a negotiator. Negotiations are part of everyday life. To reach mutually beneficial outcomes and to avoid frustration, anger or despair, a focus on interests (why negotiators want something) is essential. However, many negotiators tend to focus on positions (what they want), resulting in suboptimal outcomes. The present thesis applies construal-level theory to negotiations and proposes that a high construal level positively affects negotiation outcomes by inducing a focus on interests. In particular, we tested the notion that the effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes is mediated by information exchange and judgement accuracy. Furthermore, we expected high construal levels to facilitate analogical and adaptive transfer of learning between negotiation tasks.

To test our hypotheses, we conducted four separate, but consecutive empirical studies, that all had a laboratory setting where participants had to negotiate face-to-face.

Study 1 examined the in other studies previously found main effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes by manipulating the negotiation material itself and assessed mediation of this effect by a focus on interests. Participants ($N = 104$, 52 dyads) with a high construal level reached a better negotiation outcome than participants with a low construal level. This main effect of construal level was mediated by a focus on interests, operationalized by the frequency of information exchange regarding negotiators' profit schedules.

Study 2 aimed at replicating both the main effect of construal level and the mediation effect using a different operationalization of focus on interests as well as at testing the stability of the effect over time. Study 2 required participants ($N = 70$, 35 dyads) to negotiate twice. Negotiation Task 1 served again as manipulation of construal level. As in Study 1, participants with a high construal level reached higher outcomes than participants with a low construal level. This applied to both negotiation tasks, pointing to the effect being somewhat stable over time. Again, the main effect of construal level was mediated by a focus on interests, this time measured as the judgement accuracy of the counterpart's profit schedule.

Study 3 was designed to assess the occurrence of adaptive transfer of learning between negotiation tasks. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, construal level was manipulated prior to the first negotiation task via a separate thought exercise. Participants ($N = 76$, 38 dyads) again had to negotiate twice. In line with the results of Studies 1 and 2, participants with a high construal level reached better outcomes in Task 1 than participants with a low construal level. Unfortunately, the main effect was not present in Task 2. Study 3 thus provides further support for the main effect of construal level, but no support for the occurrence of adaptive transfer of learning or further evidence regarding the mediation hypothesis.

Lastly, Study 4 systematically tested the occurrence of analogical and adaptive transfer of learning between negotiations in one single study. As in Study 3, construal level was manipulated before the first negotiation task. In total participants ($N = 82$, 41 dyads) had to negotiate three times. In contrast to our previous findings, no main effect of construal level was present and no evidence for analogical or adaptive transfer of learning could be found.

The present thesis provides further empirical evidence for the theoretically proposed link between construal levels and negotiation outcomes and sheds some light on the processes underlying this effect, namely a focus on interests. However, as the main effect of construal level could not be replicated in all four studies, the results are inconclusive regarding the requirements of its existence. Additionally, the assumption that high construal levels facilitate analogical or adaptive transfer of learning was not supported.

Zusammenfassung (German)

Auch wenn es vielen Leuten nicht bewusst ist, jeder führt Verhandlungen. Verhandlungen sind Bestandteil des täglichen Lebens. Um Ergebnisse zu erzielen, welche für alle Beteiligten von Vorteil sind, und um Frustration, Wut oder Verzweiflung zu vermeiden, ist ein Fokus auf Interessen (warum man etwas möchte) essentiell. Jedoch tendieren viele dazu, sich auf Positionen zu konzentrieren (was sie möchten), was zu suboptimalen Ergebnissen führt. Die vorliegende Arbeit überträgt die Construal-Level Theory auf Verhandlungen und geht davon aus, dass abstrakte mentale Repräsentationen (high construal levels) sich positiv auf Verhandlungsergebnisse auswirken, indem sie den Fokus auf Interessen lenken. Im Speziellen testen wir die Annahme, dass der Effekt von mentalen Repräsentationen auf Verhandlungsergebnisse mediiert wird durch den Austausch von Informationen und die Urteilsgenauigkeit. Darüber hinaus erwarten wir, dass abstrakte mentale Repräsentationen das Auftreten von analogem und adaptivem Lerntransfer zwischen Verhandlungsaufgaben erleichtern. Zur Überprüfung unserer Hypothesen haben wir vier separate, aber aufeinander aufbauende empirische Studien durchgeführt, welche alle im Labor stattfanden, wo die Teilnehmer*innen von Angesicht zu Angesicht miteinander verhandeln mussten.

Studie 1 untersuchte den in vorherigen Studien gefundenen Haupteffekt mentaler Repräsentationen auf Verhandlungsergebnisse, indem die Verhandlungsmaterialien selbst manipuliert wurden, sowie die Mediation dieses Effekts durch einen Fokus auf Interessen. Teilnehmer*innen ($N = 104$, 52 Dyaden) mit abstrakten mentalen Repräsentationen erzielten bessere Verhandlungsergebnisse als Teilnehmer*innen mit konkreten mentalen Repräsentationen. Dieser Haupteffekt wurde mediiert durch einen Fokus auf Interessen, operationalisiert durch die Häufigkeit, mit der Informationen bezüglich der Gewinnmatrizen der Verhandlungspartner ausgetauscht wurden.

Studie 2 zielte darauf ab, den Haupteffekt sowie den Mediationseffekt unter Verwendung einer anderen Operationalisierung für Fokus auf Interessen zu replizieren. Auch sollte die zeitliche Stabilität des Effekts getestet werden. In Studie 2 mussten die Teilnehmer*innen ($N = 70$, 35 Dyaden) zweimal verhandeln. Verhandlungsaufgabe 1 diente dabei erneut zur Manipulation des Abstraktionsniveaus. Wie in Studie 1 erzielten

Teilnehmer*innen mit abstrakten mentalen Repräsentationen bessere Ergebnisse als Teilnehmer*innen mit konkreten mentalen Repräsentationen. Dies traf für beide Verhandlungsaufgaben zu, was vermuten lässt, dass der Effekt zu einem gewissen Grad stabil über die Zeit ist. Erneut wurde der Haupteffekt durch einen Fokus auf Interessen mediiert, welcher dieses Mal anhand der Urteilsgenauigkeit bezüglich der Gewinnmatrix des Verhandlungspartners gemessen wurde.

Studie 3 diente dazu, das Vorhandensein von adaptivem Lerntransfer zwischen Verhandlungsaufgaben zu erfassen. Im Gegensatz zu den Studien 1 und 2 wurde das Niveau der mentalen Repräsentation vor der ersten Verhandlungsaufgabe mithilfe einer separaten Denkaufgabe manipuliert. Die Teilnehmer*innen ($N = 76$, 38 Dyaden) mussten erneut zweimal verhandeln. Im Einklang mit den Ergebnissen von Studie 1 und 2 erzielten Teilnehmer*innen mit abstrakten mentalen Repräsentationen in Aufgabe 1 bessere Ergebnisse als Teilnehmer*innen mit konkreten mentalen Repräsentationen. Leider war dieser Haupteffekt in Aufgabe 2 nicht nachweisbar. Studie 3 liefert somit einen weiteren Beleg für den Haupteffekt des Abstraktionsniveaus, aber keine Hinweise auf das Vorhandensein eines adaptiven Lerntransfers oder weitere Belege bezüglich der Mediationshypothese.

Studie 4 untersuchte letztendlich systematisch das Vorhandensein von analogem und adaptivem Lerntransfer zwischen Verhandlungen innerhalb einer einzigen Studie. Wie bereits in Studie 3 wurde das Niveau der mentalen Repräsentation vor der ersten Verhandlungsaufgabe manipuliert. Insgesamt mussten die Teilnehmer*innen ($N = 82$, 41 Dyaden) dreimal verhandeln. Im Gegensatz zu den bisherigen Ergebnissen konnte kein Haupteffekt nachgewiesen werden und auch keine Belege für analogen oder adaptiven Lerntransfer gefunden werden.

Die vorliegende Arbeit liefert weitere empirische Belege für den theoretisch angenommenen Zusammenhang zwischen mentalen Repräsentationen und Verhandlungsergebnissen und trägt dazu bei, die zugrundeliegenden Prozesse dieses Effekts, nämlich ein Fokus auf Interessen, näher zu beleuchten. Da jedoch der Haupteffekt nicht in allen vier Studien repliziert werden konnte, sind die Ergebnisse bezüglich der Voraussetzungen zum Auftreten des Effekts uneindeutig. Darüber hinaus konnte die Hypothese, dass abstrakte mentale Repräsentationen analogen oder adaptiven Lerntransfer erleichtern, nicht unterstützt werden.

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1 Introduction

“Like it or not, you are a negotiator.”

Fisher & Ury, 1981

This quote illustrates very well what many people are not aware of: Negotiations are an integral part of everyday life. Decisions are often the result of some form of negotiation, be it with one’s significant other, children, family members, friends, co-workers, superiors, or business partners (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Negotiation is a key communication and influence tool in our personal and our professional life (Thompson, 2011).

Whenever we cannot achieve our objectives without the cooperation of others, we are negotiating (Thompson, 2011; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). Fisher and Ury (1981, p. xi) define negotiation as “[...] a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed”.

Negotiation can be considered as an interpersonal decision-making process, where two or more parties try to solve a problem or a dispute and determine what each party has to give and take or perform and receive (Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1999; Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Although there are several types of negotiation, they all share specific characteristics. A negotiation always requires at least two parties, whereby one party can be an individual, a small group, an organization or even a whole nation. The parties have a perceived or actual conflict of interest with respect to one or more different issues. Negotiations involve the management of tangibles, e.g. specific resources, the price or terms of an agreement, as well as intangibles, e.g. core beliefs or values. Negotiation is largely a voluntary process; the parties are at least temporarily joined together by choice, and seldom required to negotiate. To reach an agreement, parties present demands or proposals, evaluate those of the other party, followed by concessions and counterproposals. The activity of negotiation is thus sequential rather than simultaneous (Lewicki et al., 1999; Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Negotiations may end in impasse/disagreement or in mutual agreement. Agreements can be evaluated in terms of their efficiency. A negotiation is efficient or pareto optimal (win-win) if there is no other feasible solution that would improve the outcome of one or both parties while not hurting either party (Thompson, 1990). Pareto optimal agreements foster social harmony, strengthen the relationship between parties and improve their self-efficacy. The likelihood of future conflict is reduced and economic success promoted (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994).

Regrettably, studies show that agreements are often only beneficial to one party (win-lose) or even outright lose-lose (Nadler, Thompson, & van Boven, 2003; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). As a result, parties feel dissatisfied, frustrated and upset. Further conflict and disharmony are to be expected (Rubin et al., 1994).

This raises the question why so many negotiations, despite their importance, are characterized by suboptimal outcomes. Which personal and/or situational factors facilitate mutually beneficial outcomes and which ones are detrimental?

Negotiation research so far has already addressed a lot of potentially influential factors. Among the well-researched factors are, for example, social motives (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), goal setting (Hossiep, Harnack, & Bürkner, 2018; Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002), or gender (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). Other factors that gather more and more attention are emotions (Barry, Smithey Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Olekalns & Druckman, 2014), personality traits, cognitive ability and emotional intelligence (Sharma, Bottom, & Elfenbein, 2013), or culture (e.g. Groves, Feyerherm, & Gu, 2015; Gunia, Brett, & Gelfand, 2016; Imai & Gelfand, 2010).

The present thesis focuses on a less well-researched influence factor, namely the way we think about a negotiation and the kind of mental representations we build. More concretely, to what extent mental representations of a negotiation and its underlying interests can be abstract or concrete, and how the level of abstract thinking can influence negotiation outcomes.

Why do we think this is important? In negotiations a focus on the underlying interests – why a negotiator adopts a certain position – is vital for an optimal negotiation outcome (Thompson, 1991). Moreover, it has been shown that mental representations can affect the type of information that is focused on in a given situation and thereby can

differentially influence behaviour (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The present thesis aims at applying the concept of abstract and concrete mental representations to negotiations. We want to expand previous research by examining whether abstract mental representations can help negotiators to reach better negotiation outcomes, by shedding light on the underlying processes that mediate this effect and by testing whether abstract mental representations can even facilitate analogical or adaptive transfer of learning between negotiation tasks.

In the following, key concepts relating to negotiations and mental representations will be presented (chapter 2), followed by an overview on the research in this thesis (chapter 3).

2 Theoretical Background¹

2.1 Interests and positions in negotiations

An ever-growing body of research on negotiations and their outcomes shows that negotiators are often ineffective and tend to settle for suboptimal results (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Thompson et al., 2010). This phenomenon can partly be attributed to faulty mental models (van Boven & Thompson, 2003). Mental models are cognitive representations of causal relationships in a system, allowing people to understand, predict, and resolve problems within that system (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Holyoak, 1984). Experiences and expectations affect these representations, which in turn guide behavior, the organization of thoughts, and the interpretation of information (van Boven & Thompson, 2003). In negotiations, mental models can range from purely fixed-pie, viewing a negotiation as fixed sum (what one party gains the other loses and vice versa) (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), to purely integrative, recognizing opportunities for joint gain (Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). In order to reach optimal agreements, it is important to challenge and overcome faulty mental models and judgement inaccuracies. To achieve this, one has to think and gain knowledge about what is particularly important in a negotiation: One's own interests and those of the other party (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Rubin et al., 1994).

According to Fisher and Ury (1981), each negotiating party is driven by specific needs, desires, concerns and fears. This is what motivates negotiators to enter a negotiation and constitutes the so-called underlying interests each negotiator brings to the table. Interests define the problem; they express *why* negotiators want something. During negotiations, interests lead to the adoption of specific positions regarding the negotiated issues, these positions express *what* negotiators want. This definition of and differentiation between interests and positions are widely accepted and commonly

¹ Large parts of this chapter were published in an article in the British Journal of Social Psychology: Wening, S., Keith, N., & Abele, A. E. (2016). High construal level can help negotiators to reach integrative agreements: The role of information exchange and judgement accuracy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 55, 206-226. In the following, I will liberally use quotations from this article without explicitly marking each quote.

referred to in negotiation research (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Steinel, Abele, & De Dreu, 2007; Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).

A good and often-cited example which vividly illustrates the significance of a focus on interests is the story of the orange and the two sisters (House, 1975): Two sisters argue about who gets the last orange. As neither gives in, they cut it in half. Only then do they realize that one sister needs the peel to bake a cake and the other wants to drink the juice. Had the sisters not focused on their respective positions (wanting the orange) but exchanged their interests – the reason *why* they claimed the orange – during their negotiation, they could have reached 100% of their goal, that is obtained all of the peel or all of the juice, respectively, and not only half of it.

Past research has shown that negotiators who are aware of their own interests and who learn about the other party's interests in the early stages of a negotiation tend to earn higher profits than those who learn about interests during later stages (Steinel et al., 2007; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Also, negotiators who sought or were provided with information about their counterpart's interests made more accurate judgements and reached more integrative agreements (Thompson, 1991). In sum, a focus on interests is key to a mutually beneficial and optimal negotiation outcome. However, it remains unclear what triggers the exchange of information, what kind of information has to be exchanged to gain insight into the other party's underlying interests, and to what extent information exchange can be successfully influenced through an intervention. The present research aims at shedding light on these questions. In particular, we propose that fostering abstract mental representations during negotiations (i.e., a high construal level) promotes a focus on interests and the exchange of information on them, which in turn positively affects negotiation outcomes. Additionally, we argue that the positive effect of activating abstract mental representations may unfold not only in single but in multiple negotiations, and may even facilitate analogical and adaptive transfer of learning. We base these predictions on *Construal-Level Theory* (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007) which assumes varying levels of mental representations. These representations affect the type of information that is focused on in a given situation and thereby differentially influence behaviour. In the

following, we shall describe the basic assumptions of CLT and how this theory can be applied to negotiations and their outcomes.

2.2 Construal-level theory

According to CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope et al., 2007), we can only live in the present. We cannot experience past or future events, other places, other people or alternatives to reality. We have to find a way to represent psychologically distant objects, with psychological distance referring to the ‘subjective experience that something is close or far away from the self, here, and now’ (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p.440). To make plans, to understand other people’s point of view and to integrate their social perspectives into our own, as well as to consider alternative or hypothetical outcomes, we have to form abstract mental representations. The more distant an object or event, meaning the greater the temporal, spatial, hypothetical, or social distance is, the more abstractly we would expect it to be represented. These abstract representations are called high-level construals. They are coherent and superordinate mental representations, focusing on core properties and omitting peripheral qualities. These representations are simpler, less ambiguous and more prototypical than the more concrete or lower level representations.

The varying levels of construal serve to expand and contract one’s mental horizon, meaning that abstract construals help people to see the big picture and not get lost in details – or in metaphorical terms, to see the forest and not get tangled in the trees (Henderson & Trope, 2009). For example, the action ‘going to the gym’ can be construed in more abstract terms, emphasizing the superordinate goal (e.g., ‘exercising’) while simultaneously omitting the information about the location of the workout, or in more concrete terms, emphasizing the subordinate means of the action (e.g., ‘running on a treadmill’, with the treadmill being located in the gym). As mental construals can be more or less abstract, there is a continuum of abstractness. Going to the gym can be construed as ‘exercising’, which is more abstract than ‘running on a treadmill’, but it could also be construed as ‘maintaining a healthy lifestyle’, which is even more abstract than ‘exercising’.

In negotiations, it is important to understand other people's point of view and to consider alternative outcomes and courses of action. In terms of CLT, negotiators' underlying interests constitute the primary, superordinate features. The expressed positions on different negotiation issues, which are derived from these interests, are secondary, subordinate features (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010). CLT predicts that negotiators adopting a high construal level should be more likely to focus on these underlying interests behind their positions – the forest – rather than on the positions themselves – the trees. Consequently, negotiators with high-level construals should be more likely to exchange information regarding their interests, arrive at more accurate judgements by reducing fixed-pie perceptions, and, as a result, reach better integrative outcomes.

2.3 Construal-level theory and negotiation research

To date, only few studies have investigated CLT in the domain of negotiation. Even fewer studies have explicitly tested processes that mediate potential effects of construal level on negotiation outcomes. In one study by Henderson and Trope (2009), participants who construed issues abstractly made more multi-issue offers during the negotiation and gained higher joint profits than subjects who construed issues concretely. This study, to our knowledge, was the first to explore mechanisms linking high construal levels to integrative outcomes. Another study by Giacomantonio, De Dreu, and Mannetti (2010) examined construal level and negotiators' focus on interests versus issues. In the first two experiments, participants were tested individually and no actual negotiation took place. The results indicated that negotiators with high-level construals can better revise their inadequate fixed-pie perceptions than negotiators with low-level construals when provided with information about the counterpart's underlying interests. Negotiators with high-level construals were also more likely to accept offers that were based on the underlying interests, whereas negotiators with low-level construals tended to accept offers that were based on issues. Finally, the third experiment included an actual face-to-face negotiation, although no online processes measures (e.g., communication during negotiations) were assessed. In this experiment,

negotiators with high-level mental representations reached qualitatively better agreements than negotiators with low-level representations when the integrative potential resided in the interests and not the issues, an effect that was mediated by self-reported cooperative problem-solving.

In sum, although previous research generally supports the assumption that abstract mental representations can positively influence negotiation outcomes, we are only beginning to understand why this is the case, that is what the mechanisms are that mediate this effect. We propose that a high construal level increases a focus on interests. We further take an explicitly meditational approach and measure this focus on interests in two different ways: Information exchange and judgement accuracy. As already stated, the exchange of information on interests, not the quarrel over positions, is key to an optimal negotiation outcome because it improves negotiators' judgement accuracy concerning the other party's interests (Thompson, 1991). As such, negotiators' judgement accuracy in a way reflects their degree of focus on interests. In addition, as a high construal level enables negotiators to concentrate on the primary features of a negotiation (i.e., the interests), this enhances the probability of information being exchanged about why certain positions are important to negotiators, which, in turn, leads to better outcomes. Therefore, building on CLT and in line with previous findings, we hypothesize that adopting high-level mental construals during negotiations leads to better negotiation outcomes than low-level mental construals (Hypothesis 1). Aiming at expanding previous findings, we further propose that the effect of construal level on negotiation outcome is mediated by negotiators' focus on interests, as reflected in enhanced information exchange on why negotiators adopted certain positions during negotiations and a higher judgement accuracy about the other party's interests (Hypothesis 2).

Third and last, we further argue that a high construal level can facilitate transfer of learning between negotiations as its positive effect applies to all kinds of negotiation tasks. There are basically two types of transfer of learning that can occur during training or in general: Analogical and adaptive transfer of learning. Analogical transfer involves the application of trained skills to problems encountered before or during training. Transfer tasks are similar to training tasks, meaning the new task can be solved with procedures analogous to those previously learned. In contrast, adaptive transfer, the

transfer of skills to novel problems, implies that new solutions need to be developed to solve the tasks and that procedures are used that have not been taught or encountered yet (Bell & Kozlowski, 2010; Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000; Keith & Wolff, 2015). Resting on CLT, we propose that high-level construals should enhance problem solving by focusing on the underlying interests and seeing the big picture, and consequently facilitate not only the occurrence of analogical transfer of learning between negotiations, but that of adaptive transfer as well (Hypothesis 3).

In addition to these three main hypotheses, our research seeks to add to previous findings in the following respects. First, previous research linking construal levels to negotiations often manipulated construal level with a separate exercise that was unrelated to negotiations (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi, Sligte, & Leder, 2010). We are aware of only two studies (Henderson, 2011; Henderson & Trope, 2009) in which the manipulation task, although separate, was directly related to the actual negotiation. Henderson and Trope (2009) manipulated construal level by letting participants complete a negotiation thought exercise in which they were asked to think more abstractly or concretely about the actual negotiation issues at hand. In his third experiment, Henderson (2011) induced construal level by letting half of the participants think about why they wanted a specific negotiation outcome, thereby shifting participants' focus to their underlying interests, which is important for an optimal negotiation outcome.

While this is an appropriate way of testing the expected effect, in practical applications (e.g., in training of negotiation skills), there is the possibility that the negotiation materials themselves affect construal levels. In particular, while trainers of negotiations skills may be tempted to use lively materials for negotiation exercises in order to render them more realistic and entertaining to participants (i.e., with details on, for example, products and their commercial prizes to negotiate about), such a procedure may be suboptimal from the point of view of CLT. Rather, abstract materials that lack that kind of detail may be better suited to induce high construal levels or, stated differently, the more concrete the negotiation materials are, the more negotiators may get tangled in the trees. As a result, they will focus on concrete but possibly non-essential details of the negotiation task and lose focus on what is important: The exchange of interests.

To account for this possibility, our approach to induce construal levels differed from that of Henderson (2011) and Henderson and Trope (2009) in that we manipulated the negotiation tasks themselves. More specifically, we used abstract versus concrete negotiation materials. In line with CLT, we expected the abstract materials to foster high construal levels and help negotiators to focus on their underlying interests, the primary features of the negotiation. Conversely, we expected concrete materials to foster low construal levels and to shift negotiators' focus to non-essential details surrounding the negotiation and an attention to positions, the secondary features.

Second, our research sought to explore the stability and generality of effects of construal levels. If a longer lasting effect could be demonstrated (i.e., an effect that goes beyond a short time period after manipulation and that transfers to a novel negotiation task) this would constitute even stronger evidence for the role of construal levels during negotiations. Also, from a more practical perspective, many negotiations are not one-shot affairs but entail various encounters between negotiators (Thompson, 2011). Interventions that have the potential to last longer and that are effective across time and multiple tasks may therefore be of particular practical value.

3 Overview of the present research

The following chapter 4 constitutes the empirical part of this thesis and presents four original, separate, but consecutive studies we conducted to examine our hypotheses and our additional assumptions. All four experimental studies had a laboratory setting. For each study, we describe the design and participants, explain the procedure and negotiation tasks as well as the measures we used, report the results, and discuss them in light of our hypotheses and assumptions.

In this chapter we provide an introductory overview on all four studies and for a better and easier understanding, especially for later on, Table 1 provides an overview of the variables we used and the effects we measured across all four empirical studies.

Table 1

Overview of variables used and effects measured across all four studies

Variable / effect	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3	Study 4
<i>Construal level manipulation</i>				
Negotiation task itself	x	x		
Separate exercise			x	x
<i>Number of negotiations</i>				
Single negotiation	x			
Multiple negotiations		x	x	x
<i>Negotiation task format</i>				
Multi-issue matrix	x	x	x	x
Single-issue integrative			x	x
<i>Type of transfer</i>				
Analogical transfer		x		x
Adaptive transfer			x	x
<i>Judgement accuracy measure</i>				
Frequency of information exchange	x			
Blank matrix task		x	x	x
<i>Negotiation outcome</i>				
Joint profit	x	x	x	x

Note: x = applicable

Study 1 aimed at further examining the in previous research found main effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes using a different means of construal level manipulation and demonstrating mediation of this effect by a focus on interests. Participants ($N = 104$, 52 dyads) had to negotiate once either with concrete negotiation

materials or with abstract negotiation materials, inducing construal level through the negotiation task, a multi-issue matrix, itself. We measured focus on interests of the negotiators by counting how often exact values of the respective profit schedules were exchanged (frequency of information exchange) and calculated the joint profits of the dyads as outcome measure.

