https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/2932 2012-12-07T12:04:42Z info:eu-repo/semantics/descriptiveMetadata http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/2932/ DECT Security Analysis Tews, Erik DECT is a standard for cordless phones. The intent of this thesis is to evaluate DECT security in a comprehensive way. To secure conversations over the air, DECT uses two proprietary algorithms, namely the DECT Standard Authentication Algorithm (DSAA) for authentication and key derivation, and the DECT Standard Cipher (DSC) for encryption. Both algorithms have been kept secret and were only available to DECT device manufacturers under a None Disclosure Agreement (NDA). The reader is first introduced into the DECT standard. The two algorithms DSAA and DSC have been reverse engineered and are then described in full detail. At first, attacks against DECT devices are presented, that are based on faults made by the manufacturers while implementing the DECT standard. In the next Chapters, attacks against the DSAA and the DSC algorithm are described, that recover the secret keys used by these algorithms faster than by brute force. Thereafter, a attack against the DECT radio protocol is described, that decrypts encrypted DECT voice calls. Finally, an outlook over the next release of the DECT standard is presented, that is expected to counter all attacks against DECT, that are described in this thesis. 2012-05-30 Ph.D. Thesis NonPeerReviewed application/pdf eng Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/2932/1/thesis-webview.pdf Tews, Erik <http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/view/person/Tews=3AErik=3A=3A.html> : DECT Security Analysis. Technische Universität, Darmstadt [Ph.D. Thesis], (2012) en info:eu-repo/semantics/objectFile info:eu-repo/semantics/humanStartPage