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# BEYOND THE PILOT PROJECT

## Towards broad-based integrated violence prevention in South Africa

Zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)  
genehmigte Dissertation von M.Sc. MBA Lauren Kate Uğur aus Johannesburg,  
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Institut für Soziologie

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Darmstadt, den 31.07.2014

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(Lauren Kate Uğur)

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# ABSTRACT

*“I envision someday a great, peaceful South Africa in which the world will take pride, a nation in which each of many different groups will be making its own creative contribution.”*

*– Alan Paton*

Twenty years post-apartheid South Africa continues to face unrelentingly high levels of violence throughout the country. Despite progressive policies influenced by international best practice and the recognition of violence as a complex social problem requiring holistic solutions, the implementation of integrated prevention policy remains weak. Through the employment of a qualitative research approach, this thesis explores the dynamic and complex interrelations between policies and practice that impact on the realisation of broad-based integrated violence prevention in South Africa. In-depth case study research into the institutional structure and implementation methodologies of an internationally supported integrated prevention initiative, the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) Programme, provides the basis on which this thesis discusses the contention that institutional misalignment in South Africa hinders the realisation of broad-based implementation of integrated violence and crime prevention.

Extending from a research rationale, which suggests that the true value of this kind of internationally supported pilot programme lies in its ability to be transferred and implemented at scale, this thesis draws on the case study experience in order to conceptualise how broad-based programme transfer may be realised. In answering the primary research question *what are the main challenges facing the implementation and transferability of the VPUU programme?*, this thesis draws together the difficulties being experienced at national policy and local implementation level in order to provide new insights into what programme transfer constitutes in this context. The application of the theoretical framework that seeks to understand the epistemological complexity of the VPUU programme and the delivery of interventions results in an understanding of how the knowledge derived from the case study may contribute to the realisation of mainstreamed programme transfer in the future.

Based on the results of the case study, this thesis shows that dealing with complex problems requires the development of institutions and professionals capable of coping with complexity. Furthermore, the research outcomes highlight the prerequisite for institutional alignment towards a common understanding of urban safety and suggest that a shift in mind-set is required in the way in which urban safety and crime prevention are conceived. It is argued that in order to realise the implementation of integrated prevention, urban safety needs to be seen not as a

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stand-alone, complementary development issue but rather as a systemic guide with which all sectors and institutions should proactively concern themselves. This kind of systemic integration is likewise argued to be reliant on the establishment of a common vision of what urban safety and prevention constitute.

The core contribution of this research lies in the application of a new means of thinking about the complex interrelations associated with integrated prevention, providing in-depth understanding of the dynamics of delivery across the multiple spheres of intervention. The identification of robust intervention elements within more manageable problem spaces may aid in enabling various government departments to realise improved efficiency in the allocation of finite resources and capacities so as to contribute more effectively to the realisation of urban safety.

Key words: Urban planning, violence prevention, integrated planning, complexity, programme transfer, governance

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# ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Zwanzig Jahre nach dem Ende der Apartheid sieht sich Südafrika immer noch einem unablässig hohen Maß an Gewalt im ganzen Land ausgesetzt. Trotz beispielhafter internationaler Erfolgsmodelle und eine Anerkennung der Gewalt als komplexes Gesellschaftsproblem, das nach ganzheitlichen Lösungen verlangt, bleibt die Implementierung von integrierten Präventionsansätzen weiterhin schwach. Mithilfe qualitativer Forschungsansätze werden in dieser Dissertation komplexe und zugleich dynamische Zusammenhänge zwischen Politik und Praxis untersucht, die eine generellere Übertragung von integrierter Gewaltprävention in Südafrika beeinträchtigen.

Die vertiefte Untersuchung einer Fallstudie zum institutionellen Aufbau und den Implementierungsstrategien einer international anerkannten und integrierten Präventionsinitiative, des sogenannten “Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading” (VPUU) Programms, dient als Grundlage zur Erörterung der These, dass institutionelle Fehlausrichtungen in Südafrika die Übertragung einer integrierten Prävention von Kapitalverbrechen behindern.

Ausgehend von dem Grundgedanken, dass der wahre Wert eines international unterstützten Pilotprojektes in seiner generellen Übertragbarkeit liegt, versucht diese Dissertation aus den Ergebnissen der Fallstudie Konzeptvorschläge abzuleiten, die Wege zu integrierter Übertragbarkeit aufzeigen.

Durch das Beantworten der zentralen Forschungsfrage, was die wichtigsten Herausforderungen des VPUU Programms im Hinblick auf dessen Umsetzung und Übertragbarkeit sind, bündelt diese Dissertation jene Problemstellungen auf der Ebene der landesweiten Politik und der lokalen Umsetzung, um damit neue Perspektiven zu eröffnen, was die Übertragbarkeit von Programmen in diesem Kontext ausmacht. Die Anwendung des theoretischen Rahmens dient dem Versuch, die erkenntnistheoretische Komplexität des VPUU Programms zu verstehen. Dieser theoretische Rahmen wird mit den Ergebnissen der empirischen Forschung überlagert, um ein Verständnis zu entwickeln, was eine integrierte Übertragbarkeit bedingt.

Basierend auf den Ergebnissen der Fallstudie zeigt diese Dissertation, dass der Umgang mit komplexen Problemen Institutionen und Experten erfordert, die mit eben dieser Komplexität vertraut sind. In dieser Hinsicht heben die Forschungsergebnisse hervor, dass innerhalb der institutionellen Strukturen zunächst ein gemeinsames Verständnis des Begriffs von Sicherheit vorherrschen muss, um einen angemessenen Umgang zugunsten einer integrierten Gewaltprävention zu erzielen. Für die Umsetzung einer integrierten Prävention wird in dieser Arbeit angenommen, dass urbane Sicherheit nicht als gesondertes Einzelelement zu betrachten ist, sondern sie vielmehr in den systematischen Gesamtzusammenhang aller involvierten Sektoren zu stel-

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len ist. Hierzu müssen die jeweiligen beteiligten Stellen aktiv ihre Beiträge beisteuern. Dies macht zunächst eine erstmalig gemeinsam definierte Vorstellung von urbaner Sicherheit und Verbrechensprävention erforderlich.

Der Kernbeitrag dieser Forschungsarbeit liegt in der Anwendung einer neuen Sichtweise auf die komplexen Wechselbeziehungen, die mit integrierter Prävention verbunden sind. Daraus ergibt sich ein vertieftes Verständnis für die dynamische Ausformulierung der Intervention über die individuellen Eingriffssphären hinaus. Die Identifizierung robuster Interventionselemente innerhalb handhab zugeschnittener Problemfelder kann dazu beitragen, dass die verschiedenen Regierungsabteilungen künftig wesentlich effektiver mit ihren knappen finanziellen Ressourcen und personellen Kapazitäten gestaltend eingreifen.

Schlüsselbegriffe: Stadtplanung, Stadtentwicklung, Gewaltprävention, integrierte Planungsansätze, Komplexitätstheorie, Programmübertragbarkeit, Governance

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## List of Abbreviations

ABA	Area-based Approach
ACT	Area Coordination Teams
ANC	African National Congress
ALHDC	Affordable Land and Housing Data Centre
ASGISA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa
CAP	Community Action Plan
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CoCT	City of Cape Town
CoGTA	Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
CPF	Community Policing Forum
CPTED	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
CSV	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
CTP	Cape Town Partnership
DA	Democratic Alliance
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DLG	Developmental Local Government
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EPWP	Extended Public Works Programme
FC	Financial Cooperation
FMC	Facility Management Committees
FUNDASAL	Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HDA	Housing Development Agency
HDI	Human Development Index
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IDT	Independent Development Trust
ISRDP	Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme
ISTP	Informal Settlement Transformation Programme
IUDF	Integrated Urban Development Framework
JIPSA	Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MFMA	Municipal Finance Management Act
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department

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MRC	Medical Research Council
MURP	Mayoral Urban Regeneration Programme
NCCS	National Crime Combatting Strategy
NCPS	National Crime Prevention Strategy
NGDS	National Growth and Development Strategy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	National Party
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
PGWC	Provincial Government of the Western Cape
PFMA	Provincial Finance Management Act
PMU	Project Management Unit
QoL	Quality of Life
RDF	Rural Development Framework
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SAPS	South African Police Services
SaVI	Safety and Violence Initiative
SDF	Spatial Development Framework
SDF	Social Development Fund
SJC	Social Justice Coalition
SNA	Safe Node Area
SNAC	Safe Node Area Committee
TB	Pulmonary Tuberculosis
UDS	Urban Development Strategy
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URP	Urban Renewal Programme
VPUU	Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading
WCP	Western Cape Province
WHO	World Health Organisation

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# INTRODUCTION

*“The planner’s task is to set the basis in order to handle complexity cognitively and politically.”*

*– Dietrich Fürst*

---

## Background and Research Overview

---

This thesis engages primarily with a case study of the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme within its original site of on-going implementation, the township of Khayelitsha in Cape Town, South Africa.

This bi-lateral international cooperation programme is an ambitious undertaking in integrated planning implementation, aimed towards the employment of innovative urban upgrading, participation and institutionalisation methodologies so as to address the persistent issues of underdevelopment and chronic interpersonal violence within one of the most fragile urban contexts in South Africa. Officially launched in 2005, VPUU is now drawing its third implementation phase to a close. In entering its fourth implementation phase, the programme is thus beginning to engage in more stringent processes of institutionalisation in order to begin to transfer interventions to other neighbourhoods, both within Cape Town and the Western Cape Province.

Piloted within the former Apartheid township of Khayelitsha, the VPUU programme supports the ideals of National Government’s Urban Renewal Programme (URP). Selected as one of eight key urban renewal nodes, situated within six of South Africa’s major cities, Khayelitsha is representative of the fragile, under-resourced environmental and social contexts in which a significant majority of the country’s population currently lives.

Originally planned as an African or “black” dormitory township Khayelitsha, colloquially referred to as “Khaya”, was designed to house around 250.000 residents. Today this number has swelled to over 700.000<sup>1</sup>. Buckling under the weight of overcrowded and under-serviced formal and informal living conditions Khayelitsha is reminiscent of any number of former township areas across the country. With levels of crime, particularly violent crime, well above the already too-high national averages, Khayelitsha was identified under the urban renewal programme as in desperate need of intervention, both in addressing violence and crime through preventative methods as well as improving the overall quality of life of its residents.

Eight years into its implementation, the impacts in parts of Khayelitsha, at least physical, of the VPUU’s upgrading interventions are clearly visible within the urban environment. A

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<sup>1</sup> When addressing estimates from local NGOs this number rises to over 1 million inhabitants.

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structured, well-lit walkway connects the main routes from the Khayelitsha train station to the Harare CBD where newly formed market areas, an impressive library and community centre, as well as a variety of live-work units have been developed and are in use. These physical upgrades have done much to change the immediate surroundings of the intervention sites and are centrally based on methodologies of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). Implementing a “home-grown” methodological approach to urban interventions within low-income neighbourhoods, the VPUU programme supports the environmental design approaches to crime prevention with complementary institutional and social prevention methods and has, since its pilot phase inception, progressed from placing its focus squarely on violence prevention to addressing a broader objective of improving the overall quality of life for residents within the intervention areas. As the programme moves into other surrounding formal and informal settlements, one of the most significant questions relating to the continued implementation of the VPUU approach concerns the processes of transferability of the VPUU methodology in its ability to be adequately implemented in other areas, not just within the bounds of the Cape Town Municipality but also within other areas of the Western Cape Province as well.

The complex nature of the urban and social systems within which VPUU is implemented as well as the complex interrelatedness of the social, political and economic factors that have led to an almost normalised state of *everyday violence*<sup>2</sup> within these neighbourhoods resulted in the formulation of the starting assertion that, in order to understand the challenges being faced by the VPUU programme and in progressing towards a conceptual model for transferability, concepts derived from complexity theory may best provide a means of understanding the challenges that the programme is experiencing and furthermore, facilitate the discussion and standpoint from which these challenges may best be addressed. This is motivated by the contention that despite a global recognition of violence as a complex problem, the knowledge base provided by the complexity sciences does not underpin integrated programme design and implementation on a broad scale. A theoretical framework, or “lens”, based on specific elements of complexity theory<sup>3</sup>, along with theories and experiences of policy transfer, is therefore constructed and used as a means through which to analyse the case study undertaken in answering the central research question: “*What are the main challenges facing the implementation and transferability of the VPUU programme to other vulnerable urban areas in Cape Town and the Western Cape?*” Furthermore, this research seeks to work towards the development of a conceptual understanding of the complexity of programme transfer in this context, rendering a discussion on how it is that complexity thinking may contribute to the development of practical models of programme transfer.

The primary objective of this research is therefore to draw out and highlight the key challenges being experienced by the VPUU programme and discuss these challenges within the

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<sup>2</sup> See Moser and McIllwaine 2006, p.106

<sup>3</sup> Key elements from complexity sciences, and which are deemed most applicable to the social sciences, particularly urban planning are used to construct the theoretical framework through which the in-depth case study is undertaken. This framework includes the notions of uncertainty, interdependence, flexibility - including feedback, learning and adaptation, self-organisation and emergence.

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
specific context within which they occur, conducting an assessment of how it is that such elements may aid or hinder the transferability of the programme methodology to other areas, both within Cape Town and the Western Cape.

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## Chapter Outline

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This thesis is organised into three main parts and constitutes seven chapters in addition to this introduction. Part A, composed of the first three chapters, is concerned with the introduction and focused literature review, the presentation of the theoretical standpoint from which this research has been undertaken as well as a detailed methodological outline. Part B focuses on the empirical work associated with this research in chapters four and five while Part C concerns itself, in the final two chapters, with the overall research outcomes, conclusions, and the establishment of a subsequent research agenda.



**Figure 0.1.:** Thesis structure.

The *first chapter* begins by highlighting the overall research context, framing the issue of urban violence and crime, particularly the kind of violent crime persistent in South Africa's townships, as a complex development problem with which urban planners and development specialists are faced. Within the context of the on-going dynamic urbanisation fuelling urban population growth and global economic development policies that encourage market-led growth strategies, inequality in combination with other resultant risk factors, as opposed to poverty alone, is presented as the central cause of global rises in urban violence.

Violence, as it is being experienced in many urban areas within other developing countries, is an issue from which South Africa is certainly not exempt. The vast numbers of poor, and largely marginalised urban residents most of whom reside in the ever-growing informal settlements of large cities are most affected by issues such as violent crime, hailing this as one of the most prevalent development issues with which cities are faced. This chapter draws on a literature review of the progression in international law enforcement and crime prevention approaches over the past two decades, providing a basis from which urban renewal and crime prevention practices in the cities of South Africa can be understood since the country's official entry into democracy in 1994.

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**Chapter Two** illustrates the theoretical framework on which this research is based. Specific elements of complexity theory as they pertain to the social sciences and urban planning are related to current thinking and approaches to policy and programme transfer. The exploration of these two key bodies of literature is used to construct the theoretical lens through which the empirical case study research is undertaken and analysed.

**Chapter Three** portrays the central intent of this research through a presentation of the main objectives, specific aims, hypotheses and questions that provide the focus for this thesis. Additionally, the methods employed are specifically outlined and justified in their usage, culminating in the discussion of the expected deliverables of the research. In seeking to limit any possible misconception or understanding in the interpretation of concepts, which may occur based on the interdisciplinarity of the research environment, which draws on theories from urban planning, criminology, sociology and the political sciences, clear definitions for key terms are presented as they relate to the context of this particular research.

**Chapter Four** provides the entry point into the specific context of this research, with a critical assessment of post-apartheid (urban) development policy in South Africa. In order to provide the contextual basis from which the implementation of a large crime prevention and social development intervention programme such as the VPUU can be understood, an overview of post-apartheid social and economic development policy is presented. Focus is placed on the way in which these policies have intersected with crime prevention policy objectives, as set out by national government. This assessment is then linked to an overview of how national, provincial and local governance structures interact with and contradict one another in supporting set development objectives, as the focus shifts to the specific case of local governance, urban renewal and policing for crime prevention within the City of Cape Town.

**Chapter Five** presents a detailed case study of the VPUU programme from the ideology and methodologies underpinning its inception to present-day implementations. Through archival research, documentation analysis, observation and expert interviews, this case study results in the provision of the outcomes and, more specifically, the challenges that are being faced by the programme as it has developed from a single pilot project implementation into a more broad-based prevention methodology for tackling the prevalence of chronic interpersonal violence.

Based on the in-depth case study, a complexity lens is thus placed on the programme on the basis of which the case study results are highlighted and discussed in **Chapter Six**. The central focus of this chapter is to formulate a conceptual understanding of transferability within the context of the VPUU programme. Furthermore, the potential for complexity theory to support the development of a framework aimed towards improving the likelihood of successful broad-based transfer of the VPUU programme to other vulnerable areas is explored. This is achieved through considering the identified challenges being experienced within the programme, particularly relating to the various spheres - situational, institutional and social - within which prevention interventions are being implemented. The chapter presents a conceptual framework for how it is broad-based programme transfer can be a) considered and b) potentially realised within the South African context.

---

**Chapter Seven** constitutes the final chapter of this thesis, focusing on the provision of some final comments on the research outcomes and hypotheses. Finally, based on the case study experience and the central research outcomes, the concluding sections draw on the main findings of this research in elaborating potential points of concern that warrant further research if the objective of realising safer South African cities is to be realised.

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# 1 VIOLENCE: AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

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## 1.1 Introduction

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The world is urban. As more and more people reside in urban areas, so too does it require that the problems associated with urbanisation and the dynamic growth of cities be increasingly explored, as the numbers of people that such issues affect increases proportionally. This previously unprecedented growth of cities also results in the fact that it is cities, which have been placed at the centre of development discourses. These discourses focus on the ways in which urbanisation trends bring seemingly vast opportunities on the one hand, balanced by a number of unforeseen challenges on the other. Most often it seems to be the experience that planned development processes struggle in the quest to keep abreast of dynamic urban growth patterns, even in some of the world's most developed nations. Attributed to the fact that the highest percentages of urban growth are occurring in those countries least likely able to deal with the additional pressures levied through express urbanisation processes, it goes without saying that it is therefore the world's most vulnerable citizens who bear the true brunt of any negative "side-effects", as it is these populations that reside in the "expanding cities and slums of developing countries" (Muggah, 2012, vi).

Alongside the deficiencies of underdevelopment, which arise as cities cannot adequately absorb the influx of urban (im)migrants, increases in the experiences of urban violence are occurring at an alarming rate, gaining more focused attention from researchers and policy-makers alike. This prefatory chapter addresses the issue of dynamic urbanisation within the context of the current discourse on its linkages to severe increases in urban violence, focusing on developing countries, countries of the so-called *Global South*.

The identification of urban violence as a serious development challenge is explored through a presentation of the ways in which international violence prevention discourses and practical approaches have developed over recent years, relating these approaches to the various theories that have supported their advancement. This discussion formulates the context and overall positioning within which this research has been conducted, highlighting urban violence as one of the most prevalent and problematic challenges currently facing academics and urban development practitioners.

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## 1.2 Research Context: Dynamic Urbanisation, Inequality and Urban Violence

---

The world's cities are experiencing an increasing challenge of urban violence, which has developed itself as one of the central challenges towards the creation of accessible and liveable cities for urban populations across the globe, particularly within the context of developing nations (The World Bank, 2011; Muggah, 2012). For example, particularly in Africa and the Americas, murder statistics according to population size are quoted to be double those being experienced in more developed countries.

UN-Habitat reports the prevalence of urban violence, placing focused concern on the premise that violence is exacerbated through a complex mix of social, institutional and environmental causes resulting in perpetuated feelings of insecurity, particularly amongst those populations most at risk, the urban poor (UN-Habitat, 2007). As the most recent World Development Report contends, this complex "mix" arises through a combination of internal and external stresses that test the proverbial immune system of developing cities (The World Bank, 2011).


This section therefore positions the role that urbanisation plays in the construction of urban contexts within which social, institutional and environmental factors interrelate in ways that fail to support the growth of settlements and communities where inclusion, resilience and safety are a reality. This discussion begins with the role that dynamic urbanisation plays in what is referred to here as the *development of underdevelopment*.