Study 2 aimed at replicating both the main effect of construal level and the mediation effect using a different operationalization of focus on interests as well as at testing the stability of the effect. So Study 2 ($N = 70$, 35 dyads) required participants to negotiate twice (Task 1 and 2). As in Study 1, construal level was manipulated through Task 1 itself, which was then followed by Task 2. Both negotiation tasks were multi-issue matrixes. In contrast to Study 1, we measured focus on interests by letting participants fill in a so-called blank matrix after each negotiation task, assessing their judgement accuracy of their counterpart's profit schedule (Steinel et al., 2007). As outcome measure we again calculated the dyads' joint profits.

Study 3 was designed to assess transfer of learning between negotiation tasks, thereby looking into adaptive transfer. As in Study 2, participants had to negotiate twice. In Study 3 ($N = 76$, 38 dyads) construal level was now manipulated prior to Task 1 via a separate thought exercise. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, Task 1 was a single-issue, integrative negotiation task, which was followed by a matrix task, allowing the examination of adaptive transfer of learning between them. Judgement accuracy was again measured with the blank matrix task after Task 2 as indicator of focus on interests and the joint profit of each negotiation task served as outcome measure.

Study 4 ($N = 82$, 41 dyads) systematically tested the occurrence of analogical and adaptive transfer of learning between negotiations based on different kinds of negotiation tasks. In total participants had to negotiate three times. As in Study 3, construal level was manipulated before Task 1. Task 1 was the identical single-issue, integrative task we used in Study 3 and the same for all participants. This negotiation task was followed by two matrix tasks with either two integrative issues (analogical transfer) or four issues (adaptive transfer), respectively, resulting in two orders of

negotiation tasks, analogical-adaptive or adaptive-analogical. We assessed judgement accuracy via the blank matrix task and calculated joint profits for all three negotiation tasks.

Chapter 5 summarizes the findings from all four empirical studies and discusses them with regard to our hypotheses as well as to previous research. In addition, it examines theoretical and practical implications of CLT in negotiations and offers directions for future research.

Chapter 6 draws a general conclusion and highlights the contribution of this thesis to current research on CLT and negotiation processes and outcomes.

In short, the present research intends to further examine and substantiate the previously found main effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes (H1), to show that this effect of construal level is mediated by a focus on interests (H2), and to demonstrate that construal level can facilitate analogical as well as adaptive transfer of learning (H3). Moreover, we want to contribute to the current research on construal levels and negotiation outcomes and processes by further examining how construal levels can be induced and how stable they are over time.

4 Empirical Studies

4.1 Study 1: Main effect of construal level and mediation²

4.1.1 Design and Participants

We used a single-factor design with construal level (low vs. high) as independent variable and joint profit as dependent variable. Participants were 104 students (52 same-gender dyads) of two middle-sized German universities (mean age = 23.9 years, $SD = 5.3$ years, 73.1% female) who received course credit if needed. More than half of the participants (57.7%) were majoring in psychology and 95.2% were German native speakers. All dyads were randomly assigned to experimental conditions, resulting in 27 dyads in the high-construal-level condition and 25 dyads in the low-construal-level condition.

4.1.2 Procedure and Negotiation Task

Overview of the procedure

Upon arrival in the laboratory, the two participants were seated at opposite sides of a table. Each participant then received written information and instructions for the negotiation task. These instructions were identical across experimental conditions. Participants were given 5 minutes to individually prepare for the negotiation and up to 15 minutes for negotiating face to face. With the participants' permission, all but one of the negotiations were audio-recorded for further analysis. Once participants reached an agreement, they wrote it down using a prepared agreement form and handed it over to the experimenter. Afterwards, participants completed a questionnaire containing

² Study 1 was part of an article in the *British Journal of Social Psychology*: Wening, S., Keith, N., & Abele, A. E. (2016). High construal level can help negotiators to reach integrative agreements: The role of information exchange and judgement accuracy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 55, 206-226. In the following, I will liberally use quotations from this article without explicitly marking each quote.

demographic data. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked for their cooperation, and dismissed.

Negotiation task

The negotiation task (see Appendix A) was a self-developed matrix task similar to those commonly used in negotiation studies (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Henderson & Trope, 2009; Steinel et al., 2007; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Participants were asked to reach an agreement on five negotiation issues and were told to each gain as many points as possible, that is to maximize their own profit. Each issue comprised five options. This so-called profit schedule provided information about the value of the various options (expressed in points) within each issue for oneself, but not about the value of the same options for the counterpart. The profit schedules were devised such that there was one issue where both parties had the same preferences (compatible issue; issue 2, max. 3,500 points), two issues where the parties' preferences were diametrically opposed (distributive issues; issues 1 and 4, max. 1,500 points) and two issues with integrative potential, meaning one issue was very valuable for one participant and less valuable for the other one, and vice versa (integrative issues; issues 3 and 5, max. 3,500 points and 1,000 points, respectively).

Participants' individual profits had a potential range from 2,800 to 11,000 points. A compromise on all five options (always choosing option C) awarded each participant 5,400 points. Participants could gain the most (i.e., joint benefit of 9,000 points) if they identified the integrative issues as well as the compatible issue and compromised on the distributive issues (see Appendix A). Participants' underlying interests were, together with the instruction to maximize gains, hence specified by the pay-off structure of the matrix and could be deduced from it. The issues for which the most points (in our case 3,500) could be gained were negotiators' most important concerns. A similar approach to operationalize interests has been taken in many other negotiation studies (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Steinel et al., 2007; Thompson, 1991; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).

Manipulation of construal level

To manipulate construal level, we used either abstract or concrete negotiation materials; that is, we manipulated the profit schedules themselves (cf. Appendix A). In the *low-construal-level* condition, participants were asked to negotiate about the buying/selling of notepads (called EasyPads) and were randomly assigned to a negotiation role (buyer or seller), accompanied by some background information concerning the negotiating parties. The profit schedule comprised the five issues discount, quantity, delivery date, assortment, and date of payment. As stated above, each issue comprised five options. For example, on issue 1 (i.e., discount) negotiators could agree on a 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20% discount, which awarded them 300, 600, 900, 1,200, or 1,500 points (or vice versa, see Appendix A). All negotiation issues and options had concrete labels, providing participants with a good deal of information, some of which was essential to the negotiation task (i.e., the points to be earned for each option) and some of which were non-essential (i.e., the buyer/seller role, the labels of the issues). Thus, in terms of CLT, the profit schedules of the low-construal-level condition ‘include[ed] the concrete and contextualized aspects’ of the object of negotiation (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 455), potentially drawing participants' focus on the secondary features in the negotiation, the positions on issues.

In the *high-construal-level* condition, participants were not given a product to negotiate about. Instead, they were asked to negotiate about unspecified issues (issue 1, issue 2, etc.) where the options equalled the points that could be gained (see Appendix A). No roles were assigned here, and there was no background information concerning the negotiating parties. All negotiation issues and options had abstract labels, providing participants with only a minimum of information all of which was essential to the negotiation task. Thus, in terms of CLT, the profit schedules of the high-construal-level condition were ‘retaining central features and omitting features that by the very act of abstraction are deemed incidental’ (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 441), drawing participants' focus on the primary features in the negotiation, the interests. Apart from this framing, both the matrix structure (i.e. negotiators' preferences on the different issues) and the values of the various options were identical in both conditions.

Concerning the communication during the negotiation task, participants of both experimental conditions received exactly the same instructions. They were allowed to

verbally share any information they wished to, but were not allowed to show their profit schedule to their counterpart.

4.1.3 Manipulation Check

To test whether the abstract and the concrete matrices (profit schedules) affected participants' construal level in the intended way, we conducted an independent pilot study with 37 university students (mean age = 22.0 years, $SD = 2.3$ years, 43.2% female), who received exactly the same materials as in Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to either the low-construal-level condition (concrete matrix) or the high-construal-level condition (abstract matrix). We expected participants who received the abstract matrix to form more superordinate, higher level construals than participants receiving the concrete matrix.

Participants were asked to familiarize themselves with the negotiation task and to prepare themselves as if they actually had to negotiate afterwards. Then, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated association exercise. This exercise was an adapted version of the well-established category versus exemplar task first introduced by Fujita, Trope, Liberman, and Levin-Sagi (2006), which has since been commonly used in research to manipulate construal levels (cf. Alter, Oppenheimer, & Zemla, 2010; Crea, Liberman, Trope, & Sherman, 2008; Fujita & Han, 2009; Henderson, 2013; Rim, Uleman, & Trope, 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). In this category versus exemplar task, participants are usually provided with a list of 40 objects and asked to generate either a superordinate category for each object (high-level condition) or a subordinate example for each object (low-level condition). By doing so, participants are expected to adopt a high or a low construal level. Our modified version of the task was designed to measure construal level by presenting participants with the same list of 40 objects and asking them to freely generate either a superordinate category or a subordinate example for each object (see Appendix A).

In line with our expectations, participants in the high-construal-level condition generated more superordinate associations ($M = 17.11$, $SD = 7.51$) than participants in the low-construal-level condition ($M = 12.11$, $SD = 7.87$), $t(35) = -1.98$, $p = .028$, $d = 0.65$. This result shows that the abstract and concrete matrices used in Study 1 can in fact influence mental representations and are suited for eliciting a high or a low construal level during negotiation.

4.1.4 Measures

Dependent variable

Our dependent variable was the joint profit of a dyad, which we computed by counting the total number of points an agreement yielded to each participant of a dyad and summing them up.

Mediator variable

In Study 1, we used a process measure to assess how strongly participants focused on interests during the negotiation. Based on participants' communication during the negotiation, we used the frequency of information exchange concerning the profit schedules as indicator of focus on interests. We chose this mediator variable because the exchange of information on points reflects why negotiators prefer one outcome over another and helps the parties to understand the other's concerns. For this purpose, we transcribed the audio recordings of the negotiations and two raters independently counted for each dyad how often participants directly stated exact values of their profit schedule. For example, the exchange 'I want 1 A.' – 'Why, how much do you get?' – '1,500.' – 'Oh, I only get 300.' was coded as two instances of information exchange because two values of the profit schedule (i.e., 1,500 and 300) were being exchanged. The inter-rater reliability regarding the analysis of the transcripts was excellent ($ICC = 1.00$).

Control variables

As potential control variables, we assessed dyad gender (female vs. male dyad) and participants' first language. Dyad gender was included because meta-analyses (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) have shown men to reach better outcomes than women, and we wanted to ensure that no such effect was present in our data. First language was assessed because of the rather complex negotiation materials which could have been misunderstood by non-native speakers, affecting the results. To arrive at a dyad-level dichotomous variable, we coded 0 for dyads that included at least one non-native speaker and 1 for dyads that consisted of two native speakers (different coding methods for this variable did not alter results). As described in the Results section, the controls affected neither dependent variables nor mediators and were therefore not included in the final analyses.

Statistical analyses

We used 5% significance levels for all analyses across the four studies. For directional hypotheses, we used one-tailed testing. With regard to hypothesized mediation models, we followed recommendations to use 90% confidence intervals because these are equivalent to one-tailed hypothesis tests at the 5% level of significance (Hayes, 2018).

4.1.5 Results

Preliminary analyses

Intercorrelations are shown in Table 2. No significant correlations between the control variables and construal level or joint profit, respectively, emerged. We ran all analyses with and without the control variables. As the main results were the same, we only report results of analyses without controls in the following.

All dyads finished the negotiation within the given time frame. On average, participants needed 6 min 45 s ($SD = 2$ min 57 s) to reach an agreement. A one-way ANOVA showed that negotiation time did not differ between the two conditions, $F(1,50) < 1$, *ns*. Overall, dyads reached a joint profit of 16,265 points ($SD = 1,624$ points).

Table 2

Intercorrelations of variables in Study 1

	1	2	3	4
1 Construal level	-			
2 Joint profit	.31*	-		
3 Frequency information exchange	.53**	.46**	-	
4 Gender	.02	-.21	.02	-
5 First language	.01	.21	.15	-.18

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, $N = 52$ dyads, construal level: low = 0, high = 1; gender: male dyad = 0, female dyad = 1; first language: no native speaker/one native speaker = 0, two native speakers = 1.

Negotiation outcome (main effect)

At first, we tested whether the assigned role in the low-construal-level condition (i.e., seller or buyer) had an influence on single profits. Sellers had an average individual profit of 7,904 points ($SD = 988$), buyers averaged 7,840 points ($SD = 1133$), $F(1,48) < 1$, *ns*. We hence collapsed the data across role. As negotiation processes and outcomes are interdependent, we used dyads as unit of analysis.

Hypothesis 1 stated that a high construal level positively affects negotiation outcomes. The results supported this assumption. Dyads in the high-construal-level condition ($M = 16,748$ points, $SD = 1,471$) reached higher joint profits than dyads in the low-construal-level condition ($M = 15,744$ points, $SD = 1,647$). A one-way ANOVA indicated that this difference was statistically significant, $F(1,50) = 5.39$, $p = .024$, $d = 0.64$. Considering the number of dyads who reached the maximum joint outcome of 18,000 points (which, as described above, required that the dyads recognized the integrative issues) further demonstrates the influence of construal level: Whereas of the 27 dyads in the high-construal-level condition, 14 (52%) reached the maximum, in the low-construal-level condition, only 4 of the 25 (16%) dyads did.

Information exchange (mediation effect)

We expected the effect of construal level on negotiation outcome to be mediated by negotiators' focus on interests, operationalized in this study as the frequency of information exchange concerning the profit schedules during negotiation (Hypothesis 2). Consistent with this assumption, in the low-construal-level condition, none of the dyads exchanged specific values, whereas in the high-construal-level condition, 61.5%

of the dyads did (on average, an exact value of their profit schedule was exchanged 16.85 times in dyads, $SD = 19.19$). This difference between conditions was statistically significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 51) = 22.42, p < .001, \Phi = 0.66$.

To test whether this difference in information exchange explains the higher joint profits in the high-construal-level condition, we conducted a simple mediation analysis using the bootstrapping procedure PROCESS described by Hayes (2018). Bootstrapping is a resampling technique to estimate effect sizes and confidence intervals and to test mediation hypotheses. The method uses the sample data as a population from which repeated samples are drawn, resulting in a sample distribution. Bootstrapping is a nonparametric approach that has been suggested as a means to circumvent power problems in mediation analyses and that can be applied to small samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The indirect effect is significant and a mediation effect is present when the confidence interval for the indirect effect does not include zero.

We used the bootstrapping method with 5,000 resamples to estimate 90% confidence intervals (equivalent to one-tailed testing at the 5% level of significance; Hayes, 2018) for the indirect effect. Table 3 displays the results for the simple mediation model. As expected and in line with previous analyses, dyads with a high construal level reached higher joint profits than those with a low construal level ($c = 956.00, p = .017$) and they exchanged information more frequently ($a = 16.85, p < .001$). Also, dyads that exchanged information more frequently reached higher joint profits ($b = 42.78, p = .004$). The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 720.72$) did not include zero (398.83 to 1,094.88). There was no evidence that construal level influenced joint profit independently of its effect via frequency of information exchange ($c' = 235.28, p = .31$). Thus, the number of times dyads exchanged specific information on specific values of their profit schedules, as an indicator of a focus on interests, mediated the effect of construal level on joint profit.

Table 3
Model coefficients for simple mediation in Study 1

Predictor		Criterion						
		Frequency information exchange (mediator)			Joint profit (outcome)			
		Coeff.	SE	p		Coeff.	SE	p
Construal level	a	16.85	3.84	< .001	c'	235.28	484.07	.31
Frequency information exchange		--	--	--	b	42.78	15.26	< .01
Constant	i ₁	0.00	2.74	.50	i ₂	15,744.00	292.87	< .001
		$R^2 = 0.28$				$R^2 = 0.22$		
		$F(1, 49) = 19.24, p < .001$				$F(2, 48) = 6.65, p < .01$		

Note. $N = 51$ dyads. Unstandardized regression coefficients and one-tailed p-values are reported.

Bootstrap sample size = 5,000.

It could be possible that the number of multi-issue offers made during negotiations (cf. Henderson & Trope, 2009) may be an alternative or more specific mediator than our general measure of information exchange. To test for this possibility, we coded all transcripts for single ($ICC = .95$) and multiple issue offers ($ICC = .98$) and computed a multiple issue offer index according to Henderson and Trope. This index of multiple issue offers did not differ between conditions (low construal level: $M = 0.37, SD = 0.11$; high construal level: $M = 0.28, SD = 0.26$), $F(1,49) = 2.06, p = .157$, and, consequently, the multiple issue offer index did not mediate the effect of construal level on joint outcome. We still ran a parallel multiple mediation analysis with both the multiple offer index and information exchange as mediators. Information exchange remained the only significant mediator. We therefore conclude that the number of multiple issue offers can be excluded as an alternate mediator underlying our findings.

4.1.6 Discussion

As expected, adopting a high construal level during negotiation led to better, more integrative outcomes than adopting a low construal level. The results also extend previous findings by shedding light on the underlying processes that are triggered by a

high construal level. Participants with a high construal level exchanged more information on their profit schedules, which indicates that they had a stronger focus on each other's interests than participants with a low construal level. Such a focus on interests has been proposed to be key to an optimal negotiation outcome (Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Our results are in support of this proposition.

4.2 Study 2: Mediation effect revisited and stability over time³

Study 2 differed from Study 1 in two important respects. First, to cross-validate the mediation effect, we used a different operationalization of focus on interests. With regard to the mediator used in Study 1 (i.e., exchange of information on values in profit schedules), a noteworthy result was that although all participants were explicitly allowed to verbally share any information they wished to during negotiations, none of the dyads in the low-construal-level condition made use of the possibility to talk about their values in the profit schedules. In contrast, more than half of the dyads in the high-construal-level condition did and the extent to which they did explained differences in negotiation outcomes (i.e., mediation effect). While this is clearly a non-trivial finding, cross-validation using a measure of focus on interests that yields non-zero variance in both experimental conditions would be desirable. In Study 2, therefore, we used a different measure as indicator of a focus on underlying interests. More specifically, we measured judgement accuracy regarding the values of the profit schedule of one's counterpart as indicator of focus on interests (cf. Steinel et al., 2007). A high judgement accuracy indicates knowledge about the counterpart's most important concerns and is relevant to understand why the other party prefers a specific outcome. We expected this judgement accuracy to be different from zero in both experimental conditions but higher in the high-construal-level condition. We further expected the differences in this variable to explain the main effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes (i.e., mediation).

Second, in Study 1, participants in the high-construal-level condition were only presented with a minimum of information (i.e., the profit schedules), presumably shifting their attention to information essential for the negotiation task. Participants of the low-construal-level condition, in contrast, received both essential (i.e., the same profit schedule as in the high-construal-level condition) and non-essential information (e.g., the buyer/seller role, the labels in the profit schedule). It is possible that not construal level per se but this shift of attention to specific values in the profit schedule –

³ Study 2 was part of an article in the *British Journal of Social Psychology*: Wening, S., Keith, N., & Abele, A. E. (2016). High construal level can help negotiators to reach integrative agreements: The role of information exchange and judgement accuracy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 55, 206-226. In the following, I will liberally use quotations from this article without explicitly marking each quote.

that was somewhat facilitated in the high but not or to a lesser extent in the low-construal-level condition – benefitted negotiation outcomes. Our pilot study showing effects of our negotiation material on construal levels as well as the fact that not all dyads in the high-construal-level condition exchanged specific values, provide circumstantial evidence contrary to this possibility, but do not rule it out entirely. To account for this possibility, we included a second, content-based negotiation task with concrete materials (i.e., essential and non-essential information) in both conditions. For this purpose, dyads were asked to negotiate twice.

4.2.1 Design and Participants

We used a single-factor design as in Study 1 with construal level (low vs. high) as between-subjects factor and joint profit as dependent variable. Seventy students of a middle-sized German university voluntarily participated in the experiment (mean age = 25.3 years, $SD = 5.1$ years, 68.6% female) and received course credit if needed. Most of the students (74.0%) were majoring in psychology and 88.6% were German native speakers. We ensured that none of the students had taken part in a negotiation study before. The 35 dyads (25 same-gender and 10 mixed-gender) were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions, resulting in 18 dyads in the high-construal-level condition and 17 dyads in the low-construal-level condition.

4.2.2 Procedure and Negotiation Tasks

Overview of the procedure

The general procedure was the same as in Study 1, with the exception that subjects negotiated twice. Task 2 thereby was more difficult than Task 1 as it included more issues to negotiate about. Subjects arrived in pairs at the laboratory, were seated opposite each other and received the written information for Task 1, which, as in Study 1, also served as the manipulation of construal level. Subjects then had 5 minutes to prepare themselves and 15 minutes to negotiate an agreement. Consistent with Study 1,

participants were allowed to verbally exchange any information they wished to. From this point on the procedure differed from Study 1. After the completion of Task 1, we assessed participants' focus on interests with a measure of judgement accuracy of the negotiation partner's profit schedule. Subsequently, participants received the written information for Task 2, the more challenging negotiation task. Participants again had 5 minutes to prepare and 15 minutes to negotiate. After Task 2, judgement accuracy as indicator of focus on interests was measured again. Subjects then filled in a questionnaire comprising negotiator beliefs, acquaintance with the respective partner, and demographic data. Participants were thanked, received course credit if needed, debriefed, and dismissed.

Negotiation tasks and manipulation of construal level

Task 1, that is the abstract and the concrete matrices, again served as construal level manipulation and was the same one as employed in Study 1. We only changed the content of the negotiation in the low-construal-level condition to ensure that negotiation outcomes were only dependent on the abstractness of the matrices and not the negotiated subject. We exchanged the buying of notepads (from Study 1) with the buying of a car and a kitchen, respectively, and counterbalanced the negotiation content between dyads. Half of the low-construal-level dyads negotiated about the car, the other half about the kitchen. In Task 2, subjects in the low-construal-level condition who had first negotiated about the car now negotiated about the kitchen and vice versa. Participants in the high-construal-level condition (who, by experimental condition, negotiated without a concrete content in Task 1) either negotiated about the car or the kitchen in Task 2 (random assignment). In the low-construal-level condition, the roles of seller and buyer were randomly assigned in Task 1 and reversed in Task 2. In the high-construal-level condition, the roles of seller and buyer were randomly assigned in Task 2.

The additional Task 2 was adopted from Harinck and De Dreu (2008) (see Appendix B). It was the same for all participants and more difficult than Task 1 because it comprised more negotiation issues. Participants had to reach an agreement on eight instead of five issues (warranty, colour, delivery date, price, number of extras, audio/electric equipment, date of payment, and waste removal) with five options each.

The values of the various options also differed from those of Task 1. For example, this time there were issues where one could get zero points. The matrix included one compatible issue (issue 2), three distributive issues (issues 4, 7, and 8), and four integrative issues (issues 1 and 3, and issues 5 and 6, respectively). The potential individual profits ranged from 0 to 21,200 points, the compromise solution (choosing C on every issue) earned each negotiator 10,600 points, and the integrative solution yielded 13,600 points for each negotiator. The potential joint profit ranged from 20,000 to 27,200 points, and the maximum was only attainable if the integrative potentials were discovered and trade-offs made.

4.2.3 Measures

Dependent variable

As in Study 1, the dependent variable was joint profit which we computed for both negotiation tasks.

Mediator variable

In this study, we assessed subjects' focus on interests during the negotiation by directly asking them after each negotiation task to indicate what their counterpart's profit schedule looked like. For this purpose, we used the so-called blank matrix task. This task is often used to determine subjects' knowledge of their counterpart's interests (i.e., judgement accuracy) and has been deemed to be a measure of fixed-pie perceptions (cf. Steinel et al., 2007; Thompson, 1990, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1991). After both negotiation tasks, participants were presented with a blank matrix containing only the negotiated issues and options but no values. Participants then had to indicate what they thought their counterpart's profit schedule looked like by filling in the missing values. To facilitate the task, participants were allowed to refer to their own matrices. Judgement accuracy was computed by calculating the differences between the actual and estimated values of the integrative issues (for the exact calculation method, see Steinel et al., 2007; or Thompson, 1990). The resulting measure can vary from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a low judgement accuracy that is reflective of a very limited insight

into the other party's interests, and 1 indicating a perfect judgement accuracy that is reflective of a very good understanding of the other party's interests. As negotiations can be viewed as disjunctive tasks (Steiner, 1972) whose outcomes are influenced by the negotiator with the better understanding of the task and its underlying interests, all following analyses are based on the highest judgement accuracy score attained within a dyad (cf. Steinel et al., 2007).

Control variables

In addition to dyad gender and dyad's first language, we assessed participants' attitude towards the malleability of negotiation skills using the Implicit Negotiation Beliefs Scale (INBS; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007) because implicit beliefs have been shown to influence negotiation outcomes (Wong, Haselhuhn, & Kray, 2012). The seven items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*very strongly agree*) to 7 (*very strongly disagree*). Examples are "In negotiations, experience is a great teacher" and "Good negotiators are born that way" (reverse scored). An overall higher score reflects an implicit belief that negotiation skills are malleable through experience rather than being a fixed ability. To create a score on the level of the dyad, we aggregated the individual mean scores for each dyad. To ensure that personal relations between participants did not influence the negotiation outcomes, we asked participants to indicate whether they knew their respective counterpart prior to the negotiation or not. As described in the Results section, including control variables did not alter results.

