Helm, Carsten ; Neugart, Michael (2008):
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information.
In: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, 192, [Report]
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| Item Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Title: | Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information |
| Language: | English |
| Abstract: | With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter. |
| Series: | Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics |
| Series Volume: | 192 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Asymmetric information, coalition governments, policy reform |
| Classification DDC: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| Divisions: | 01 Department of Law and Economics 01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete 01 Department of Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > Angewandte Mikroökonomik und Institutionenökonomik |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2009 12:17 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Jan 2016 15:16 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47340 |
| Additional Information: | JEL - Classification : D72, D78, D82 |
| URI: | https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/4734 |
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