---

### 1.2.1 Dynamic urbanisation: the development of underdevelopment

---

Urbanisation is a worldwide phenomenon with the most quoted statistics being that of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), which state that, in 2008 more than half the world's population was already recorded to be living in cities. This urbanisation experience will by no means be halted in the near future as projections determine that the world's urban population will rise from a current estimate of 3.6 billion (in 2011) to 5 billion by 2030 and to 6.3 billion by 2050, representing an urban population increase of 67% (United Nations, 2012b, p. 3). This demonstrates that it is urban areas that will not only be required to absorb all global population growth over the next 40 years but also continue to absorb any rural migrant populations (ibid.). These statistics are, however, particularly pertinent to the developing continents of Africa and Asia where the urbanisation process is at its most rapid – by 2030 these two continents will include almost seven out of every ten urban dwellers across the world. Africa alone will experience an increase in its urban populations of almost 1 billion over the next four decades (UNFPA, 2007; United Nations, 2012b). Essentially, where more than half of the world's population lives in urban areas, likewise will any challenges faced within the urban context, also affect the majority of our global population. Figure 1.1 depicts the distribution and projection of urban and rural populations for developed and less-developed regions between 1950 and 2050.



**Figure 1.1.:** Projected urban and rural populations for developed and less-developed world regions (United Nations, 2012b).

The process of urbanisation as it has been observed to occur can be categorised into two broad categories: urbanisation that occurs “with development” and urbanisation that occurs “without development” (Cheru, 2005, p.2-3). As urbanisation has progressed and the global economy has opened up to include many more previously removed economies, such as that of South Africa, another intermediary, categorisation of urbanisation in terms of development becomes visible, something that Cheru (2005, p.2) refers to as contexts where urbanisation occurs within circumstances of “limited development”. The understanding of the differences in the experience of cities facing urbanisation, with varying degrees of development<sup>4</sup>, provides significant insight into why the urbanisation challenges being faced are so much more exaggerated in the developing (African) context. Cities located within the context of more developed nations predominantly experience the forces of urbanisation characterised by continuing development, meaning that, as urbanisation occurs, the focused development and provision of services and infrastructures mean that these cities are able to more adequately accommodate growing urban populations. At the other end of the spectrum however, cities in developing nations by contrast,

<sup>4</sup> Development refers in this context to the physical development of infrastructures within urban areas that allow growing urban areas to accommodate increasing populations adequately in terms of the provision of access to basic services and physical infrastructures such as public transportation, roads, housing etc. The use of the term here does not intend to promote all development as good but is merely a commentary on how it is that urbanisation has resulted in under-served and under-resourced urban areas, resulting in inadequate living conditions for millions of urban residents.

---

generally experience the challenges of urbanisation without, or at best, with limited services and infrastructure development capacities. Cities thus experience differential levels of development when undergoing rapid urbanisation, which is essentially dependent on the level at which existent infrastructures, physical and otherwise, are (un)able to cope.

Urbanisation processes coupled with a lack of focused and complimentary economic development and urban planning policy results in the relative absence of secondary cities, leading to the growth of primary urban centres, which do not enjoy the support of smaller surrounding urban areas. Due to the prevalence of only a small number of large primary cities, urban areas thus continue to develop without the ability to cope with the influx of new urban dwellers, resulting in the culmination of large, over-populated urban areas with poor economic bases that are unable to deliver the municipal capacity required to provide even the most basic of services (Cheru, 2005; UN-Habitat, 2007).

Researchers in the fields of sociology, planning and criminology, link urbanisation and the resultant inability of urban areas to provide access to services and infrastructure, particularly in developing countries, with increases in the prevalence of urban violence and, along with major international organisations, thus view urban violence as one of the most significant threats to development at local, regional and international level. The resultant economic, social and political situations of cities, within the global south correspondingly increases the rate, intensity and overall impacts of urban violence (Winton, 2004; Moser, 2004; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). The varied linkages between social and infrastructure services and their relationship to urban safety supports the argument that the success of crime and violence prevention strategies in more developed nations can be attributed largely to the more sophisticated infrastructures and social service delivery systems present within developed cities than to the actual safety and prevention strategies themselves, as these societies have benefited from “*the protective layers of centuries of uninterrupted investment in the delivery of services and access to basic rights*” (Holtmann, 2011, p.109).

Development specialists such as Winton (2004) remind us of the fact that by no means is violence unique to urban areas, however, academic focus situates the experience of increasing, “endemic” violence within the urban context, showing how it is that complex social, economic and political processes driving the development processes of cities interact alongside processes of urbanisation to create situations with which cities cannot cope. It is under these conditions that the normalisation of, what Moser (2004, p. 6) refers to as *everyday violence*, increasingly results as a reality of daily life.

It is not to argue that urbanisation is by any means the sole reason for the prevalence and continuing trend towards increased urban violence but it does provide a platform from which one can begin to grasp and tackle the role that environment and the construction of place, particularly under the multiple stresses inflicted by rapid, dynamic urban growth, has played in relation to the experience of inadequate development and thus violence, particularly ubiquitous in relation to continually growing, underprivileged, poor communities.

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## 1.2.2 Rapid development, social change and disorganisation

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The notion that underdeveloped, inadequate urban contexts hold the potential to result in social disorganisation, which in turn has been linked to increases in urban violence, is not a new one. Social disorganisation theory, popularised by Chicago School sociologists Shaw and McKay (1942), provided empirical evidence from studies undertaken in the City of Chicago linking high levels of delinquency with what they termed socially disorganised areas where residents, particularly youth, suffer a detachment from conventional groups and institutions. Despite some critique levied against social disorganisation theory due to the possible spuriousness of the presumed relationship between social disorganisation, the detachment from conventional groups and delinquency (Bohm, 2001, p.69), what is important here is that the linkages established between urban environments, marginalisation and increased cases of delinquency have informed the development of contemporary prevention practices that target environmental improvement.

In an extension of the Chicago School Theories linking delinquency with socially disorganised urban environments, the architect Oscar Newman (1973) presented evidence on the relationship between the actual physical form of an urban environment and the prevalence of crime. Based on his position that badly designed buildings and spaces in urban areas experience higher levels of crime than well-designed neighbourhoods, Newman's theory of *defensible space* provided a model for the design of residential environments which would inhibit criminality through the use of physical and non-physical barriers, with particular importance placed on the creation of improved surveillance. It is this model that supports what we now term crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), a prevention methodology still very much in use today and one of the foundational intervention approaches used in the case study investigated through this research (chapter 5).

What is taken from the work of the Chicago School Theorists and Oscar Newman, in their investigations into neighbourhood characteristics and resultant delinquency as a manifestation of social disorganisation and inadequate design, is that rapid urbanisation with which many cities have not been able to cope, contributes to the creation of urban areas characterised by physical underdevelopment along with marginalisation and the inadequate access of residents to economic opportunities and social support. Furthermore, rapid growth and resultant social change in growing urban areas leads to the breakdown of social cohesion within these communities as rapid growth and residential mobility often occur with very high frequency. Such areas therefore most often do not provide for the conditions in which stable residences can be established, resulting in ties to normative institutions being lost. Central to the theory of social disorganisation is the dismissal of the thesis that violence and crime are attributable to deviant racial groups, ethnic or immigrant cultures, asserting instead that regardless of ethnicity, culture or race, any group living within socially disorganised urban communities would be subject to higher rates of crime.

Within socially disorganised areas, the structural factors that characterise these neighbourhoods lead to the breakdown of normative values usually based on strong family and community

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
structures, which in turn results in the development of deviant subcultures of violence. Empirical research has shown that communities which exhibit low levels of networks, unsupervised youth groups and low organisational access and participation exhibit higher rates of crime and delinquency (Sampson and Groves, 1989). These subcultures, as they progress over time, result in the development of a value system increasingly conducive to violence.

Bohm (2001) extends the discussion on Chicago school theories, asking what it is that fuels the way in which cities develop and what determines where these areas of social disorganisation occur, arguing that it is not simply the processes of rapid growth occurring at random but also that it is the result of the way in which urbanisation occurs, predicated on the value and decision-making processes and interests of the political and economic elite. It is these development decisions that orient the ways in which urbanisation processes are approached and dealt with that play a significant role in the development, or underdevelopment as it may be, of particular urban settlements. Critical theory approaches support the contention that human beings are both determined and determining in our behaviour. In direct opposition therefore to classic and neoclassic approaches, which centre on the assertion that humans act entirely based on free will and positive theoretical approaches, which propose that human actions are determined, critical theories assert that we, as human beings, create the very institutions that determine and constrain our actions (Bohm, 2001, p.104).

This position is extended through this research in chapter 4, which depicts the role that post-apartheid governance in South Africa and the experience of Cape Town as one of the country's largest cities, has played in the creation of urban landscapes where economic success is starkly juxtaposed against the social failures still being observed and arguably exacerbated almost 20 years on. Rapid urbanisation and the consequential inadequate urban environments that evolve, mostly inhabited by the poorest of the poor are all factors, which arguably may or may not result in the increase of crime and violence.

As the point has been made, it is a complex mix of the way in which a multitude of risk factors converge usually supported, perhaps even exacerbated, by local development policies driven by varied elite interests that results in what can be termed socially disorganised, inadequate urban living environments where increasing violence and crime becomes a daily reality. Research has shown however that inadequate development, marginalisation and the extreme poverty, which generally characterises the urban contexts being described, cannot be simply and linearly connected to increases in violence in these areas. Rather, violence is at its worst where all of the mentioned factors are further contributed to by the hopelessness that occurs when social and economic opportunities exclude those who are poorest (Vanderschueren, 1996, pp.98-102).


In many developing countries, the urban poor live in abominable conditions just a few kilometres away from a sector of society that is so far beyond their reach in terms of access to services and material wealth that it no longer makes sense to bother to dream of such attainment. Supporting this, clear linkages have been established between development status and homicide rates, based on human development index (HDI) valuations and measures of inequality based on Gini index indicators, as shown in Figure 1.2 (UNODC, 2011).



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2011), UNDP Human Development Index and World Bank Data Gini Index. Bubble size is proportional to the percentage of homicides at global level in countries with HDI or Gini value.

**Figure 1.2.:** Global homicide rates and development indicators. Source: UNODC (2011).


South Africa relates directly to this trend as one of the most unequal countries in the world Figure 1.3, displaying persistently high levels of violent crime with a national homicide rate of 36,5 per 100.000 of the population<sup>5</sup> Figure 1.4.



**Figure 1.3.:** Distribution of family income – Gini index country comparison. Source: CIA Factbook 2011. Map developed through chartsbin.com.

Anomie or strain theories developed in the fields of sociology and criminology support this line of thought in providing a theoretical understanding of the impacts that such exclusion has on urban residents and the communities in which they live.

<sup>5</sup> This map depicts data from 2008. Subsequent UNODC statistical data demonstrates a drop from 36,5 to 30,9 homicides per 100.000 population in 2011. Statistics freely available at <http://www.unodc.org>.



**Figure 1.4.:** Comparative map of global homicide rates per 100.000 of the population. Source: UNODC Statistics on Crime and Justice 1995-2011. Map developed through chartsbin.com.

### 1.2.3 Underdevelopment and societal anomie: urban residents under strain

Sociologist Émile Durkheim first introduced the concept of anomie in the early 1890s, which can be roughly defined as the condition of instability that results in societies or individuals, from the breakdown of value systems or a lack of purpose or opportunity. In extending Durkheim's concept of anomie, Merton (1938) theorised that the most severe causes of anomie in individuals is the inability, through access to acceptable means, to achieve personal goals, resulting in increased strain that, if perpetuated, results in a breakdown of regulated systems. Under these conditions, previously acceptable means of goal attainment are replaced with varying forms of illegitimate means of achievement. Merton's work resulted in a continuum of responses to anomie, ranging from conformity and social innovation through to rebellion. Delinquency and crime, which may often be violent, are the result of such rebellion. Essentially, according to Merton, anomie results most in contexts where normative success is restricted through a lack of opportunity. Therefore, likewise to the theory of social disorganisation, high crime rates in deprived urban areas can be supported using Merton's anomie theory in that individuals residing in such neighbourhoods are most often marginalised, excluded from basic opportunities such as access to education or the local economy, that would provide them with the means of attaining the central goal of earning a living and being able to provide for their families.

It is posited therefore that it is not just underdevelopment and poverty that results in violent crime increases but rather that it is underdevelopment, which occurs in some areas while massive economic growth and development occurs in other areas within the same city, what we refer to as *inequality*, that most fuels increases in violent crime. The differential between

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the “haves” and “have-nots”, coupled with limited to zero access to social and economic opportunities is hypothesised to be the combination that best fosters the build-up of deep-seated resentment that when stimulated to such an extent often expounds itself in violent aggression. As researchers from the McDonald Williams Institute so aptly put it, “*Crime is not an inevitable consequence of city life or poverty or a lack of education; rather, it is the culmination of multiple risk factors and opportunities lost*” (McDonald Williams Institute, 2007, p.3). It is therefore not merely urbanisation and an inability to cope with its pressures that poses the greatest risk to increased violence and crime but, in recent years, more clear linkages have been made in associating the level of inequality between the rich and poor with higher rates of urban violence (The World Bank, 2011).


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#### 1.2.4 Inequality, violence and crime

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In the attempt to grapple with the challenge of fragile urban contexts, most often plagued by poverty and an absolute lack of basic-service infrastructure, institutional support and economic opportunity, this argument seeks to make clear that it is not poverty or inadequate living environments alone that contribute to urban violence but rather a situation in which income disparity is coupled with other exclusionary factors that perpetuate unequal development. Inadequate infrastructure and services, lack of access to education and employment opportunities as well as other services such as those associated with basic health care are some such factors (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). What is also clear, on the other hand, is that in instances where severe inequalities in development occur, the absence or inability of governments and local authorities to provide proper state protection, policing and functional judicial systems most affects the urban poor whom have less resources with which to protect themselves. The living conditions of the urban poor in developing countries where inequality precedes, heightens the potential for fragile social contexts to develop, which lead to the emergence of violence, as these varying influences converge in different ways, dependant on the contextual urban setting, and intersect with such local conditions, thus resulting in increased incidences of crime, in many instances, serious violent crime (Vanderschueren, 1996; Winton, 2004). Having outlined the relationship between urbanisation and the inability of urban service providers to cope with rates of influx, resulting in underdeveloped areas, what has emerged is that development practices being undertaken in parallel and which foster unequal development in their inability to balance economic and social development objectives, leads one to conclude that it is the development of inequality, supported by processes of dynamic urbanisation and competing governance, that is most criminogenic (Shaw and Carli, 2011).

John Galtung’s work from the early 1990s originally proposed the now widely accepted argument that deprivation is, in itself, a form of violence. Within the urban context, deprivation is manifested in the form of inequality. Inequality is thus argued to be the most important form of *structural violence* that relates most directly to the emergence of everyday *reactionary violence* (Winton, 2004, pp.166-167). Vanderschueren (1996, p.93) continues this argument



**Figure 1.5.:** Social characteristics and their impact on violent crime. Source: Adapted from Kawachi et al. (1999).

in referring to violence as “... above all, the product of a society characterized by inequality and social exclusion. It is a distortion of social relationships generated within social structures – family, school, peer group, neighbourhood, police, justice – which can no longer fulfil their role”.

Studies from the USA have confirmed Merton’s (1938) ideas through research showing that a correlation certainly exists between income inequality, what is referred to as *relative deprivation*, and violent crime (Kawachi et al., 1999; Fajnzylber et al., 2000). In linking societal characteristics with crime rates, studies such as this confirm the correlation between increased crime rates, relative deprivation and social cohesion and have similarly confirmed positive correlations between relative deprivation and levels of social cohesion (Figure 1.5).

This research supports the main essence of this argument in addressing the situation of governance at national and local level in terms of economic and social development policy in conjunction with violence prevention in post-apartheid South Africa. This results in outcomes that are indicative of a lack of recognition for the seriousness of urbanisation and the ignorance of the impacts that have been felt in South Africa’s cities due to the urban growth of the past two decades. Alongside misaligned economic and social development policies that are arguably reinforcing the segregation purposefully created under apartheid and fostering a continuing situation of severe inequality (Appendix A), all of these factors interrelate to explain the “causes” of the multiple, severe dimensions of violence being experienced in the country’s cities.

Overall, perpetual inequality is what runs the very real risk of being the central key element in a total breakdown of the majority society, something that is already being seen in the form of an increasing number of violent protests across the country with the sole aim being that of an

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era thought to be past in calling for residents to render cities ungovernable<sup>6</sup> until their needs are addressed.

In 1993, just prior to the country's first democratic elections which were held in 1994, commentators cited poor social and economic conditions, entrenched by an undemocratic system, as the foundation for pervasive social, political and economic violence (Simpson, 1993, pp.13-14). Unfortunately this remains the case today.

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### 1.3 Research Rationale

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*“We owe our children, the most vulnerable citizens in our society, a life free of violence and fear.”*

*– Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1918-2013)*

The research rationale, which underpins this research, is threefold. Firstly, violence is considered a key development challenge with which multiple disciplines, including planning, must engage. Secondly, urban violence and violent crime is recognised as a significant barrier to the future development of inclusive and sustainable settlements in South Africa and finally, the ability to move beyond the pilot project through developing effective project/intervention transfer processes that make use of existing systems and aid in the allocation of limited resources is purported as key to ensuring that a greater impact in violence and crime prevention is made, both in Cape Town and across South Africa.

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
#### 1.3.1 Violence as a planning challenge

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The identification of violence as one of the most significant challenges facing the sustainable development of cities in developing countries, as has been outlined, is something that cannot be ignored within the field of urban planning. In line with global trends and representative of South Africa's developing status as a nation, South Africa's urban populations likewise continue to grow (Figure 1.6). As one of the most urbanised countries in sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 62% of South Africa's total population resides in urban areas and by 2033 when the rest of sub-Saharan Africa will have larger urban than rural populations, South Africa's urban population is expected to rise to 75% of the total population (Turok, 2012, p.12). Additionally, South African crime statistics show that violent crime is disproportionately concentrated in the country's most urbanised areas, something that is exacerbated by the rapid growth and transformation of its cities and the opportunities that growing urban areas provide for criminals as well as the persistence of socio-economic disparities and spatial segregation (Boisteau, 2005; Samara, 2011).

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<sup>6</sup> A key strategy in the resistance against the apartheid government was the implementation of targeted strikes, boycotts and attacks on state representatives that sought to render the country ungovernable (Veit et al., 2011).



**Figure 1.6.:** South African urban and rural population projections (United Nations, 2012a).

Essentially, violence, including violent crime, is thus argued here as a significant threat to the sustainable development of liveable cities for millions of urban residents within developing nations, who have very few resources with which to tackle such an enormous and ever-growing problem. Planners and the implementation of planning policy play a central role in the formation of urban development strategies and although significantly embedded within the fields of sociology, psychology and criminology, urban violence, in its multidisciplinary, is now something, which demands progressive innovation from urban planning academics and practitioners alike.

As cities in the developing world continue to grow, the subsequent growth of informal settlements that are unable to provide adequate living conditions to their populations expound. It is these populations that generally make up the poorest echelons of society and whom already make up the majority demographic of urban residents that are most vulnerable to the effects, both physical and psychological, of violence and crime. In order to approach this multi-faceted, dynamic and highly complex issue of violence, its causes and the prevention thereof, systemic approaches are required that draw on the input and resources of a large number of stakeholders, along with the input and necessary support of strong governance alliances. This is something that this research seeks to reaffirm.

Urban planning practice within the context of developing countries requires specific approaches, underpinned and adapted from international research and practical methods, implemented through an alignment of governance between community led initiatives and local government as well as non-governmental institutions. Some progress has been made in terms of planning for violence prevention but much more still needs to be achieved in order to develop fully institutionalised, practical methodologies which address the contextual needs of poor communities in the presence of highly fragile social systems through research, such as this, which addresses the issues faced as well as the opportunities present, that can lead to a bridging of the gap between academic knowledge, international urban planning practices and local policy implementation.

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Successful urban planning interventions require both political will along with relevant policy reforms and the necessary technical capabilities required for project implementation in order to not only warrant the best possible outcomes but also in order for successful projects to be transferable and thus ever-increasingly valuable to city administrations as a whole, not just simply to individual communities situated in isolated pockets within the greater urban environment.

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### 1.3.2 Violent crime and prevention in South Africa

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South Africa, and more specifically the City of Cape Town, provides the focal point in terms of the empirical investigations of this research. In addition to the obvious fact that this focus has been chosen based on the geographical location of implementation of the bi-lateral violence prevention programme, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) as the case study, there are a additional reasons as to why South Africa provides an appropriate “laboratory” in which to investigate the prevalence of violence, particularly interpersonal violence, and its prevention.