4.2.4 Results

Preliminary analyses

All dyads finished both negotiation tasks within the allotted time. In Task 1, dyads reached an overall joint profit of 15,731 points ($SD = 1,849$ points); in Task 2 a joint profit of 23,634 points ($SD = 2,485$ points). Intercorrelations are shown in Table 4. While the control variables did not correlate with the experimental condition, some of them (in particular gender and first language) significantly correlated with some outcome and mediator variables. We therefore ran all analyses with and without these

control variables. As the main results were the same, we only report results of analyses without controls in the following.

Table 4
Intercorrelations of variables in Study 2

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Construal level	-							
2 Joint profit Task 1	.41*	-						
3 Joint profit Task 2	.38*	.29	-					
4 Judgement accuracy Task 1	.61**	.46**	.53**	-				
5 Judgement accuracy Task 2	.55**	.48**	.40*	.77**	-			
6 Gender	.20	.20	.55**	.41*	.19	-		
7 First language	.17	.44**	.23	.32	.32	.11	-	
8 Acquaintance	.33	-.04	.10	.02	.09	-.12	.02	-
9 INBS	.14	.16	.25	.36	.32	.07	.05	-.29

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, $N = 35$ dyads; construal level: low = 0, high = 1; gender: female dyad = 0, male-female/male-male dyad = 1; first language: no native speaker/one native speaker = 0, two native speakers = 1; acquaintance no = 0, yes = 1; INBS = Implicit Negotiation Beliefs Scale.

Negotiation outcomes (main effects)

First, we tested whether the assigned roles of buyer/seller had any influence on the individual outcomes of the two negotiation tasks. This was not the case, $F(1,32) = 3.27$, *ns*, for Task 1 and $F(1,68) = 1.37$, *ns*, for Task 2. Next, we tested whether the content of the negotiation task (buying of a car vs. buying of a kitchen) influenced the joint profits. Neither in Task 1, $F(1,15) < 1$, *ns*, nor in Task 2, $F(1,33) < 1$, *ns*, did the content influence the outcome. We therefore collapsed data across role and content and, as in Study 1, used the dyads as unit of analysis.

Hypothesis 1 stated that a high construal level positively affects negotiation outcomes. We further proposed this effect to be stable over time and to apply to a subsequent negotiation. The results supported both assumptions, as joint profit was higher for dyads of the high-construal-level condition in both Task 1 and Task 2. In Task 1, dyads in the high-construal-level condition reached an average of 16,450 points ($SD = 1,733$), whereas dyads in the low-construal-level condition reached an average of 14,971 points ($SD = 1,697$), $F(1,33) = 6.50$, $p = .016$, $d = 0.86$. In Task 2, dyads in the high-construal-level condition reached an average of 24,544 points ($SD = 2,901$), whereas dyads in the

low-construal-level condition reached an average of 22,671 points ($SD = 1,503$), $F(1,33) = 5.65$, $p = .023$, $d = 0.81$ (note that effect sizes were even larger than in Study 1). Thus, the main effect of construal level on negotiation outcome found in Study 1 was replicated in Task 1 and it was also present for Task 2 (Hypothesis 1).

Focus on interests (mediation effect)

We expected the effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes to be mediated by negotiators' focus on interests, operationalized in this study by the judgement accuracy of the counterpart's profit schedule (Hypothesis 2). Participants with a high construal level reached a higher judgement accuracy in Task 1 ($M = 0.74$, $SD = 0.41$) than dyads in the low-construal-level condition ($M = 0.18$, $SD = 0.32$), $F(1,33) = 19.75$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.46$, with a large effect size. The same pattern emerged for Task 2 ($M_{\text{high}} = 0.66$, $SD_{\text{high}} = 0.43$, $M_{\text{low}} = 0.20$, $SD_{\text{low}} = 0.26$, $F(1,33) = 14.34$, $p = .001$, $d = 1.29$). Dyads with a high construal level were significantly more aware of their counterparts' profit schedules than dyads with a low construal level.

To test whether this difference in judgement accuracy explains the higher joint profits in the high-construal-level condition, we used the same technique of simple mediation analysis as in Study 1. For Task 1, as expected and in line with previous analyses, dyads with a high construal level outperformed those with a low construal level ($c = 1,479.41$, $p = .008$) and reached a higher judgement accuracy ($a = 0.55$, $p < .001$). Also, dyads with a good judgement accuracy reached higher joint profits ($b = 1,381.63$, $p = .044$). The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 764.23$) did not include zero (103.98 to 1,742.90). There was no evidence that construal level influenced joint profit independently of its effect on judgement accuracy ($c' = 715.18$, $p = .16$). Thus, the judgement accuracy acquired during Task 1 mediated the effect of construal level on joint profit of Task 1 supporting Hypothesis 2 and replicating the findings from Study 1.

For Task 2, as expected and in line with previous analyses, construal level predicted joint profit ($c = 1,873.86$, $p = .012$) and judgement accuracy ($a = .46$, $p = .003$). Against expectations, judgement accuracy did not predict joint outcome at the 5% level of significance ($b = 1625.67$, $p = .075$). Consistent with this result, the bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 749.88$) included zero (-86.94

to 2,271.99). Accordingly, the indirect effect of construal level on joint profit through judgement accuracy reached statistical significance only at the 10% level even though it was in the predicted direction. In sum, the mediation effect found in Study 1 was replicated in Study 2 for Task 1 but not quite for Task 2.

In a last step, we tested whether the effect of construal level on negotiation outcome in Task 2 was mediated by focus on interests in Task 1. As already stated, dyads with a high construal level were significantly more aware of their counterpart's profit schedule during Task 1.

The results of the simple mediation analysis are shown in Table 5. In line with previous results, dyads with a high construal level reached higher joint profits in Task 2 than those with a low construal level ($c = 1,873.86, p = .012$) and had a higher judgement accuracy in Task 1 ($a = 0.55, p < .001$). Dyads with higher judgement accuracy in Task 1 also reached higher joint profits in Task 2 ($b = 2,603.70, p = .008$). The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect ($ab = 1,440.20$) did not include zero (606.63 to 3,277.27). There was no evidence that construal level influenced joint profit in Task 2 independently of its effect on judgement accuracy in Task 1 ($c' = 433.65, p = .32$). Thus, the improved information processing during Task 1 (resulting in a higher judgement accuracy) mediated the effect of construal level on joint profit in Task 2.

Table 5

Model coefficients for simple mediation between negotiations in Study 2

Predictor		Criterion						
		Judgement accuracy Task 1 (mediator)			Joint profit Task 2 (outcome)			
		Coeff.	SE	p	Coeff.	SE	p	
Construal level	a	.55	.12	< .001	c'	433.65	922.57	.32
Judgement accuracy Task 1		--	--	--	b	2,603.70	1,020.58	< .01
Constant	i ₁	.18	.12	.02	i ₂	22,192.73	555.80	< .001
		$R^2 = .37$			$R^2 = .29$			
		$F(1, 33) = 19.75, p < .001$			$F(2, 32) = 6.55, p < .01$			

Note. $N = 35$ dyads. Unstandardized regression coefficients and one-tailed p-values are reported.

Bootstrap sample size = 5,000.

As reported, we used the highest judgement accuracy score within a dyad as mediator. For completeness, we also calculated the correlations between partners' accuracy scores. They were $r = .74$, $p < .001$, for Task 1, and $r = .76$, $p < .001$, for Task 2. Further, we reran analyses using the dyads' average accuracy score (this measure correlated highly with the dyads' highest accuracy score, $.95$, $p < .001$, and $.94$, $p < .001$, respectively). Results were the same with the exception that for Task 1, the accuracy score did not quite predict joint outcome ($p = .064$, as opposed to $p = .044$ using the dyads' highest accuracy scores). As a result, the respective indirect effect was also non-significant (i.e., confidence interval included zero).

4.2.5 Discussion

Negotiators with a high construal level outperformed those with a low construal level in both negotiation tasks due to a stronger focus on interests, as indicated by a higher judgement accuracy. This is in accordance with the results of Study 1 and further emphasizes the positive influence of a high construal level on negotiation processes and outcomes. In addition, we found evidence for a lasting effect of construal level manipulations. The impact of the high-construal-level manipulation on negotiation outcome was not only present during Task 1 but also during Task 2.

In summary, Study 1 and Study 2 both support our main hypotheses (H1 and H2). On top, Study 2 provides evidence for our assumption that the effect of construal level can be stable over time.

4.3 Study 3: Transfer of learning

So far, Studies 1 and 2 have demonstrated a positive effect of a high construal level on negotiation outcomes, which is mediated by a focus on underlying interests, supporting our hypotheses H1 and H2. Moreover, Study 2 shows that the effect of construal level is stable over time and may even indicate a transfer of learning effect. In Study 2, both negotiation tasks were similar matrix tasks, highly identical in structure and appearance. They can be regarded as analogous problems. Solving Task 2 in Study 2 therefore required analogical or near transfer of learning. Analogical transfer involves the application of trained skills to problems encountered before or during training. Transfer tasks are similar to training tasks, meaning the new task can be solved with procedures analogous to those previously learned. In contrast, adaptive transfer, the transfer of skills to novel problems, implies that new solutions need to be developed to solve the tasks and that procedures are used that have not been taught or encountered yet (Bell & Kozlowski, 2010; Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000; Keith & Wolff, 2015). Resting on CLT and our previous findings, high-level construals should enhance problem solving by focusing on the underlying interests and seeing the big picture, regardless of the kind of exercise or task format, and consequently facilitate the occurrence of analogical as well as adaptive transfer of learning between negotiation tasks. Based on this assumption we hypothesize that a high construal level not only enables analogical transfer of learning between negotiations, but adaptive transfer as well (H3). As Study 2 seems to provide initial evidence for analogical transfer of learning, we wanted to examine a possible adaptive transfer of learning effect in Study 3. Therefore, we included a second negotiation task in Study 3 that allowed for adaptive transfer.

Apart from testing for adaptive transfer of learning, Study 3 differed in two additional aspects from Studies 1 and 2. First, as pointed out after Study 1, participants in the high-construal-level condition were only presented with a minimum of information in Study 1 and also during Task 1 of Study 2. This could have shifted their attention to information essential for the negotiation task, in particular the specific values in the profit schedule. Participants in the low-construal-level condition, in contrast, received both essential (i.e., the same profit schedule as in the high-construal-level condition)

and non-essential information (e.g., the buyer/seller role, the labels in the profit schedule). It is possible that not construal level per se but this shift of attention to the specific values – that was somewhat facilitated in the high but not or to a lesser extent in the low-construal-level condition – benefitted negotiation outcomes. Our pilot study already indicated that it is our negotiation material itself that affects the level of mental construal. Study 2 provided additional support for this assumption, as the effect of construal level transferred to a second negotiation task which contained essential and non-essential information for all participants regardless of construal level condition.

To rule out the possibility of an attention shift even further, we decided to only use concrete negotiation materials and manipulate construal level independently of the negotiation tasks in Study 3, thereby adopting the standard approach to testing the effects of construal level manipulation in construal level research. Moreover, using concrete negotiation materials makes the negotiation much more realistic and representative of everyday negotiations, where there is always some kind of context involved.

Second, because Studies 1 and 2 did not include a manipulation check for construal level as such (we relied on the results of our pilot study), we made sure there was one included in Study 3.

4.3.1 Design and Participants

Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, we used a single-factor design with construal level (low vs. high) as between-subjects factor and joint profits as dependent variables. Seventy-six students of the same middle-sized German university as in Study 2 voluntarily participated in the experiment (mean age = 22.4 years, $SD = 3.65$ years, 51.3% female). Participants received course credit if needed. Almost half of the students were majoring in psychology (43.4%), the remaining students were majoring in fields like civil engineering, social sciences or biology. Almost all participants (96.1%) were German native speakers. As before, we made sure that none of the students had taken part in any previous negotiation study. The 38 dyads (23 same-gender and 15 mixed-

gender) were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions, resulting in 19 dyads each in the high and the low-construal-level condition.

4.3.2 Procedure and Negotiation Tasks

Overview of the procedure

The general procedure was very similar to that of Study 2, with two exceptions. First, this time we manipulated construal level prior to Task 1, using a thought exercise developed by Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope (2004), which is well established in construal level research. Second, we exchanged the first matrix negotiation task for an integrative, single-issue task to assess adaptive transfer.

Subjects arrived in pairs at the laboratory, were seated opposite each other and received instructions for the construal level manipulation, which ostensibly helped them to focus their minds during the subsequent negotiation tasks. The thought exercise was followed by an additional manipulation check. Subjects then received the written information for Task 1, had 5 minutes to prepare themselves and 15 minutes to negotiate an agreement. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, participants were allowed to verbally exchange any information they wished to. After Task 1, subjects filled in a short questionnaire and were given the written information for Task 2. Again, participants had 5 minutes to prepare and 15 minutes to negotiate. After Task 2, judgement accuracy was measured using the blank matrix task already used in Study 2. Subjects then filled in another questionnaire comprising satisfaction with the negotiated outcome, negotiation behaviour, negotiator beliefs, conflict management, acquaintance with the respective partner, and demographic data. Participants were thanked, received course credit if needed, debriefed, and dismissed.

Manipulation of construal level

Based on random assignment, both participants of a dyad individually completed either an increasingly abstract or increasingly concrete thought exercise to manipulate a high or a low construal level, respectively (see Appendix C). This mindset manipulation has been introduced by Freitas et al. (2004) and has since been successfully applied in

various research to induce high or low construal levels (Agrawal & Wan, 2009; Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita & Roberts, 2010; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Gong & Medin, 2012; Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Participants were told that the thought exercise would help focus their minds during the subsequent negotiation tasks. In the high-construal-level condition, the exercise was introduced by a written passage explaining that for everything we do, there is a reason *why* we do it. In the low-construal-level condition, the passage explained that for everything we do, there is a process of *how* we do it. Both passages equaled those used by Freitas et al. (2004). After reading the passage, participants in the high-construal-level condition had to think about *why* improving and maintaining their health is important by completing a corresponding diagram (see Figure 1). By thinking more and more abstractly, that is about superordinate goals, psychological distance is increased and participants should adopt a high construal level. Participants in the low-construal-level condition had to think about *how* they could improve and maintain their health. By thinking more and more concretely, that is about subordinate means, psychological distance is decreased and participants are likely to adopt a low construal level.

When using this thought exercise in construal level research, most often a simple check whether participants filled in the boxes correctly and thus were thinking more and more abstractly or concretely, is viewed as manipulation check for construal level and no further measures are applied (e.g., Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Fessel, 2011; Freitas et al., 2004; Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita & Roberts, 2010; Fujita et al., 2006; Gong & Medin, 2012; Henderson, 2013; Kanten, 2011; Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & Sherman, 2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). However, to be on the safe side, we decided to include an additional manipulation check within the study itself.




Figure 1. Thought exercise for manipulation of construal level used in Study 3, directing participants to think increasingly abstractly (left) or concretely (right).

So, after completion of the exercise, participants filled in the Behavior Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), which served as separate manipulation check. The BIF is a list of 25 behaviours, where each behaviour is followed by two descriptions the subjects have to choose from. One description is always an abstract representation of the behaviour (higher level), the other a concrete representation (lower level). For example, for the behaviour ‘*Making a list*’ subjects can choose between ‘*Writing things down*’ (lower level) and ‘*Getting organized*’ (higher level). The BIF or a modified version of it is commonly used in construal level research and has been shown to successfully measure construal level and to confirm construal level manipulations, respectively (e.g., Agrawal & Wan, 2009; Ahn & Lee, 2019; Alter, Oppenheimer, & Zemla, 2010; Fujita & Roberts, 2010; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Soderberg, Callahan, Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2015; Wang, Hurlstone, Leviston, Walker, & Lawrence, 2019).

The number of higher level and lower level responses were counted separately for each participant, assuming that participants in the high-construal-level condition would choose higher level representations more often than those in the low-construal-level condition.

On a side note, we deliberately decided to use the BIF as additional manipulation check and not our own manipulation check exercise from the pilot study we conducted for Study 1 (the adapted category vs. exemplar task). First, in contrast to our own measure, the BIF is, as stated above, a commonly used and accepted measure for construal level, having proven its legitimacy. Second, we considered the total duration of the study and, more importantly, the time between the construal level manipulation and Task 1. Our category vs. exemplar task (where participants had to come up with their own answers), even if cut by half, would have taken participants a lot longer than filling in the BIF (choosing between alternatives), increasing the total time of the study and the time before Task 1.

Negotiation tasks

Task 1, an integrative, single-issue negotiation task, was a slightly adapted version of the Kukui Nuts exercise (Kopelman & Berkel, 2012), which is based on the Ugli Orange exercise by House (1975), referencing the story of the orange and the two sisters (see Appendix D). Participants were buyers at two large rival pharmaceutical companies, named ‘Grandios AG’ and ‘Großartig GmbH’, respectively. Both companies were highly interested in the acquisition of a rare bean, the so-called Black Calypso Bean. Only 4,000 beans worldwide were available for buying. Grandios AG needed the shells of the beans to extract an oil from them, which was to be used as an ingredient in a new anti-wrinkle moisturizer. Großartig GmbH needed the inside of the beans themselves, not the shells, to extract an active ingredient from them, which was to be used in a new drug against multiple sclerosis. This need of different parts of the beans constituted the integrative potential of the exercise. Each party could acquire all 4,000 beans, one keeping the shells, the other the inside of the beans.

The information about which part of the bean was actually needed was clearly mentioned twice in the instructions, but not explicitly highlighted. Roles were assigned randomly within each dyad. Participants had to negotiate an agreement on the

distribution of the beans between each other, the integrative solution being a 4,000-4,000 allocation, which required a focus on interests and the exchange of information on why the two parties claimed the beans for themselves.

We explicitly chose this negotiation task because of its apparently fixed sum nature. At first sight, there is no win-win solution, what one party gains the other loses. In contrast to the matrix tasks, which seem to have more potential for win-win outcomes due to having more negotiation issues at hand, negotiators have to overcome even stronger fixed-pie perceptions to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. So demonstrating a positive influence of construal level on negotiation outcome with this kind of negotiation task further stresses the stability of construal level effects.

Task 2 was the exact same matrix task we used for Task 1 in Study 2. Participants had to either negotiate the buying/selling of a car or a kitchen. The negotiation content was counterbalanced between dyads in each construal level condition; the role of buyer/seller was randomly assigned within the dyads. The matrix comprised the same five negotiation issues as before (discount, colour, delivery date, extras, and date of payment) and had the same pay-off structure with two integrative, two distributive and one compatible issue. Participants' individual profits had a potential range from 2,800 to 11,000 points. A compromise on all five issues resulted in 5,400 points for each party. Identifying the integrative potential, the compatible issue, and compromising on the distributive issues awarded each participant 9,000 points.

4.3.3 Measures

Dependent variables

As dependent variables we used the joint profit of Task 1, which is a dichotomous measure (4,000 beans when the integrative potential was not identified and 8,000 beans, or more precisely, parts, when it was identified: 4,000 shells plus 4,000 inner parts) and the joint profit of Task 2.

Mediator variables

As the main focus of Study 3 was assessing adaptive transfer of learning, we chose negotiation tasks that would allow for its occurrence, namely the new single-issue, integrative bean exercise followed by the previously used matrix task. Whereas the matrix task can again also be used for testing our mediation hypothesis, the Black Calypso Bean exercise cannot. Both mediator variable (recognition of the integrative potential), if you choose to call it that, and outcome variable (joint profit) are dichotomous measures and go hand in hand. Recognizing the integrative potential automatically leads to a win-win outcome. If you code both variables with 0 and 1, there are only two possible combinations: 0-0 and 1-1. Because of the dichotomous nature of all involved variables and the missing variance between mediator and dependent variable, mediation analysis is not practicable.

Therefore, in Study 3 we only used the judgement accuracy for Task 2 as mediator variable. Judgement accuracy was assessed after Task 2 via the blank matrix task already used in Study 2 (De Dreu et al., 2000; Steinel et al., 2007; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). The measure varies from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a low judgement accuracy and 1 indicating a perfect judgement accuracy. Analyses are again based on the highest judgement accuracy score obtained within a dyad.

Control variables

Control variables were collected via two questionnaires, one after each negotiation task. Both questionnaires contained four questions to measure satisfaction with the negotiated agreement following Henderson et al. (2006). Items were for example "How satisfied are you with this agreement" or "How much do you feel that the other party took advantage of you" (reverse coded). The answer scale ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*very much*). Additionally, both questionnaires included 10 items to measure the participants' cooperative and competitive negotiation behaviour on a 7-point scale (1 '*not at all*' to 7 '*very much*') (Harinck & De Dreu, 2008; Harinck & De Dreu, 2011). Examples were "I tried to find a compromise" or "I fought for a good outcome for myself". The three competitive items were reverse coded to compute the mean score across all 10 items.

The second questionnaire contained one item to assess how difficult it was for participants to fill in the blank matrix on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*very much*) (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010) and two self-developed items concerning a change in negotiation strategy from Task 1 to Task 2. Items were “During the second negotiation I pursued another strategy than during the first one” and “I behaved the same during both negotiations” on a 7-point scale (*not at all* to *very much*). In addition, we included the DUTCH (The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling; De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001; Van de Vliert, 1997), consisting of 20 items within five subscales (yielding, compromising, forcing, problem solving, and avoiding), measuring conflict management on a 5-point scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). Examples of items are “I give in to the wishes of the other party”, “I insist we both give in a little”, “I push my own point of view”, “I examine ideas from both sides to find a mutually optimal solution” or “I avoid differences of opinion as much as possible”. Lastly, the INBS (Implicit Negotiation Beliefs Scale; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007) from Study 2 was part of the questionnaire as well to measure the extent to which participants implicitly believed that negotiation skills are a fixed ability and not formed by experience. The seven items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*very strongly agree*) to 7 (*very strongly disagree*).

Further control variables were dyad gender, first language, and acquaintance with the negotiating partner.

4.3.4 Results

Manipulation check

To verify whether participants adopted a high or a low construal level, respectively, we checked if they filled in the boxes in the thought exercise correctly and were thinking more and more abstractly or concretely. Two independent raters coded the answers in the four boxes for each participant. A higher-level answer was coded as +1, a lower-level answer was coded as -1, and answers that were neither were assigned a 0. An interrater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters for each answer. The interrater reliabilities for the raters were

found to be Kappa = 0.95 for box 1, 0.86 for box 2, 0.88 for box 3 and 0.70 for box 4. According to Landis and Koch (1977), the ratings of the first three boxes are in almost perfect agreement, and the ratings of the fourth box still show a substantial agreement. Consequently, the four ratings per participant were summed up, resulting in a score from -4 to +4. As was to be expected, participants in the high-construal-level condition had a significantly higher score ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 0.75$) than participants in the low-construal-level condition ($M = -3.68$, $SD = 0.57$), $F(1,74) = 2276.68$, $p < .001$, $d = 10.97$. The thought exercise was filled in correctly and according to the respective condition, implying that the manipulation of construal level was successful.

Next, we analysed the results from the BIF (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), which participants completed after the thought exercise. We expected participants in the high-construal-level condition to choose higher level representations for the 25 listed behaviours more often than those in the low-construal-level condition. Unexpectedly, this was not the case. Participants in the high-construal-level condition chose an average of $M = 14.45$ ($SD = 4.64$) higher level representations, matching the average number of higher level representations chosen by participants in the low-construal-level condition ($M = 14.47$, $SD = 5.78$), $F(1,74) < 1$, *ns*. Although participants filled in the thought exercise as intended and should have adopted a high or low construal level, the level of construal could not be verified using the BIF as additional manipulation check.

Preliminary analyses

All but four dyads (three in the low-construal-level condition and one in the high-construal-level condition; $\chi^2(1, N = 38) = 1.12$, *ns*) finished Task 1 within the given 15 minutes. The four dyads were therefore excluded from analyses regarding Task 1. All 38 dyads reached an agreement on Task 2. In Task 1, participants joint profit was 4,824 beans ($SD = 1,642$). The mean joint profit for Task 2 was 16,118 points ($SD = 1,292$).

We tested whether the assigned roles of Großartig GmbH and Grandios AG for Task 1 and buyer/seller for Task 2, had any influence on the individual profits of the two negotiation tasks. Participants assigned Großartig GmbH received an average of $M = 2,604$ beans ($SD = 938$), those assigned Grandios AG an average of $M = 2,219$ beans ($SD = 1,098$), $F(1,66) = 2.42$, *ns*. In Task 2, buyers reached an individual profit of $M =$

7,939 points ($SD = 1231$), sellers of $M = 8,179$ points ($SD = 852$), $F(1,74) < 1$, *ns*. As there were no effects of assigned role present, next we tested whether the content of Task 2 (buying of a car vs. buying of a kitchen) influenced the joint profits. This was also not the case ($M_{\text{kitchen}} = 16,030$ points, $SD_{\text{kitchen}} = 1,047$; $M_{\text{car}} = 16,217$ points, $SD_{\text{car}} = 1,545$, $F(1,36) < 1$, *ns*). Therefore, for both negotiation tasks we collapsed data across role and content and used the dyads as unit of analysis.