Firstly, the fact remains that crime in South Africa remains abundant, despite some decreases over the past decade according to official statistics. Furthermore, it is not just the volume of crime experienced across the board but rather, the most “distinctive feature” of crime in South Africa is the violence with which crime is often carried out (Breetzke, 2010, p.446), coupled with the fact that many forms of violence are deemed socially acceptable (Collins, 2013, p.35). This fact thus confirms the status of violence and crime, as is the case in a large number of developing countries, as a fundamental barrier to equitable and sustainable development as social and particularly economic participation of community residents is hindered both by victimisation and the fear<sup>7</sup> of victimisation and has proven to be the primary reason for residents of highly violent communities, such as Khayelitsha, to not undertake entrepreneurial activities (Cichello et al., 2011).

The nature of violence and crime as complex social problems (see chapter 2) has allowed for the realisation that the underlying causes of violence and crime are attributable to a complex mix of historical, political, social, economic and even cultural factors (Moser and Shrader, 1999; Moser, 2004; Winton, 2004; Vanderschueren, 1996; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). Moreover, this “complex mix” as it is, determines the way in which typologies of violence, and violent crime, are manifested in different places (Moser and Shrader, 1999). In relation to South Africa, the most cited causes of the violence being experienced are related to the country’s recent history of structural violence and oppression (Winton, 2004; Silber and Geffen, 2009), persistent spatial segregation Lemanski (2004) socio-economic marginalisation (Palmary, 2001) and inadequate infrastructure and service provision within the built environment (Donaldson and du Plessis, 2011).

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<sup>7</sup> The fear of victimisation as well as the actual experience of victimisation has profound, complex detrimental effects on the quality of life of individuals and their communities as such fear diminishes trust and degenerates any social cohesion that may be present (Gie, 2009). Fear of violence and crime likewise entrenches social divides along class structures, creating an “architecture of fear” (Lemanski, 2004, p.102).

The overarching conclusion here is that indeed violence is an incredibly complex social phenomenon to which no single cause can be attributed. Holtmann 2008 provides an overview on the range of underlying factors that continue to contribute to the cycle of crime and violence in South Africa (Figure 1.7).



**Figure 1.7.:** South Africa’s cycle of crime and violence. Source: Holtmann 2008.

A detailed discussion on the causes of violence and crime in South Africa is not presented here more definitively because as Pelsaer (2002, p.2) purports, given the state in which we find ourselves, less focus should be placed on theorising the “underlying social factors through to be generally conducive to criminality” and more time spent engaging in questions of how the “practical management of specific risks and minimisation of damage” can best occur. In going beyond the theoretical standpoint from which this research is undertaken, this research aims to do just that in practically engaging with questions on the challenges to violence prevention and the relation of these challenges to the transfer of prevention interventions.

Secondly, and more positively, South Africa in its status as a country in transition from being a developing country towards a developed country is atypical in comparison to the majority of other developing countries in terms of a) the existent institutional and governance capacities and structures in place and b) the existence of strong guiding policies on urban development and crime prevention that demonstrates the states acknowledgement that violence and crime can only be tackled using innovative, multi-disciplined approaches from urban upgrading through infrastructure and service provision to broader social development, public health and education. In contrast, other developing nations, to use Indonesia as an example, have no social policy

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documentation to speak of that targets the prevention of everyday violence (Tadjoeddin and Murshed, 2007).

South Africa has both recognised the necessity for strong, competent local governance (White Paper on Local Government) and has since 1998 professed the need for integrated approaches to violence and crime prevention (National Crime Prevention Strategy). The major challenge in successfully tackling the issues has come in the implementation of these policies (see chapter 4) and therefore it is supposed that South Africa and the local experience holds much in the way of what these experiences can teach us, providing insight into where problems in implementation lie, particularly as it pertains to the transfer of interventions.

Overall, this means therefore that there is much hope placed here on the ability to use this strong institutional and policy positioning to draw lessons on how the realisation of such policy can be supported through the consideration of how programme transfer of violence prevention initiatives are/should be conceptualised, based on the assertion that the efficient transfer of successful prevention projects is key to being able to more extensively prevent violence and crime.

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### 1.3.3 Beyond the pilot project for greater impact

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In working towards establishing what works, what doesn't, and why, within a specific context, one can thereafter move more easily towards ensuring the longer-term implementation and sustainability of interventions, through the facilitation of any identified necessity for modification and transfer of interventions.

Programme sustainability and broader success in delivering effective prevention initiatives is reliant on forms of transfer that allow the scaling up of pilot project successes, learning from experiences iteratively as we progress. Currently pilot projects reach only a handful of selected communities and what is thus subsequently required is a pragmatic means of moving beyond these "pockets" of intervention so that violence prevention initiatives can be implemented on a much larger scale, making use of scarce resources as effectively as possible.

A failure to engage with the challenges facing pilot projects and relating these challenges to the ways in which the implementation of prevention initiatives may occur in other areas, locally or otherwise, translates into the risk that successful prevention initiatives will remain isolated, impacting only a fraction of the society for whom such initiatives are being designed. It is for this reason that this research focuses so particularly on the implementation processes associated with the chosen case study, relating these processes and the challenges being faced in order to discover where opportunities for transfer occur and what forms such transfer does/should take.

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## 1.4 Responding to Violent Crime: International Approaches

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This dissertation avoids a repetition of much of the well-known and easily accessible international literature, from a range of disciplines, that focuses on the challenges, causes and effects of

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violence and violent crime in developed and developing nations in order to more efficiently focus a literature review which remains within the tighter bounds of the research undertaken. This section thus outlines the current discourse and recent developments surrounding policy implementation and practical planning methodologies associated with violence and crime prevention at an international level, governed by large international organisations such as UN-Habitat, The World Bank and The World Health Organisation (WHO). The relative origins and development of each of these best practice approaches is further explained, as each component is linked to the body of theoretical knowledge (primarily criminological and sociological) that have contributed to their formulation.

Collectively, these international organisations have been working towards the collection and analysis of prevention methodologies implemented in cities across the developing world, the aim of which is to generate correlations between experiences as to what works and what doesn't in the pursuit to prevent crime and violence. In doing so, these organisations have worked towards the promotion of international standards, otherwise referred to as best practices, in guiding developing nations in finding a necessary balance between hard-line crime prevention methods, associated with policing and the functioning of criminal justice systems, and more social development-oriented approaches determined to target the root causes of violence and crime. Volumes of literature and handbook resources are thus now available to governments and practitioners, all of which are based in one way or another on the widely disseminated theories discussed in the next section.

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#### 1.4.1 Law enforcement and the reign of the criminal justice system

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The most traditional response of many governments, not least those in developing nations, has been to respond to violence and the challenge of increasing violent crime in cities by means of law enforcement (Vanderschueren, 1996; World Bank, 2003). Government officials and party leaders often speak of zero tolerance “crack-downs” to punish criminals, allocating budgets to bolster police forces and make improvements to the judicial system where harsher penalties for offenders are promised. This is a trend not unfamiliar to political discourse in South Africa as well.

The problem here is that law enforcement only becomes effective after the fact of a crime, violent or otherwise, has been enacted. Furthermore, with this approach, as much research has shown, law enforcement does little to prevent violence and crime. Annual funding allocations and expenditure related to policing and the functionality of judicial systems in both developed and developing countries are argued by some to be punitive in that increased policing and harsher prison sentences do not address the root causes of why violent crime occurs and yield little evidence of being able to adequately prevent further or repeat offences (Whitzman, 2008).

Typical tough-on-crime policing tactics in South Africa have, in addition to harsher penalties, included the demolition of squatter housing and the destruction of hawker stalls as well as their complete removal and on-going exclusion from the streets within the areas that hold what

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little hope there is of earning enough to provide for their next meal. These forceful reactions are however garnered by public support as well as through development approaches that seek to “improve”, “upgrade” and “reclaim” urban areas earmarked for “proper development”, as the rhetoric goes. While such tactics may indeed provide short-term solutions for some in reducing experiences of crime within these areas, such interventions certainly do not address the structural issues that need to be dealt with in providing long-term solutions to the problem of violence and crime (Shaw and Carli, 2011).

Over the past decades, a shift in international perspective has occurred with regard to the ways in which violent crime should be dealt with and specifically the role that policing and criminal justice systems occupy in this respect. This shift has seen a move away from the view that violence and crime is a problem to be dealt with exclusively by the police towards a far more broad understanding that, due to the complex nature and mix of social and environmental factors at play in the causes of crime, prevention as opposed to repression tactics need to be employed if one is to more definitively address this issue. More specifically, community involvement has become part of the recognition of safety and security as a public good<sup>8</sup> and focus has been placed on the necessity to include all stakeholders such as governments, local organisations and civil society alongside the police in being actively engaged through multi-level partnerships aimed at targeting the particular risk factors identified as the precursors to endemic violent crime. Additionally, incentive for these approaches arises from the knowledge gained through implementation experience that prevention is in fact a more cost effective solution than the repressive approaches that require massive sums of money in enforcing law and order through hard-line policing tactics and punitive measures (World Bank, 2003).

This shift, from a policing and criminal justice system focus, to an understanding of the need for prevention rather than reaction has led to the development of alternative methods, which address the problem of violence and violent crime in rapidly evolving urban contexts, through means targeted towards addressing the difficult social and environmental situations within which many urban residents now find themselves. These situations are such that they cannot only be addressed through reactive measures. Many of the prevention methods presented in the following sections of this chapter, form the basis for policy development and project implementation in countries such as South Africa.

The next section thus provides an overview on the evolution of violence and crime prevention methodologies within the international arena in order to provide an overview of the theoretical and practical basis from which interventions are being implemented in South African cities such as Cape Town.

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<sup>8</sup> A public good is defined as a good which is highly indivisible in that it is not subject to exclusion but is collectively accessible. Once a public good is made available, the rest of society enjoys accessibility without any reference being given to who pays the costs Ostrom and Ostrom (1971, 1999).

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## 1.4.2 Integrated approaches to violent crime prevention

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The WHO report on violence and health (2002) called for a focus to be placed on the primary prevention of violence. No longer is violence and violent crime a domestic issue with which countries are expected to deal in isolation. WHO, along with the World Bank and UN-Habitat recognise the necessity to develop means of perceiving violence prevention as a global problem that needs to be viewed and dealt with from a variety of professional perspectives, as an interdisciplinary public health issue (Krug et al., 2002). It is from this basis that international best practice models for violence prevention have emerged.

UN Crime congresses have worked towards establishing and promoting international standards that guide crime prevention and criminal justice approaches since the mid 1950s. In 1995 and 2002, major progress was made with the issuing of the UN Guidelines on technical assistance for urban crime prevention as well as principles for effective crime prevention strategies and practice, respectively (Shaw and Carli, 2011).

Over the past decade, crime prevention and the understanding of violent crime as a serious issue has progressed significantly from discussions surrounding the importance of community involvement in prevention initiatives (Tait and Usher, 2002; World Bank, 2003; Sabol et al., 2004) to the identification of youth as a specific population profile at risk (Twemlow, 2003; Petersen et al., 2005; Someda, 2007; Olinger, 2007; Finegan and Husain, 2007), for which specific urban strategies have been identified, to current discourses and in-depth analyses of the linkages between urban governance, urban development and security as it affects urban citizens (UN-Habitat, 2007; Holtmann, 2008; Pillay, 2008).

The requirement for the embedding of integrated prevention strategies into policy and urban administration structures is now a focal point and the way forward is identified as finding the bridge between the implementation of international standards within local contexts and the existent planning legislation and urban administrative processes which exist at local government level (GIZ, 2012; RSA, 2011). The extent of crime varies considerably across regions and cities, influenced by a range of political, cultural, economic and historical factors and therefore the strategies that stand the best chance of yielding results are those that work to address both individual needs in conjunction with existent social and economic issues.

Combinations of methods, which address the spectrum of recognised risk factors associated with the causes of violence and crime, which inherently vary in contributory magnitude between contexts, have been identified. Much of this development has been advanced through intensive research over the years, based on experiences from within a number of contextual settings, with UN departments spearheading much of the literature existent on the varied approaches available in addressing crime and violence that are currently being implemented. Independent researchers from a number of social sciences fields illustrate the implementation and issues concerned with violence and crime prevention as they occur within particular urban settings.

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In order to summarise the dominant approaches to crime prevention, four main categories into which varying theories and methodologies can be grouped are presented in the UNODC's 2010 international guidelines on crime prevention. These include:

- Crime prevention through social development
- Community based crime prevention
- Situational crime prevention
- Institutional crime prevention and re-integration programmes

In providing a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that determine/influence crime and violence prevention across many countries, each of these four categories is expanded on here.

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#### 1.4.2.1 Crime prevention through social development

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Crime prevention through social development, often more simply referred to as social crime prevention, includes strategies that deliver a range of programmes that support and promote the social well being of individuals and communities. Fundamentally, social crime prevention approaches seek to *“promote the well-being of people and encourage pro-social behaviour through social, economic, health and educational measures, with a particular emphasis on children and youth, and focus on the risk and protective factors associated with crime and victimization”* (Shaw, 2010, p.13).

The understanding of the negative impacts of violence and crime as well as the effects that the fear of victimisation, that occurs with most severity within deprived neighbourhoods, has on community structures in weakening social cohesion, is what has primarily underpinned social forms of preventative measures, many of which were not previously considered under the umbrella of crime prevention at all (Palmary, 2001).

Establishing strengthened communities and improving access to services, particularly to at-risk population groups such as children and youth, social prevention initiatives aim to intervene from an early age so as to develop resilience and the social skills necessary for children, youth and parents to have the best chance of contributing positively to the development of the communities within which they live, enabling them to cope with their environments as best as possible. This approach of working with young children and youth identified as living within community and family conditions that render them “at-risk” has been adapted and pioneered by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and has been dubbed the “Life-Cycle Approach”, where focus is placed on prevention initiatives that focus on all age-group populations, implemented in a so-called cradle-to-grave approach.

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### 1.4.2.2 Community-based crime prevention

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Community based crime prevention methodologies place their focus on targeting identified areas where the risks of engaging in or becoming a victim of crime are considered to be very high. These kinds of preventative interventions work towards increasing services to these normally severely deprived areas and building social networks and cohesion within the community through involving the active participation of local residents and civic organisations such as local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Priority is placed on addressing the conditions that foster criminal behaviour, victimisation and insecurity by utilising the local knowledge, expertise and engagement of local community members who are supported in working together to address common afflictions. These kinds of initiatives seek to develop social capital and foster social cohesion that can in turn better stimulate on-going, self-organised processes of crime prevention within communities (Shaw, 2010).

The development of social cohesion within communities has long been recognised as an important component in the creation of functional neighbourhoods, particularly relating to community development and renewal interventions where community support and participation is given much credence (Middleton et al., 2005). In relation to violence and crime, a significant number of academic authors support the argument that the development of social cohesion, referred to in some instances as collective efficacy, within communities plays an important role in the prevention of violence and crime (Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson, 2004; Morenoff et al., 2001; Sabol et al., 2004; Muggah, 2012). Overall, social cohesion coupled with a common interest of community members to contribute to the overall good of their neighbourhood has been linked to reductions in violence (Sampson et al., 1997), particularly where the central mechanism associated with social cohesion concerns social control, which is enacted under conditions of mutual society and trust [p.112]Sampson2004. Contributing to the theories of social cohesion, practical intervention methods are also prevalent within academic literatures and focus particularly on the ways in which community capacity can be supported in increasing their ability to contribute more pro-actively to the prevention of violence (Sabol et al., 2004).

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### 1.4.2.3 Situational crime prevention

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Situational crime prevention is perhaps furthest removed from the more traditional criminology and sociology-based theories that support other prevention methodologies. Whereas traditional approaches are concerned with those committing criminal acts, these forms of prevention methodologies focus on the particular physical setting in which crime occurs. Situational crime prevention, otherwise referred to as environmental crime prevention, places emphasis on environmental change and management with the central aim being that of reducing the opportunities for criminal activity to take place (Clarke, 1997). Situational prevention is representative of an environmental criminology approach that focuses on the role of the environment and the creation of space and place in shaping crime (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981).

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As mentioned earlier on in this chapter, Oscar Newman's (1973) theory of *defensible space*, derived from the Chicago school theories of social disorganisation, has evolved into the set of situational crime prevention methodologies we currently refer to as crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). CPTED includes a set of practical design principles that seek to reduce the opportunities for crime to occur, such as the upgrading of walkways, improved street lighting and the development of functional public spaces that ensure that such areas are more likely to be under continuous surveillance as well as the removal of screening mechanisms, such as dense trees or shrubbery, from roadsides.

The UNODC (Shaw, 2010, p.14) defines the contribution of situational crime prevention methods through their ability to “*prevent the occurrence of crimes by reducing opportunities, increasing risks of being apprehended and minimizing benefits, including through environmental design, and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual victims*”.

Situational crime prevention can therefore be seen as a more generalised approach to the reduction of opportunities for any kind of crime, supporting other forms of crime prevention approaches as well as law-enforcement strategies by focusing on place-specific crime problems (Donaldson and du Plessis, 2011).

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#### 1.4.2.4 Institutional crime prevention and re-integration programmes

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Institutional crime prevention refers to those programmes, which strengthen the ability of local and government institutions to successfully and systemically employ a range of crime prevention methodologies at multiple levels. Governance at all levels as well as strong partnerships between civic, public and private institutions and stakeholders is an essential element in ensuring the systemic, broad-based implementation of crime prevention strategies. Institutional crime prevention aims to *mainstream* the principles of social and situational crime prevention strategies, embedding such approaches into all levels of development and planning within local and national policy structures.

Institutional crime prevention through the mainstreaming of crime prevention approaches aims also to create resilience within institutions, not only to prevent crime but also in ensuring that recurring offences are likewise limited. This requires the strengthening of programmes that support law enforcement and criminal justice systems in ensuring that those previous offenders returning to their communities receive adequate support for reintegration, providing alternative opportunities when they return. Such support would include elements such as job skills, training, education, housing and role models, many of which are offered through local NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs). NGOs and CBOs active in deprived areas also require the support of strong government institutions in ensuring that they can offer the best services possible to address the most pressing needs of the community members they serve.

Perhaps the most important point to be made here is that no one approach is favoured in terms of one being better or worse than the other as all of these approaches bring with them varied advantages and disadvantages in terms of implementation. These advantages and disad-



**Figure 1.8.:** Overview of UN standardised crime prevention methodologies. Source: Adapted from (UN-Habitat, 2007).

vantages are highly dependent on the context within which such approaches are implemented and should therefore form part of a strategically thought-out, balanced crime prevention plan, including any combination of these approaches. This demonstrates the necessity in crime prevention strategies and implementation for contextual adaptation, as even cities within the same country may require adapted approaches, based on the identification of specific underlying causes of violence and crime, the kinds of crime and violence being experienced and the specific urban development challenges present within the targeted area.

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## 1.5 Conclusion

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This chapter has highlighted violence and violent crime as a significant challenge to the equitable and sustainable development of cities and has presented the role that rapid, dynamic urbanisation processes, coupled with inadequate development plays in affecting the situation within the context of developing countries, which experience processes of dynamic urban growth without the necessary development that would ensure the ability of governments to cope in the provision of adequate infrastructures and access to basic services.

Inadequate, underdeveloped urban areas give rise to risk factors that, when combined, result in violence and crime. Simultaneously the resultant fear of victimisation erodes social cohesion within communities, resulting in a vicious circle that, the more it perpetuates, the harder it becomes to break.

The review of dominant literatures demonstrates how the traditional approach to violence and crime, as being within the exclusive realm of police forces and the criminal justice system, has evolved towards a multitude of alternative approaches that have emerged based on the

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shift in understanding of safety and security as a basic human right and public good for which all strata of society and government should be responsible. Furthermore, the multitudinous combinations of social, situational and institutional factors that result in violent crime can no longer be dealt with on a reactionary level alone. Specific approaches aimed at prevention, through which such risk factors are contextually addressed, are required. This shift towards the need for integrated approaches marks the recognition of the complexity of the causes of violence and crime in that the call for broad-based, multidisciplinary approaches aimed at the prevention of violence now resounds most strongly (UN-Habitat, 2007).

It is thus from this basis that the subsequent chapters of this dissertation seek to unravel the concept of complexity as it pertains to violent crime and the transfer of pilot projects, placing this within the localised context of South Africa, more specifically Cape Town, in developing an understanding of the role that national policy and local governance play in addressing this phenomenon.

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## 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

*“...the point about complexity is that it is useful - it helps us understand the things we are trying to understand.”*

*– Byrne (1998, p.7)*

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### 2.1 Introduction


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This research extends from the premise that urban violence is the result of a complex, interrelated amalgamation of underlying causal factors which manifest within similarly complex social systems.