Concerning the blank matrix task for assessing judgement accuracy for Task 2, all participants found it rather easy to fill in the blanks ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.16$) and there was no difference between participants in the low-construal-level condition ($M = 2.61$, $SD = 1.31$) and those in the high-construal-level condition ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 0.99$), $F(1,72) < 1$, *ns*.

Intercorrelations for all variables across the two negotiation tasks are shown in Table 6. As before, variables were aggregated at the level of the dyads.

None of the control variables correlated with the experimental condition, the dependent variables or the mediator variable. We therefore ran all analyses without any of the control variables.

Table 6
Intercorrelations of variables in Study 3

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	
1 Construal level	-																			
2 Joint profit Task 1	.48**	-																		
3 Joint profit Task 2	-.10	.04	-																	
4 Integrative potential Task 1	.48**	1.00**	.06	-																
5 Judgement accuracy Task 2	.18	.16	.53**	.19	-															
6 INBS	.03	.10	.09	.13	-.12	-														
7 DUTCH yielding	-.08	-.09	-.06	-.10	-.04	.04	-													
8 DUTCH compromising	.23	.01	-.08	.07	-.10	.22	-.05	-												
9 DUTCH forcing	-.04	.26	-.13	.23	-.20	.06	-.46**	.02	-											
10 DUTCH problem solving	.28	.23	-.16	.21	-.03	.28	-.11	.59**	.40*	-										
11 DUTCH avoiding	-.05	-.03	-.21	-.05	-.27	.13	.60**	.06	-.48**	-.10	-									
12 Cooperation Task 1	.21	-.13	-.06	-.05	-.05	.34*	.04	.57**	-.16	.18	.08	-								
13 Cooperation Task 2	-.19	-.09	-.20	-.11	-.13	.08	.30	.06	-.02	.32	.24	-.17	-							
14 Satisfaction Task 1	.47**	.67**	.10	.62**	.40*	-.00	.08	.25	-.11	.12	-.16	.29	-.17	-						
15 Satisfaction Task 2	.04	-.22	.08	-.20	.24	-.16	.01	.13	-.24	.01	-.28	.37*	-.11	.33*	-					
16 Strategy change	-.22	.01	.08	.01	.11	.09	-.13	-.10	.01	.01	-.27	.03	-.15	-.03	.20	-				
17 Gender	-.11	-.08	-.09	-.12	-.14	-.34*	-.06	-.21	.40*	.04	-.19	-.45**	-.16	-.21	-.17	.02	-			
18 First language	-.29	-.13	.03	-.14	.08	-.04	.18	-.40*	.08	-.02	-.13	-.33*	.16	-.11	.02	.23	.20	-		
19 Acquaintance	-.29	-.15	.07	-.17	-.26	.08	-.15	-.05	.18	.19	-.17	.02	-.01	-.26	.13	.30	.02	.13	-	

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, $N = 38$ dyads; construal level: low = 0, high = 1; integrative potential: no = 0, yes = 1; gender: female dyad = 0, male-female/male-male dyad = 1; first language: two native speakers = 0, no native speaker/one native speaker = 1; acquaintance no = 0, yes = 1; INBS = Implicit Negotiation Beliefs Scale; DUTCH = The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (respective subscales).

Negotiation outcomes (main effects)

Hypothesis 1 stated that a high construal level positively affects negotiation outcomes. The results only partially support our assumption. In Task 1, seven dyads recognized they needed different parts of the beans and made use of this integrative potential. All seven dyads belonged to the high-construal-level condition. A chi-square test confirmed that this difference between construal level conditions was significant, $\chi^2(1, N = 34) = 7.84, p = .005, \text{Phi} = 0.48$. Consequently, dyads in the high-construal-level condition got an average of 5,556 beans ($SD = 2,007$), whereas dyads in the low-construal-level condition got an average of 4,000 beans ($SD = 0$; reflecting the dichotomous nature of the joint profit and none of the dyads recognizing the integrative potential), $F(1,32) = 9.58, p = .004, d = -1.10$.

For the sake of completeness, we also took a look at participants' single profits in Task 1. Participants in the high-construal-level condition got an average of 2,778 beans ($SD = 1,169$), whereas participants in the low-construal-level condition got an average of 2,000 beans ($SD = 654$), $F(1,66) = 11.07, p = .001, d = 0.82$

In Task 2, dyads in the high-construal-level condition reached an average of 15,989 points ($SD = 1,372$), whereas dyads in the low-construal-level condition reached an average of 16,247 points ($SD = 1,229$), $F(1,36) = 0.37, p = .55, ns$. There was no effect of construal level on negotiation outcome present.

Out of curiosity, we took a look at the use of the integrative potential in Task 2. Only 10 dyads recognized the integrative potential, four in the low-construal-level condition and six in the high-construal-level condition, $\chi^2(1, N = 38) = .54, ns$. Only three of the seven dyads in the high-construal-level condition who identified the integrative potential in Task 1 were able to also identify it in Task 2.

The main effect of construal level on negotiation outcome found in Studies 1 and 2 could be replicated for Task 1, but not for Task 2. Hypothesis 1 was thus only partially supported.

Focus on interests (mediation effect)

We expected the effect of construal level on negotiation outcome to be mediated by negotiators' focus on interests, operationalized in Task 2 as the judgement accuracy of

the counterpart's profit schedule (Hypothesis 2). Regarding Task 2, as there was no main effect of construal level on negotiation outcome, we omitted running mediation analyses with joint profit and judgement accuracy. In summary, Hypothesis 2 was not tested for Task 1 and was not supported for Task 2.

Transfer of learning

We further expected high construal levels to facilitate the occurrence of adaptive transfer of learning (Hypothesis 3). Although there was a main effect of construal level on joint profit in Task 1, providing evidence that construal level can influence negotiation outcomes independently of the kind of negotiation exercise or task format, the effect did not transfer to Task 2. Participants in the high-construal-level condition did not outperform participants in the low-construal-level condition on the adaptive negotiation task. Consequently, Hypothesis 3 is not supported in Study 3.

4.3.5 Discussion

First, we would like to address the issue of successful manipulation of construal level. Contrary to the cited literature above, we could not validate construal level manipulation by using the BIF (Vallacher & Wegener, 1989). Nevertheless, we thought holding back these results would be inappropriate. We found one study by van Houwelingen, van Dijke and De Cremer (2018) who also failed to prove construal level manipulation via the BIF. As they point out, the BIF was originally developed as a dispositional scale and not a scale to detect fluctuations of construal level over time (Vallacher & Wegener, 1989), thereby limiting its reliability and usefulness as a manipulation check. Unfortunately, and to the best of our knowledge, another, more suitable manipulation check for construal level does not exist. However, it is important to note that many studies, also cited above, have reliably produced a host of effects associated with either high or low construal level mindsets by using the thought exercise by Freitas et al. (2004) (van Houwelingen et al., 2018). So as long as the thought exercise is filled in correctly, we assume that construal level manipulation has occurred

as intended. As this is the case in our study, we like to think of the construal level manipulation as being successful.

Consequently, in Study 3 negotiators with a high construal level performed significantly better than those with a low construal level in the single-issue, integrative negotiation task (Task 1) by recognizing the integrative potential. This can be seen as support for a stronger focus on interests. In addition, the result is also in line with the results of Studies 1 and 2 and further emphasizes the positive influence of a high construal level on negotiation outcomes. However, the main effect of construal level was not present for the subsequent negotiation task (Task 2). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is only partially supported in this study.

As expected, the effect of construal level on negotiation outcome seems to be independent of the kind of negotiation exercise. Although the single-issue bean exercise is more difficult to solve than the matrix task due to stronger fixed-pie perceptions, a high construal level helped negotiators to overcome these mental barriers and focus on their interests.

Concerning Task 1, it is possible that participants who wanted the beans for medical purposes had a moral advantage over those wanting the beans for cosmetic usage. The results do not support this assumption. If this had been the case, all participants assigned Großartig GmbH should have gained more beans than their counterparts independent of construal level condition. Running an analysis on single profit with assigned role as covariate only reached significance at the 10% level, $F(2,65) = 2.80, p = .10$. There was no influence of role present, just the main effect of construal level. But to be on the safe side and to avoid any possible influence of the medical vs. cosmetic usage scenario, in future studies the intended usage for Großartig GmbH should be changed to a cosmetic purpose as well.

Regarding Hypothesis 2, the mediation effect, Study 3 is unable to replicate and further substantiate the results of Studies 1 and 2. As there was no main effect of construal level on negotiation outcome for Task 2, a mediation effect could not be verified. Hypothesis 2 is not supported in this study. The same applies to Hypothesis 3. Without a main effect of construal level on negotiation outcome, an adaptive transfer of learning effect cannot be supported.

In summary, Study 3 provides further, but not complete, evidence for the existence of a main effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes (H1), which seems to be independent of task format. There is no additional support for a mediation effect of focus on interests (H2) or support for the occurrence of adaptive transfer of learning between negotiation tasks (H3).

4.4 Study 4: Analogical versus adaptive transfer

Study 2 provided some initial evidence for a possible analogical transfer of learning effect, subsequently we conducted Study 3 to examine the presence of an adaptive transfer of learning effect. Although Study 3 did not support our hypothesis, we wanted to take another look at analogical and adaptive transfer of learning within one study. Hence the main objective of Study 4 was to test analogical and adaptive transfer of learning systematically within one study by using different kinds of negotiation tasks and by manipulating the order of the negotiation tasks at hand. Therefore, participants had to negotiate three times. We developed modified versions of the previously used matrix tasks which consisted of only two (analogical) or four issues (adaptive) to make them more or less similar to the single-issue Black Calypso Bean negotiation task. Then we manipulated the order in which participants had to negotiate the two matrix tasks and by this the nature of a possible transfer of learning between negotiation tasks (analogical-adaptive vs. adaptive-analogical).

In addition, we changed one of the intended usages of the Black Calypso Beans in the corresponding negotiation task to avoid a potential advantage of one party due to moral reasoning.

4.4.1 Design and Participants

In contrast to Studies 1, 2, and 3 we used a two-factor design with construal level (low vs. high) and order of negotiation tasks (analogical-adaptive vs. adaptive-analogical) as between-subjects factors and the joint profits of all three negotiation tasks as dependent variables. Eighty-two students of the same middle-sized German university as in Study 3 voluntarily participated in the experiment (mean age = 23.5 years, $SD = 3.76$ years, 52.4% female). Participants received course credit if needed. Almost two third of the students were majoring in psychology (41.5% general psychology and 19.5% psychology in informatics), the remaining students were majoring in fields like engineering or social sciences. 87.8% of the participants were German native speakers. As before, we made sure that none of the students had taken part in any of our previous

negotiation studies. The 41 dyads (26 same-gender and 15 mixed-gender) were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. There were 20 dyads in the high-construal-level condition and 21 dyads in the low-construal-level condition and 21 dyads in the analogical-adaptive order condition and 20 dyads in the adaptive-analogical order condition (see Table 7).

Table 7

Distribution of dyads across experimental conditions in Study 4

Construal-level	Order of negotiation tasks		total
	analogical-adaptive	adaptive-analogical	
low	11	10	21
high	10	10	20
total	21	20	41

4.4.2 Procedure and Negotiation Tasks

Overview of the procedure

The general procedure was almost identical to that of Study 3, with one major exception. Instead of negotiating twice, participants had to complete three different negotiation tasks that measured analogical and adaptive transfer of learning (see Figure 2).

Subjects arrived together at the laboratory, were seated opposite each other and asked to fill in a short questionnaire. Afterwards, we manipulated construal level, again using the thought exercise developed by Freitas et al. (2004). Participants received written instructions for the construal level manipulation, which ostensibly helped them to focus their minds during the subsequent three negotiation tasks. The thought exercise was followed by Task 1, the Black Calypso Bean negotiation used in Study 3. Participants had 5 minutes to prepare themselves and 15 minutes to negotiate an agreement. Consistent with Studies 1 to 3, all participants were allowed to verbally exchange any information they wished to. After the negotiation, subjects filled in a second questionnaire and were given the written information for Task 2, a matrix task with

either two or four issues. Again, participants had 5 minutes to prepare and 15 minutes to negotiate. After Task 2, judgement accuracy was measured using the blank matrix task already used in Studies 2 and 3. Subjects then filled in a third questionnaire and received the written information for the additional Task 3. Subjects who had previously negotiated about only two issues now negotiated about four issues and vice versa. As always, participants had 5 minutes to prepare and 15 minutes to come to an agreement. After completing a fourth and last questionnaire, which again measured judgement accuracy, among other variables, participants were thanked, received course credit if needed, debriefed, and dismissed.




Figure 2. Flow diagram depicting the order of negotiation tasks in Study 4.

Manipulation of construal level

To manipulate construal level, we relied on the same thought exercise developed by Freitas et al. (2004) that we used in Study 3. Both participants of a dyad were randomly assigned to the high-construal-level or the low-construal-level condition and individually completed either the increasingly abstract or increasingly concrete thought exercise, respectively. Participants were told that the exercise would increase their concentration during the three negotiations tasks. As before, in the high-construal-level condition, the exercise was introduced by a written passage explaining that for everything we do, there is a reason *why* we do it. In the low-construal-level condition, the passage explained that for everything we do, there is a process of *how* we do it. After reading the passage, participants in the high-construal-level condition had to think about *why* improving and maintaining their health is important. Participants in the low-

construal-level condition had to think about *how* they could improve and maintain their health. Both participants wrote down their thoughts in the corresponding diagram.

As in Study 3, afterwards two independent raters checked whether participants had filled in the boxes correctly and thus were thinking more and more abstractly or concretely. This served as our manipulation check.

Negotiation tasks

Task 1 was the integrative, single-issue Black Calypso Bean negotiation, based on the Kukui Nuts exercise (Kopelman & Berkel, 2012), we already used in the previous study. Although there was no influence of participants' role on single profit in Study 3, we changed the intended usage of the beans for Großartig GmbH from a medical one to a cosmetic purpose (shampoo) to prevent possible moral reasoning towards Grandios AG during the negotiation. Again, both companies were highly interested in the acquisition of a rare bean, the so-called Black Calypso Bean. Only 4,000 beans worldwide were available for buying. As before, Grandios AG needed the shells of the beans to extract an oil from them, which was to be used as an ingredient in a new anti-wrinkle moisturizer. Großartig GmbH needed the inside of the beans themselves, not the shells, to extract a protein from them, which was to be used in a new protein shampoo. This need of different parts of the beans constituted the integrative potential of the exercise. Each party could acquire all 4,000 beans, one keeping the shells, the other the inside of the beans.

The information about which part of the bean was actually needed was, again, clearly mentioned twice in the instructions, but not explicitly highlighted. Roles were assigned randomly within each dyad. Participants had to negotiate an agreement on the distribution of the beans between each other, the integrative solution being a 4,000-4,000 allocation, which required a focus on interests and the exchange of information on why the two parties claimed the beans for themselves.

Task 2 and Task 3 were modified versions of the matrix task we used in Study 3 and consisted of two or four negotiation issues, respectively. Participants had to negotiate the buying/selling of a car for Task 2 and the buying/selling of a kitchen for Task 3. The role of buyer/seller was randomly assigned within the dyads and counterbalanced between Task 2 and Task 3. The matrix task with only two issues to negotiate about

served to measure analogical transfer of learning and comprised delivery date and date of payment. The negotiation issues were of an integrative nature. Participants' individual profits had a potential range from 1,200 to 4,500 points. A compromise on both issues resulted in 2,100 points for each party. Making use of the integrative potential awarded each participant 3,700 points (see Appendix D).

The matrix task with four negotiation issues served to measure adaptive transfer of learning and included warranty, extras, disposal, and price. To make it sufficiently different from the other matrix task, we not only included four negotiation issues, but also changed the payoff-structure. Participants could receive zero points on each issue (the lowest in the two-issue matrix was 200) and the increases in points between options were 400, 500, 600, and 1,000 instead of 200 and 500. Extras and price were distributive issues; warranty and disposal were the integrative ones. Individual profits could range from 0 to 10,000 points. A compromise on all four issues resulted in 5,000 points for each party. Identifying the integrative potential and compromising on the two distributive issues awarded each participant 6,200 points.

Due to the two different kinds of matrix tasks (analogical and adaptive) and the two different negotiation contents (buying of a car vs. buying of a kitchen), there were, in total, four different versions of the matrix tasks in use (see Figure 2): analogical car, analogical kitchen, adaptive car, and adaptive kitchen.

4.4.3 Measures

Dependent variables

As dependent variables we again used the joint profits of all three negotiation tasks.

Mediator variables

In this study we again used judgement accuracy as mediator variables for Tasks 2 and 3 or, more precisely, for the analogical and the adaptive negotiation task, respectively. Judgement accuracy was assessed after both Task 2 and Task 3 via the blank matrix task already used in Studies 2 and 3 (De Dreu et al., 2000; Steinel et al., 2007; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). The measure varies from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a low judgement

accuracy and 1 indicating a perfect judgement accuracy. Analyses are once more based on the highest judgement accuracy score obtained within a dyad.

Control variables

Control variables were collected via four questionnaires, one before construal level manipulation and one each after the three negotiation tasks.

The first questionnaire included, as before in Studies 2 and 3, the INBS (Implicit Negotiation Beliefs Scale; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007) to measure the extent to which participants implicitly believed that negotiation skills are a fixed ability and not formed by experience. The seven items were again rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*very strongly agree*) to 7 (*very strongly disagree*). Also included was the DUTCH we already used in Study 3 (Harinck & De Dreu, 2008; Harinck & De Dreu, 2011). The 10 items measured participants' cooperative and competitive negotiation behaviour as a trait on a 7-point scale (1 '*not at all*' to 7 '*very much*'). Examples were "I tried to find a compromise" or "I fought for a good outcome for myself". For the first time we also included items from the Goal Orientation Scale (Vandewalle, 1997) to measure avoidance and learning goal orientation. Items were for example "I would avoid taking on a new task if there was a chance that I would appear rather incompetent to others", "I enjoy challenging and new tasks where I'll learn new skills" or "I prefer to work in situations that require a high level of ability and talent". The answer scale ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). Also newly included was the BFI-10 (Big Five Inventory; Rammstedt & John, 2007), a short version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), assessing extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. Examples were "I see myself as someone who is reserved", "I see myself as someone who is generally trusting" or "I see myself as someone who does a thorough job". Items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 '*disagree strongly*' to 5 '*agree strongly*'). Finally, we assessed instrumental and expressive traits. Instrumental, agentic traits are considered to be socially desirable in both sexes but stereotypically more characteristic of males. Feminine, communal traits, on the other hand, are stereotypically more characteristic of females (Runge, Frey, Gollwitzer, Helmreich, & Spence, 1981). The 16 items were rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (*not at*

all) to 5 (*very much*). Items were, for example, “independent”, “competitive”, “self-confident”, “gentle”, “helpful to others” or “understanding of others”.

After Task 1, the Black Calypso Bean exercise, we measured instrumental outcome, self-perception, and negotiation process via the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). The answer scale ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*). Example items were “How satisfied are you with your own outcome - i.e., the extent to which the terms of your agreement (or lack of agreement) benefit you?”, “Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator?” or “Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair?”.

The third questionnaire was administered after Task 2, the first matrix task. It contained the blank matrix to measure judgement accuracy and one item to assess how difficult it was for participants to fill in the blank matrix on a 6-point scale (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010). In addition, the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI; Curhan et al., 2006) was included again.

The fourth and last questionnaire, filled in after Task 3, also contained the blank matrix task and the item to measure the difficulty of completing it. Next, the SVI was assessed one last time and we asked participants to answer the DUTCH (Harinck & De Dreu, 2008; Harinck & De Dreu, 2011) with regard to all three previous negotiation tasks, thereby assessing it as a state variable.

This last questionnaire further included control variables such as gender, age, acquaintance with the negotiating partner, and first language.

4.4.4 Results

Manipulation check

To check whether participants adopted a high or a low construal level, respectively, we used the same approach as in Study 3. We analyzed the answers of the thought exercise to see if participants filled in the boxes as intended and were thinking more and more abstractly or concretely. The same two independent raters from Study 3 coded the answers in the four boxes for each participant. A higher-level answer was again coded as +1, a lower-level answer was coded as -1, and answers that were neither were

assigned a 0. An interrater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters for each answer. The interrater reliabilities for the raters were found to be Kappa = 0.93 for box 1, 0.95 for box 2, 0.87 for box 3 and 0.75 for box 4. According to Landis and Koch (1977), the ratings of the first three boxes are in almost perfect agreement, and the ratings of box 4 still show a substantial agreement. Consequently, the four ratings per participant were summed up, resulting in a score from -4 to +4. As was to be expected, participants in the high-construal-level condition had a significantly higher score ($M = 3.65$, $SD = 0.74$) than participants in the low-construal-level condition ($M = -3.69$, $SD = 0.60$), $F(1,80) = 2448.01$, $p < .001$, $d = 10.90$. The thought exercise was filled in correctly and according to the respective condition. It is reasonable to assume that the manipulation of construal level was successful.

Preliminary analyses

First, we would like to note that although Task 1 was the same for all participants, Tasks 2 and 3 differed according to the respective task order condition. So it is not feasible to analyse variables for Task 2 and Task 3, respectively. Instead, we recoded the variables as pertaining to the two-issues, analogical negotiation task or the four-issues, adaptive negotiation task.

For Task 1, 38 out of the 41 dyads reached an agreement. Of the three dyads who did not, two were in the high-construal-level condition and one in the low-construal-level condition; $\chi^2(1, N = 41) = 0.41$, *ns*. The three dyads were excluded from analyses for Task 1. Participants' mean joint profit was 5,158 beans ($SD = 1,838$).

All but two dyads reached an agreement for Task 2. Both dyads belonged to the low-construal-level condition and the adaptive-analogical task order, respectively. Regarding participants' Task 3, only one dyad in the low-construal-level/analogical-adaptive condition reached an impasse. All in all, there were three non-agreements on the adaptive, four-issue matrix task whereas all dyads reached an agreement on the analogical, two-issues matrix task. Dyads with an impasse at one of the matrix tasks were excluded from the respective analyses.

Participants in the analogical-adaptive task order condition reached a mean joint profit of 6,291 points ($SD = 1,068$) on the analogical, two-issues matrix task and a mean joint

profit of 11,445 ($SD = 1,208$) on the adaptive, four-issues matrix task. Participants in the adaptive-analogical task order condition reached a mean joint profit of 6,395 points ($SD = 903$) on the analogical, two-issues matrix task and a mean joint profit of 10,661 points ($SD = 1,003$) on the adaptive, four-issues matrix task.

Across all participants, the mean joint profit for the analogical, two-issues matrix task (41 dyads) is 6,341 points ($SD = 980$) and for the adaptive, four-issues matrix task (38 dyads) it is 11,074 points ($SD = 1,170$).

We further tested whether the assigned roles of Großartig GmbH and Grandios AG for Task 1 and buyer/seller for the analogical and adaptive negotiation task, had any influence on the individual profits of the three negotiation tasks. Participants assigned Großartig GmbH received an average of $M = 2,625$ beans ($SD = 925$), those assigned Grandios AG an average of $M = 2,507$ beans ($SD = 955$), $F(1,74) < 1$, *ns*. In the analogical negotiation task, buyers reached an individual profit of $M = 3,041$ points ($SD = 705$), sellers of $M = 3,300$ points ($SD = 605$), $F(1,80) = 3.18$, $p = .08$, *ns*. In the adaptive negotiation task, buyers received an individual profit of $M = 5,453$ points ($SD = 1,003$), sellers of $M = 5,621$ points ($SD = 1,217$), $F(1,74) < 1$, *ns*.

As there were no effects of assigned role present for any of the negotiation tasks, we checked whether the content of the negotiation tasks (buying of a car vs. buying of a kitchen) influenced the joint profits of the analogical or the adaptive negotiation task. This was not the case for the analogical negotiation task ($M_{\text{kitchen}} = 6,555$ points, $SD_{\text{kitchen}} = 1,000$; $M_{\text{car}} = 6,138$ points, $SD_{\text{car}} = 938$, $F(1,39) = 1.90$, *ns*) or the adaptive negotiation task ($M_{\text{kitchen}} = 10,868$ points, $SD_{\text{kitchen}} = 1,252$; $M_{\text{car}} = 11,279$ points, $SD_{\text{car}} = 1,076$, $F(1,36) = 1.18$, *ns*). As before, for all negotiation tasks we collapsed data across role and content and used the dyads as unit of analysis.

Concerning the blank matrix task for assessing judgement accuracy for the analogical negotiation task, all participants found it rather easy to fill in the blanks ($M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.35$) and there was no difference between participants in the low-construal-level condition ($M = 2.31$, $SD = 1.32$) and those in the high-construal-level condition ($M = 2.40$, $SD = 1.39$), $F(1,80) < 1$, *ns*. The same applies to the adaptive negotiation task. Participants found it a little bit more difficult to fill in the blanks ($M = 2.61$, $SD = 1.35$),

but there was no difference between the low-construal-level condition ($M = 2.61$, $SD = 1.50$) and the high-construal-level condition ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.21$), $F(1,78) < 1$, *ns*. As in all previous studies, for analyses we used the highest judgement accuracy within a dyad.