The prime assertion in conducting research into this kind of complex problem is thus that the complexity sciences offers a body of theoretical knowledge, providing imperative concepts and tools by which these kinds of complex phenomena, their functionality and impacts can be better understood. In dealing more particularly with an empirical investigation into the delivery of integrated violence prevention interventions the empirical elements of this research are grounded in a theoretical framework that not only recognises urban violence as a complex challenge but so too seeks to explore the complexity of delivering integrated prevention interventions within fragile communities. Here, the driving motivation is to make use of this knowledge base to consider how it is that such an understanding can aid in the scaling up of existing pilot projects to promote broad-based programme transfer, extending piloted successes to a significantly enlarged group of beneficiaries.

This chapter therefore focuses on outlining the key theoretical positions that have supported both the development of the research hypotheses and the pursuit of the empirical research undertakings.

The theoretical framework established here draws on two main bodies of literature. Firstly, using particular concepts derived from complexity theory, the first part of the theoretical framework is developed through the presentation of urban systems and violence as complex phenomena, which require innovative, non-standardised solutions. Complexity, as it is used here, does not intend to be merely descriptive of what some authors refer to as the obvious and non-informative portrayal of societal reality as complex (Wagenaar, 2007, p.23). Rather, complexity, is understood and presented as an epistemological approach that describes the theoretical position from which this research is conducted, based on an evolving body of literature, dealing with complexity as a determined theoretical perspective through which one views the functioning of existent physical and social realities.



**Figure 2.1.:** Theoretical framework, key research concepts.

Secondly, the theoretical approach based on complexity theory is linked to prominent theories relating to policy and programme transfer. This research deals primarily with questions concerning not only the complexity of violence as a wicked problem but more specifically, with questions concerning the transferability of integrated violence prevention interventions from one area of intervention to another. Despite certain successes associated with violence prevention interventions, the argument is made that the move beyond the pilot project will only occur if we can better understand the nature of transferability as it is required in dealing with complex systems facing complex problems.

Overall, the dual-pronged theoretical framework established in this chapter, provides the lens through which the governance of urban violence, particularly crime prevention in South Africa, chapter 4, and the violence prevention through urban upgrading (VPUU) programme case study presented in chapter 5 are investigated and analysed. The primary focus of which is placed on the broad-based transferability of violence prevention interventions at local municipal level.

This chapter begins with a brief introduction on the origins of complexity theory and provides a working definition of the ontological and epistemological differences associated with the use of complexity as a term. Further, an explanation of the applicability of complexity theory to the social sciences and field of urban planning is presented. This applicability is supported by an overview of the opportunities that the use of such a theoretical perspective offers in exploring, understanding and dealing pragmatically with complex urban phenomena, in this instance integrated planning approaches targeting violence prevention.

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## 2.2 Complexity Theory

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Broadly, complexity theory is the means by which we as scientists, social or otherwise, enable ourselves to understand and deal with systems, which we identify as being complex in nature. No single, all-encompassing theory of complexity exists. Rather, the complexity sciences is characterised by a broad set of theories on the functionality of complex systems, which have been applied in a variety of fields, across a range of disciplines.

This section thus does not aim to provide an all-encompassing overview on the evolution of complexity theory, with its roots in physics and mathematics. What it does aim to do is afford a broad introduction on the evolution of complexity theory and its uses, in order to assert an understanding of complexity in its applicability to the social sciences, urban planning and most importantly to the analysis of the views and outcomes presented in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

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### 2.2.1 Origins of complexity theory

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The notion of complexity and the evolution of theories related to complexity have evolved from scholarship in the sciences of physics, biology, mathematics and computer science. Gaining in popularity within a number of scientific and professional fields over the past two decades, complexity theory is fundamentally utilised as a means of simplifying, and thus better understanding, an array of different processes and phenomena. This is essentially based on the increasing recognition of the world in which we all live as innately complex (Zuidema and De Roo, 2004, pp.3-4).

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#### 2.2.1.1 Defining complexity

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In order to move forward with the use of complexity as a term, referring to the determinants of the complexity sciences and theories of complexity, it is important that complexity itself be adequately defined. The usage of terminology influences the way in which we define the systems that we are trying to understand and it is therefore imperative that such obstruction be dealt with in providing clarity on what it means to determine something as being complex. Many would argue, and correctly so, that based on certain dictionary definitions, the word *complex* may be asserted as a mere synonym for that which is *complicated*. This is illustrated when one undertakes a simple search for the word complex which realises the dictionary definition *consisting of many different and connected parts*<sup>9</sup>.

Similarly, as a noun, the word complexity is denoted as *the state or quality of being intricate or complicated*. It is in this light that expressions of the word complex, used merely as a descriptive term for real-world problems that are not entirely understood, abound. In thinking about complexity and its relationship to the discipline of planning, some criticism has been placed on the

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<sup>9</sup> See Oxford Online Dictionary – <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com>

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ease with which all things have become complex, as the concept itself becomes at risk of being set-aside as an overused, meaningless analogy for any situation that is not fully understood.

Within the fields of physical and social sciences research however, complexity, particularly in its reference to complex systems, has significantly evolved over recent decades to refer to something very different from that which may be merely understood to be complicated. It is therefore imperative for authors to use an interpretation of the word complex as it is refers to the usage within the scholarship of the complexity sciences, as an epistemological body of knowledge. It is this body of knowledge that provides the theories by which we are better able to identify and better understand the characteristics of the systems with which we are required to deal. A complicated system involves one where an analysis of the individual components of the system results in an accurate presentation of the complete system, regardless of the number of components. A complex system, on the other hand, refers to one where the system in its entirety cannot be fully understood through an analysis of its individual components (Reitsma, 2002, p.3).

Essentially, the concept of complexity and complex systems, as they are understood within the framework of this research, primarily asserts an acceptance of social systems as complex in nature thus stressing a rejection of reductionism to a level of simplified cause and effect relationships.

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#### 2.2.1.2 Complex systems: Non-linearity and the rejection of reductionism

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The rejection of reductionism and the identification of complex systems, as those which cannot be broken down piece by piece in order to be fully understood, validates the perspective that, in contrast to complicated systems, the sum of the individual parts in a complex system is not equal to that of the entire whole. Fundamentally, all complexity theories thus concur that a complex whole is always greater than the sum of its individual parts (Senge, 1990). As Urry (2005, p.3) confirms, complex systems are irreducible to linear, simple processes and elementary laws that explain all outcomes.

Principally, complexity investigates emergent, dynamic and self-organising systems that interact in ways that heavily influence the probabilities of later events. Despite the rejection of simple, linear cause and effect relationships, complexity sciences thinking does rest in the assumption that simple causes result in complex effects, the core assumption being that *complexity in the world arises from simple rules* (Phelan, 2001, p.130). Scientists and researchers engaging with complexity theory thus seek to identify these simple generative rules, determining how agents behave within environments over time, identifying how these agents interact with one another. Unlike in the traditional sciences, however, these generative rules do not predict outcomes for identified states (ibid.).

During the time of its theoretical evolution, the complexity sciences has been significantly impacted upon by the advancement of systems thinking and, later on, by the notion of chaos and its relationship to order and disorder (Gleick, 1987). As somewhat of a precursor to complexity

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theory, systems thinking evolved as a direct critique of linear reductionist schools of thought (Flood, 2010). Systems thinking primarily cast off the linear cause-and-effect progressions previously held valuable in (read Newtonian) scientific analysis and advocated the necessity to observe processes within systems as part of their greater environment as opposed to dealing with interconnected parts of a system in isolation from the larger whole. As defined by Anderson and Johnson (1997, p.2), a system is “a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent components that form a unified whole”. Components can be both tangible and intangible, thus including physical objects as well as processes, policies, relationships and flows of information.

Systems thinking can, and has been, applied throughout a range of different fields and disciplines and is recognised as a crucial component of complexity theory in that it is credited with the notion that wider systems cannot merely be understood through closed investigations of the individual component parts. Elements associated within a complex system can only be experienced through the combination of two or more inter-related parts. Simplistically illustrating this point, Senge (1990) famously describes the interrelatedness of complex systems using the analogy that the division of an elephant, for example, does not produce two small elephants. The elephant, as a whole, is therefore not merely equal to the sum of its parts but is fully dependent on the way in which these parts are organised.

*“Incidentally, sometimes people go ahead and divide an elephant in half any-way. You don’t have two small elephants then; you have a mess. By a mess, I mean a complicated problem where there is no leverage to be found because the leverage lies in interactions that cannot be seen from looking only at the piece you are holding.” – Senge (1990, p.52)*


Furthermore, complex systems are *open* systems in the sense that they do not operate in isolation and are therefore inherently linked to their broader environment (e.g. a neighbourhood within a city, within a nation, within the global environment). Open systems are likewise *complex* in the sense that the individual components of the system are so numerous that causal relationships between them cannot be clearly established. These components form highly complex networks that include innumerable feedback channels or loops, making it all but impossible to trace cause and effect (Portugali, 2006). It is this understanding of complex interdependence, determining complex systems as interrelated and interdependent on other systems within the larger environment that resulted in the development of Bronfenbrenners (1977) ecological approach to human development.

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### 2.2.2 Interdependency in complex systems: The socio-ecological model

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For all intents and purposes, ecological models demonstrate the interdependent relationship between systems, highlighting the necessity for multi-level approaches based on the fact that behaviours are affected by, and likewise affect, multiple levels of influence. Drawing on the



**Figure 2.2.:** A Socio-ecological Model for Violence Prevention. Developed by Krug et al. (2002).

ecological models of interaction between organisms and their larger environment, the socio-ecological model came about as a means of understanding the dynamic interactions between humans and the environments which we inhabit.

Socio-ecological models, since Bronfenbrenner's initial propositions evolved from a conceptual understanding into a theoretical position and have been widely used across a variety of fields, urban planning and violence prevention included (Figure 2.2).

Based on the realisation that no single factor is determinant of why violence occurs (chapter 1), violence is thus recognised as the result of a complex interaction involving individual, relationship, social, cultural and environmental factors. Socio-ecological models are thus applied as a theoretical platform from which one can begin to understand how it is that the various factors associated with each level occur in combination with one another and how they interrelate dynamically to result in experiences of violence. This recognition of the complex interrelatedness of systems based on this socio-ecological theory of systemic interdependence now forms a central part of the methodologies used in the development of integrated violence prevention approaches (Krug et al., 2002).

Complexity and its recognised usefulness in understanding the interaction and interdependency of complex systems, which have informed the development of theoretical perspectives such as Bronfenbrenner's ecological model, has over the past two decades or so begun to be more readily addressed within the broader social sciences, as the potential for deeper understandings of complexity theory in their applicability to a range of complex social problems is acknowledged.

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### 2.3 Complexity: A Social Sciences Episteme

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Urry (2005, p.2) puts it so eloquently in saying, "*it is in the late 1990s that the social sciences begin to go complex*". Complexity theory is not purported as a single identifiable theory as such, which is holistically transferable. Rather, it is viewed as an emerging body of work, thus far loosely structured, which provides a set of "conceptual tools", guiding our thinking across a range of disciplines (Walby, 2007, p.456). The "turn to complexity" in the social sciences has

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been arguably most comprehensively covered by Byrne (1998) in his book *Complexity theory and the Social Sciences*. In his positivity about the potential of complexity theories to contribute to the social sciences, Byrne advocates the necessity to develop new modes of thinking and assessment within the pursuit of social sciences research based on the fundament of complexity as an overarching means of understanding social systems as intrinsically complex. Byrne (1998) presents concepts of chaos and complexity as fundamental theories to the way in which social scientists across fields such as urban studies, education and health would approach research, using these theories as a new means of investigating the nature of social research in order to stimulate a wider appreciation for the contribution that complexity theory could, and has, made to the advancement of social sciences research.

The realisation that it is the complex system that best represents occurrences in reality further supports the emergence of complexity theory in the social sciences, as an advancement on traditional systems thinking. Social scientists are primarily concerned with human behaviour and therefore place human beings within the complexity paradigm. The relative autonomy and uniqueness of human beings in combination with an innumerable variation in the possibilities present when human beings interact with one another is what results in the complexity of outcomes (Geyer, 2004). The recognition that the complexity of systems, within which human beings are central agents, renders often unpredictable outcomes has in turn had profound implications for urban planning theory and practice as attempts are made to address the varying urban development challenges present in dynamic urban contexts.

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### 2.3.1 Complexity in urban development and planning

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#### 2.3.1.1 Planning with complexity: from technical rationalism to communicative collaboration

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Initially, the modernist, orderly episteme within social sciences was indeed heavily influenced by the successes of tracing cause and effect through a linear paradigm experienced within the natural sciences under Newtonian law. In viewing social interactions and urban phenomena as linear and therefore as predictable, planners aimed to create the master plan which would bring them closer to the desired “end-state”. Such linearity however is removed from reality where linear causality is far less observable. Principally, as has been outlined above, complexity purports a rejection of linear reductionism in the form of identifying cause and effect relationships between system elements, their actions and resultant outcomes. Complexity thus too purports a rejection of certainty and predictability. The non-linearity and relational complexity of complex systems results in only one predictable outcome: *certain uncertainty*, something with which urban planners must continuously cope. In largely precluding reductionism, a more postmodernist episteme underpins this research approach in that uncertainty is not only accepted, but also stressed as inevitable.

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This brings about the discussion and presentation on the specific relevance of complexity to the discipline of urban planning and subsequently, to the manifestations of urban violence and crime as a complex development challenge. Prior to the past two decades or so, planners approached their work with what authors such as Voogd (1995), cited in Zuidema and De Roo (2004, p.2) term primitive optimism. This optimism was grounded in the technical rational thought processes, which characterised this era and held the belief that government could address and adequately control all arising problems. This is of course based on the premise that a high level of certainty is attainable, something which the evolution of complexity theory and the notion of urban systems, as complex interrelated systems, dispels.

Alongside the realisation that technical rationality provided unrealistic expectations, certain shifts within planning theory emerged. Developments in planning discourses over recent years demonstrate that the reality of the complex nature of the societies and spaces we aspire to “plan” is largely recognised. Since the 1970s, planning theories and practices have thus evolved from the implementation of traditional, technical rationalist approaches towards the realisation of more communicative and collaborative approaches. This shift from implementing planning approaches based on linear assumptions in order to “deliver” solutions to developing a focus on wider stakeholder engagement and participation rests fundamentally in the realisation that governments, and the planners they employ, can not tackle the multitude of challenges being faced alone (Healey, 1999, 2003; Innes and Booher, 2003).

A rejection of taxis-oriented approaches, which imagine the investment in abstract utopian ideas as a means of “engineering” the coordination of human activities and outcomes, has thus been largely expelled and replaced with the intention of developing methods that are more “humble and dynamic” in their approach (Moroni, 2010, p.277).

It is beyond the scope of this research to engage in an exhaustive overview of the transition from technical rational planning to current discourses in planning theory and practice where communication, civil-society engagement and collaborative planning processes are given much credence. However, the process of change in planning from traditional, technical rational approaches towards placing emphasis on communicative and collaborative methods is well documented by a number of authors. See for example, Healey (1999, 2003, 2006), Harris (2002) and Zuidema and De Roo (2004). The impact of these changes has also been discussed in direct relation to the context of Sub-Saharan Africa (Watson, 2002; Harrison, 2006).

The intention here is to make the point that these observed shifts in planning ideologies and processes are indicative of the seriousness with which planning theorists and practice-oriented professionals have begun to consider the complexity of the issues we are trying to solve. These developments are thus noted as being expressive of the growing recognition of complex, non-linear system dynamics as something central to planning research and practice. As Friedmann (2008, p.251) asserts, the scale and complexity of the challenges facing planners incite questions on “the limits of knowledge about a world that despite incredible scientific achievements in some realms leaves many of us perplexed”.

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Despite the fact that complexity has increasingly become a topic with which planning literature grapples (Healey, 2007; De Roo and Silva, 2010; Innes and Booher, 2010; De Roo et al., 2012; Portugali et al., 2012), there is still much to be done in terms of considering the real potential complexity holds, particularly when it comes to relating this potential more normatively to the ways in which such understanding may contribute to the formulation of innovative approaches to dealing with complex problems expressed within complex environments.

On a theoretical level, Michael Batty (2005) and Patsy Healey (2006) explore the relationships between complexity, chaos, urban analyses and the practice of planning. Encouragement is levied by such authors towards focusing efforts on moving beyond the acknowledgment of complexity simply as a means of perceiving reality and working towards how it is that complexity may potentially provide a very useful theoretical platform from which planning practices may be better informed (Byrne, 2003; Zuidema and De Roo, 2004; Chettiparamb, 2006; Portugali, 2006).

This research addresses the call for explorations on the potential of complexity to contribute to planning practice more directly, through the development of a conceptual framework for how complexity concepts may aid in informing the adaptation of planning practices for the implementation of integrated violence prevention initiatives. This approach is based on an in-depth case study into integrated violence prevention being undertaken in Cape Town South Africa (chapter 5). The case study investigation, which seeks to draw out the key challenges facing the transfer of such an integrated programme initiative to other areas within Cape Town and the Western Cape Province (WCP), is supported by the idea that complexity is a non-uniform concept, thus suggesting the presence of variable degrees of complexity across systems.

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### 2.3.1.2 Variable complexity

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
Complexity, as it represents a description of the level of connectivity and number of interactions present within a system (Reitsma, 2002, p.3), is not standardised across the board. As much as the interconnected nature of networks and the level of interdependence of system elements render a system *complex* as opposed to merely *complicated*, the actual extent, or degree, of complexity between systems likewise varies. Thus, in seeking to work to address complex problems where no single solution exists, the degree of complexity of the most direct system within which the problem occurs needs to be determined prior to being able to hypothesise on what forms of intervention within such a system may yield any effective impact.

As has been highlighted by a group of planning researchers at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands<sup>10</sup> the acceptance of a variance in degree of complexity allows us in principle to determine particular issues to be classified as simple, complex or very complex in nature, based on the perception of how ordered or chaotic the system within which the issue occurs

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
<sup>10</sup> Concepts presented in Association of European Schools of Planning (AESOP) Planning and Complexity thematic group meetings. Presentation accessible at [http://www.aesop-planning.eu/blogs/en\\_GB/planning-and-complexity](http://www.aesop-planning.eu/blogs/en_GB/planning-and-complexity).

appears to be. This is based on the theoretical standpoint that degrees of complexity within a system occur between variable states of order and chaos (Zuidema and De Roo, 2004; De Roo and Silva, 2010; De Roo, 2011)(Figure 2.3).



**Figure 2.3.:** Variable degrees of complexity between order and chaos. Source: adapted from Zuidema and De Roo (2004); De Roo (2010, 2011).

Furthermore, the same researchers purport that as one determines the degree of complexity of a particular (planning) issue, the respective degree of complexity so too determines the most applicable planning approach for addressing an issue. Therefore, if an issue is determined to be relatively simple as opposed to very complex, more technical rational approaches may serve to develop plausible solutions. On the other side of the spectrum, more complex issues require broader inputs, more extensive feedback and subsequent learning and adaptation, rendering these issues more amenable to communicative and collaborative planning approaches (Figure 2.4).



**Figure 2.4.:** Variable degrees of complexity and planning approaches. Source: adapted from Zuidema and De Roo (2004); De Roo (2010, 2011).

The concept of variable complexity and the general framework presented here provides two fundamental points of departure from which the empirical research elements of this thesis have been developed and undertaken: Firstly, variable degrees of complexity are identifiable between the opposing poles of ordered, less complex issues and chaotic, highly complex problems.

Secondly, based on the classification of particular planning issues as either more or less complex and thus also more or less uncertain, variable planning approaches ranging from technical rational approaches to the more communicative and collaborative approaches will be required when implementing any planning intervention. Accordingly, this research draws heavily on the

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above concept in determining the identification of varying degrees of complexity as fundamental to understanding the integrated violence prevention interventions being implemented across situational, social and institutional spheres.

The application of this framework to the research at hand is of course similarly based on the fundamental understanding of the complex nature of urban violence as a *wicked* problem, highly resistant to determinable resolution.

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### 2.3.1.3 Wicked problems

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The problem with problems is that unfortunately not all problems are readily solvable. As with anything else, the complexity of various problems with which one is faced can vary from the simplistic to the incredibly complex, where the application of logical approaches to solving these problems may have no impact in addressing the issue whatsoever. Violence is one such problem.

Once again, the recognition of the existence of various kinds of problems is not a recent one, in the social sciences or otherwise, as Rittel and Weber's (1973) typology of the differences in problematic complexity makes apparent. Their explanation of the variance in problematic complexity determines the differences between what are referred to as *tame* problems as opposed to those that are considered to be *wicked*. Tame problems characterise those problems that, although not entirely simplistic in nature, are resolvable through linear actions, as the level of uncertainty expressed through the problem is limited and can be managed. Tame problems have therefore been likened to puzzles in that a solution always exists, irrelevant of how long it may take to identify (Grint, 2010). In this sense one may refer to tame problems as variable on a scale, which represents *complication*.

Wicked problems on the other hand are characterised by a high degree of *complexity*. As opposed to being complicated, complex problems cannot be assessed, solved and returned to their original context without affecting the greater environment. Additionally, clearly identifiable causal relationships do not exist, identifying these problems as intractable. The inter-relatedness of the various dilemmas which constitute such problems and which affect multiple levels within the local and extended environment is exactly what makes wicked problems so resilient to resolution. In the social sciences such problems project themselves as what can be referred to as *social messes* (Horn and Weber, 2007, pp.6-8).

In developing his initial ideology on wicked problems and their definition, Rittel, described wicked problems as being "*a class of social system problems, which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing*" (Churchman, 1967, p.141). Rittel furthermore argued that the majority of problems with which we are faced are indeed wicked problems that require non-standardised, non-linear approaches if solutions are to be found (*ibid.*). Examples of wicked problems include marginalisation and social exclusion, unemployment, climate change, lifestyle-generated health issues and *violence and crime* (Jordan, 2011).

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### 2.3.2 The complexity of violence and crime prevention

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Violence is deemed a prime example of a wicked problem. This section therefore explores the depth of wickedness associated with violence and highlights what this means in terms of how wicked problems within complex social systems need to be considered and approached in formulating workable solutions based on the theoretical understanding offered.

Wicked problems originate based on a “tangle of factors” (Cabaj, 2006, p.27) that exist across social, cultural, political and economic boundaries. At the most basic level, violence is a wicked problem in that the root causes of the problem are so heavily inter-related, spanning many levels of societal linkages. Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature, not only of the problem itself but also of the varied causes and outcomes, which fuel the flames of the fire, the way in which communities experience these problems are on many levels, unique. It is not just economic deprivation or a lack of access to stable employment opportunities that are identified as attributable to the increases in violence now endemic within growing township and informal urban areas. Numerous other factors including inadequate sanitation, poor health and education services, non-existent family support mechanisms that lead to familial dysfunction, drug and alcohol abuse and the loss of hope for a better future likewise contribute to the problem. This multiplicity of issues are so intertwined that a massive number of relationships exist in the ways in which the identified root causes interact with one another and manifest themselves in a variety of outcomes. It is on the basis of this interrelated mix of causal factors that systemic interventions are called for (See chapter 1).

Furthermore, dependent on the professional or lay viewpoint from which the issues associated with violence are analysed, the changeable realities can be experienced in an unlimited number of ways. All stakeholders will view the issues and perceive the necessary solutions from very different vantage points, supported by changeable motivations and objectives. All in all, the distinct nature of wicked problems means that one cannot expect that a mere replication of what may have been seen to be successful in one community within another will generate the same positive results. One may inform the other, however all interventions will have to yield some innovation in the form of adaptation, both to the local context requirements as well as in the form(s) of implementation (Cabaj, 2006).

In their complexity, wicked problems provide for the situation of what one can only term a double-edged sword. Arising within the complexity of human social systems and urban environments as the “whole”, the complexity of wicked problems is merely exacerbated. Essentially one can view these problems as the negative by-products of highly complex, dysfunctional social systems. Dysfunctional in the sense that these kinds of problems render more negative emergent properties than positive emergent properties that would contribute to the sustainability and non-harmful functioning of urban systems.

Just as with connectivity in complex systems, the processes of understanding wicked problems and developing possible solutions is an *iterative* one in that both affect one another. Perhaps then, only the acceptance of the uncertainty, unpredictability and fundamental fluidity of wicked

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problems (and the characteristics of complex systems) will allow for the emergence of innovative, more broadly applicable solutions. The suggestion is thus that the search for effective ways to address these issues lies in the ability of all stakeholders to embrace uncertainty and stop trying to “nail the problem to the wall” (Cabaj, 2006, p.26).


Within complex systems an “immense space of possibilities” exists (Waldrop, 1992, p.167) and therefore, in its relation to social systems and planning methodologies, no singular “best solution” to wicked problems is possible. Therefore, the most valid approach perhaps lies in the exploration of existent spaces of possibility, focusing on the identification of ways in which improvements can be made (Wagenaar, 2007). Some consensus exists as to how it is that the investigation of where and how such improvements should be made in relation to dealing with wicked social problems. Holtmann (2011, p.62) summarises this in her work on unsafety in South African communities stating that the best approaches are consultative, interactive approaches where visualisation can be used to help define “solution spaces”. Within these spaces, the formulation of solutions demands an extensive understanding of the varied social, economic and political perspectives present within the environment being addressed. Not only does this call for approaches to include multi-level perspectives in analysing such situations but so too does it imply the necessity to draw on knowledge available from a variety of sources, an action that not only supports, but requires, the collective input of all stakeholders.

This ideology once again reinforces the shift in perspective on experts in terms of planning interventions and urban renewal approaches. Professionals, usually external experts, can no longer deliver decreed solutions but rather act as one kind of expert within a larger pool of experts where community members and the local knowledge they possess are given as much credence and room for inclusion as those derived through professional knowledge sources (Richardson and Midgley, 2007).

The absence of singular answers to many of the questions posed in addressing wicked problems emphasises the importance of the collective, requiring the transfer of authority from the individual (expert) to the communal. This collective engagement is hypothesised as being able to result in the emergence of the innovative approaches required to develop workable solutions (Horn and Weber, 2007). In the context of social systems, where societal structures and processes are contributing to the emergence of such wicked issues, isolated intervention measures or “quick-fixes” are largely ineffectual, particularly over the long term. Therefore, changes in how such societal systems operate are required in order to realise long-term, sustainable success in resolving these issues (Jordan, 2011).

Figure 2.5 provides a simplified graphical representation of the multiple levels of intervention (spatial, institutional and social) and social interaction (individual to societal) that make up the integrated planning approaches to violence prevention that have been developed based on the complexity of the problem.

The simultaneous acknowledgement of urban violence as an inherently complex challenge with multiple drivers and dimensions alongside the progression of the social sciences, planning theory and practice in particular in making use of complexity theory to investigate com-



**Figure 2.5.:** Components of integrated violence prevention. Source: author's own.

plex social phenomena provides the primary motivation for the development of the theoretical framework presented here.

Essentially this framework concerns the use of a complexity lens through which experience and further progress can be made in dealing with the complexity of urban violence and the development of appropriate solutions. This framework, as outlined thus far, is further supported by a number of fundamental concepts drawn from the complexity sciences. These concepts, although explored briefly in the preceding sections of this chapter, are outlined individually in the following section.

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## 2.4 A complexity framework for understanding violence prevention interventions

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Urban planning professionals operate within the complexity of urban environments and human social systems and are therefore likewise affected by the processes associated with complex systems. For this reason, it is proposed that the use of such a framework will provide new insights in determining and addressing the challenges being experienced in the delivery of integrated interventions.

Based on the acknowledgement of the world we live in and the problems we faced as inherently complex, a theoretical framework applicable to this research and particularly to the case study investigation and analysis has been developed, drawing on the key concepts discussed above, in their applicability to the social sciences, urban planning and violence as a complex problem. This section therefore draws these strands together through the formulation of clear linkages and explanations as to how it is concepts taken from the broader set of complexity theories are understood and applied in this research. These key concepts include **uncertainty, interdependence, flexibility, emergence and self-organisation.**

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### 2.4.1 Uncertainty - the limits of reliable knowledge

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Complexity theory, first and foremost, allows for a *new perspective on reality*. The move from reductionist ideologies towards concepts of expansionism and the resultant acknowledgement

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that human behaviour and the social systems within which we function, cannot ever be either fully understood or entirely controlled (Zuidema and De Roo, 2004), due to the non-linear dynamic interactions which occur within complex systems. An inability to effectively trace cause and effect results in a situation of what can only be referred to as *certain uncertainty*.

For researchers and professionals seeking to develop workable approaches to addressing complex problems, the acceptance of uncertainty and the unpredictability it promises is something that must be acknowledged and incorporated into the ways in which approaches are formulated. An ability to cope with uncertainty using the potential of complexity theory to contribute more significantly to planning processes is hypothesised as providing a means through which improved learning and implementation processes can be realised. The work of planners is inseparable from the behaviour of human actors. It is humans that are the residents of neighbourhoods, which form the communities that make up the broader system of suburbs, cities, metropolitan regions, provinces and countries. Knowing every aspect of human behaviour and being able to predict outcomes based on an innumerable number of possible variations and reactions to initial influences is literally impossible, therefore meaning that planners cannot be certain of everything no matter how detailed their plan may be.

Communities and the residents that make up communities are exceedingly heterogeneous and one cannot be exactly compared with another. Humans manage their available resources in a multitude of varying ways based on a likewise multitude of varying situations resulting from their needs, constraints, opportunities and access rights (Haggith and Prabhu, 2003). In this, the theoretical case for contextually based research and the necessity for the continual adaptability of planning approaches according to the specificities of an urban context are supported.

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#### 2.4.2 Interdependence

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Communities, neighbourhoods and cities themselves, constitute the urban environment as a whole. The affirmation that these urban environments are complex in nature is little more than stating the obvious. Highly interrelated elements, both human and physical, contribute to the complex nature of urban areas, at all levels from individuals within the most localised community to the wider urban metropolis.

In their complexity, cities are systems composed of elements including people, places and activities that interact in multiple, dynamically changing ways. Social connections such as family history as well as economic factors, access to public services and infrastructure as well as transportation modes determine where people live, shop, work, attend school etc. As these factors evolve, so too do people and activities adapt in response to changes as they occur (Cameron and Larsen-Freeman, 2007).

As presented in an earlier section of this chapter, complex systems are characterised by a series of heavily intertwined relationships between a system's elements, both within the system itself and within its larger environment. *Connectivity* and *interdependence* within complex systems is seen as key to the use of complexity as a theoretical framework for the assessment of planning

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interventions as part of this research. It is these connections and interrelatedness that result in the phenomena that small interventions at one level can result in major changes both within the same level or far further afield<sup>11</sup>. In technical terms, the larger impact that small interventions can have on the larger system is known as the *sensitive dependence on initial conditions*.

The word complex itself is literally representative of the importance that connectivity holds in that it is derived from the Latin word *complexus*, where *plexus* means braided together. Complex behaviour therefore arises through the “*intricate intertwining*” of elements within and between systems and their environments (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003, p.5). Within a human (social) system, this concept manifests itself within decisions and actions taken by individuals, groups, organisations or institutions, as they relate to and affect other individuals and/or inter-dependent systems (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003).

**“For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;  
for want of a shoe, the horse was lost;  
for want of a horse, the rider was lost;  
for want of a rider, the battle was lost;  
for want of a battle, the kingdom was lost!”**

– Gleick (1987, p.23)

Such a concept may thus prove useful when considering the interconnectedness and importance of varying elements such as infrastructure and access to basic services, social development, cultural norms and economic opportunity and their relationship(s) to a wide range of agents in how governments and planning interventions seek to address issues such as increasing violence. Similarly, the recognition of interdependence promotes the necessity for the use of a multi-level perspective in analysing interventions and determining the factors that may or may not affect the outcomes of such interventions.

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### 2.4.3 Flexibility – feedback, learning and adaptation

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Within complex social systems, agents take the form of individuals and the groups they represent. Citizens, politicians, planners, activists etc. are all considered agents within the urban social systems with which planners work and to which we aim to contribute. John Holland’s work on agents in complex systems in the 70s and 80s led him to pose the question, “what actually has to happen for game-playing agents to survive and prosper?” A question he answered in two words, *prediction* and *feedback* (Waldrop, 1992, p.176). Holland supports his answer in that, despite the unpredictability of complex system interactions, all complex adaptive systems, whether social systems such as economies or natural complex adaptive systems such as organisms, build models that seek to allow them to anticipate worldly behaviour. Prediction is not about knowing exactly what will happen but is rather about thinking ahead. Prediction therefore helps one take advantage of perceived opportunity. An agent that can think ahead, as Holland affirms, undoubtedly develops an advantage over one that cannot (Waldrop, 1992).

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<sup>11</sup> This phenomena is most well known as “The Butterfly Effect”, a term originating from the natural sciences and popularised through Lorenz’s work that explains how it a flap of a butterfly’s wings in Beijing may result in altered weather patterns in New York at some point in the future (Waldrop, 1992).

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The second element associated with how agents function within complex, networked environments, is feedback. Prediction underpins the creation of the model used initially, however, feedback from the environment is what ensures that the model itself is adapted for improvement the next time round; one “*simply has to try the models out, see how well their predictions work in the real world, and – if its survives the experience – adjust the models to do better the next time*” (Waldrop, 1992, p.179).

In human systems, the strength of such feedback is often determined by the degree of connectivity present within the system as well as the time and context within which the feedback takes place. Feedback in terms of reference to human interaction aids in influencing the actions, or behaviour, of agents (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). The nature of feedback within such a context, requires the recognition of these non-linear influences as they pertain to the multiple processes and multi-level interactions within which various types of feedback occur and on which learning and subsequent adaptation can be based.

The notions of prediction and feedback support the contention made here that flexibility constitutes a key means of dealing effectively with complex systems and the development of unpredictable changes. In this sense, flexibility refers to the ability to respond to and learn from feedback in such a way that interventions can be adapted appropriately, in situ. In terms of its applicability to the case study investigation undertaken here, flexibility in terms of adaptation based on feedback is distinctly linked to processes of implementation, monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management, all of which will be explored in more detail as part of the case study analysis (chapter 6).

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#### 2.4.4 Self-Organisation

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In their interactions within complex systems, agents are not isolated. They interact on a variety of levels and ways within the systems in which they operate and, as predicated by their adaptive nature, agents transform themselves in order to adjust according to changes experienced within the systems in which they operate. It is these transformations that constitute *self-organisation*.

*Autopoiesis*, yet another natural sciences term, is a condition of radical autonomy that is secured through processes of self-organisation, emerging when a system begins to define its own boundaries in relation to its environment, developing its own operational codes, implementing its own programmes and reproducing its own elements in a closed circuit, thus allowing it to obey its own laws of motion (Jessop, 2003, p.17). Within the context of civil organisations or communities, self-organisation may best be related to how one may view self-organisation within an organisational setting where spontaneous gatherings occur based on a common purpose. Under these conditions, the individuals making up the group determine what will be done as well as how and when agreed upon action will be taken. Self-organisation by definition means that no one outside the group directs those activities (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003).

In developing the theory of self-organisation, neurobiologists Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987) coined the term *autopoiesis* as a description of the general patterns of organisation

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present within all living systems. *Auto* meaning “self” and *poiesis* meaning “making” relates to the processes through which entire networks continually re-form as each network component participates in the production or transformation of other, neighbouring components (Ferdig, 2000).

Within the social sciences, Luhmann’s much touted work on social autopoiesis builds on the concept originally formulated in the biological sciences. Luhmann’s (1995) sociological work describes autopoiesis as a process of *communication*. Communication, as a form of non-linear feedback that supports self-organisation, occurs as self-amplifying feedback loops form based on the results of conversations that thus give rise to further conversations. This results in a developed, shared system of beliefs, explanations and values, which provide a context of meaning that is constantly sustained through continued conversations (Capra, 1996). The re-conceptualisation of social systems as modes of specialised communications, representative of functional subsystems in the production of social order, provides yet another example of how the concepts of feedback and self-organisation are applied to the functioning of complex social systems (Schneider and Bauer, 2007).

In relation to both understanding the underlying causes of violence and crime as well as responses, both state and civil, which target the prevention of violence, self-organisation emerges as a key concept in that one must consider the variety of ways in which individuals and communities may or may not respond to specific interventions. The stimulation of positive self-organised prevention practices (in contrast to self-organised justice delivery through vigilantism and kangaroo courts) through creating conditions in which self-organised processes can be realised is hypothesised here as being essential to sustaining and transferring prevention interventions, particularly social development interventions, on a much larger scale.

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#### 2.4.5 Emergence

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Through the processes of feedback, resultant adaptation and self-organisation, the concept of *emergence* also contributes to the theoretical framework of understanding complexity theory and its linkages to the prevention of urban violence. Emergence is the process that creates new order and is related to the concept of the “whole” in that it is seen as the “*transition from local rules or principles of interaction between individual components or agents, to global principles or states encompassing the entire collection of agents*” (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003, p.20).

In using complexity as a fundamental argument for context specificity in the investigation of the singular case study used in this research (chapter 3), it is recognised that this is merely the first phase being undertaken in terms of reaching the ultimate goal, being more broadly applicable methodologies through which one can mitigate and attempt to address the complex challenges associated with violence, across nations. Also, if one extends the concept of self-organisation by agents (e.g. community members), new ideas and knowledge that arise when such agents work together can best be described as emergent properties. During processes of in-

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teraction, new ideas evolve through group interactions that result in the formation of innovative concepts and ideas that no individual would have necessarily been able to produce alone.

In social systems, agents participate in the construction of emergent properties, both influencing and being influenced by the social ecosystem. No individual or organisation is therefore powerless, as processes of connectivity and co-evolution affects both individuals and systems at different levels and scales, within different domains, a concept that has likewise supported the move towards collaborative planning practice. Individuals participating within social systems constantly take and act on decisions, which they make, determining the path that their lives follow. These decisions are likewise based on the range and type of available alternatives. Alternatives are constrained not only by a person's current state but also by the variety of alternatives accessible within the surrounding environment (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003).

This concept is principal to dealing with fragile social systems found in areas such as the one investigated through this work. The emergent behaviour of individuals within fragile social systems cannot simply be dismissed as a matter of chance but are in fact the result of an individual's decisions that are based on a finite number of alternate choices. Interventions in providing alternative choices or resources may therefore be seen as supporting the possibility for an extension of the choices available. In turn this creates potential sources of innovation through which new solutions may be endowed on the individual and the system, as new solutions become apparent (Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou, 2000; Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). This thought process is further developed during the exploration of the case study and in the presentation of its results as it is hypothesised that the kinds of resources provided through planning intervention for violence prevention affects the availability of alternative choices to individuals. Furthermore, the point is extrapolated that such resources may take the most simplistic form yet enact significant change within the broader system and environment.

Overall, understanding complexity theory and recognising the advantages it give us in terms of the way in which urban systems can be understood based on the agreement that complex problems exist, of which violence is representative, supports the way in which we can view and interpret the approaches, experiences and outcomes of the interventions that seek to address such problems. The reasoning behind complexity advocates that the generation of knowledge and learning processes need to be enabled through the provision of appropriate technical and socio-cultural conditions that support connectivity and most importantly encourage self-organisation and emergence (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). The way in which such conditions can be defined and created in order to best inform transfer processes are of central concern here.

Within the framework of this research, the motivating objective of determining ways in which violence can be addressed on a far broader scale requires that the understanding of complexity and its potential to contribute must be considered in conjunction with the concept of *transfer*. An inability to effectively transfer positive intervention experiences, which have resulted in positive impacts on the prevalence of violence in pilot sites, means that we will not be able to move beyond the pilot project in creating safer communities across cities and countries.

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The second part of the theoretical framework established in order to undertake this research therefore considers the notion of transfer, as it relates to both policy and programmes.

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## 2.5 Transfer

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“The complexity of a programme affects its transferability; the more complex a policy or programme is, the harder it will be to transfer.” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.353). Having established violence to be a complex, wicked problem, and in acknowledging as Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) put it, that complexity directly impacts programme transferability, the existential need to consider complexity when discussing the potential for pilot projects to be extended becomes clear. One cannot however do this without first determining a theoretical standpoint based not only on certain complexity theories as an overall epistemic approach to research but also on a grounding of this episteme in the theoretical and empirical evidence expressed in existent transfer and implementation literatures.