Variables were again aggregated at the level of the dyads. Intercorrelations across the three negotiation tasks are shown in Table 8. Due to lack of space and better legibility, we omitted the Subjective Value Inventory variables collected after each negotiation task and the DUTCH state variables collected after Task 3 from this correlation matrix. So Table 8 shows all the correlations of variables collected before Task 1, which can potentially influence negotiation outcomes and processes but not vice versa. Correlations between the remaining variables and the independent, dependent, and mediator variables are shown in Table 9.

This means that some correlations between the various control variables are not reported here, but we included them in Appendix D (see Table D1).

Table 8

Intercorrelations of variables in Study 4

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27		
1 Construal level	-																												
2 Task order	.02	-																											
3 Joint profit Task 1	-.02	.06	-																										
4 Joint profit analogical	.01	.05	.34*	-																									
5 Joint profit adaptive	.10	-.34*	.31	.28	-																								
6 Integer potential analogical	-.20	.02	.19	.70**	.19	-																							
7 Integer potential adaptive	-.09	-.37*	.31	.33*	.73**	.33*	-																						
8 Judge accuracy analogical	.11	.23	.30	.33*	.53**	.17	.31	-																					
9 Judge accuracy adaptive	-.04	-.06	.14	.40**	.64**	.18	.54**	.31*	-																				
10 INBS	-.09	.01	.17	.04	.05	-.11	.08	.18	.10	-																			
11 DUTCH yielding tr.	.03	-.05	-.36*	-.16	-.17	-.20	-.08	-.04	-.08	-.19	-																		
12 DUTCH compromising tr.	-.23	.07	-.03	-.08	-.17	-.04	-.20	-.02	-.11	.32*	.29	-																	
13 DUTCH forcing tr.	-.12	-.02	.18	.11	.12	.18	.24	-.19	.09	.13	-.41**	-.34*	-																
14 DUTCH problem solving tr.	-.09	-.05	.30	.13	.30	.34*	.30	.18	-.12	.26	-.09	.33*	.05	-															
15 DUTCH avoiding tr.	-.02	.14	-.11	-.25	-.35*	-.14	-.27	-.15	-.41**	.00	.27	.33*	-.22	.13	-														
16 Learning orientation	-.10	-.11	.29	.15	.21	-.15	.29	-.01	.34*	.04	-.33*	-.06	.29	.28	.10	-													
17 Avoidance orientation	.20	.35*	.06	.12	-.04	-.03	-.19	.16	-.28	-.01	.22	.02	-.25	-.20	.25	-.60**	-												
18 Extraversion	.08	-.06	.07	.03	.07	.01	.06	-.15	-.10	.08	-.48**	-.11	.40**	.34*	-.07	.19	-.15	-											
19 Agreeableness	.06	-.27	.03	.14	.18	.15	.34*	-.06	-.00	-.11	.09	.31*	-.21	.19	.27	.17	-.04	.08	-										
20 Conscientiousness	-.01	-.12	-.03	-.22	.06	-.20	-.03	-.16	.25	-.13	-.15	-.02	-.15	.09	.15	.35*	-.26	.24	.17	-									
21 Neuroticism	.07	.40**	-.28	.04	-.25	.21	-.20	-.19	-.02	.01	.19	.22	-.03	-.05	.09	-.23	.16	-.30	-.08	-.19	-								
22 Openness	-.04	-.04	-.21	-.02	-.34*	.10	-.16	-.10	-.10	-.30	.11	.10	-.08	-.03	.03	-.01	-.17	-.11	.21	-.15	.02	-							
23 Agency	.07	-.12	.33*	.02	.12	-.05	.13	-.10	.03	.15	-.63**	-.31*	.38*	.05	-.10	.35*	-.15	.64**	-.00	.25	-.46**	-.22	-						
24 Communion	.00	.04	.04	.09	-.08	.13	-.13	-.06	-.07	-.13	-.06	.24	-.11	.28	.08	-.15	.13	.26	.32*	.31*	.07	.27	-.23	-					
25 Gender	-.02	-.02	.34*	.58**	.22	.35*	.25	.24	.30	-.02	-.07	-.24	.08	.11	.02	.32*	-.04	-.17	-.05	-.20	-.06	-.11	.12	-.29	-				
26 First language	.19	-.05	-.08	-.00	-.23	.05	-.33*	-.16	-.14	-.01	-.27	.09	-.01	-.12	.12	-.15	.05	.07	.02	.03	.05	.21	.23	.15	.01	-			
27 Acquaintance	.04	-.07	.15	-.34*	-.20	-.22	-.19	-.16	-.23	-.07	.06	-.18	-.12	.01	-.13	.00	-.15	-.07	-.11	.11	-.08	.12	.01	-.09	-.34*	-			

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, $N = 41$ dyads; construal level: low = 0, high = 1; task order: analogical-adaptive = 0, adaptive-analogical = 1; analogical = referring to the 2-issues task, adaptive = referring to the 4-issues task; integrative potential: no = 0, yes = 1; gender: female dyad = 0, male-female/male-male dyad = 1; first language: two native speakers = 0, no native speaker/one native speaker = 1; acquaintance no = 0, yes = 1; INBS = Implicit Negotiation Beliefs Scale; DUTCH = The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (respective subscales measured as trait variables).

Table 9
Intercorrelations of SVI and DUTCH state variables in Study 4

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	
1 Construal level	-																							
2 Task order	.02	-																						
3 Joint profit Task 1	-.02	.06	-																					
4 Joint profit analogical	.01	.05	.34*	-																				
5 Joint profit adaptive	.10	-.34*	.31	.28	-																			
6 Integr. potential analogical	-.20	.02	.19	.70**	.19	-																		
7 Integr. potential adaptive	-.09	-.37*	.31	.33*	.73**	.33*	-																	
8 Judge accuracy analogical	.11	.23	.30	.33*	.53**	.17	.31	-																
9 Judge accuracy adaptive	-.04	-.06	.14	.40**	.64**	.18	.54**	.31*	-															
10 SVI Task 1 outcome	-.04	-.12	.62**	.24	.34*	.14	.36*	.09	.12	-														
11 SVI Task 1 self	-.11	.02	.49**	.11	.02	.02	.14	-.11	-.03	.62**	-													
12 SVI Task 1 process	-.06	.10	.41*	-.02	.10	.15	.22	-.14	-.25	.62**	.49**	-												
13 SVI analogical outcome	.01	.11	.40*	.55**	.17	.49**	.24	.24	.21	.36*	.04	.09	-											
14 SVI analogical self	.09	.02	.30	.33*	.19	.09	.21	.06	.23	.30	.27	.00	.49**	-										
15 SVI analogical process	.05	.14	.26	.24	.17	.26	.32	.20	.15	.21	.16	.25	.68**	.27	-									
16 SVI adaptive outcome	.19	-.10	-.08	-.03	.10	-.15	.25	-.01	.01	.18	.13	.18	.20	.26	.34*	-								
17 SVI adaptive self	.06	-.27	.05	.08	.17	-.16	.34*	.10	.17	.12	.31	-.06	.09	.41**	.16	.64**	-							
18 SVI adaptive process	.28	.00	-.02	-.07	.14	-.17	.29	-.05	.01	.05	.02	-.12	.06	.03	.29	.77**	.41**	-						
19 DUTCH yielding st.	-.11	.18	-.11	.01	.06	-.10	.09	-.12	.03	-.09	-.17	-.07	.01	-.07	-.00	.28	-.03	.43**	-					
20 DUTCH compromising st.	-.41**	-.05	.00	-.05	.11	.06	.12	-.09	-.14	.08	-.02	.13	.18	-.00	.15	.19	-.00	.20	.35*	-				
21 DUTCH forcing st.	.00	-.17	.32*	.03	.12	.01	.32*	.00	.06	.13	.16	.12	.01	.06	.10	-.05	.08	.08	.12	-.06	-			
22 DUTCH problem solving st.	-.07	-.06	.28	.01	.00	.11	.07	-.07	-.23	.32*	.23	.41**	.42**	.15	.45**	.41**	.10	.33*	.13	.62**	.05	-		
23 DUTCH avoiding st.	.23	-.16	.18	-.09	-.01	-.13	-.14	-.13	-.20	-.05	-.01	.10	-.20	-.22	.01	-.08	-.13	.32*	.13	.08	-.05	.18	-	

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, $N = 41$ dyads; construal level: low = 0, high = 1; task order: analogical-adaptive = 0, adaptive-analogical = 1; analogical = referring to the 2-issues task, adaptive = referring to the 4-issues task; integrative potential: no = 0, yes = 1; SVI = Subjective Value Inventory (respective subscales); DUTCH = The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (respective subscales measured as state variables).

As can be seen in Table 8, participants in the adaptive-analogical task order condition scored higher on the avoidance goal orientation scale and on the BFI-10 neuroticism scale than participants in the analogical-adaptive task order condition. Since these variables do not correlate with any of the dependent variables (the joint profits), or the mediator variables, we did not take them into account while running our analyses.

Gender, on the other hand, correlates significantly with two of the three dependent variables. Female dyads, as opposed to mixed dyads or male dyads, have a lower joint profit in Task 1, the single-issue integrative negotiation task and in the analogical negotiation task. Therefore, we ran analyses for all three negotiation tasks with and without dyad gender as control variable. Also, dyads that were not acquainted with each other before the study reached higher joint profits in Task 1, which is why we included acquaintance in the respective analysis.

Table 9 shows no unusual correlations with the exception of the self-reported compromising behaviour across all negotiation tasks and construal level condition. Participants in the low-construal-level condition reported more compromising behaviour than those in the high-construal-level condition, which, however, does not reflect in any of the joint profits.

Negotiation outcomes (main effects)

First we tested Hypothesis 1, that a high construal level positively affects negotiation outcomes. In Task 1, eleven dyads recognized they needed different parts of the beans and made use of this integrative potential. Five dyads belonged to the high-construal-level condition and six to the low-construal-level condition, $\chi^2(1, N = 38) = 0.02, ns$. Means and standard deviations for the joint profits of Task 1 are shown in Table 10.

A two-way ANOVA was conducted to analyse the main effects of construal level and task order and the interaction effect between construal level and task order on the joint profit of Task 1. Neither the main effect of construal level, $F(1,34) < 1, ns$, nor the main effect of task order, $F(1,34) < 1, ns$, are statistically significant. The same is true for the interaction effect between construal level and task order, $F(1,34) = 1.03, ns$. Controlling for dyad gender and acquaintance does not alter any of the results, so we choose not to report them here. Hypothesis 1 is not supported for Task 1.

Table 10

Means and standard deviations for Task 1 in Study 4

Construal-level	Task order	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Low	analogical-adaptive	4,800	1,687	10
	adaptive-analogical	5,600	2,066	10
	total	5,200	1,881	20
High	analogical-adaptive	5,333	2,000	9
	adaptive-analogical	4,889	1,764	9
	total	5,111	1,844	18
Total	analogical-adaptive	5,053	1,810	19
	adaptive-analogical	5,263	1,910	19
	total	5,158	1,838	38

Regarding the analogical negotiation task, 12 dyads made use of the integrative potential, eight in the low-construal-level condition and only four in the high-construal-level condition, $\chi^2(1, N = 41) = 1.62, ns$. Means and standard deviations for the joint profits are depicted in Table 11.

Table 11

Means and standard deviations for the analogical negotiation task in Study 4

Construal-level	Task order	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Low	analogical-adaptive	6,227	1,223	11
	adaptive-analogical	6,440	1,053	10
	total	6,329	1,122	21
High	analogical-adaptive	6,360	928	10
	adaptive-analogical	6,350	779	10
	total	6,355	834	20
Total	analogical-adaptive	6,290	1,068	21
	adaptive-analogical	6,395	903	20
	total	6,341	980	41

A two-way ANOVA was conducted to analyse the main effects of construal level and task order and the interaction effect between construal level and task order on the joint profit of the analogical negotiation task. Neither the main effect of construal level,

$F(1,37) < 1$, *ns*, nor the main effect of task order, $F(1,37) < 1$, *ns*, nor the interaction effect of construal level and task order, $F(1,37) < 1$, *ns*, are significant. Controlling for dyad gender does again not change any of the results. Hypothesis 1 is not supported for the analogical negotiation task either.

In the adaptive negotiation task, 11 dyads recognized the integrative potential and used it for their advantage. But as before, there is no difference between the two construal level conditions (six in the high-construal-level condition vs. five in the low-construal-level condition), $\chi^2(1, N = 38) < 1$, *ns*. Means and standard deviations for the joint profits of the adaptive negotiation task can be seen in Table 12.

Table 12

Means and standard deviations for the adaptive negotiation task in Study 4

Construal-level	Task order	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Low	analogical-adaptive	11,390	1,447	10
	adaptive-analogical	10,413	768	8
	total	10,956	1,265	18
High	analogical-adaptive	11,500	990	10
	adaptive-analogical	10,860	1,159	10
	total	11,180	1,099	20
Total	analogical-adaptive	11,445	1,208	20
	adaptive-analogical	10,661	1,003	18
	total	11,074	1,170	38

A two-way ANOVA was conducted to analyse the main effects of construal level and task order and the interaction effect between construal level and task order on the joint profit of the adaptive negotiation task. Neither the main effect of construal level, $F(1,34) < 1$, *ns*, nor the interaction effect of construal level and task order, $F(1,34) < 1$, *ns*, are significant. But the main effect of task order significantly influenced the joint profits, $F(1,34) = 4.77$, $p = .04$. Participants in the analogical-adaptive task order condition reached higher joint profits in the adaptive negotiation task than participants in the adaptive-analogical task order condition. Controlling for dyad gender does not change this result.

It is possible that after two comparably easier negotiation tasks participants in the analogical-adaptive task order condition could transfer their learnings to the last, adaptive negotiation task and improve their performance. Whereas participants in the adaptive-analogical task order condition may have found the switch between the single-issue negotiation task and the four-issues matrix task too hard and were not able to benefit from the previous negotiation experience.

In summary, there was no main effect of construal level on negotiation outcome present for any of the three negotiation tasks. Hypothesis 1 was not supported for Study 4.

Focus on interests (mediation effect)

Hypothesis 2 states that the effect of construal level on negotiation outcome is mediated by negotiators' focus on interests, operationalized in the analogical and the adaptive negotiation task as the judgement accuracy of the counterpart's profit schedule. Neither the outcome of the analogical nor of the adaptive negotiation task was influenced by the level of construal. Therefore, running mediation analyses with joint profit and judgement accuracy is fruitless. Hypothesis 2 is not supported for Study 4.

Transfer of learning

Hypothesis 3 states that construal level facilitates the occurrence of analogical as well as of adaptive transfer of learning. Although some kind of learning or transfer effect has presumably occurred between negotiation tasks for some participants, there was no effect of construal level on analogical or adaptive transfer of learning present. Hypothesis 3 is not supported for Study 4, either.

4.4.5 Discussion

According to the results of the manipulation check, we can assume that construal level manipulation was successful and participants adopted either a high or a low construal level prior to the three consecutive negotiation tasks. Nevertheless, we found no evidence for the influence of construal level on negotiation outcomes. There was no

main effect of construal level on the joint profits of the single-issue bean exercise, the analogical or the adaptive negotiation task, respectively. This is contradictory to the findings of Studies 1 and 2 and Task 1 of Study 3. It is especially surprising that we could not replicate the results of Study 3 regarding the single-issue, integrative bean exercise. The negotiation task in Study 4 was identical to the one employed in Study 3 except for the intended usage of the beans for Großartig GmbH. As the preliminary analyses show, there was no effect of role on joint profits present. So the slight change in role description can be disregarded. It is noteworthy, however, that in Study 4 11 out of the 34 dyads (32.35 %) who reached an agreement recognized the integrative potential. In Study 3 only seven out of the 38 dyads (18.42 %) recognized this potential for mutual gain. So in Study 4 the solution rate for the Black Calypso bean exercise was overall higher, but it was independent of the level of construal. In Study 3 solely participants in the high-construal-level condition recognized the integrative potential.

As can be seen in Table 8, the control variables DUTCH yielding and agency show significant correlations with the joint profit of Task 1. Running analyses with these variables as covariates though does not change the results in the slightest. It remains unclear why the effect of construal level could not be replicated for this specific negotiation task.

Consequently, with no main effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes present, we were not able to test for any mediation effects. Again, we are incapable of shedding more light on the underlying processes of construal level on negotiation outcomes.

Study 4 also shows no support regarding the occurrence of analogical and adaptive transfer of learning (Hypothesis 3). There was no main effect of construal level on any of the negotiation outcomes and not even an interaction effect between construal level and task order. Handling the analogical negotiation task instead of the adaptive one after the single-issue bean exercise in combination with a high construal level did not facilitate negotiation outcomes. Instead, we found a main effect for task order. Working on the adaptive negotiation task last, participants apparently applied some insights from the previous two negotiation tasks, which were more similar to each other, to this new and more difficult task, resulting in higher joint profits than those from participants who were confronted with the adaptive negotiation task before the analogical one.

5 General Discussion⁴

5.1 General findings

In negotiations, it is important to seek and give information regarding interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Rubin et al., 1994). The more information is exchanged and the more accurate judgements become, the better is the outcome of a negotiation (Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Applying CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope et al., 2007) to negotiations, the content of a negotiation can be mentally represented in varying ways: One can form concrete, lower level mental representations which focus on secondary features, that is positions on negotiation issues; or one can form more abstract, higher level representations emphasizing primary features, that is the underlying interests, allowing for a more holistic consideration and integration of the information at hand. Following this train of thought, we expected abstract representations of negotiation issues to lead to more information being exchanged and to better negotiation outcomes, the effect thereby being stable over time. We further expected a mediation of this main effect by measures of focus on interest. Lastly, we assumed that the effect of construal level facilitates the occurrence of analogical as well as of adaptive transfer of learning.

To summarize the results of the four empirical studies more clearly, we revert back to Table 1 from the overview of the present research and extend it by our three hypotheses, marking the studies in which each hypothesis was supported or at least partially backed up (see Table 13).

⁴ Parts of this chapter were published in an article in the *British Journal of Social Psychology*: Wening, S., Keith, N., & Abele, A. E. (2016). High construal level can help negotiators to reach integrative agreements: The role of information exchange and judgement accuracy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 55, 206-226. In the following, I will liberally use quotations from this article without explicitly marking each quote.

Table 13

Overview of used variables, measured effects, and supported hypotheses across all four studies

Variable / effect	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3	Study 4
<i>Construal level manipulation</i>				
Negotiation task itself	x	x		
Separate exercise			x	x
<i>Number of negotiations</i>				
Single negotiation	x			
Multiple negotiations		x	x	x
<i>Negotiation task format</i>				
Multi-issue matrix	x	x	x	x
Single-issue integrative			x	x
<i>Type of transfer</i>				
Analogical transfer		x		x
Adaptive transfer			x	x
<i>Judgement accuracy measure</i>				
Frequency of information exchange	x			
Blank matrix task		x	x	x
<i>Negotiation outcome</i>				
Joint profit	x	x	x	x
Supported hypotheses				
1: Main effect of construal level	x	x	x*	
2: Mediation effect of focus on interests	x	x		
3: Learning transfer between tasks				
Analogical		x		
Adaptive				

Note: x = applicable, x* = partly applicable

Concerning Hypothesis 1, the main effect of construal level, in line with previous findings (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi et al., 2010; Henderson & Trope, 2009), negotiators with a high construal level reached higher joint profits than negotiators with a low construal level in Studies 1 and 2 and Task 1 of Study 3. Unfortunately, this was not the case for Task 2 of Study 3 and all of Study 4. The results of the influence of a high construal level on negotiation outcomes are not consistent across studies and thus inconclusive. Construal level can obviously positively affect negotiation outcomes, but the effect is not always present. The question remains why this is the case? One possible explanation that comes to mind is the manner in which construal level is manipulated. In Studies 1 and 2 we manipulated the negotiation materials themselves, in Studies 3 and 4 we used the thought exercise by Freitas et al. (2004), which has been proven to be successful many times (Agrawal & Wan, 2009; Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita & Roberts, 2010; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Giacomantonio, De Dreu, &

Mannetti, 2010; Gong & Medin, 2012; Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), but that was unrelated to the following negotiations.

Taking a look at the study by Henderson and Trope (2009), they used a self-developed thought exercise to manipulate construal level. Participants were asked to think more abstractly or concretely about their negotiation, meaning they should think about the negotiation issues at hand and either generate specific, subordinate descriptions of these issues or general, superordinate descriptions. So the manipulation was directly related to the negotiation task. A manipulation check was not included. Following the manipulation of construal level, participants had to actually negotiate with each other.

Our first two studies as well as the one by Henderson and Trope (2009) used a construal level manipulation that was directly associated with the negotiation task and, in addition, participants had to engage in and experience an actual negotiation. Considering these circumstances, it is feasible that concerning negotiations, a construal level manipulation that is related to the task at hand may be stronger and more effective in eliciting positive outcomes.

Regarding the study by Giacomantonio, De Dreu, and Mannetti (2010), they conducted three experiments in total and manipulated construal level in the first two experiments with a procedure that asked participants to write down ten activities or events in which they could have been involved in the near or in the distant future, thus unrelated to the negotiation task. In both experiments participants did not have to negotiate with a counterpart at all, there was no interaction. Only fixed-pie perceptions were measured. So it remains uncertain if this kind of manipulation of construal level would have been strong enough to positively influence an actual negotiation and its outcome. In experiment three the unrelated thought exercise by Freitas et al. (2004) was employed to manipulate construal level without a separate manipulation check and participants actually engaged in a face-to-face negotiation task, resulting in better outcomes for participants with a high construal level. This at least contradicts the findings of our Study 4. It is definitely evident that there is a need for further research concerning the manner of construal level manipulation in the context of negotiations and their strength to effectively and lastingly influence negotiation processes and outcomes.

Concerning Hypothesis 2, the mediation effect of focus on interests, both study 1 and 2 (using different operationalizations) showed that the effect of construal level was

mediated by a focus on negotiators' interests. It seems that a high construal level fosters concentrating on the structure of a negotiation task – the forest, representing the underlying interests – the exchange of information, and thereby the achievement of integrative outcomes. In short, high-level mental construals help negotiators to not get tangled in the trees and to get the entire orange and not only half of it.

As there was no main effect of construal level present in Task 2 of Study 3 and all of Study 4, we were incapable of replicating these findings and validating them even further. Nevertheless, based on the results of Studies 1 and 2, we believe that in the event of construal level positively influencing negotiation outcomes, the effect is mediated by negotiators' focus on interests.

Additionally, we found some evidence that the manipulation of construal level can have beneficial effects for consecutive negotiations. In Study 2, the effect of construal level on the outcome of Task 2 was mediated by the focus on interests in Task 1, implying a transfer effect from one negotiation task to another and a stability of the effect of construal level over time. It would be interesting to clarify whether this effect is due to actual learning of negotiators, that is whether participants gained insight into principles of negotiations (i.e., a focus on interests) and then actively applied them in Task 2. Steinel et al. (2007) showed that explicit advice on negotiation principles alone was not sufficient to improve negotiation outcomes, whereas our construal level manipulation, using abstract matrices, apparently was. We believe that the transfer effect was due to construal level and a resulting focus on interests, but we cannot ultimately rule out alternative explanations. For example, the different negotiation materials might have elicited a certain negotiation style in Task 1 which worked well for the negotiating parties. Consequently, it was applied to Task 2. As the basic structure of the two negotiation tasks (matrix) was identical, this could have proved to be a successful strategy. This might explain why participants in the high-construal-level condition in Study 3 were unable to reach higher outcomes in Task 2 than participants in the low-construal-level condition. The negotiation tasks were of an adaptive nature and not identical as in Study 2. In Study 4 one could argue that the declared analogical tasks, although each negotiator only had one underlying interest, differed in their task format. One was a text-based exercise, the other a matrix task. Participants might have

perceived them more as adaptive tasks than analogical ones, thereby maybe impairing analogical transfer of learning. So if there had been a main effect of construal level on Task 1, but not on the analogical or the adaptive task, the above explanation might still apply. Unfortunately, as there was no main effect of construal level present during Study 4 at all, no support for any kind of transfer of learning effect based on construal level manipulation is provided. Both explanations mentioned for the transfer effect in Study 2 are plausible and we cannot draw a final conclusion regarding this issue.

In summary, concerning Hypothesis 3 and the facilitation of analogical and adaptive transfer of learning, both Studies 3 and 4 show no support for this assumption and Study 2 shows only slight support for analogical transfer of learning. A high construal level does not seem to positively influence transfer of learning between negotiation tasks and, if it does, only when the two tasks are highly identical in structure and task format. Future research is needed to investigate if and under which conditions the manipulation of construal level can actually enable transfer of learning between negotiation tasks.

At least, the present Studies 1 and 2 showed that influencing the construal level of negotiators can be achieved by manipulating the negotiation materials themselves and not only by an independent thought exercise, as has been shown in previous research. On the contrary, it has been shown to work even better. As already noted, this kind of manipulation also has some limitations with regard to interpretability of findings. As negotiators in the high construal level-condition only received a minimum of information (and this information was essential to the negotiation task), the effect on information exchange may be attributed to this lack of content (i.e., no provision of potentially distracting non-essential information as in the low construal level-condition) and not construal level per se. Yet, at least circumstantial evidence against this possibility is provided by our manipulation check. Moreover, in Study 2, the effect of construal level transferred to a second, content-based negotiation where all participants ran the risk of getting lost in details non-essential to the negotiation task. This also suggests that our negotiation materials directly influenced construal levels. All in all, the evidence is in favour of our interpretation that materials led to the adoption of different construal levels but we cannot entirely rule out other possibilities.