Transfer literature, most predominantly based in the political sciences *diffusion* discourse, focuses principally on the transfer of policy. Policy transfer has received significant focus in recent decades and is largely attributed to processes of globalisation and increased network exchanges between countries. This transpires as processes of exchange occur in learning from the ways in which particular (universal) problems are being addressed elsewhere. In addition to the extended reach of global networks and national interdependence, the promotion and sometimes enforcement<sup>12</sup> of policy occurs due to the intervention of international organisations in the dissemination of best practices across a diverse range of countries (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

Within this global setting, policy transfer has become commonplace. In defining policy transfer and addressing questions on what policy transfer constitutes, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) provide a comprehensive literature review, revisited recently by Benson and Jordan (2011), on the evolution of policy transfer thinking, supplemented by on-going discourses on the role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making processes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) as well as the future agenda that policy transfer research should consider (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012).

Discourse within transfer literatures provide insight into the particularities of initial rational, linear forms of transfer in off-the-shelf policy adoption (Rose, 1991, 1993) and the various constraints transfer processes face (Benson, 2009). These discourses have since evolved employing the notions of learning and translation (McFarlane, 2011), which are insistent on the importance of considering local requirements for policy implementation (Dwyer and Ellison, 2009) and so too give credibility to the complexity of specific contexts that “modifies exports of policy and the need for interpretation or experimentalism in the *assemblage* of policy” (Stone, 2012,

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<sup>12</sup> Although this research recognises the differences between the voluntary adoption or “borrowing” of policies from elsewhere and coercive or “forced” adoption based on international power relations, such a discussion is avoided here. See Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) and Stone (2001).

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p.1). Within the bounds of this research two primary elements from transfer discourses are rendered of key importance and are focused on accordingly:

1. The distinction between the transfer of policy and the transfer of programmes or specific interventions and
2. The deliberation as to the necessity for policy and/or programmes to remain true to their original form (fidelity) versus the requirement for adaptation to fit local contexts based on the available, albeit limited, experiences of projects elsewhere.

Additionally, the literature demonstrate key lessons that can be learnt, for example, through understanding the constraints placed on transfer through determinant elements such as the programmatic, contextual and application limitations which can be identified (Benson, 2009), thereby supporting the assertion maintained here that in-depth contextual analysis of implementation processes is essential in formulating a locally applicable conceptualisation of programme transfer. Comprehensive understanding of the political, economic, social and cultural contexts within which implementation occurs is precursory to being able to adequately consider the forces behind mechanisms used in the realisation of outcomes from which lessons can be learnt and subsequently applied elsewhere (Jenkins et al., 2004).

This work, in its conceptualisation and use of transfer, deviates most significantly from the core body of literature in that the transfer of programme interventions are not discussed in relation to the translocal mobility/dissemination of policies and programmes. Rather, this study considers transfer first and foremost on a local scale, within and between cities, as a starting point from which impacts for more global applicability can be discussed at a later stage. This is based on the contention that the complexity of the issues being faced determines the need to investigate the necessary modes of transfer at a localised scale in order to gauge how transfer can be conceptualised in terms of supporting scaling-up processes, requiring the rapid expansion of pilot projects from one area to another within local boundaries.

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### 2.5.1 Complexity, planning and transfer: A likely triumvirate

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Prior to entering into the extended discussion on how transfer theory informs this research, a brief explanation on the intersections between the complexity theory framework established earlier on in this chapter and the notion of transfer as it is to be used here is necessary. Principally, and similarly to the shifts in planning discourses, the recognition of the complex nature of the societal systems with which we work as well as the complex interrelationships that determine the causes and motivators of the problems with which global development is faced, so too can transfer discourses be said to have experienced changes based on the acceptance of complexity and the unpredictability that characterises complex problems.

Just as with the movements in planning away from traditional rationalism towards collaborative approaches, the concept of policy transfer and its analysis has likewise developed from its original focus on the “off-the-shelf” adoption of policies and practices deemed successful

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elsewhere, to engaging discussions on the processes of learning and the recognised need for adaptation in the transfer process - in the *translation* of policies so to say, from one context to another - taking account of contextual specificities. As McFarlane (2011, p.113) puts it, “the possibilities of learning are dependent on openness to learning through difference, that is to learning as translation rather than reducing the possibilities of learning to direct knowledge transfer”. Stone (2012, p.7) too reiterates the impact of complexity on transfer processes in describing the translation process as one in which policy/programme modifications result due to prior processes of learning. Therefore, as with complexity theory, transfer theories similarly place emphasis on learning and adaptation, which in turn relates to the emergence of hybrid combinations focused to address local conditions, informed by an accumulation of prior experiences (Evans and Davies, 1999; Stone, 2001). Having moved away from traditional state-centred approaches, policy transfer research now similarly includes a far broader range of actors and venues with applications of such research being applied to wider issues (Benson and Jordan, 2011), crime and violence prevention included (Newburn, 2010).

As it relates most particularly to this research, the importance of recognising the intersection with the influences of complexity on the way in which we approach problems such as violence stems from the realisation that the sustainability of programmes is reliant on the successful transfer of interventions, with required levels of translation/adaptation. After all, a key factor in sustaining interventions occurs when plans are made for transferring a project (Altman, 1995, p.530).

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### 2.5.2 On the transfer of policy and programmes

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Distinguished from the more dominant issue of policy transfer, this research is concerned with the transfer of programmes, based on the characteristics of the specific interventions incorporated within a comprehensive, integrated violence prevention programme. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000, p.12) highlight the “misguided” approach that has dominated transfer discourses where “programs and policies are conflated into a single category” and provide a differentiation based on the recognised importance of distinguishing between policies and programmes.

According to this differentiation, policies are viewed as “broader statements of intention” whereas programmes embody the specific means of the course of action taken in implementing set policies. Within this research, the VPUU programme implements prevention interventions across the environmental, institutional and social domains, making up a complete course of action that are both impacted upon and informed by local, provincial and national policy (chapter 4 and chapter 5). Similarly, due to the pilot programme status of the VPUU programme, transfer likewise must consider that in addition to being informed by local policy structures, such programmes also inform policy development, meaning that although distinctive in nature, the transfer of programmes and policies are inextricably linked. This research acknowledges this link in agreeing that VPUU implementation processes and the transfer of pilot interventions will undoubtedly inform local policy development and similarly the transfer of

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newly developed policies between cities and provinces. In light of maintaining focus however, this research maintains its concentration on the transfer of pilot programmes and the specific prevention initiatives that make up the programme itself.

The following section therefore draws on examples of particular prevention programme transfer experiences, focusing on the debates surrounding the maintenance of programme fidelity - in other words remaining true to the original programme design and implementation process as far as possible - and the necessity to adapt programme implementation processes to local contexts.

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### 2.5.3 Replication versus translation: balancing fidelity and adaptation

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One of the fundamental arguments prevalent in transfer and implementation literature concerns the balance between fidelity and adaptation. Literature on the replication of programmes demonstrates some experienced difficulties in balancing the fidelity of programmes to be replicated with ensuring contextual sensitivity in adapting programmes to the needs of new populations (Bell et al., 2007).

Relatively little empirical research exists which focuses on the process of implementing prevention initiatives and how it is such initiatives can be replicated or transferred on a much broader scale that will impact positively on local and national levels of violence and delinquency. Therefore, the development of a scientific knowledge base for the replication and dissemination of programmes, that have proven to be effective, is crucial (Elliott and Mihalic, 2004). In reporting on findings from a large replication and dissemination programme focusing on violence prevention initiatives – *The Blueprints for Violence Prevention-Replication Initiative* – Elliott and Mihalic (2004, p.51) maintain that, based on its relative success in replicating initiatives, the need for local adaptation of prevention programmes is “greatly overstated”. The argument is that in order to effectively up-scale prevention initiatives programme fidelity is key. This position is maintained based on the assertion that subjectively driven adaptations hold the potential to interfere with the known effectiveness of the programme and could thus potentially undermine trust in the claims made on the effectiveness of original interventions, in turn eroding the chance for these programmes to remain sustainable.

Similarly to Elliot and Mihalic, Stanton et al. (2005), in their study on urban to rural transfer of sexual risk reduction interventions, compare implementations where on one hand the intervention remained effectively unaltered while on the other hand the intervention was transferred with modifications aimed at accommodating local cultures and the perception of sexual risk. This study renders two important results: Firstly, the less altered version of the intervention was deemed more effective overall. Secondly, however, neither transfer of the intervention was as effective as the primary intervention undertaken in the original urban setting. Importantly, the authors acknowledge that in actual fact neither version of the intervention was delivered as planned and in situ adaptations occurred due to a variety of logistical issues. Despite the adjustments being unplanned and seemingly minor in nature, such deviations may have had a

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greater than expected impact on the effectiveness of the intervention. These findings highlight the complexity of the systems in which these prevention interventions are implemented and are demonstrative of how small changes can have much wider reaching consequences.

Moreover, it is also somewhat a demonstration of the simple fact that 100% fidelity of a programme or intervention is all but impossible to achieve, which, in the opinion of this author, renders the question of necessary adaptation to original initiatives as still highly relevant. This argument is based on the observation that the transfer of interventions discussed by Elliot and Mihalic have admittedly, not been adequately discussed in terms of looking at which elements within original interventions are considered core elements and which elements are peripheral, or optional, elements. Elliott and Mihalic (2004, p.50) further acknowledge that fidelity of an intervention refers in particular to the “implementation of core components as designed and demonstrated in the trials”.

As far as the transfer of prevention programmes goes, the limited experience available suggests no real conclusive evidence as to what exactly may constitute the most effective balance of programme fidelity with adaptation, if any. This seems to arise based on little investigation into how it is that programme components can or should be classified and what it is that constitutes a programme’s “core” elements. Overall, what is garnered from the limited number of programme transfer experiences available, which relate directly to the work undertaken here, is that the transfer of programmes is a complex process, “riddled with a number of challenges and barriers” (Mihalic and Irwin, 2003, p.4).

This research therefore seeks to learn from the descriptions of such experiences and approaches the questions posed here on the transfer of violence prevention initiatives accordingly. The replication, or transfer as it is referred to here, of effective interventions faces challenges of both implementation design as well as challenges of determining the extent to which core elements should be balanced with optional elements targeted towards the needs of differing populations (Bell et al., 2007).

What is proposed here, and which has informed the case study research, is a deviation from the consideration of programme components as *core* and *optional*, replacing this terminology by referring to project components as either *robust* or *dynamic*. The choice of such terminology relates directly to the complexity theories that support this research and the conception of transfer presented here in that all complex systems exhibit robust elements, important for planning in that such robustness can act as somewhat of a “control parameter – something which can have a profound influence on the kind of future which comes to pass” (Byrne, 2003, p.174).

One other clear occurrence in the implementation literature, that this research aims to clarify, concerns the use of the terminology as it pertains to *replication*, *transfer* and *translation*. These terms are therefore expanded on and defined in their relation to this research in the following section.

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#### 2.5.4 Programme transfer: clarifying the objective

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In having reviewed transfer and implementation literatures in forming the second branch of the theoretical framework used in supporting the case study investigation, this research advocates for a distinction in the use of the words *transfer* and *replicate*. Within much of the dominant literature, little distinction is made between the transfer and replication of policy and/or programmes, and the term replication is widely used.

Here, the term transfer is preferred in that the transferability of a policy or programme and its attached definition does not explicitly rule out the notion of adaptation within the transfer process. As defined by the Oxford Dictionary, transfer denotes a “move from one place to another”. Definitions of replication on the other hand infer the reproduction of “an exact copy” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012), leaving little room for the inclusion of any adaptation.

In relation to the experiences discussed previously, “replication” implies fidelity to the original, while “community-based and culturally sensitive” implies variation. It is accepted that in any process of implementing an intervention, programme or policy an exact replication is never possible, as even simple changes which occur based on logistical issues will result in deviations even if just slight. In any new context, even within one city, both the people and places on which interventions will have an impact differ and therefore true replication within complex social systems is rendered a factual impossibility (Tilley and Laycock, 2010).

This idea is supported by a large research cooperation working on the transferability of good territorial governance within the EU, which likewise recognises the challenge in approaching transferability as a process characterised by “a high degree of complexity, difficulty and risk of failure”, made particularly challenging due to the “questionability of ‘reproductive’ assumptions behind the rhetoric of best practices transferability, specially where this concerns diversified, institutional contexts” (ESPON, 2013, p.62).

This research therefore advocates for the defined use of the word transfer in describing the process of implementing programme interventions in new contexts. The level(s) of adaptation, commonly referred to as *translation*<sup>13</sup> in policy transfer literatures, that occurs or is deemed necessary for transfer processes to be successful, is an entirely different consideration altogether, one that this research seeks to investigate.

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#### 2.5.5 A framework for investigating transfer

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As the point has been made, the complexity of a programme directly affects its transferability. However, the application of complexity concepts to transfer processes is a significantly under studied area. A framework based on the conceptualisation of transfer provided above is therefore constructed, predominantly based on the work of Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000, 2012). This framework, supported by the complexity theories outlined in the first parts of this chapter, works in order to inform the case study investigation through developing an understanding

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<sup>13</sup> See McFarlane (2011).

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of a) how transfer is considered within the VPUU project itself, b) the challenges facing the programme that affect transfer processes and c) what it is that is to be transferred.

The following questions, adapted from Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), therefore supported the questions developed and explored during the case study investigation and provide a framework through which the research questions relating to transfer are addressed:

- What is to be transferred?
- Who are the key actors involved in the transfer process?
- From where are lessons drawn?
- What different degrees of transfer exist or are envisaged?
- What restricts or facilitates the transfer process?

In addition to the above framework, an important element in undertaking this research and formulating the research outcomes includes the acknowledgement, that just as with policy transfer, the transfer of programmes and intervention are also subject to and dependent upon the political, bureaucratic and economic resources available. This is something that has special implications for this research, particularly when considering the transfer of programmes from one municipality, or province to another (chapter 5).

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## 2.6 Conclusions

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The establishment of the theoretical framework presented here forms the basis for the principal argument that resulted in the development of this research and its approach initially. The argument is that current urban planning challenges require modes of thinking that embrace complexity, not just as a descriptive indicator of real problems but as a useful episteme, in order to progress towards developing integrated intervention models that are broadly transferable.

Overall, complexity theories as they pertain to the social sciences and planning in particular allow us to understand the dynamics of systems that are non-linear yet highly interrelated and interdependent. Furthermore, it likewise provides a platform of knowledge and a means of viewing complex social realities, providing concrete frames through which complex systems, processes and problems can be better understood. The development of planning approaches, particularly the emergence of systemic, multi-level integrated approaches is representative of the recognition of the need to tackle complexity. Similarly, theoretical development in policy transfer discourse is also representative of the acknowledgment of the complexity associated with the transferral of successful policies or interventions from one context to another. This theoretical framework has also directly informed the research set-up and the choice of methodologies employed in that a multi-level perspective alongside an ecological approach to assessing and determining the transferability of interventions is used.

The research design, approach and the methodologies employed are rationalised in more detail in the following chapter.

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## 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

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### 3.1 Introduction

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This thesis is representative of a theoretically supported, qualitative empirical investigation of a context specific planning intervention aimed at the prevention of violence in Khayelitsha, one of Cape Town's most notoriously dangerous townships. In approaching violence as a highly complex problem manifesting within a highly fragile social situation, the undertaking of this research, in its interdisciplinarity, demands the implementation of a variety of research methods.

Prior to outlining the fundamental aims and objectives that form the basis for the pursuit of this research, this chapter begins with a presentation of the interdisciplinary nature of this work and presents the conceptual framework used, defining the principal concepts referred to. Interdisciplinarity allows for the possibility of misinterpretation in the conceptual understanding of terms based on a variety of factors such as a reader's professional or experiential background. This is therefore mitigated through the concise presentation of how such concepts are understood and used within the contextual bounds of this particular research.

Subsequently, the specific research methods used in formulating the research approach and theoretical framework, as well as the more specific tools used during the case study investigations, are outlined in detail. These methods are likewise justified in both their usage and applicability to the development of the research theme, research undertaking and resultant outcomes, providing detailed insight into the way in which the research was pragmatically undertaken. Additionally, the choice of the singular, focused case study approach as well as the conscious reasoning by which the specific case study was selected for investigation are also detailed.

Recognition of the researcher's own personal and professional positioning is acknowledged and affirmed and the inherent limitations and restrictions of the research and its methodologies draws this chapter to a close.

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### 3.2 An Interdisciplinary Research Undertaking

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Urban planning, as a practice-oriented profession, is one which demands interdisciplinarity in its borrowing of theory from a range of other disciplinary sciences. Importantly, interdisciplinary research such as this is motivated by the need to address complex social problems (Szostak, 2012) through research that not only provides a scholarly contribution but also generates practical policy advice based on normative results.

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In seeking to conduct research that contributes to urban development and planning practice, a non-scientific field in itself, this kind of research is inherently interdisciplinary in that the theoretical frameworks and the scientific approaches employed originate from a range of other scientific fields. This research, for example, is based primarily on contemporary theories of violence and crime (criminology, sociology), which explain the evolution and provides an understanding of the dominant approaches to prevention. In the same respect, the theoretical framework that forms the basis for the empirical investigations combines elements of complexity theory (natural sciences, mathematics as well as the social sciences in general) with transfer and implementation theories (political sciences). The interdisciplinarity of this research therefore demands a detailed description and justification of the methodologies used, as this kind of interdisciplinary research is not subject to the more strictly defined methods and accepted research processes of “regulated” disciplinary work (Szostak, 2012).

Despite the enormous challenges that interdisciplinary research poses, it is embraced here as an opportunity rather than a detriment in that the belief is held that in dealing with contemporary, complex social issues, the combination of perspectives that are brought together from a number of disciplines holds significant potential for developing new knowledge and methods for addressing such problems. Essentially, interdisciplinarity allows for the engagement with complex problems that involve not only interactions between numerous phenomena which need to be understood but also that result in challenges based on non-linearity. As in the complexity theories that provide the epistemological stance from which this research has progressed, non-linearity and uncertainty are hallmarks of interdisciplinary research (Bammer, 2005). In its set-up, this research approach takes its lead from other research experience that likewise place value on utilising multi- and transdisciplinary approaches as a means of best addressing complex problems such as violence. See Velthuisen (2012).

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### **3.3 Conceptual Framework**

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The understanding of conceptual terms and their actual meaning(s) are accepted here as being highly contextual. Meanings and interpretations vary from place to place as well as from one professional field to another. Within the field of contemporary research, which is increasingly inter- and multidisciplinary, researchers are naturally influenced by their training/education, professional backgrounds and personal experiences when interpreting the meanings of various concepts. It is for this reason, in order to limit any possible misunderstanding or confusion associated with the highly complex and still debated meanings of the terms used, that working definitions are presented as they apply to the perspective taken during this research process.

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#### **3.3.1 Planning/Urban planning**

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Planning is understood, for the purposes of this research, as the intentional means of employing efforts to improve the built environment. Although it is acknowledged that planning, and urban

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planning, can be performed both through formal (professional, state institutions etc.) and informal (self-organised civil society, e.g. CBOs, NGOs and private business) channels, this research refers to those in the formal category: planning methodologies being implemented by large international organisations, planning professionals and experts as well as the planning practices implemented by local government institutions. Urban planning is an extension of the understanding of the meaning of planning within the context of this research as urban planning, although encompassing broader overlaps with rural, regional and national planning, is differentiated through the fact that it relates directly to the urban context and is primarily concerned with the development of both space and place (Watson, 2009b).

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### 3.3.2 Violence and violent crime

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The most quoted definition of violence tends to be that of the World Health Organisation (WHO), which states violence as being:

*“The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal development or deprivation.” (Krug et al., 2002, p. 5)*

Crime, on the other hand, is an act, which is punishable by law and that may or may not be violent in nature. Therefore the phenomena of violence and crime are two distinct portents, each of which may occur individually and independently from one another in terms of legal understanding (Moser, 1999; Vanderschueren, 1996). For the purposes of this research, it is a combination of the two, which is used, as both phenomena are considered together within the concept of violent crime. Violent crime is thus understood to be the undertaking of criminal acts, as defined by the legal systems of the country of research, which are carried out with the intention to cause physical harm. It is recognised however that the definitions of physical force, harm, violence and crime may differ distinctly in their interpretation from one country to another and therefore this research will clarify these distinctions through outlining the way in which such terms are defined and understood within the South African context.

Essentially, this thesis refers to violent crime in particular, as opposed to crime in general, based on the prevalence of crime being experienced within the case study environment as being highly violent in nature. Violent crime and the various prevention methods identified in order to deal with violent crime, are specifically understood as a pre-cursory to addressing problems of other, non-violent crime at large, hence crime in general is not distinctly addressed.

In relation to the South African context, Loots (2005, p.2) provides a useful categorisation differentiating the local manifestations of violent crime:

- Interpersonal violent crime; murder, attempted murder, serious assaults (or assault with the intent to cause grievous bodily harm or assault GBH), common assaults and rape.