Lastly, we used the terms interests and positions in line with the seminal work by Fisher and Ury (1981). We further operationalized interests via the pay-off structure of the profit schedules, with the issues where the most points could be gained constituting the most important concerns. This or similar approaches are widely used in negotiation research (cf. De Dreu et al., 2000; Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Steinel et al., 2007; Thompson, 1991; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) but have one major disadvantage. Although participants were instructed to maximize their own gains along the lines of the pay-off structure assigned to them, we cannot preclude the possibility that they pursued alternative or additional superordinate interests.

5.2 Theoretical and practical implications

Construal-level theory is a theory whose predictions have been supported in a variety of domains, such as visual perception (Liberman & Förster, 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), person perception (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Pronin & Ross, 2006), self-control (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levi-Sagi, 2006), and even perception of music (Hansen & Melzner, 2014), confirming the broad applicability of the theory. In line with previous studies (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi et al., 2010; Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006; Trope & Henderson, 2009), our research demonstrates that CLT can also be fruitfully applied to negotiations. CLT and its assumptions can help to predict and explain negotiation outcomes. In this context, our research additionally sheds light on the question why this is the case, namely because a high construal level instigates a focus on interests during negotiations. This focus on interests has long been proposed as being key to beneficial outcomes in negotiation research (Fisher & Ury, 1981); our studies, in a way, connect negotiation research, which has a more applied focus, with basic cognitive processes assumed in CLT.

From a practical perspective, the result that the mode of presentation of negotiation material alone (i.e., abstract vs. concrete material) can instigate high versus low construal levels that subsequently affect negotiation processes and outcomes has

implications for the delivery of negotiation training. Trainers may use concrete negotiation material with the well-meant intention to design training tasks as illustrative and lively as possible. Our results indicate, however, that using concrete (and possibly more lively) material can actually be counterproductive as concrete exercises lead to low-level representations and thereby distract from exchanging essential information (i.e., focus on interests) during negotiations. A more promising approach may be to present abstract negotiation material in the beginning of training. In a next step, concrete tasks can be used to implement and consolidate the acquired negotiation skills. The effect of abstract versus concrete material on negotiation outcomes is also noteworthy with regard to trainability of negotiation skills. A study by Steinel et al. (2007) demonstrated that only a combination of experience (i.e., negotiating twice) and advice (direct instructions on overcoming fixed-pie perceptions and exchanging information), but neither experience alone nor advice alone, led to improved negotiation processes and outcomes. In our Studies 1 and 2, the mere presentation of negotiation materials in an abstract way led to better negotiation outcomes. Moreover, in Study 2 this effect transferred to a second, more complex task, indicating a strong and lasting impact of the construal level manipulation. It seems that the goal to direct trainees' attention to essential information during negotiations may be better achieved by removal of non-essential information (i.e., concrete details) from the negotiation task than by provision of explicit instructions to focus on essential information of the task (i.e., advice condition in the Steinel et al. study). Future research may further explore this possibility and test more directly whether trainees can in fact gain better insight into the structure of negotiations when confronted with abstract material.

In line with previous findings, in Study 3 the main effect of construal level in Task 1 could be elicited without manipulating the negotiation material itself, supporting the assumption that a separate exercise to focus one's thoughts before a negotiation is also sufficient to adopt a beneficial mindset. This approach would also be more suitable for everyday negotiations, where there is always some kind of context and content present. Therefore, thinking even more practical and in terms of everyday life, we suggest that negotiators, whenever they enter negotiations, should attempt to adopt a high construal level and focus on why they want something. Although our results are partially inconclusive, they seem to suggest that adopting a high construal level can positively

influence negotiation outcomes or at least increase the possibility of reaching a win-win agreement. Consequently, by adopting a high construal level, negotiators have a lot to win and nothing to lose, so it is worth a try.

5.3 Directions for future research

As already indicated above, there are several aspects future research could and should look into. First, there is the issue of construal level manipulation with regard to negotiations. Not all kinds of manipulation seem appropriate enough to elicit strong and lasting high or low construal levels. Research could address the question of what constitutes a suitable construal level manipulation and maybe even test different manipulation techniques against each other within one study. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine if an actual exercise, like we used in Studies 3 and 4, is necessary to induce a high construal level or if explicit advice to think abstractly and focus on the “why” would be sufficient as well. Or maybe a combination of explicit advice and feedback as in the Steinel et al. (2007) study is vital. Also, future research could take a look at possibilities and methods to trigger high construal levels in daily life.

On top, a more suitable and reliable manipulation check for construal levels would be nice as well.

Second, future studies may take a closer look at the negotiation process initiated by a construal level manipulation and assess negotiators’ focus on interests using additional process and outcome measures to cross-validate our findings.

Third, we operationalized interests via the pay-off structure of the profit schedules, with the issues where the most points could be gained constituting the most important concerns. Future research, using similar approaches, may try and find another way to operationalize interests within the negotiation to ensure that participants actually focus on them and not on some alternative or additional interests of their own.

Fourth, additional research is needed to further explore the transfer effect between negotiation tasks and its underlying mechanisms. When does it occur and under what circumstances? Are participants actually gaining insight into the principles of negotiations due to construal level manipulation and applying these learnings to subsequent negotiations or are they rather adopting a certain negotiation style that incidentally (or not) facilitates future negotiations and leads to better outcomes?

Fifth, we already stated that negotiations can be viewed as disjunctive tasks (Steiner, 1972). If one of the negotiators gains an understanding of the task and its underlying interests, that should lead to a better or even a win-win outcome. Following this line of thought, one could argue that only one of the negotiators needs to adopt a high construal level to recognize the integrative potential of a negotiation and not both of them. Future studies might research how well pairs of negotiators where one negotiator adopts a high construal level and the other a low construal level perform in contrast to pairs of negotiators where both adopt a high or a low construal level, respectively.

Lastly, it would be interesting to learn if there are other ways negotiators can profit from a high construal level apart from a focus on interests. For instance, can construal level influence the style of communication during a negotiation, the kind of emotions that are experienced or the trust in the other party?

6 Conclusion

We are all negotiators. Negotiations are not limited to business life, they are an essential part of day-to-day life. Many decisions are the result of some form of negotiation. Unfortunately, studies show that agreements are often win-lose or even outright lose-lose, we leave money on the table (Nadler et al., 2003; Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Dissatisfaction, frustration and anger are predestined, further conflict and disharmony are to be expected (Rubin et al., 1994). To reach mutual beneficial agreements, a focus on one's own underlying interests and those of the other party is vital (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Thompson, 1991). Interests express why negotiators want something. However, negotiators instead often focus on what they want, their specific positions regarding the negotiated issues, and thus fail to reach optimal outcomes.

According to CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope et al., 2007), psychological distance is one important determinant of whether primary, essential characteristics of an event or secondary, peripheral characteristics are used as the basis of evaluation. The more psychologically distant an event is – because it takes place in the future, is less likely to occur, or happens to people that are unlike ourselves – the more this event will be represented at higher levels of abstraction. Transferring this concept of high and low construal levels to negotiations, negotiators' underlying interests can be considered as the primary, core features of a negotiation and the expressed positions as secondary, incidental features (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010). CLT predicts that negotiators adopting a high construal level should be more likely to focus on the underlying interests than the positions and consequently be more likely to exchange information regarding their interests, arrive at more accurate judgements regarding the other party's interests, and reach better outcomes.

So far, only few studies have applied CLT to negotiations to examine the influence of construal levels on negotiation processes and outcomes. Thus, the present research aimed at substantiating a previously found main effect of construal level on negotiation outcomes, at showing that this effect of construal level is mediated by a focus on interests, and at demonstrating that construal level can facilitate analogical as well as adaptive transfer of learning.

We conducted four original, empirical studies whose results can be summarized as follows: First, a high construal level can help negotiators to see the forest and not get tangled in the trees. Adopting a high construal level can result in higher outcomes. As this main effect was not present in all four studies, future research is needed to test the conditions under which this main effect occurs. Second, whenever this main effect of construal level was present, it was mediated by a focus on interests. Negotiators with a high construal level shifted their attention to the primary features of the negotiation, the underlying interests, and away from the secondary features, the positions. Third, a high construal level does apparently not facilitate analogical or adaptive transfer of learning. We only found some evidence that the effect of construal level is stable over time when the negotiation tasks are highly similar in structure and task format.

In conclusion, the research presented in this thesis substantiates the previously found main effect of construal level and sheds some light on the underlying mediation process. Regarding the occurrence of analogical or adaptive transfer of learning, the results are inconclusive and future research is needed.

Nevertheless, we would advise negotiators to adopt a high construal level before entering negotiations, as they have a lot to win and nothing to lose, so it is worth a try.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Study 1

Appendix B: Study 2

Appendix C: Study 3

Appendix D: Study 4

Appendix A

Modified category versus exemplar task of the pilot study

Instructions low-construal-level condition

Instructions high-construal-level condition

Negotiation materials low-construal-level condition (male version)

Negotiation materials high-construal-level condition (female version)

Assoziationsaufgabe

Bei dieser Aufgabe wird dir eine Reihe von Wörtern vorgegeben. Ziel dieser Aufgabe ist es, zu jedem der vorgegebenen Wörter eine Assoziation zu finden. Dieses assoziierte Wort soll **entweder** einen übergeordneten Begriff (Kategorie) **oder** ein konkretes Beispiel darstellen. Für einen übergeordneten Begriff stelle dir dabei die Frage „Der Begriff ist ein Beispiel wofür?“. Für ein konkretes Beispiel stelle dir die Frage „Ein Beispiel für den Begriff ist was?“. Für welche der beiden Möglichkeiten du dich jeweils entscheidest, bleibt dir überlassen. Notiere jeweils einfach das erste Wort, das dir einfällt und welches entweder einen übergeordneten Begriff oder ein konkretes Beispiel darstellt.

Beispiel: Das vorgegebene Wort ist „Hund“. Die Assoziationen „Tier“ oder sogar „Lebewesen“ wären in diesem Fall übergeordnete Begriffe. Die Assoziationen „Pudel“ oder sogar „Pluto“ (die Disney-Figur) wären konkrete Beispiele. Die Assoziationen Katze, Hundeleine oder Fressnapf hingegen wären weder noch und sollten deshalb nicht notiert werden.

Bilde nun bitte zu jedem Wort einen übergeordneten Begriff (Kategorie) **oder** ein konkretes Beispiel!

Limonade	_____	Münze	_____
Computer	_____	Restaurant	_____
Zeitung	_____	Baum	_____
Professor	_____	Spiel	_____
Pasta	_____	Gemälde	_____
Buch	_____	Tasche	_____
Sport	_____	Wasser	_____
Tisch	_____	Universität	_____
Schuh	_____	Tanz	_____
Film	_____	Süßigkeit	_____
Stift	_____	Gitarre	_____
Abgeordneter	_____	Berg	_____
Mittagessen	_____	Plakat	_____
Zug	_____	Seifenoper	_____
Post	_____	Fluss	_____
Schauspieler	_____	Mathematik	_____
Bier	_____	König	_____
Telefon	_____	Wal	_____
Seife	_____	Sänger	_____
Obst	_____	Lastwagen	_____

Jetzt werde ich Ihnen die Anweisung für den weiteren Ablauf vorlesen. Alle Punkte dieser Anweisung erhalten Sie auch schriftlich.

Sie werden in den nächsten ca. 20 Minuten an einer Verhandlungsübung teilnehmen. Dabei übernehmen Sie entweder den Part eines Käufers oder Verkäufers und sollen sich mit Ihrem Verhandlungspartner auf einen Kauf einigen. Sie haben 5 Minuten Zeit, um sich vorzubereiten und danach 15 Minuten für die Verhandlung.

Sollten Sie nach 15 Minuten zu keiner Einigung gekommen sein, werde ich Sie auffordern, jeweils einen letzten Vorschlag einzubringen oder die Verhandlung ergebnislos abzubrechen. Es wäre aber auf jeden Fall gut, wenn Sie sich einigen würden.

Vor Ihnen liegen zwei Blätter: Blättern Sie jetzt zuerst auf die zweite Seite ihrer Unterlagen. Sie sehen auf diesem Blatt eine Tabelle. Die Tabelle enthält in der ersten Zeile alle Verhandlungsaspekte, in welchen Sie Einigkeit mit Ihrem Verhandlungspartner erzielen sollen. Zur besseren Übersichtlichkeit sind diese Aspekte mit Ziffern versehen. In den einzelnen Spalten sehen Sie alle möglichen Optionen. Neben jeder Option steht eine Punktzahl in Klammern. Aus diesen Punkten wird am Ende der Verhandlung Ihr jeweiliges Gesamtergebnis errechnet. Ihr Ziel ist es, eine möglichst hohe Gesamtsumme zu erreichen.

Während der Verhandlung dürfen Sie sich über jede beliebige Information mündlich austauschen, allerdings dürfen Sie Ihr Blatt nicht Ihrem Verhandlungspartner zeigen.

Wenn Sie sich mit Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben, tragen Sie das Ergebnis bitte in den dafür vorgesehenen Kasten ein, z.B. 1A, 2B, 3C, 4D, 5E. Absprachen außerhalb der vorgesehenen Optionen sind nicht möglich.

Blättern Sie jetzt zurück auf die erste Seite. Dort finden Sie allgemeine Informationen über Ihre eigene Situation und Ihren Verhandlungspartner.

Lesen Sie jetzt bitte Ihre näheren Informationen, bereiten Sie sich vor und beginnen Sie dann mit der Verhandlung.

Jetzt werde ich Ihnen die Anweisung für den weiteren Ablauf vorlesen. Alle Punkte dieser Anweisung erhalten Sie auch schriftlich.

Sie werden in den nächsten ca. 20 Minuten an einer Verhandlungsübung teilnehmen. Ihr Ziel ist es, sich mit Ihrem Verhandlungspartner zu einigen. Sie haben 5 Minuten Zeit, um sich vorzubereiten und danach 15 Minuten für die Verhandlung. Sollten Sie nach 15 Minuten zu keiner Einigung gekommen sein, werde ich Sie auffordern, jeweils einen letzten Vorschlag einzubringen oder die Verhandlung ergebnislos abzubrechen. Es wäre aber auf jeden Fall gut, wenn Sie sich einigen würden.

Vor Ihnen liegt ein Blatt: Sie sehen auf diesem eine Tabelle. Die Tabelle enthält in der ersten Zeile alle Bereiche, in welchen Sie Einigkeit mit Ihrem Verhandlungspartner erzielen sollen. Für jeden Bereich gibt es verschiedene Optionen, die Sie in der ersten Spalte sehen. Die Zahlen in den weiteren Spalten sind die Punkte, die Sie für die verschiedenen Optionen in den einzelnen Bereichen bekommen. Aus diesen Punkten wird am Ende der Verhandlung Ihr jeweiliges Gesamtergebnis errechnet. Ihr Ziel ist es, eine möglichst hohe Gesamtsumme zu erreichen.

Während der Verhandlung dürfen Sie sich über jede beliebige Information mündlich austauschen, allerdings dürfen Sie Ihr Blatt nicht Ihrem Verhandlungspartner zeigen.

Wenn Sie sich mit Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben, tragen Sie das Ergebnis bitte in den dafür vorgesehenen Kasten ein, z.B. 1A, 2B, 3C, 4D, 5E. Absprachen außerhalb der vorgesehenen Optionen sind nicht möglich.

Bereiten Sie sich jetzt bitte vor und beginnen Sie mit der Verhandlung.

Einkäufer

In der folgenden Verhandlung sind Sie **Herr Schmidt, Einkäufer eines Darmstädter Geschenke- und Schreibwarenladens**. Sie wurden von ihrem Großhändler wegen einer besonderen Rabattaktion angeschrieben, in deren Rahmen ein ausgewähltes Produkt (**EasyPad Schreibblöcke**) abgesetzt werden soll.

Ihr Verhandlungspartner Herr Schneider ist Verkäufer des Großhändlers. Sie sollen in den nächsten 15 Minuten zu einer Einigung bezüglich des Geschäftes kommen, dabei müssen fünf Punkte geklärt werden:

1. Preisnachlass: Da es sich um eine Rabattaktion handelt, wird der Großhändler Ihnen sicher einen Preisnachlass anbieten. Sie sollen sich auf die Höhe dieses Nachlasses einigen.
2. Stückzahl: Sie sollen sich auf die Menge einigen, die abgenommen wird.
3. Liefertermin: Sie sollen sich einigen, bis wann die bestellte Menge geliefert wird.
4. Sortiment: In der Aktion werden **Schreibblöcke** aus verschiedenen Preisklassen angeboten. Sie sollen sich einigen, in welchem Verhältnis hochpreisige und niedrigpreisige **Blöcke** bestellt werden.
5. Zahlungsziel: Sie sollen sich einigen, bis wann die Lieferung bezahlt werden muss.

Das Geschäft mit Herrn Schneider ist sehr wichtig für Sie, auch ihr Vorgesetzter wünscht einen erfolgreichen Abschluss.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **15 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Preisnachlass, Stückzahl, Liefertermin, Sortiment und Zahlungsziel.
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Preisnachlass z.B. 3%, 5%, 10%, 15% und 20%.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. 3% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen z.B. 300 Punkte, 20% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen dagegen schon 1.500 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - o wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 1.500 + 900 + 600 = 5.400$ Punkte
 - o oder: $1A (300) + 2B (1.200) + 3C (1.500) + 4D (600) + 5E (1.000) = 4.600$ Punkte

Käufer	1. Preisnachlass	2. Stückzahl	3. Liefertermin	4. Sortiment (teuer : billig)	5. Zahlungsziel
A	3% (300)	100 (1.000)	3 Tage (3.500)	20:80 (1.500)	1 Woche (200)
B	5% (600)	300 (1.200)	5 Tage (2.500)	40:60 (1.200)	2 Wochen (400)
C	10% (900)	600 (1.500)	1 Woche (1.500)	50:50 (900)	3 Wochen (600)
D	15% (1.200)	1.000 (2.500)	2 Wochen (1.200)	60:40 (600)	4 Wochen (800)
E	20% (1.500)	1.500 (3.500)	3 Wochen (1.000)	80:20 (300)	5 Wochen (1.000)

Platz für Ihre Notizen:

Ihre Einigung:				
1	2	3	4	5
A	A	A	A	A
B	B	B	B	B
C	C	C	C	C
D	D	D	D	D
E	E	E	E	E

Bitte ankreuzen!

Verkäufer

In der folgenden Verhandlung sind Sie **Herr Schneider, Verkäufer eines Großhändlers für Geschenk- und Schreibwaren**. Sie haben ihre besten Kunden wegen einer besonderen Rabattaktion angeschrieben, in deren Rahmen ein ausgewähltes Produkt (**EasyPad Schreibblöcke**) abgesetzt werden soll.

Ihr Verhandlungspartner Herr Schmidt ist Einkäufer eines Darmstädter Geschenk- und Schreibwarenladens. Sie sollen in den nächsten 15 Minuten zu einer Einigung bezüglich des Geschäftes kommen, dabei müssen fünf Punkte geklärt werden:

6. Preisnachlass: Da es sich um eine Rabattaktion handelt, gibt es einen Preisnachlass. Sie sollen sich auf die Höhe dieses Nachlasses einigen.
7. Stückzahl: Sie sollen sich auf die Menge einigen, die abgenommen wird.
8. Liefertermin: Sie sollen sich einigen, bis wann die bestellte Menge geliefert wird.
9. Sortiment: In der Aktion werden **Schreibblöcke** aus verschiedenen Preisklassen angeboten. Sie sollen sich einigen, in welchem Verhältnis hochpreisige und niedrigpreisige **Blöcke** bestellt werden.
10. Zahlungsziel: Sie sollen sich einigen, bis wann die Lieferung bezahlt werden muss.

Das Geschäft mit Herrn Schmidt ist sehr wichtig für Sie, auch ihr Vorgesetzter wünscht einen erfolgreichen Abschluss.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **15 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Preisnachlass, Stückzahl, Liefertermin, Sortiment und Zahlungsziel.
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Preisnachlass z.B. 3%, 5%, 10%, 15% und 20%.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. 3% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen z.B. 1.500 Punkte, 20% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen dagegen nur 300 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - o wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 600 + 900 + 1.500 = 5.400$ Punkte
 - o oder: $1A (1.500) + 2B (1.200) + 3C (600) + 4D (1.200) + 5E (1.000) = 5.500$ Punkte

Verkäufer	1. Preisnachlass	2. Stückzahl	3. Liefertermin	4. Sortiment (teuer : billig)	5. Zahlungsziel
A	3% (1.500)	100 (1.000)	3 Tage (200)	20:80 (300)	1 Woche (3.500)
B	5% (1.200)	300 (1.200)	5 Tage (400)	40:60 (600)	2 Wochen (2.500)
C	10% (900)	600 (1.500)	1 Woche (600)	50:50 (900)	3 Wochen (1.500)
D	15% (600)	1.000 (2.500)	2 Wochen (800)	60:40 (1.200)	4 Wochen (1.200)
E	20% (300)	1.500 (3.500)	3 Wochen (1.000)	80:20 (1.500)	5 Wochen (1.000)

Platz für Ihre Notizen:

Ihre Einigung:					
1	2	3	4	5	
A	A	A	A	A	
B	B	B	B	B	
C	C	C	C	C	
D	D	D	D	D	
E	E	E	E	E	

Bitte ankreuzen!

In der folgenden 15-minütigen Verhandlung sollen Sie zu einer Einigung mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin kommen, dabei müssen Sie sich für jeden der fünf Bereiche auf eine Option einigen.

Die Verhandlung ist sehr wichtig für Sie, ein erfolgreicher Abschluss wäre gut.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Bereiche (d.h. Bereiche 1 bis 5), über die Sie verhandeln müssen.
- Für jeden dieser Bereiche gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten: Option A, B, C, D und E.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. Option A im Bereich 1 bringt Ihnen z.B. 300 Punkte, Option E bringt Ihnen dagegen schon 1.500 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - o wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 1.500 + 900 + 600 = 5.400$ Punkte
 - o oder: $1A (300) + 2B (1.200) + 3C (1.500) + 4D (600) + 5E (1.000) = 4.600$ Punkte

Option	Bereich 1	Bereich 2	Bereich 3	Bereich 4	Bereich 5
A	300	1.000	3.500	1.500	200
B	600	1.200	2.500	1.200	400
C	900	1.500	1.500	900	600
D	1.200	2.500	1.200	600	800
E	1.500	3.500	1.000	300	1.000

Platz für Ihre Notizen:

Ihre Einigung:				
1	2	3	4	5
A	A	A	A	A
B	B	B	B	B
C	C	C	C	C
D	D	D	D	D
E	E	E	E	E

Bitte ankreuzen!

In der folgenden 15-minütigen Verhandlung sollen Sie zu einer Einigung mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin kommen, dabei müssen Sie sich für jeden der fünf Bereiche auf eine Option einigen.

Die Verhandlung ist sehr wichtig für Sie, ein erfolgreicher Abschluss wäre gut.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Bereiche (d.h. Bereiche 1 bis 5), über die Sie verhandeln müssen.
- Für jeden dieser Bereiche gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten: Option A, B, C, D und E.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. Option A im Bereich 1 bringt Ihnen z.B. 1.500 Punkte, Option E bringt Ihnen dagegen nur 300 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - o wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 600 + 900 + 1.500 = 5.400$ Punkte
 - o oder: $1A (1.500) + 2B (1.200) + 3C (600) + 4D (1.200) + 5E (1.000) = 5.500$ Punkte

Option	Bereich 1	Bereich 2	Bereich 3	Bereich 4	Bereich 5
A	1.500	1.000	200	300	3.500
B	1.200	1.200	400	600	2.500
C	900	1.500	600	900	1.500
D	600	2.500	800	1.200	1.200
E	300	3.500	1.000	1.500	1.000

Platz für Ihre Notizen:

Ihre Einigung:

1	2	3	4	5
A	A	A	A	A
B	B	B	B	B
C	C	C	C	C
D	D	D	D	D
E	E	E	E	E

Bitte ankreuzen!

Appendix B

Instructions low-construal-level condition

Negotiation materials Task 1 low-construal-level condition

Instructions high-construal-level condition

Negotiation materials Task 1 high-construal-level condition (example car)

Negotiation materials Task 2 both conditions (example kitchen)

Blank matrix task low-construal-level condition

Blank matrix task high-construal-level condition (example car 5 issues)

Auf dem Blatt vor Ihnen sehen Sie eine Tabelle. Die Tabelle enthält in der ersten Zeile alle Bereiche, in denen Sie sich einigen sollen. Zur besseren Übersichtlichkeit sind die Bereiche mit Ziffern versehen. In der ersten Spalte sehen Sie alle möglichen Optionen (A-E). Die Zahlen in den weiteren Spalten sind die Punkte, die Ihnen die jeweilige Option im entsprechenden Bereich einbringt. Aus diesen Punkten wird am Ende der Verhandlung Ihr jeweiliges Gesamtergebnis errechnet. Ihr Ziel ist es, eine möglichst hohe Gesamtsumme zu erreichen.