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- Violent property crime; all categories of robbery, i.e. robbery with aggravating circumstances (armed robbery, car hijacking etc.) and common robbery.

The VPUU Programme, the core focus of the empirical research, is fundamentally concerned with the prevention of interpersonal violence.

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### 3.3.3 Crime prevention

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Crime prevention is the general term used here to refer to social, situational and institutional methodologies being implemented, with the main aim of preventing crime, much of which constitutes violent crime in the context being addressed. This distinction is made in opposition to reactive measures taken in addressing violence and crime such as those employed by police and traditional criminal justice system approaches.

Crime prevention is defined by the UNODC guidelines as “*strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes*” (Shaw, 2010, p.9).

Internationally, a variety of terms are commonly used such as crime reduction and community safety. These terms have come about based on the notion of crime prevention as having originated from the fields of criminology and policing. In light of this, community safety has become a term more synonymous with an extended concept of safety, as something that goes beyond the consequences of crime reduction (Shaw, 2010).

Regardless of the differences in contextual usage of terms between countries, the point to be made is that, as part of this research undertaking, importance is placed on understanding the wide range of interventions and methodologies that aim to prevent (violent) crime and improve community safety and the ways in which such interventions are combined, as well as under what circumstances these may or may not produce desired results.

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### 3.3.4 Safety and security

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The terms, *safety* and *security*, are often used interchangeably, however, particularly in English, a definite distinction can be made. Safety describes the state of a particular area. Places are determined to be either safe or unsafe, dependant on the perceived and/or actual threat of danger in an area. Security on the other hand, is the collective term referring to the methods used in providing protection to oneself and others within areas which are unsafe (Holtmann, 2011). Thus, security can be defined as “the process or means of delaying, preventing and otherwise protecting against external or internal dangers”, including those posed by criminals (Oakes, 2008, p.1). In the South African context, focus is too often placed on the need for security on the basis of feared victimisation and is realised on the basis of socio-economic means where those who can afford to encapsulate themselves in walled compounds and place reliance on private security firms to provide armed response in instances of (perceived) threat. This

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socio-economic segregation on the basis of fear is what Lemanski (2004, p.102) refers to as “architectures of fear”.

Within the bounds of this research, the distinction between safety and security is defined in order to ensure clarity when referencing areas classified to be unsafe and referring to planning interventions and methodologies, targeted towards the aim of building safe communities, as opposed to securing an environment. Furthermore, the contextual situation within which the research is placed deals with township areas with fragile social systems characterised by high levels of crime and violence, therefore rendering them *unsafe*.

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### 3.3.5 Townships

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Township has a variety of definitional variations on the international level, according to the Oxford English Dictionary. Commonly however, in Australia, Britain and America, a township refers to a particular urban formation, mostly referred to as a district, or small village or town that forms part of a larger district. With respect to the South African context, the concept of a township holds a different meaning and very specifically refers to the created suburbs, or residential areas, “officially designated for black occupation by apartheid legislation<sup>14</sup>”.

In relation to urban planning, townships in South Africa are very much representative of planned segregation, which continue to pose multiple challenges to the urban planning and inclusive development of South Africa’s cities. Townships are, for the most part, still characterised by segregated and marginalised, poor communities as these areas lack connectivity to the rest of the city, basic services and adequate infrastructure. Furthermore, rapid urbanisation processes and the inability of the state and local government to respond to these situations has led to former, formally planned townships developing to become more and more informal as population numbers far exceed the number originally planned for<sup>15</sup>. Backyard, shack dwellings become the norm, with little or no basic services such as water and electricity being made available to these populations. Many townships have become synonymous with informal housing and economies, which function outside the limits of state support.

In discussing the implementation of international planning practices and the impact of local planning policy, in reference to the prevention of violence and violent crime in such low-income township areas, the specific case study example of the township of Khayelitsha in Cape Town, South Africa is used.

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### 3.3.6 Informal settlement

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In contrast to the previously planned segregation areas known as townships, an informal settlement refers to those areas where people have settled and built housing structures, normally

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com>

<sup>15</sup> According to VPUU project data (2002), Khayelitsha for example, was originally planned as a township, which was to accommodate 250.000 residents. Today, Khayelitsha has a population estimated to be around 700.000 residents.

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constructed of corrugated iron and other second-hand materials, on previously vacant land, without the provision of municipal services or formal infrastructure. Also often referred to as *squatter camps*, these informal settlements are now prevalent throughout South Africa's larger urban areas and continue to grow on the back of migration to urban areas based on the hope of work and improved quality of life.

Many such settlements have developed spontaneously along the strips of vacant land directly surrounding formally planned township areas that were previously kept as buffer zones between former white residential areas and the townships (Kruger, 2001).

The distinction is made here due to the fact that as the central case study, the VPUU programme first began in the previously formally planned township of Khayelitsha, meaning that although seriously deprived, some formal housing as well as city services and infrastructure are present within the area. In fulfilling the central aim of the VPUU programme, which concerns improving the quality of life for those urban citizens that are most vulnerable, work has begun on "rolling-out" the VPUU methodology and intervention approaches to surrounding informal settlement areas.

The questions associated with programme transfer as they are raised during the course of this dissertation therefore need to be placed within the context of informality as well. Despite being likewise characterised by basic deprivation, the social and spatial conditions in informal settlement areas are worse and the non-existence of municipal services poses challenges that reach beyond those faced by more formally planned township areas, for example unstable residences and high residential mobility in these areas may result in lower levels of social cohesion, a key factor in developing the community partnerships necessary for implementation.

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### 3.3.7 Mainstreaming

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The concept of mainstreaming is a complicated one in that the word is used with significant frequency and almost universal acceptance within planning and policy discourses. The challenge comes in the vagueness of understanding of exactly what it is that constitutes mainstreaming, both as a concept and as a process. "... *everyone understands the idea but no one is sure what it requires in practice*" (Beveridge and Nott, 2002, p.299).

Arguably the most functional definition of the verb "to *mainstream*" is provided by Picciotto (2002, p.323) in his assertion that as a dynamic concept, mainstreaming connotes gradual reform rather than frantic revolution of policy: "... *mainstreaming is typically achieved through incremental changes in program goals, protocols of operations and organizational cultures*".

Mainstreaming, alternatively referred to here as institutional integration, is therefore used within the framework of this research in its most practical sense, understood as a policy instrument, and is described through the ways in which the VPUU programme is expanding to other areas within Cape Town and the Western Cape. Mainstreaming methods are the *tools* used in the multi-level implementation of the methodologies and approaches to violence and crime prevention that put everyone on the same page. Mainstreaming in this sense thus allows for improved

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cooperation based on mutual understandings of the problem and causes of violent crime and the necessities of adequately addressing the issues that culminate in the volatile mix of risk factors present in underdeveloped communities. The concept of mainstreaming is limited within this research to the gauged understanding of mainstreaming as an institutionalisation process as presented by VPUU programme implementers and local government officials.

Mainstreaming is therefore also very much related to the concept of transfer as it is pursued here in that the significant up-scaling of interventions to move beyond the pilot project inherently requires an investigation into the ways in which implementation processes should (and should not?) be *mainstreamed* into existing policy and processes of policy implementation.

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### 3.4 Research Aims and Objectives

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The overall aim of this research is to realise a contribution of new knowledge on the challenges associated with the transfer of integrated planning practices aimed at the prevention of violence. Particularly, this research places focus on the most vulnerable of urban populations, working within the context of the fragile social systems existent in urban township and informal settlement communities of developing countries. This aim is to be achieved through the investigation of “on-the-ground” implementation practices and an analysis of current planning policy discourse as it relates to the chosen contextual situation of Khayelitsha Township in Cape Town, South Africa. A number of more specific research aims and objectives further inform the process and structure of achieving the above-stated overall research aim.

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#### 3.4.1 Specific aims

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The specific research aims include:

- i. The construction of a theoretically supported, sound argument as to the ways in which violence prevention should be understood and addressed in order to ensure that more may be done in terms of tackling violent crime on a larger scale through the transferability of intervention experiences.
- ii. A contextual investigation into the influence of international crime prevention methodologies on both the implementation of physical planning interventions conducted at community level as well as into the development of planning policy and development frameworks at national, provincial and local government level in South Africa and Cape Town respectively.
- iii. The introduction of a detailed discussion on the experience of violence prevention interventions, supported by local policy and international prevention approaches, and the challenges with which they are being faced, based on the empirical research undertaken on the VPUU programme in the City of Cape Town.

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- iv. The identification of the ways in which the theoretical framework, constructed based on aspects of complexity and transfer theory, holds the potential to contribute to better analyses, understanding and the provision of practical multi-level solutions that will aid in conceptualising the transferability of violence prevention interventions on a broader scale.

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### 3.4.2 Objectives

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Each of the specific research aims outlined above involves a number of goals or objectives, which are essentially the pieces that come together in order to develop a single, coherent argument and contribution to the understanding of violence prevention and the role various actors play in implementing successful prevention practices at neighbourhood level.

These objectives include:

The establishment of violence, particularly violent crime as a complex problem, which forms part of an urban reality where urban and community structures are understood to be representative of complex adaptive systems.

A construction of a contextual overview of current planning and development practice within the municipality bounds of the City of Cape Town, as it relates to violence and crime prevention. This is based on a broader understanding of the roles that national government-led social and economic development policy has played since the end of apartheid.

An analysis of the implementation of international methodologies and how these have been reconceptualised and adapted to increase impact and the potential for transferability to other areas within the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape province, as part of the focused case study.

A representation of possible policy directions set within the established theoretical framework, used as a means for re-conceptualising the complexity of prevention strategies towards the promotion of larger scale project transferability within the City of Cape Town and the larger bounds of the Western Cape Province.

Overall, this seeks to work towards developing a conceptual framework for the transferability of integrated prevention initiatives based on the results and analysis of the case study.

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### 3.4.3 Deliverables

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In light of the research aim and specific objectives stated above, this work seeks to produce the following deliverables: Primarily, a unique contribution to the discipline of urban planning with relation to violence prevention and programme transfer, specifically within the South African context. This is to be achieved through a) the provision of new, contextual understandings on the adaptability of international planning methods and policy within the local context and b) contributions to the understanding of the effects such implementation has on the planning and development policy at local government level in order for broad-based violence prevention to become feasible.

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The delivery of an extended research agenda based on the relevant conclusions drawn through the research which may inform further works aimed at addressing the multiple and inter-disciplinary questions associated with the way in which international planning norms are disseminated and implemented.

Post critique, the dissemination of research findings in a format adequate and applicable to the relevant audiences, through the provision of normative results in the form of an in-depth analysis of the challenges facing programme transfer, pertaining to how violence prevention may be addressed across multiple communities within the City of Cape Town. Beyond academia, appropriately formulated recommendations and results are, at first, to pertain specifically to local government level urban planning within the City of Cape Town<sup>16</sup>.

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#### 3.4.4 Audience, beneficiaries

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The audience and beneficiaries associated with this research include: i) Academics in the fields of urban and planning research, social sciences and development planning. ii) Public agencies such as local government planning offices as well as international funding institutions, consulting experts and, iii) civic entities such as the locally based community and non-governmental organisations that act as stakeholders in the practical implementation of urban violence prevention strategies and interventions.

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### 3.5 Research Argument and Questions

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#### 3.5.1 Assertions on cooperative governance and the value of complexity

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As discussed in the research rationale (chapter 1), the motivation for this work extends from the premise that urban violence is a major development challenge which poses one of the most significant risks to the production of accessible and more equal cities in South Africa. Moreover, the real potential and benefit of pilot programmes, employing integrated prevention initiatives that target the multiple environmental, institutional and social risk factors that support violence, lies in their ability to be implemented at scale.

The argument made throughout this thesis is therefore that the broad-based realisation of integrated violence and crime prevention initiatives is challenged on the basis of two core assumptions.

Firstly, it is purported that broad-based integrated prevention is reliant on the alignment and coordination of activities across government institutions, from the national to the local level. Extending from personal and professional experience with the status of on-going violence in South Africa as well as post-Apartheid development, the logical assumption that led to the development of this research is that a failure of government departments and sectors to coordinate

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<sup>16</sup> The production of normative results and the ability to communicate academic research results to the public is an important part of extending interdisciplinary research beyond academia (Szostak, 2012, p.11).

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effectively will significantly hinder the mainstreamed transfer of an integrated programme such as VPUU.

Secondly, the complex nature of the issues being addressed and the recognised need for integrated approaches fuels the assumption that a theoretical understanding of complexity and the functionality of complex systems provides a valuable starting point from which to consider integrated violence prevention and the transfer of integrated prevention approaches, such as those being advocated through the implementation of the VPUU programme. Therefore, it is contended that drawing on complexity theory as outlined in the theoretical framework (chapter 2) in framing and understanding cities and their communities as complex adaptive systems and the perpetuation of violence as a complex problem, requiring innovative solutions, will provide an appropriate lens through which the challenges being experienced in the implementation of integrated violence prevention programmes can be better understood. Furthermore, these insights are to provide a platform from which to address such challenges, ultimately supporting the path towards the broadened transferability of violence prevention programmes and their outcomes.

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### 3.5.2 Research questions

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*What are the main challenges facing the implementation and transferability of the VPUU project to other vulnerable urban areas in Cape Town and the Western Cape?*

This central research question forms the basis for the theoretical and empirical investigations undertaken as part of this thesis and is approached using the theoretical basis of complexity theory and multi-level perspectives.

The following specific research questions will be addressed as part of formulating the case study and its analysis. These questions are related to a) the national and local policy context within which violence prevention programmes such as the VPUU programme are taking place, b) questions relating more directly to the actual implementation experiences of the VPUU project itself and c) what these experiences mean for the transferability potential of the programme:

- a) Violence prevention in South Africa and Cape Town [Ch. 4]
  - i. How has the issue of violence prevention been dealt with in South Africa since the inception of democracy, post 1994?
  - ii. How does the relevant policy/discourse surrounding violence prevention relate to the overall development trajectory pursued by national government post apartheid?
  - iii. What role(s) do the various spheres of government – National, Provincial and Local – play in the implementation of violence/crime prevention policy?
- b) The VPUU programme as an example of successful integrated violence prevention at local government level in Cape Town [Ch. 5]

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- i. How have international best practices informed the implementation of the VPUU project and to what extent?
  - ii. What role does the implementing agency have in aligning civil society and local government needs/requirements?
  - iii. What, if any, affect has this had on local policy for violence prevention?
  - iv. Which are the main government departments responsible for responding to the issue of violence and crime in the City?
  - v. What relationship do policing mechanisms have with socially oriented prevention strategies being employed by the VPUU?
  - vi. What is the current status of programme institutionalisation/mainstreaming?
  - vii. Is the VPUU programme already being extended to other areas? In what form? What are the main challenges being faced?
- c) Programme transferability [Ch. 5]
- i. What does transferability in this context mean?
  - ii. How is the VPUU programme envisaging the roll-out/transfer of the programme to other areas?
  - iii. Considering the context specificity and challenges being experienced by the VPUU programme, what would/does programme transfer look like?

The research questions, supported by the theoretical framework developed for this research (chapter 2), formed the basis for both the semi-structured and unstructured expert interviews, as well as the opportunistic informal interviews, that were conducted as part of the fieldwork that supports this research (See case study methodologies).

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### 3.5.3 Research design and methodology

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
This section provides a description of the research design and analytical approach that determined the research process as well as detailed descriptions of the various qualitative methods used.

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### 3.5.4 Analytical model

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The research design and analytical model developed for the undertaking of this research depicts the multi-level perspective that has been used in viewing a localised case study within the broader bounds of local, national and international development and violence/crime prevention influences.



**Figure 3.1.:** Analytical framework.

Graphically represented in Figure 3.1, the analytical framework shows the bi-directional approach taken in determining the flow of influences of international discourse and violence prevention approaches on policy and individual programme development, implementation and transfer.

On one hand, the influence of international best practices and discourses on national, provincial and local level policy development is explored, with focus being placed on the way in which economic and social development policy has been implemented in post-apartheid South Africa. This is undertaken in order to fully understand the post-apartheid situation of development and how this relates to the continuing prevalence of violence and the various policy approaches that have been developed in attempting to implement violence prevention strategies in South Africa since 1994 (chapter 4).

On the other hand, the conception and formulation of international cooperation programmes such as the VPUU are likewise influenced in their undertakings by international discourses and best practice experiences. These programmes are thus implemented in the form of various interventions construed according to international guidelines, which are adapted and implemented within the local context (See chapter 5).

The way in which the two sides of this framework intersect and the results being experienced on the ground at local level is used as the primary point of entry into determining the potential for the transferability of the methodologies employed and positive programme experiences based on a multi-level perspective of local, national and international factors influencing implementation.

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The analytical approach taken is supported by complexity theory and an ecological model of violence prevention in that the boundaries between the various levels at which policy and violence prevention approaches are conceived and implemented are understood to be fluid, thereby requiring that, despite the importance of context specificity at local level, any results realised must be viewed both within the local context itself as well as within the greater bounds of the extended environment.

From that which is internationally informed, nationally regulated yet locally implemented, even the most focused of case studies can not exist within itself but must give credence not only to the contextual specificity that drives the outcomes in experiences but also to the broader, external and often widely replicated features that underpin implementation practices in the first place.

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### 3.6 Research Methods

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The methodology employed for this research is structured to assist the processes of assessing contemporary international violence prevention approaches within the context of community-level, practical experience, provided for through an in-depth, empirical case study approach.

At a macro scale, this research can be deemed a) both as inter and multidisciplinary and b) explorative in its approach. The framework of complexity and the inherent requirements of that which is complex in exploring the localised interactions that occur can no longer be adequately conducted or justified within the closed confines of any singular disciplinary approach. The identification of inefficiencies in the ways in which social and economic policy development occur alongside prevention initiatives requires a number of perspectives in analysing the existent status and relationships within and between the varied levels of complex interrelationships. This supports the multi-level perspectives approach employed and the selection of the qualitative methods used.

With respect to recognition of the need to consider the issue of transferability, as it relates to the implementation of violence prevention initiatives, and the formation of the theoretical framework used to support this research, the methodology used comprises three main elements, in addition to the undertaking of the focused case study, which forms the core of this research:

Firstly, in-depth *secondary source analysis* is implemented in drawing existing academic literature together so as to outline the current state and theoretical understanding of violence, crime and prevention as complex issues from a social planning perspective.

Secondly, this secondary source analysis underpins the formulation of the *literature review* as well as the theoretical framework used to support the research approach, which are presented in the introductory chapters of this thesis. Moreover, research specific definitions have been elaborated on in the beginning sections of this chapter so as to provide a guiding conceptual framework and thus limit any misunderstanding in conceptual interpretation that may occur when such definitions fail to be adequately extended.

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Finally, through the use of *document analysis*, current policy documentation, the current state of urban planning and the role planning policy plays in assisting violence prevention in post-apartheid South Africa and Cape Town is outlined and assessed. The understanding of violence as a serious and pressing social issue and the ways in which this issue is being addressed at local level through the implementation of development interventions specifically aimed at violence prevention is supported through the document analysis methods employed. Document analysis likewise forms part of the unobtrusive methods applied during the actual case study research and is used as a basis of knowledge that is probed for verification through the use of more obtrusive methods, such as interviews and personal attendance at programme meetings or workshops.

The analytical research methodology, used in order to produce the outcomes and results of this thesis, relies on the broad, qualitative methodological approach of a case study. An overarching methodological approach in itself, case studies require the use of a range of methodologies. The interplay between the theoretical, analytical and empirical is achieved through having applied the constructed theoretical framework to the analysis of the selected case study. In doing so, it must be made clear that the aim of this thesis is not to produce a thorough, professional evaluation of the VPUU programme but rather the intention is to present an analysis of the programme, as an empirical planning case using the theoretical lens of complexity in order to further the discussion of programme transfer. Subsequent to a deepened explanation as to the reasons for which a singular case study approach has been followed, each of the more intrinsic research methods is outlined and justified.

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### 3.6.1 The singular case study approach

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The singular, localised and highly focused case study approach was chosen as the primary methodological means for this research based on the recognised issues present within current academic literature. The selection of the singular case study approach is essentially based on two fundamental points.

Firstly, the assertion of violence and violent crime as a complex problem that requires innovative, but more importantly, locally specific approaches, supports this approach. Essentially, the mere fact that this research adopts the lens of complexity theory and thus the resultant acknowledgement that urban systems and such cases are highly complex and unpredictable, supports the singular case study approach in its own right, as the process of investigation attempts to understand how particular interventions targeting violence prevention function within the contextually specific complexities of the social, environmental and political (governance) structures in place.