Während der Verhandlung dürfen Sie sich über jede beliebige Information mündlich austauschen, allerdings dürfen Sie Ihr Blatt nicht Ihrem Verhandlungspartner zeigen.

Wenn Sie sich geeinigt haben, tragen Sie das Ergebnis bitte in den dafür vorgesehenen Kasten ein, z.B. 1A, 2B, 3C, 4D, 5E. Absprachen außerhalb der vorgesehenen Optionen sind nicht möglich.

Sie haben 5 Minuten Zeit, sich die Instruktionen durchzulesen und auf die Verhandlung vorzubereiten. Danach haben Sie 15 Minuten Zeit für die Verhandlung.

In der folgenden 15-minütigen Verhandlung sollen Sie zu einer Einigung mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner kommen. Dabei müssen Sie sich für jeden der fünf Bereiche auf eine Option einigen.

Sie haben 5 Minuten Zeit, um sich vorzubereiten.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Bereiche (d.h. Bereiche 1 bis 5), über die Sie verhandeln müssen.
- Für jeden dieser Bereiche gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten: Option A, B, C, D und E.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. Option A im Bereich 1 bringt Ihnen z.B. 300 Punkte, Option E bringt Ihnen dagegen schon 1.500 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 1.500 + 900 + 600 = 5.400$ Punkte

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
A	300	1.000	3.500	1.500	200
B	600	1.200	2.500	1.200	400
C	900	1.500	1.500	900	600
D	1.200	2.500	1.200	600	800
E	1.500	3.500	1.000	300	1.000

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungsaspekte	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Gewählte Option (A-E)					

In der folgenden 15-minütigen Verhandlung sollen Sie zu einer Einigung mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner kommen. Dabei müssen Sie sich für jeden der fünf Bereiche auf eine Option einigen.

Sie haben 5 Minuten Zeit, um sich vorzubereiten.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Bereiche (d.h. Bereiche 1 bis 5), über die Sie verhandeln müssen.
- Für jeden dieser Bereiche gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten: Option A, B, C, D und E
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. Option A im Bereich 1 bringt Ihnen z.B. 1.500 Punkte, Option E bringt Ihnen dagegen 300 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 600 + 900 + 1.500 = 5.400$ Punkte

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
A	1.500	1.000	200	300	3.500
B	1.200	1.200	400	600	2.500
C	900	1.500	600	900	1.500
D	600	2.500	800	1.200	1.200
E	300	3.500	1.000	1.500	1.000

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungsaspekte	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Gewählte Option (A-E)					

Vor Ihnen liegen zwei Blätter. Blättern Sie zunächst auf die zweite Seite Ihrer Unterlagen. Die Tabelle die Sie dort sehen, enthält in der ersten Zeile alle Verhandlungsaspekte, in denen Sie sich einigen sollen. Zur besseren Übersichtlichkeit sind diese Aspekte mit Ziffern versehen. In den einzelnen Spalten sehen Sie alle möglichen Optionen (A-E). Neben jeder Option steht eine Punktzahl in Klammern. Aus diesen Punkten wird am Ende der Verhandlung Ihr jeweiliges Gesamtergebnis errechnet. Ihr Ziel ist es, eine möglichst hohe Gesamtsumme zu erreichen.

Während der Verhandlung dürfen Sie sich über jede beliebige Information mündlich austauschen, allerdings dürfen Sie Ihre Blätter nicht Ihrem Verhandlungspartner zeigen.

Wenn Sie sich geeinigt haben, tragen Sie das Ergebnis bitte in den dafür vorgesehenen Kasten ein, z.B. 1A, 2B, 3C, 4D, 5E. Absprachen außerhalb der vorgesehenen Optionen sind nicht möglich.

Auf der ersten Seite Ihrer Unterlagen finden Sie allgemeine Informationen über die Verhandlungssituation in der Sie sich befinden.

Sie haben 5 Minuten Zeit, sich die Instruktionen durchzulesen und auf die Verhandlung vorzubereiten. Danach haben Sie 15 Minuten Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Käufer

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie möchten sich ein neues Auto kaufen. In einem Autohaus haben Sie bereits Ihr Traumauto entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie noch mit dem Verkäufer zu einer Einigung in verschiedenen Punkten kommen:

1. Preisnachlass: Da Sie bereits zum zweiten Mal ein Auto in diesem Autohaus kaufen, wird Ihnen der Händler sicher einen Preisnachlass gewähren. Sie sollen sich auf die Höhe dieses Nachlasses einigen.
2. Farbe: Einigen Sie sich auf eine Farbe, in der das Auto ohne Aufschlag geliefert werden soll.
-
3. Liefertermin: Einigen Sie sich darauf, wann das Auto geliefert wird.
-
4. Extras: Einigen Sie sich auf die Anzahl der Extras (Extras sind z.B. Sitzheizung und Parkassistent), die Sie ohne zusätzliche Kosten erhalten.
-
5. Zahlungsziel: Wann muss das Auto bezahlt werden? Einigen Sie sich auf einen Termin.

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, da Sie schon immer genau dieses Auto haben wollten.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **15 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Preisnachlass, Farbe, Liefertermin, Extras und Zahlungsziel
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Preisnachlass z.B. 3%, 5%, 10%, 15% und 20%.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. 3% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen z.B. 300 Punkte, 20% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen dagegen schon 1.500 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 1.500 + 900 + 600 = 5.400$ Punkte

Käufer	1. Preisnachlass		2. Farbe		3. Liefertermin		4. Extras		5. Zahlungsziel	
A	3%	(300)	rot	(1.000)	1 Woche	(3.500)	5	(1.500)	4 Wochen	(200)
B	5%	(600)	weiß	(1.200)	2 Wochen	(2.500)	4	(1.200)	5 Wochen	(400)
C	10%	(900)	blau	(1.500)	3 Wochen	(1.500)	3	(900)	6 Wochen	(600)
D	15%	(1.200)	schwarz	(2.500)	4 Wochen	(1.200)	2	(600)	7 Wochen	(800)
E	20%	(1.500)	grau	(3.500)	5 Wochen	(1.000)	1	(300)	8 Wochen	(1.000)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungsaspekte	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Gewählte Option (A-E)					

Verkäufer

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind Verkäufer in einem Autohaus. Ein Kunde hat bei Ihnen sein Traumauto entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie zu einer Einigung in verschiedenen Punkten kommen:

1. Preisnachlass: Da der Kunde bereits zum zweiten Mal ein Auto in diesem Autohaus kauft, gibt es einen Preisnachlass. Sie sollen sich auf die Höhe dieses Nachlasses einigen.
2. Farbe: Einigen Sie sich auf eine Farbe, in der das Auto ohne Aufschlag geliefert werden soll.
3. Liefertermin: Einigen Sie sich darauf, wann das Auto geliefert wird.
4. Extras: Einigen Sie sich auf die Anzahl der Extras (Extras sind z.B. Sitzheizung und Parkassistent), die der Kunde ohne zusätzliche Kosten erhält.
5. Zahlungsziel: Wann muss das Auto bezahlt werden? Einigen Sie sich auf einen Termin.

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, auch Ihr Vorgesetzter wünscht einen erfolgreichen Abschluss.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **15 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Preisnachlass, Farbe, Liefertermin, Extras und Zahlungsziel
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Preisnachlass z.B. 3%, 5%, 10%, 15% und 20%.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. 20% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen z.B. 300 Punkte, 3% Preisnachlass bringen Ihnen dagegen schon 1.500 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: $900 + 1.500 + 600 + 900 + 1.500 = 5.400$ Punkte

Verkäufer	1. Preisnachlass		2. Farbe		3. Liefertermin		4. Extras		5. Zahlungsziel	
A	3%	(1.500)	rot	(1.000)	1 Woche	(200)	5	(300)	4 Wochen	(3.500)
B	5%	(1.200)	weiß	(1.200)	2 Wochen	(400)	4	(600)	5 Wochen	(2.500)
C	10%	(900)	blau	(1.500)	3 Wochen	(600)	3	(900)	6 Wochen	(1.500)
D	15%	(600)	schwarz	(2.500)	4 Wochen	(800)	2	(1.200)	7 Wochen	(1.200)
E	20%	(300)	grau	(3.500)	5 Wochen	(1.000)	1	(1.500)	8 Wochen	(1.000)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungsaspekte	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Gewählte Option (A-E)					

Käufer

Stellen Sie sich vor Sie möchten sich eine neue Küche kaufen. In einem Möbelhaus, das gerade eine Rabattaktion durchführt, haben Sie bereits Ihre Traumküche entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie noch mit dem Verkäufer zu einer Einigung in verschiedenen Punkten kommen.

1. Garantie: Es gibt die Möglichkeit, die Garantie zu verlängern. Einigen Sie sich, um wie viele Monate die Garantie verlängert wird.
2. Farbe: Einigen Sie sich auf eine Farbe, in der die Küche ohne Aufschlag geliefert werden soll.
3. Liefertermin: Einigen Sie sich darauf, wann die Küche geliefert wird.
4. Preis: Da gerade eine Rabattaktion durchgeführt wird, wird Ihnen der Händler sicher einen Preisnachlass gewähren. Einigen Sie sich auf den Preis, den Sie für die Küche zahlen.
5. Extras: Einigen Sie sich auf die Anzahl der Extras (ein Extra ist z.B. eine ausziehbare Trittleiter), die Sie ohne zusätzliche Kosten erhalten.
6. Elektrogeräte: Sie können verschiedene Elektrogeräte zu der Küche dazu bekommen (z.B. einen Kühlschrank, einen Ofen oder eine Spülmaschine). Einigen Sie sich darauf, welche Geräte im Preis enthalten sind.
7. Zahlungsziel: Wann muss die Küche bezahlt werden? Einigen Sie sich auf einen Termin.
8. Entsorgung: Wer übernimmt die Kosten für die Entsorgung der alten Küche? Sie, der Verkäufer oder teilen Sie sich die Kosten?

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, da Sie von der zeitlich begrenzten Rabattaktion profitieren möchten.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **15 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Garantie, Farbe, Liefertermin, Preis, Elektrogeräte, Zahlungsziel und Entsorgung
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Garantie z.B. 6, 12, 18, 24 oder 30 zusätzliche Monate
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. 6 Monate Garantie bringen Ihnen z.B. 0 Punkte, 30 Monate bringen Ihnen dagegen schon 4.000 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: 2.000 + 600 + 800 + 3.000 + 400 + 1.600 + 1.000 + 1.200 = 10.600 Punkte

	1. Garantie (Monate)	2. Farbe	3. Liefertermin (Wochen)	4. Preis (€)	5.Extras	6. Elektrogeräte	7. Zahlungsziel (Wochen)	8. Entsorgung
A	6 (0)	weiß (1.200)	5 (0)	12.000 (0)	0 (0)	Kühlschrank	4 (0)	100% Käufer (0)
B	12 (1.000)	buche (900)	4 (400)	11.500 (1.500)	1 (200)	Kühlschrank/Herd	5 (500)	70% Käufer (600)
C	18 (2.000)	schwarz (600)	3 (800)	11.000 (3.000)	2 (400)	Kühlschrank/Herd/Ofen	6 (1.000)	Je 50 % (1.200)
D	24 (3.000)	rot (300)	2 (1.200)	10.500 (4.500)	3 (600)	Kühlschrank/Herd/Ofen/ Spülmaschine	7 (1.500)	70% Verkäufer (1.800)
E	30 (4.000)	blau (0)	1 (1.600)	10.000 (6.000)	4 (800)	Kühlschrank/Herd/Ofen/ Spülmaschine/Mikrowelle	8 (2.000)	100% Verkäufer (2.400)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungsaspekte	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Gewählte Option (A-E)								

Verkäufer

Stellen Sie sich vor Sie sind Verkäufer in der Küchenabteilung eines Möbelhauses. Momentan führen Sie eine Rabattaktion durch. Ein Kunde hat bei Ihnen seine Traumküche entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie zu einer Einigung in verschiedenen Punkten kommen:

1. Garantie: Es gibt die Möglichkeit, die Garantie zu verlängern. Einigen Sie sich, um wie viele Monate die Garantie verlängert wird.
2. Farbe: Einigen Sie sich auf eine Farbe, in der die Küche ohne Aufschlag geliefert werden soll.
3. Liefertermin: Einigen Sie sich darauf, wann die Küche geliefert wird.
4. Preis: Da gerade eine Rabattaktion durchgeführt wird, bekommt der Kunde einen Preisnachlass. Einigen Sie sich auf den Preis, den Sie für die Küche bekommen.
5. Extras: Einigen Sie sich auf die Anzahl der Extras (ein Extra ist z.B. eine ausziehbare Trittleiter), die der Kunde ohne zusätzliche Kosten erhält.
6. Elektrogeräte: Sie können verschiedene Elektrogeräte zu der Küche liefern (z.B. einen Kühlschrank, einen Ofen oder eine Spülmaschine). Einigen Sie sich darauf, welche Geräte im Preis enthalten sind.
7. Zahlungsziel: Wann muss die Küche bezahlt werden? Einigen Sie sich auf einen Termin.
8. Entsorgung: Wer übernimmt die Kosten für die Entsorgung der alten Küche? Sie, der Käufer oder teilen Sie sich die Kosten?

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, auch Ihr Vorgesetzter wünscht einen erfolgreichen Abschluss.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **15 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie alle Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Garantie, Farbe, Liefertermin, Preis, Elektrogeräte, Zahlungsziel und Entsorgung
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Garantie z.B. 6, 12, 18, 24 oder 30 zusätzliche Monate
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. 6 Monate Garantie bringen Ihnen z.B. 1.600 Punkte, 30 Monate bringen Ihnen dagegen 0 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis wird aus allen gewählten Optionen addiert:
 - wenn Sie sich z.B. überall auf C einigen: 800 + 600 + 2.000 + 3.000 + 1.600 + 400 + 1.000 + 1.200 = 10.600 Punkte

	1. Garantie (Monate)	2. Farbe	3. Liefertermin (Wochen)	4. Preis (€)	5.Extras	6. Elektrogeräte	7. Zahlungsziel (Wochen)	8. Entsorgung
A	6 (1.600)	weiß (1.200)	5 (4.000)	12.000 (6.000)	0 (3.200)	Kühlschrank (800)	4 (2.000)	100% Käufer (2.400)
B	12 (1.200)	buche (900)	4 (3.000)	11.500 (4.500)	1 (2.400)	Kühlschrank/Herd (600)	5 (1.500)	70% Käufer (1.800)
C	18 (800)	schwarz (600)	3 (2.000)	11.000 (3.000)	2 (1.600)	Kühlschrank/Herd/Ofen (400)	6 (1.000)	Je 50 % (1.200)
D	24 (400)	rot (300)	2 (1.000)	10.500 (1.500)	3 (800)	Kühlschrank/Herd/Ofen/Spülmaschine (200)	7 (500)	70% Verkäufer (600)
E	30 (0)	blau (0)	1 (0)	10.000 (0)	4 (0)	Kühlschrank/Herd/Ofen/Spülmaschine/Mikrowelle (0)	8 (0)	100% Verkäufer (0)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich mit Ihrer Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihrem Verhandlungspartner geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungsaspekte	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Gewählte Option (A-E)								

Zum Abschluss der Verhandlungsaufgabe füllen Sie bitte diese Matrix aus.

Was glauben Sie, wie viele Punkte Ihre Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihr Verhandlungspartner bei den jeweiligen Optionen bekommen hat? Füllen Sie bitte **alle** Kästchen der untenstehenden Tabelle aus.

Wenn Sie sich nicht sicher sind, versuchen Sie bitte trotzdem eine ungefähre Schätzung abzugeben. Sie können hierfür gerne Ihre eigene Matrix zu Hilfe nehmen.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
A					
B					
C					
D					
E					

Zum Abschluss der Verhandlungsaufgabe füllen Sie bitte diese Matrix aus.

Was glauben Sie, wie viele Punkte Ihre Verhandlungspartnerin/Ihr Verhandlungspartner bei den jeweiligen Optionen bekommen hat? Füllen Sie bitte **alle** Kästchen der untenstehenden Tabelle aus.

Wenn Sie sich nicht sicher sind, versuchen Sie bitte trotzdem eine ungefähre Schätzung abzugeben. Sie können hierfür gerne Ihre eigene Matrix zu Hilfe nehmen.

	1. Preisnachlass	2. Farbe	3. Liefertermin	4. Extras	5. Zahlungsziel
A	3% <input type="text"/>	rot <input type="text"/>	1 Woche <input type="text"/>	5 <input type="text"/>	4 Wochen <input type="text"/>
B	5% <input type="text"/>	weiß <input type="text"/>	2 Wochen <input type="text"/>	4 <input type="text"/>	5 Wochen <input type="text"/>
C	10% <input type="text"/>	blau <input type="text"/>	3 Wochen <input type="text"/>	3 <input type="text"/>	6 Wochen <input type="text"/>
D	15% <input type="text"/>	schwarz <input type="text"/>	4 Wochen <input type="text"/>	2 <input type="text"/>	7 Wochen <input type="text"/>
E	20% <input type="text"/>	grau <input type="text"/>	5 Wochen <input type="text"/>	1 <input type="text"/>	8 Wochen <input type="text"/>

Appendix C

Construal level manipulation low-construal-level condition

Construal level manipulation high-construal-level condition

Negotiation materials Task 1 “Black Calypso Bean” Grandios AG

Negotiation materials Task 1 “Black Calypso Bean” Großartig GmbH

Denkaufgabe

Bei allem was wir tun, gibt es immer eine Methode, *wie* wir es tun. Tatsächlich können wir unsere größeren Lebensziele oft bis zu ganz spezifischen Verhaltensweisen hinunter verfolgen.


Zum Beispiel hoffst du bestimmt, wie die meisten Menschen, Glück und Zufriedenheit im Leben zu erlangen. Wie schaffst du das? Vielleicht kann es helfen einen besonders guten Job zu bekommen oder viel Geld zu verdienen. Wie erreichst du diese Dinge? Vielleicht, indem du einen besonders guten Abschluss machst. Wie erlangst du einen besonders guten Abschluss? Vielleicht, indem du im Studium erfolgreich bist. Wie bist du im Studium erfolgreich? Vielleicht, indem du dich immer weiterbildest. Wie kannst du dich weiterbilden? Zum Beispiel könntest du, wie du es heute tust, an einer psychologischen Untersuchung teilnehmen.

Studien zeigen, dass solche Denkaufgaben, wie gerade beschrieben, in denen jemand darüber nachdenkt, wie seine übergeordnete Ziele sich in seinen spezifischen Handlungen zeigen, die mentalen Fähigkeiten von Menschen verbessern kann.

In dieser Untersuchung testen wir eine solche Technik. Diese Denkaufgabe soll deine Aufmerksamkeit darauf lenken, *wie* du die Dinge tust, die du tust. Für diese Denkaufgabe denk bitte über die folgende Aktivität nach: „Seine Gesundheit aufrechterhalten und verbessern.“


Fange daher beim obersten Kasten an und trage in den Kasten untendrunter ein, *wie* es möglich ist, seine Gesundheit zu erhalten und zu verbessern. Versuche dann immer konkreter zu denken und in den nächsten Kasten einzutragen, *wie* du die neue, spezifischere Verhaltensweise, erreichen kannst. Gehe dabei also immer eine Stufe tiefer, so wie oben beschrieben, bis du bei ganz spezifischen Verhaltensweisen angelangt bist. Das Ziel im untersten Kasten sollte das Konkreteste sein.

Gesundheit aufrechterhalten und verbessern



Wie?

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Wie?

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Wie?

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Wie?

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Denkaufgabe

Bei allem, was wir tun, gibt es immer einen Grund, *warum* wir es tun.

Tatsächlich können wir die Gründe für unser Verhalten bis zu unseren großen Lebenszielen zurückverfolgen. Zum Beispiel nimmst du gerade an einer psychologischen Untersuchung teil. Warum tust du das? Vielleicht, weil es dich interessiert oder du dich weiterbilden willst. Warum willst du dich weiterbilden? Vielleicht um im Studium erfolgreicher zu sein. Warum im Studium erfolgreicher sein? Vielleicht willst du einen besonders guten Universitätsabschluss erlangen. Warum einen besonders guten Abschluss erlangen? Vielleicht, weil du danach auch einen besonders guten Job haben oder viel Geld verdienen willst. Und vielleicht willst du einen besonders guten Job haben oder viel Geld verdienen, weil du das Gefühl hast, so erreichst du im Leben Glück und Zufriedenheit.

Studien zeigen, dass solche Denkaufgaben, wie gerade beschrieben, in denen jemand darüber nachdenkt, wie seine Handlungen mit höher geordneten Zielen in Zusammenhang stehen, die mentalen Fähigkeiten von Menschen verbessern können.

In dieser Untersuchung testen wir eine solche Technik. Diese Denkaufgabe soll deine Aufmerksamkeit darauf lenken, *warum* du die Dinge tust, die du tust. Für diese Denkaufgabe denk bitte über die folgende Aktivität nach: „Seine Gesundheit aufrechterhalten und verbessern.“

Fange daher beim untersten Kasten an und trage in den Kasten obendrüber ein, *warum* es wichtig ist, seine Gesundheit zu erhalten und zu verbessern. Versuche dann immer abstrakter zu denken und in den nächsten Kasten einzutragen, *warum* es wichtig ist, dass neue, übergeordnete Ziel zu erreichen. Gehe dabei also immer eine Stufe höher, so wie oben beschrieben, bis du bei den höchsten Zielen angelangt bist. Das Ziel im obersten Kasten sollte das Abstrakteste sein.

[Empty box for notes]



Warum?

[Empty box for notes]



Warum?

[Empty box for notes]



Warum?

[Empty box for notes]



Warum?

Gesundheit aufrechterhalten und verbessern

Grandios AG

Im Folgenden nimmst du an einer ersten Verhandlung teil. Alle Informationen zu deiner Rolle und dem Hintergrund der Verhandlung findest du auf diesem Blatt. Notiere das Ergebnis der Verhandlung anschließend bitte auf dem zweiten Blatt. Lies nun bitte zuerst die Instruktionen zu deiner Rolle.

Instruktionen:

Stell dir vor, du bist Mitarbeiter/in in einem der größten Pharmakonzerne der Welt, *Grandios AG*, und wurdest beauftragt, einen sehr seltenen Inhaltsstoff für eine neue Gesichtscrème zu beschaffen. Das Öl, um welches es sich dabei handelt, ist unglaublich wirksam gegen Falten. Tests haben gezeigt, dass die neue Gesichtscrème dank des Öls effektiver ist als alles, was es zurzeit auf dem Markt gibt. Befragungen haben zudem ergeben, dass Kunden bereit wären, einen hohen Preis für diese Crème zu bezahlen. Es wäre demnach äußerst wichtig für die Firma und förderlich für deine Karriere, wenn du diesen Auftrag erfüllen kannst.

Das spezielle Öl, welches beschafft werden soll, kann jedoch lediglich aus der Schale einer sehr seltenen Bohne gewonnen werden, die man nur auf einer kleinen Insel im Südpazifik findet: Die „Black-Calypso-Bohne“. Sie wird nur einmal im Jahr reif und es können daher pro Jahr nur 4000 dieser Bohnen verkauft werden.

Du wurdest informiert, dass die diesjährige Jahresernte von 4000 Bohnen zum Verkauf steht. Die Menge an Öl, die aus den Schalen dieser Bohnen gewonnen werden könnte, wäre gerade genug für einen Jahresvorrat der Crème. Die Ernte kann leider auch in den nächsten Jahren nicht gesteigert werden, da alle Versuche, die Bohne an einer anderen Stelle anzupflanzen, gescheitert sind.

Du hast außerdem die Information erhalten, dass dein größter Konkurrent, *Großartig GmbH*, ebenfalls am Kauf der Bohnen interessiert ist. Du weißt nicht, wofür er die Bohnen verwenden will; es ist jedoch kein Geheimnis, dass einige andere Pharmakonzerne daran interessiert sind, die chemischen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten der Bohne zu erforschen.

Du triffst du dich mit einem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Großartig GmbH*, denn du möchtest verhindern, dass er/sie dir beim Kauf in die Quere kommt. Du hast noch nie mehr als ein paar Worte mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in gewechselt und eure Konzerne haben keine sehr harmonische Vergangenheit miteinander. Etliche Spionage-Attacken und Anklagen wegen Patentverletzungen hat es bereits gegeben. Trotzdem ist es wichtig, noch einmal in Ruhe über den Kauf der Bohnen mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in zu verhandeln.

Stell dir nun bitte vor, du sitzt dem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Großartig GmbH* gegenüber. Eure Aufgabe ist es, darüber zu verhandeln und zu einer Einigung zu gelangen, wer wie viele Bohnen kaufen darf.

Du hast ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit dich auf deine Rolle vorzubereiten.

Danach hast du **15 Minuten** Zeit zum Verhandeln.

Verhandelt nun bitte und einigt euch, wer wie viele von den **4000 Bohnen** erhält.

Haltet das Ergebnis eurer Verhandlung bitte auf diesem Blatt fest.

Grandios AG bekommt:

_____ Bohnen

Großartig GmbH bekommt:

_____ Bohnen

Großartig GmbH

Im Folgenden nimmst du an einer ersten Verhandlung teil. Alle Informationen zu deiner Rolle und dem Hintergrund der Verhandlung findest du auf diesem Blatt. Notiere das Ergebnis der Verhandlung anschließend bitte auf dem zweiten Blatt. Lies nun bitte zuerst die Instruktionen zu deiner Rolle.

Instruktionen:

Stell dir vor, du bist Mitarbeiter/in in einem der größten Pharmakonzerne der Welt, *Großartig GmbH*, und wurdest beauftragt, ein sehr seltenes Material für einen neuen Wirkstoff zu beschaffen. Der Wirkstoff nennt sich „Supradoin“ und ist ein einzigartiges, kürzlich entdecktes Enzym, das als Medikament für Multiple Sklerose verwendet werden kann. Es mindert die Entzündungen der Nervenfasern und verlangsamt die Krankheit so erheblich. Auch wenn der Verkauf des neuen Medikaments nicht sehr viel Profit einbringen wird, so sorgt er doch für ein positives Firmenimage und deiner Karriere wäre es ebenfalls förderlich, wenn du diesen Auftrag erfüllst.

Supradoin ist allerdings lediglich aus dem Inneren einer sehr seltenen Bohne zu extrahieren, die man nur auf einer kleinen Insel im Südpazifik findet: Die „Black-Calypso-Bohne“. Sie wird nur einmal im Jahr reif und es können daher pro Jahr nur 4000 dieser Bohnen verkauft werden.

Du wurdest informiert, dass die diesjährige Jahresernte von 4000 Bohnen zum Verkauf steht. Die Menge an Supradoin, die aus dem Inneren dieser Bohnen gewonnen werden könnte, wäre gerade mal genug, um 10% der Betroffenen zu behandeln. Die Ernte kann auch in den nächsten Jahren nicht gesteigert werden, da alle Versuche, die Bohne an einer anderen Stelle anzupflanzen, gescheitert sind.

Du hast außerdem die Information erhalten, dass dein größter Konkurrent, *Grandios AG*, ebenfalls am Kauf der Bohnen interessiert ist. Du weißt nicht, wofür er die Bohnen verwenden will; es ist jedoch kein Geheimnis, dass einige andere Pharmakonzerne daran interessiert sind, die chemischen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten der Bohne zu erforschen.

Du triffst dich mit einem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Grandios AG*, denn du möchtest verhindern, dass er/sie dir beim Kauf in die Quere kommt. Du hast noch nie mehr als ein paar Worte mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in gewechselt und eure Konzerne haben keine sehr harmonische Vergangenheit miteinander. Etliche Spionage-Attacken und Anklagen wegen Patentverletzungen hat es bereits gegeben. Trotzdem ist es wichtig, noch einmal in Ruhe über den Kauf der Bohnen mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in zu verhandeln.

Stell dir nun bitte vor, du sitzt dem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Grandios AG* gegenüber. Eure Aufgabe ist es, darüber zu verhandeln und zu einer Einigung zu gelangen, wer wie viele Bohnen kaufen darf.

Du hast ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit dich auf deine Rolle vorzubereiten.

Danach hast du **15 Minuten** Zeit zum Verhandeln.

Verhandelt nun bitte und einigt euch, wer wie viele von den **4000 Bohnen** erhält.

Haltet das Ergebnis eurer Verhandlung bitte auf diesem Blatt fest.

Großartig GmbH bekommt:

_____ Bohnen

Grandios AG bekommt:

_____ Bohnen

Appendix D

Table D1: Intercorrelations between control variables in Study 4
Negotiation materials Task 1 “Black Calypso Bean” Grandios AG
Negotiation materials Task 1 “Black Calypso Bean” Großartig GmbH
Negotiation materials analogical negotiation task (example car)
Negotiation materials adaptive negotiation task (example kitchen)

Table D1
Intercorrelations between control variables in Study 4

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
1 INBS	-																												
2 DUTCH yielding tr.	-.19	-																											
3 DUTCH compromising tr.	.32*	.29	-																										
4 DUTCH forcing tr.	.13	-.41**	-.34*	-																									
5 DUTCH problem solving tr.	.26	-.09	.33*	.05	-																								
6 DUTCH avoiding tr.	.03	.27	.33*	-.22	.13	-																							
7 Learning orientation	.04	-.33*	-.06	.29	.28	.10	-																						
8 Avoidance orientation	-.01	.22	.02	-.25	-.20	.25	-.60**	-																					
9 Extraversion	.08	-.48**	-.11	.40**	.34*	-.07	.19	-.15	-																				
10 Agreeableness	-.11	.09	.31*	-.21	.19	.27	.17	-.04	.08	-																			
11 Conscientiousness	-.13	-.15	-.02	-.15	.09	.15	.35*	-.26	.24	.17	-																		
12 Neuroticism	.01	.19	.22	-.03	-.05	.09	-.23	.16	-.30	-.08	-.19	-																	
13 Openness	-.30	.11	.10	-.08	-.03	.03	-.01	-.17	-.11	.21	-.15	.02	-																
14 Agency	.15	-.63**	-.31*	.38*	.05	-.10	.35*	-.15	.64**	-.00	.25	-.46**	-.22	-															
15 Communion	-.13	-.06	.24	-.11	.28	.08	-.15	.13	.26	.32*	.31*	.07	.27	-.23	-														
16 SVI Task 1 outcome	.15	-.22	-.20	.21	.29	-.27	.22	-.15	.13	.10	-.09	-.42**	-.12	.32*	-.08	-													
17 SVI Task 1 self	.30	-.39*	-.20	.29	.10	-.10	.21	-.18	.17	.05	-.11	-.10	-.08	.36*	-.10	.62**	-												
18 SVI Task 1 process	.23	-.12	.04	.24	.21	-.05	-.14	.09	.09	.22	-.38*	-.10	-.10	.08	-.04	.62**	.49**	-											
19 SVI analogical outcome	-.05	-.06	-.03	-.03	.29	-.24	-.03	.09	.01	.11	-.08	.04	-.04	.04	.13	.36*	.04	.09	-										
20 SVI analogical self	.04	.13	-.09	-.18	.13	-.23	-.10	.12	-.03	.10	.05	-.02	-.38*	.05	.11	.30	.27	.00	.49**	-									
21 SVI analogical process	.12	-.04	-.18	.11	.31	-.17	-.16	.04	-.07	-.02	-.22	.10	-.05	-.12	-.01	.21	.16	.25	.68**	.27	-								
22 SVI adaptive outcome	.05	.24	-.02	-.23	.14	-.12	-.33*	.03	.11	.09	-.17	-.06	.02	.04	-.14	.18	.13	.18	.20	.26	.34*	-							
23 SVI adaptive self	.17	.02	-.04	-.12	.20	-.13	-.09	-.16	.19	.09	-.04	-.09	-.11	.28	-.19	.12	.31	-.06	.09	.41**	.16	.64**	-						
24 SVI adaptive process	.06	.24	.01	-.19	.17	.10	-.17	.15	-.05	.12	-.14	.08	.09	-.07	-.23	.08	.02	.12	.06	.03	.29	.77**	.41**	-					
25 DUTCH yielding st.	.02	.20	.09	-.20	.02	.01	-.18	.43**	.03	-.09	-.11	.13	.09	-.12	.05	-.09	-.17	-.07	.01	-.07	-.00	.28	-.03	.43**	-				
26 DUTCH compromising st.	.02	-.08	.30	-.25	.20	.05	-.04	.01	.06	.42**	.07	.00	-.01	-.10	.27	.08	-.02	.13	.18	-.00	.15	.19	-.00	.20	.35*	-			
27 DUTCH forcing st.	.24	-.12	-.16	.38*	.06	.13	.41**	-.15	.02	.09	-.04	-.08	-.11	.24	-.18	.13	.16	.12	.01	.06	.10	-.05	.08	.08	-.12	-.06	-		
28 DUTCH problem solving st.	.11	-.16	.13	-.13	.36*	.11	-.09	-.00	.27	.38*	.09	-.14	.05	.14	.32*	.32*	.23	.41**	.42**	.15	.45**	.41**	.10	.33*	.13	.62**	.05	-	
29 DUTCH avoiding st.	-.06	.04	.12	.05	.13	.51**	.03	.25	.01	.10	-.04	.07	-.02	-.08	.06	-.05	-.01	.10	-.20	-.22	.01	-.08	-.13	.32*	.13	.08	-.05	.18	

INBS = Implicit Negotiation Beliefs Scale; SVI = Subjective Value Inventory (respective subscales); DUTCH = The Dutch Test for Conflict Handling (respective subscales measured as trait and state variables).

Grandios AG

Im Folgenden nimmst du an einer ersten Verhandlung teil. Alle Informationen zu deiner Rolle und dem Hintergrund der Verhandlung findest du auf diesem Blatt. Notiere das Ergebnis der Verhandlung anschließend bitte auf dem zweiten Blatt. Lies nun bitte zuerst die Informationen zu deiner Rolle.

Anweisungen:

Stell dir vor, du bist Mitarbeiter/in in einem der größten Pharmakonzerne der Welt, *Grandios AG*, und wurdest beauftragt, einen sehr seltenen Inhaltsstoff für eine neue Gesichtscrème zu beschaffen. Das Öl, um welches es sich dabei handelt, ist unglaublich wirksam gegen Falten. Tests haben gezeigt, dass die neue Gesichtscrème dank des Öls effektiver ist als alles, was es zurzeit auf dem Markt gibt. Befragungen haben zudem ergeben, dass Kunden bereit wären, einen hohen Preis für diese Crème zu bezahlen. Es wäre demnach äußerst wichtig für die Firma und förderlich für deine Karriere, wenn du diesen Auftrag erfüllen kannst.

Das spezielle Öl, welches beschafft werden soll, kann jedoch lediglich aus der Schale einer sehr seltenen Bohne gewonnen werden, die man nur auf einer kleinen Insel im Südpazifik findet: Die „Black-Calypso-Bohne“. Sie wird nur einmal im Jahr reif und es können daher pro Jahr nur 4000 dieser Bohnen verkauft werden.

Du wurdest informiert, dass die diesjährige Jahresernte von 4000 Bohnen zum Verkauf steht. Die Menge an Öl, die aus den Schalen dieser Bohnen gewonnen werden könnte, wäre gerade genug für einen Jahresvorrat der Crème. Die Ernte kann leider auch in den nächsten Jahren nicht gesteigert werden, da alle Versuche, die Bohne an einer anderen Stelle anzupflanzen, gescheitert sind.

Du hast außerdem die Information erhalten, dass dein größter Konkurrent, *Großartig AG*, ebenfalls am Kauf der Bohnen interessiert ist. Du weißt nicht, wofür er die Bohnen verwenden will; es ist jedoch kein Geheimnis, dass einige andere Pharmakonzerne daran interessiert sind, die chemischen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten der Bohne zu erforschen.

Du triffst dich mit einem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Großartig AG*, denn du möchtest verhindern, dass er/sie dir beim Kauf in die Quere kommt. Du hast noch nie mehr als ein paar Worte mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in gewechselt und eure Konzerne haben keine sehr harmonische Vergangenheit miteinander. Etliche Spionage-Attacken und Anklagen wegen Patentverletzungen hat es bereits gegeben. Trotzdem ist es wichtig, noch einmal in Ruhe über den Kauf der Bohnen mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in zu verhandeln.

Stell dir nun bitte vor, du sitzt dem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Großartig AG* gegenüber. Eure Aufgabe ist es, darüber zu verhandeln und zu einer Einigung zu gelangen, wer wie viele Bohnen kaufen darf.

Du hast ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit dich auf deine Rolle vorzubereiten.

Danach hast du **15 Minuten** Zeit zum Verhandeln.

Verhandelt nun bitte und einigt euch, wer wie viele von den **4000 Bohnen** erhält.

Haltet das Ergebnis eurer Verhandlung bitte auf diesem Blatt fest.

Grandios AG bekommt:

_____ Bohnen

Großartig AG bekommt:

_____ Bohnen

Großartig AG

Im Folgenden nimmst du an einer ersten Verhandlung teil. Alle Informationen zu deiner Rolle und dem Hintergrund der Verhandlung findest du auf diesem Blatt. Notiere das Ergebnis der Verhandlung anschließend bitte auf dem zweiten Blatt. Lies nun bitte zuerst die Informationen zu deiner Rolle.

Anweisungen:

Stell dir vor, du bist Mitarbeiter/in in einem der größten Pharmakonzerne der Welt, *Großartig AG*, und wurdest beauftragt, einen sehr seltenen Inhaltsstoff für ein neues Shampoo zu beschaffen. Bei dem Inhaltsstoff handelt es sich um ein Protein, das die Haare unglaublich glänzend und geschmeidig macht. Selbst im Alter stärkt es brüchiges Haar und macht es wieder gesund und lebendig. Tests haben gezeigt, dass das neue Shampoo dank des seltenen Proteins wirksamer ist als alles, was es zurzeit auf dem Markt gibt. Befragungen haben zudem ergeben, dass Kunden bereit wären, einen hohen Preis für dieses Shampoo zu bezahlen. Es wäre demnach äußerst wichtig für die Firma und förderlich für deine Karriere, wenn du diesen Auftrag erfüllen kannst.

Das entsprechende Protein, welches beschafft werden soll, ist allerdings lediglich aus dem Inneren einer sehr seltenen Bohne zu extrahieren, die man nur auf einer kleinen Insel im Südpazifik findet: Die „Black-Calypso-Bohne“. Sie wird nur einmal im Jahr reif und es können daher pro Jahr nur 4000 dieser Bohnen verkauft werden.

Du wurdest informiert, dass die diesjährige Jahresernte von 4000 Bohnen zum Verkauf steht. Die Menge an Proteinen, die aus dem Inneren dieser Bohnen gewonnen werden könnte, wäre gerade genug für einen Jahresvorrat des Shampoos. Die Ernte kann auch in den nächsten Jahren nicht gesteigert werden, da alle Versuche, die Bohne an einer anderen Stelle anzupflanzen, gescheitert sind.

Du hast außerdem die Information erhalten, dass dein größter Konkurrent, *Grandios AG*, ebenfalls am Kauf der Bohnen interessiert ist. Du weißt nicht, wofür er die Bohnen verwenden will; es ist jedoch kein Geheimnis, dass einige andere Pharmakonzerne daran interessiert sind, die chemischen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten der Bohne zu erforschen.

Du triffst dich mit einem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Grandios AG*, denn du möchtest verhindern, dass er/sie dir beim Kauf in die Quere kommt. Du hast noch nie mehr als ein paar Worte mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in gewechselt und eure Konzerne haben keine sehr harmonische Vergangenheit miteinander. Etliche Spionage-Attacken und Anklagen wegen Patentverletzungen hat es bereits gegeben. Trotzdem ist es wichtig, noch einmal in Ruhe über den Kauf der Bohnen mit deinem/r Konkurrenten/in zu verhandeln.

Stell dir nun bitte vor, du sitzt dem/r Mitarbeiter/in von *Grandios AG* gegenüber. Eure Aufgabe ist es, darüber zu verhandeln und zu einer Einigung zu gelangen, wer wie viele Bohnen kaufen darf.

Du hast ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit dich auf deine Rolle vorzubereiten.

Danach hast du **15 Minuten** Zeit zum Verhandeln.

Verhandelt nun bitte und einigt euch, wer wie viele von den **4000 Bohnen** erhält.

Haltet das Ergebnis eurer Verhandlung bitte auf diesem Blatt fest.

Großartig AG bekommt:

Grandios AG bekommt:

_____ Bohnen

_____ Bohnen

Käufer

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie möchten sich ein neues Auto kaufen. In einem Autohaus haben Sie bereits Ihr Traumauto entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie noch mit dem/der Verkäufer/in zu einer Einigung bezüglich zwei verschiedener Punkte kommen:

1. Liefertermin: Einigen Sie sich darauf, wann das Auto geliefert wird.
2. Zahlungsziel: Wann muss das Auto bezahlt werden? Einigen Sie sich auf einen Termin.

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, da Sie schon immer genau dieses Auto haben wollten.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **10 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie die beiden Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Liefertermin und Zahlungsziel.
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Liefertermin z.B. 1 Woche, 2 Wochen, 3 Wochen etc.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. So bringt Ihnen z.B. ein Zahlungsziel von 5 Wochen 400 Punkte, ein Zahlungsziel von 7 Wochen bringt Ihnen dagegen schon 800 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis ergibt sich aus der Addition der Punkte der beiden gewählten Optionen.

Käufer	1. Liefertermin		2. Zahlungsziel	
A	1 Woche	(3.500)	4 Wochen	(200)
B	2 Wochen	(2.500)	5 Wochen	(400)
C	3 Wochen	(1.500)	6 Wochen	(600)
D	4 Wochen	(1.200)	7 Wochen	(800)
E	5 Wochen	(1.000)	8 Wochen	(1.000)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der beiden Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungspunkt	1. Liefertermin	2. Zahlungsziel
Einigung auf Option		

Verkäufer

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind Verkäufer/in in einem Autohaus. Ein/e Kunde/in hat bei Ihnen sein/ihr Traumauto entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie mit dem/der Käufer/in noch zu einer Einigung bezüglich zwei verschiedener Punkte kommen:

1. Liefertermin: Einigen Sie sich darauf, wann das Auto geliefert wird.
2. Zahlungsziel: Wann muss das Auto bezahlt werden? Einigen Sie sich auf einen Termin.

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, auch Ihr Vorgesetzter wünscht einen erfolgreichen Abschluss.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten.

Danach haben Sie **10 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie die beiden Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Liefertermin und Zahlungsziel.
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Liefertermin z.B. 1 Woche, 2 Wochen, 3 Wochen etc.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. So bringt Ihnen z.B. ein Liefertermin von 2 Wochen 400 Punkte, ein Liefertermin von 4 Wochen bringt Ihnen dagegen schon 800 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis ergibt sich aus der Addition der Punkte der beiden gewählten Optionen.

Verkäufer	1. Liefertermin	2. Zahlungsziel
A	1 Woche (200)	4 Wochen (3.500)
B	2 Wochen (400)	5 Wochen (2.500)
C	3 Wochen (600)	6 Wochen (1.500)
D	4 Wochen (800)	7 Wochen (1.200)
E	5 Wochen (1.000)	8 Wochen (1.000)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der beiden Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungspunkt	1. Liefertermin	2. Zahlungsziel
Einigung auf Option		

Käufer

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie möchten sich eine neue Küche kaufen. In einem Möbelhaus, das gerade eine Rabattaktion durchführt, haben Sie bereits Ihre Traumküche entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie noch mit dem/der Verkäufer/in zu einer Einigung bezüglich verschiedener Punkte kommen:

1. Garantie: Es gibt die Möglichkeit, die Garantie zu verlängern. Einigen Sie sich, um wie viele Monate die Garantie verlängert wird.
2. Extras: Einigen Sie sich auf die Anzahl der Extras (ein Extra ist z.B. eine ausziehbare Trittleiter), die Sie ohne zusätzliche Kosten erhalten.
3. Entsorgung: Wer übernimmt die Kosten für die Entsorgung der alten Küche? Sie, der/die Verkäufer/in oder teilen Sie sich die Kosten?
4. Preis: Da gerade eine Rabattaktion durchgeführt wird, wird Ihnen der/die Verkäufer/in sicher einen Preisnachlass gewähren. Einigen Sie sich auf den Preis, den Sie für die Küche zahlen.

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, da Sie von der zeitlich begrenzten Rabattaktion profitieren möchten.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten. Danach haben Sie **10 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie die Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Garantie, Extras, Entsorgung und Preis.
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Garantie z.B. 6 Monate, 12 Monate, 18 Monate etc.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. So bringt Ihnen z.B. 1 Extra 500 Punkte, 3 Extras bringen Ihnen dagegen schon 1.500 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis ergibt sich aus der Addition der Punkte der gewählten Optionen.

Käufer	1. Garantie	2. Extras	3. Entsorgung	4. Preis
A	6 Monate (0)	0 (0)	100% Käufer (0)	12.000 (0)
B	12 Monate (1.000)	1 (500)	70% Käufer (400)	11.500 (600)
C	18 Monate (2.000)	2 (1.000)	je 50% (800)	11.000 (1.200)
D	24 Monate (3.000)	3 (1.500)	70% Verkäufer (1.200)	10.500 (1.800)
E	30 Monate (4.000)	4 (2.000)	100% Verkäufer (1.600)	10.000 (2.400)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungspunkte	1. Garantie	2. Extras	3. Entsorgung	4. Preis
Einigung auf Option:				

Verkäufer

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind Verkäufer/in in der Küchenabteilung eines Möbelhauses. Momentan führen Sie eine Rabattaktion durch. Ein/e Kunde/in hat bei Ihnen seine/ihre Traumküche entdeckt. Nun müssen Sie noch mit dem/der Käufer/in zu einer Einigung bezüglich verschiedener Punkte kommen:

1. **Garantie:** Es gibt die Möglichkeit, die Garantie zu verlängern. Einigen Sie sich, um wie viele Monate die Garantie verlängert wird.
2. **Extras:** Einigen Sie sich auf die Anzahl der Extras (ein Extra ist z.B. eine ausziehbare Trittleiter), die der/die Kunde/in ohne zusätzliche Kosten erhält.
3. **Entsorgung:** Wer übernimmt die Kosten für die Entsorgung der alten Küche? Sie, der/der Käufer/in oder teilen Sie sich die Kosten?
4. **Preis:** Da gerade eine Rabattaktion durchgeführt wird, bekommt der/die Kunde/in einen Preisnachlass. Einigen Sie sich auf den Preis, den Sie für die Küche bekommen.

Ein erfolgreicher Abschluss des Geschäfts ist sehr wichtig für Sie, auch Ihr Vorgesetzter wünscht einen erfolgreichen Abschluss.

Sie haben ab jetzt **5 Minuten** Zeit, um sich auf diese Verhandlung vorzubereiten. Danach haben Sie **10 Minuten** Zeit für die Verhandlung.

Zur Erklärung der Tabelle:

- In der 1. Zeile sehen Sie die Aspekte, über die Sie verhandeln müssen: Garantie, Extras, Entsorgung und Preis.
- Für jeden dieser Aspekte gibt es fünf Auswahlmöglichkeiten. Für Garantie z.B. 6 Monate, 12 Monate, 18 Monate etc.
- Die verschiedenen Optionen bringen Ihnen unterschiedlich viele Punkte. So bringen Ihnen z.B. 3 Extras 500 Punkte, 1 Extra bringt Ihnen dagegen schon 1.500 Punkte.
- Ihr Gesamtergebnis ergibt sich aus der Addition der Punkte der gewählten Optionen.

Verkäufer	1. Garantie		2. Extras		3. Entsorgung		4. Preis	
A	6 Monate	(1.600)	0	(2.000)	100% Käufer	(4.000)	12.000	(2.400)
B	12 Monate	(1.200)	1	(1.500)	70% Käufer	(3.000)	11.500	(1.800)
C	18 Monate	(800)	2	(1.000)	je 50%	(2.000)	11.000	(1.200)
D	24 Monate	(400)	3	(500)	70% Verkäufer	(1.000)	10.500	(600)
E	30 Monate	(0)	4	(0)	100% Verkäufer	(0)	10.000	(0)

Tragen Sie bitte hier für jeden der Verhandlungspunkte die Option ein, auf die Sie sich geeinigt haben:

Verhandlungspunkt	1. Garantie	2. Extras	3. Entsorgung	4. Preis
Einigung auf Option				

Curriculum Vitae

Dipl.-Psych. Stefanie Wening

Date and Place of Birth: 09.09.1983, Nürnberg

Professional Experience

06/2015 – today	BAUR Versand Burgkunstadt, Customer Experience & Services, Marketing Manager Market Research
11/2014 – 05/2015	Job seeking
11/2009 – 10/2014	Technische Universität Darmstadt, Organizational and Business Psychology (Prof. Dr. N. Keith), Research Associate/PhD Student
12/2005 – 04/2009	Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Social Psychology (Prof. Dr. A. Abele-Brehm), Student Assistant
08/2007 – 09/2007	TÜV SÜD Life Service, Service-Center Nürnberg, Internship
02/2007 – 04/2007	GfK SE Nürnberg, Internship

Academic Education

10/2003 – 10/2009	Studies of Psychology, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
09/1994 – 06/2003	Friedrich-Alexander-Gymnasium Neustadt/Aisch

Publications

Wening, S., Keith, N., & Abele, A. E. (2016). High construal level can help negotiators to reach integrative agreements: The role of information exchange and judgement accuracy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 55, 206-226

Obligatory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have, with the exception of the help that has been clearly mentioned in the thesis, developed and written the enclosed doctoral thesis entitled “Construal Level and its Influence on Outcomes and Processes in Single and Multiple Integrative Negotiations” all by myself.

I have included a list of all references used in the present thesis. I have not used sources or means without declaration in the text. Any thoughts from others or literal quotations are clearly marked.

This thesis was not used in the same or in a similar version to achieve an academic grading or is being published elsewhere.

Neuhof, April 24 2020

Stefanie Wening