Secondly, academicians continue to raise the issue that if theory is to continue to develop in ways that are more useful to urban planners in terms of practical implementation then research needs to take a grounded approach in the form of a return to *“the concrete, to the empirical and to case research, not as a mindless return to empiricisms, but as a way of gaining a better*

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*understanding of the nature of difference, and generating ideas and propositions which can more adequately inform practice*" (Watson, 2003: 396). A lack of systematic case study investigations persists, leaving a gap where one should be able to use the outcomes of focused case study research in understanding the functions and interrelations as they occur in the daily practices of the various urban actors involved, that are required should one really aim to support the extension of applied implementation in crime prevention interventions based not only on theoretical approaches but also on the complex reality that often does not conform to predicated expectations. Only through careful, grounded case study research will researchers be able to most definitively contribute to the changes required in promoting the requisite change that provides most hope for the development of what Pieterse (2009, p.13) terms a "truly post-apartheid condition" in South Africa.

The main objective of the case study is to explain the complex causal links using this as an example of a "real-life" intervention and to describe not only the intervention itself but also to consider the specific context in which the intervention has occurred. The case study used provides the analytical base for the conclusions drawn from this research and the analysis and explanation of why and how the programme was implemented, focusing on the provision of insight into the research questions.

Evidence is presented in chronological order, highlighting the problem of violence pre-programme, how the issues were addressed during the programme and the evidence which leads us to believe that the programme is a relative success and why. Specific focus is then placed on the challenges being experienced and the institutionalisation of the identified "successful" methodologies employed as key programme implementation stakeholders are reporting them.

The singular case study approach was traditionally severely contested within the social sciences, centrally criticised by authors such as Campbell (1966; 1975) cited by Flyvbjerg (2006, p.220) on the basis that such analysis has an "absence of control" that renders them of no scientific value whatsoever. Flyvbjerg (2006) however presents a different perspective as he dispels what are referred to as *misunderstandings* of case study research, supporting the notion that if one is to adequately understand contemporary complex issues, detailed, in-depth cases are required as illustrations of reality. Furthermore, it is strongly detailed that the social sciences may best be strengthened through the undertaking of more high quality, focused case studies, based on the idea that "*a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one*" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.219). In addition to this, authors such as Thacher (2006) likewise support such case study approaches, particularly those focused on rendering scientifically-based, normative results.

The singular case study as a research methodology can arguably be implemented as a successful means through which the promise of practice-oriented research may be well serviced, as the conducting of focused, in-depth case studies may answer the appeals existent in sociology and other social sciences fields for more normative case study examples.

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### 3.6.2 Selecting the case

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The VPUU programme was selected as the case study focus of this research in that it is a prime example of an international cooperation programme, targeting integrated violence prevention. In being implemented with the input of international organisations and local government, the programme is one which employs innovatively adapted approaches tailored to the local context of the implementation sites in dealing with the complexities of violence and violent crime prevalent in the targeted neighbourhoods. Currently preparing for its fourth implementation phase, the programme has been mooted as an unrivalled success and at this stage, where the programme's shorter-term goals of environmental upgrades using situational prevention strategies and where political buy-in is seen to be strengthening the support for the extension of the programme, much can be learned from how the programme has managed to impact the quality of life and safety of the communities where implementations are occurring.

Based on the fact that increased political buy-in will enable more social and institutional developments that will work alongside the more tangible elements of situational interventions, the time is now right to investigate the challenges being experienced. In identifying the causes of such challenges, recommendations can be better informed as to how to ensure a) the longevity of the current programme implementation sites and b) adapt the model adequately to achieve positive impacts in other areas characterised by different underlying causes and where primary community needs may vary.

Additionally, the variation in the culture and societal norms present within communities varies greatly within the Cape Town context and it is assumed that these factors all need to be taken into consideration in transferring the VPUU methodologies to and from these areas. For example, Khayelitsha is a traditionally Xhosa-speaking<sup>17</sup> settlement whereas many other settlements within the geographic area of the cape flats are predominantly made up of "coloured"<sup>18</sup>, predominantly Afrikaans-speaking populations.

Finally, the way in which monitoring and evaluation processes are to be conducted within the programme may better be informed by such an in-depth case study and may also support the recommendation of policy directions that will balance the requirement for short term "wins" with the longer term dedication required in ensuring that the programme remains viable once donor funding ceases and the programme implementing agency withdraws.

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### 3.6.3 Case study methodologies

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The case study approach, as it has been undertaken here, called for the integration of several tools in order to gather and assess the detailed information required in drawing the conclusions

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<sup>17</sup> Afrikaans is the most dominantly spoken language in Cape Town, followed by English and isiXhosa (Smith 2005, p.12).

<sup>18</sup> The term coloured refers to the classification of mixed-raced people and is one of the four formally used population group classifications still in effect in South Africa: Black African, Coloured, White or Caucasian and Indian/Asian.

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presented in the final chapters of this thesis. The following methods were therefore drawn on in conducting the case study itself:

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### 3.6.3.1 Archival research and primary source analysis

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The case study undertaken in Khayelitsha employs the analysis of primary sources in the form of professionally conducted programme feasibility studies and interim reports based on the empirical evidence available through the implementation of the urban violence prevention programme, VPUU. Access to non-public contractual documentation, meeting protocols, terms of reference for each programme phase as well as both interim and completion reports was granted by the KfW German Development Bank with the restriction of use for academic purposes only. This archival research was undertaken on site at the KfW headquarters in Frankfurt in April/May 2012. Documentation was accessed both physically and/or electronically.

The ability to access such non-public documentation was a fundamental criterion determining the success of this research and the viability of the research outcomes. Such information acts not only in providing a more clear picture of the processes and agreements that support the funding and implementation of a programme of this magnitude but also, more importantly, provides an invaluable cross-reference for information gathered through other means, such as the expert interviews, on-site observations and other, publicly available, programme information.

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### 3.6.3.2 Expert interviews

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Expert interviews constituted another valuable element of the case study research. These expert interviews were developed based on the theoretical framework and the relevant research questions applicable to the respective expert's experience. Interviews were all however only semi-structured in nature so that despite the objective of addressing a clear set of issues, flexibility was allowed for in terms of the order and depth to which issues were discussed. This was done so as to allow experts the space to develop ideas and speak more freely about the topics being raised (Denscombe, 2010; Nohl, 2009). In considering which experts were to be interviewed the determined choice to approach experts with variable levels of direct interaction with the VPUU programme, from VPUU team leaders and staff to local academics and practitioners, meant that the process of sampling was non-random and employed the non-probability sampling techniques of purposive and availability sampling (Tansey, 2007). This approach was deemed best in that a) it was necessary to identify experts working within the thematic fields relevant to the research and b) the willingness of various experts to be interviewed for academic purposes varied greatly and therefore access to a number of interviewees relied heavily on participatory willingness. Furthermore, snowballing through referrals also formed an important part of accessing experts, as one successful interview often led to new contacts being established and additional formal and/or non-formal interviews.

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Generally, experts were selected and approached according to their ability to provide knowledge and personal insight into the subjects being explored, namely, i) post-apartheid violence and crime prevention policy, ii) experiences and implementation processes associated with the VPUU programme itself and iii) local government urban planning processes and policy development. Essentially, three key groups of experts were identified in order to explore the above-mentioned topics:

- VPUU programme leaders and staff,
- Academics, researchers and planning professionals working on community development, violence, crime prevention and related issues and
- Local government officials working in either planning or policing related departments.

In total, 18 interviews were undertaken of which 15 directly inform the research outcomes<sup>19</sup>. As far as possible interviews were conducted face-to-face while undertaking field research however due to limited time and the challenge of schedule alignment, 4 of the expert interviews were conducted post field research over Skype. The majority of the expert interviews used to formulate the research outcomes were voice recorded. In order to supplement the recorded material, personal notes were taken during the interview process. A number of experts interviewed requested to remain anonymous. For this purpose, direct quotes are kept anonymous throughout the presentation of this thesis. The requests for anonymity relate primarily to the fact that the issue of violence and crime as well as its prevention are highly politicised topics within the South African and Cape Town context. Furthermore, fragile relationships and partnerships have been painstakingly established over the life of the programme since the early 2000s and any errors in judgement, quoting or exposure may jeopardise these tenuous affiliations.

Essentially, the value of the expert interviews conducted for this research is three-fold:

1. Experts provided insight into personal experience, being able to explain certain programme outcomes, which are unable to be understood through the reading of even non-public documentation.
2. Experts were able to confirm or further elaborate on information gathered from other sources such as public and non-public documentation. This was important in checking information and facts based on the concept of triangulation.
3. The diversity of the various experts interviewed allowed for the development of a fuller picture constructed through inputs from academics and practitioners as well as government officials, as opposed to merely relying on experts directly affiliated with the VPUU programme.

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<sup>19</sup> 3 interviews were not used during the analysis and interpretation of data on the basis that the interviewee either a) changed their mind as to allowing their comments to be considered as part of this research or b) due to the fact that the interviewee did not yield any productive information and sought to push an alternate agenda against the interests of ethical research

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### 3.6.3.3 Informal, opportunistic interviews

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In addition to the planned expert interviews, opportunistic, informal interviews were also conducted, making use of the lucky occasions, which arose from site visits and participation in programme workshops and meetings during field research. These interviews were conducted with a variety of people, including community members, local officials and people working with VPUU and the City of Cape Town on the implementation of the VPUU programme. Additionally, some informal interviews addressed other researchers present at the workshops held.

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### 3.6.3.4 Participant observation

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As part of the field research, participant observation was allowed for through site visits. In particular, two workshops were held within the framework of transferring the VPUU programme<sup>20</sup>.

The first workshop constituted a preliminary meeting with community representatives from The Heights and Lavender Hill informal settlements. This workshop targeted the establishment and clarification of community expectations as well as the mandate provided by the City of Cape Town in terms of implementing the VPUU programme in these areas. Furthermore, the notions of violence and crime, its causes and effects were discussed and presented by members of each community. The use of large-scale aerial photographs of the settlement areas were used by the community to identify and explain the kinds of resources existent in the communities, such as voluntarily run early childhood development centres, soup kitchens, after-school supervision facilities and places of religious worship. Likewise, problematic issues such as areas perceived to be dangerous, for example the locations of drug houses and shebeens<sup>21</sup> were highlighted.

The second workshop was targeted towards the improvement of information dissemination and networks between local and provincial government as well as with the South African National Police Services (SAPS). This workshop was held at the community centre in Harare, Khayelitsha, and concerned the implementation of the VPUU programme in the townships of Nyanga and Gugulethu.

Both workshops provided an invaluable opportunity to witness first-hand the complex processes involved in gathering support, garnering trust and laying the foundations for participatory processes required prior to the commencement of any form of programme implementation. These workshops allowed for invaluable and otherwise unobtainable insight into the perspectives of community members as well as those of local and provincial government and police authorities.

Appendix B provides details and photos from both of the above-mentioned workshops.

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<sup>20</sup> These workshops took place in September/October 2012.

<sup>21</sup> A shebeen refers to locally run, usually illegal, taverns.

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### 3.6.3.5 Documentary

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Secondarily, systematic review of mainstream media, newspaper articles and online discussion platforms was also undertaken as a means of supporting the primary research methods used. This was deemed useful in terms of gaining additional insight into popular discourse on particular topics such as the way in which the VPUU programme is publicly represented, the prevalence of violence in Khayelitsha and surrounding areas during the period of research, perceptions of trust/mistrust of police and the more general approach to policing in South Africa.

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### 3.6.4 Analysis and interpretation of data

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Overall, the mass of qualitative information garnered during the research process was drawn from multiple sources including both public and non-public documentation, conversations and more formal interviews with various experts as well as through personal observation. The analysis and interpretation of the data, used in order to draw out the case study results and conclusions, was therefore well facilitated through the process of triangulation in terms of viewing particular issues from a range of different perspectives (Denscombe, 2010). This enabled the assessment of the validity of information and the conclusions being drawn in an iterative manner through the use of multiple sources. For example, the process of employing expert interviews as a research methodology was deemed necessary in being able to cross-reference information extracted from written programme documentation, media reports and personal observation.


Both the primary documentation and the interview contents were coded and thematically analysed so as to facilitate the process of cross-referencing and to develop a broader picture of the VPUU programme, its implementation and the contextual specificities of the institutional environment within which the programme interventions operate. This process of content analysis was modelled on the generic model offered by Creswell (2009) and involved an iterative process of raw data collection, the transcription of relevant recorded data, detailed reading and re-reading of both original texts and transcribed data and the allocation of codes and themes so as to facilitate cross-referencing across interview and documentation data (Figure 3.2).

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## 3.7 Positioning the Researcher

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All contributors to academic literature result from particular trajectories (Healey, 2007, p.ix). My own particular trajectory combines personal and professional characteristics that determine the way in which I, as a female, as a South African citizen and as a pragmatically minded, planning-oriented professional, place focus and importance on the way in which I approach the research topics and select the methods used in pursuing this thesis. Our upbringing, cultural background and education all shape not only what it is we as researchers focus on but also *how* it is that we focus on chosen subjects as well as the language and methods which we select in order to express ourselves.



**Figure 3.2.:** Analysis of qualitative data. Source: Adapted from Creswell (2009).

In adopting a stance that places myself as a researcher in opposition to a neutral approach to science, the positives and negatives of personal association, attachment even, in terms of how I am emotionally connected to the thematic field with which I have chosen to dedicate four years of my postgraduate career, is something which I have chosen not only to acknowledge but also to embrace. Social sciences by the mere fact that we deal with human systems inherently must consider the subjectivity of issues raised and solutions proposed, as these will undoubtedly be influenced by a diverse range of factors that may render such solutions to be deemed somewhat subjective. Unlike the “pure” sciences, social science laboratories do not produce black and white answers but rather a spectrum of grey, immune to full objectivity.

Whether or not full objectivity is or should be a goal towards which we strive is another discussion entirely. My personal answer would be no. We are not independent of the research we conduct and for this reason it is deemed important that researchers place themselves within the research process and consciously acknowledge any partiality (Mies 1993). The afflictions of contemporary society highlight the need to challenge social order and therefore the position that social science researchers hold should, as with any other element of the research process, be utilised to the best of its ability or else run the risk of never influencing the status quo.

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### 3.8 Methodological Limitations and Challenges

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In commencing research within a thematic field such as that of urban violence and crime, researchers must, from the start, acknowledge and accept the immediate limitations on the research, which are incurred. As an independent researcher one is reliant on the access to data

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provided by programme implementing organisations, local municipalities and regional government. This is a time-consuming process and researchers are often faced with an inability to adequately access sensitive data. Furthermore, and particular to this research, the recording and distribution of violent crime statistics is often unreliable, with the possible exception of murder. Rape and serious assault are very often underreported and case reporting processes have been found to be weak within understaffed local police stations, something confirmed by officials working in local safety and security during expert interviews (September 2012). Statistical data provided by local police departments is therefore somewhat only usable as a guideline in determining the extent of the prevalence of violent crimes occurring in certain areas until other mechanisms for data collection on crime related deaths and injuries are established.

Field research methods and possibilities are also distinctly limited when dealing with a topic such as violence. The ability of the researcher to access community members and conduct any form of interview processes without being directly involved in and/or related to the community is highly limited due to the sensitive nature of the topics being broached. Furthermore one must ensure that no damage is done inadvertently to the sensitive relationships that have been painstakingly built up over the course of the past years between programme implementers and local community members.

Additionally, a certain level of bias must be acknowledged in the fact that it is in the interest of programme leaders and experts involved in the implementation of interventions, such as the VPUU, that the programme's interventions be deemed successful and this needs to be considered when gauging and using information gained through the interview process. Likewise however, due to the politically charged nature of both the issue of violent crime and the perspectives given on the successes of the VPUU programme implementation thus far it must also be considered that some parties may wish to express politically driven points of view when expressing opinions on both the successes and lack of success of programme interventions as well.

In terms of the expert interview approach, the acquisition of a larger number of useful interviews was limited as saturation levels<sup>22</sup> were reached very quickly. This occurred mainly due to the fact that the VPUU programme is still relatively new and although political buy-in is present and growing, detailed information and therefore also opinions on the programme are limited outside the direct circle of experts actually involved in its implementation.

Many respondents within other government departments and at external research institutes acknowledged their awareness of the programme's existence however few interviewees beyond those directly involved were able to provide any additional insights. For this reason, the access to internal reports and meeting minutes was essential in gaining a deeper, more extensive insight into the functioning of the programme from the perspectives of the donor agency (KfW development bank), local government (City of Cape Town) and the programme implementers (SUN Consultants/VPUU).

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<sup>22</sup> Saturation refers here to the inability of a large range of experts to provide new information on the VPUU projects beyond those directly involved in implementation.

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The recognition of such limitations to the research approach and the specific methods employed is an essential part of likewise recognising the extent to which this research may be able to contribute on a practical level in progressing the ability of the VPUU programme to transfer prevention interventions to other areas, both within and outside the borders of the greater Cape Town metropolitan region.

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# 4 URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME PREVENTION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

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## 4.1 Introduction

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Post-apartheid urban geographies continue to pose a significant challenge for planners in the achievement of sustainable and safe urban neighbourhood development in South Africa. South Africa's now democratic urban centres continue to be faced with the challenge of addressing the most stringent forms of segregation and exclusion that characterised the control of planning and urban development, increasingly implemented and enforced under National Party (NP) rule since the late nineteen forties. The calculated and purposeful segregation plans of the NP regime continue to pervade the urban landscape of many of South Africa's most prominent cities and, as in many other instances, the influence of pre-democratic planning methods continues to bare stark relevance to the current situation within which the City of Cape Town (CoCT), as the focus of this research, finds itself.

The divisions of the past persist, running deep along clearly visible physical, social and economic lines. After almost two decades of democracy, rising inequality, inadequate infrastructure and service provision, alongside rampant violence and crime continue to characterise township and informal settlement areas, still very much marginalised at the peripheries of South Africa's largest cities, Cape Town presenting no exception.

The first chapter of this thesis introduced violence as a considerable barrier to development however what must likewise be considered is that, as Winton (2004, p.179) puts it, the relationship between violence and development is inherently contradictory in that "while violence is a considerable barrier to development, the development process itself has been instrumental in both producing and shaping new forms of violence in the South".

This chapter therefore engages with the relationship between development, policy agendas and the persistence of violence and crime, providing an overview of South Africa's post-1994 economic growth, social development and crime prevention objectives, as set out by national government. Focus is then placed specifically on local government mandates and the situation being experienced in Cape Town through the presentation of how national and local mandates have sought to address the issue of violence and crime since the inception of democracy.

Supported by a critical discussion on how these national and local governance forces have worked towards the creation of a persistent urban dichotomy in which economic growth and

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prosperity are a reality alongside vast income disparity, unemployment and violent crime, these weighty barriers to the future sustainable development and creation of an accessible, inclusive and safe city are drawn on in the following chapter and further explored in relation to the current implementation practices of the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme.

Fundamentally, this chapter provides a platform from which one can understand the governance and policy context within which a programme such as the VPUU is being implemented. An understanding of local governance structures and national urban renewal policies provides the basis for engagement with the challenges that are being experienced with regards to the ongoing implementation and transferability of the programme interventions and methodologies.

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## **4.2 Post-apartheid Urban Governance: social development and economic prosperity/austerity**

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Post-apartheid discourse on urban policy in South Africa has been a critically analysed topic addressed by many prominent academic authors. The impact of principal international planning concepts and their applicability to the case of the “South” (Parnell, 1997; Watson, 2009a,b, 2007) supported by insight into the transitional processes and democratic era challenges with which the country has been faced (Mabin, 1995; Watson, 1998; Pillay et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2008) as well as discussions on the role that national and local policy development and implementation play in working towards the use of urban development, as drivers for both economic and human development (Turok and Parnell, 2009), have peppered academic publications since the latter half of the nineties.

More recently however, urban policy and development practices are ostensibly being dealt with from a far more critical perspective. Such criticisms focus most centrally on the argument that non-integrative departmental structures alongside confusing and, in many instances, contradictory processes, have resulted not only in parallel policy implementation but that “unreconciled policy principles” (Atkinson and Marais, 2006, p.22) have given rise to a situation in which South Africa may be “buckling under the weight of policy overload” (Pieterse, 2009, p.11).

This section presents an overview of the key policies relating to social and economic development since the mid 1990s, highlighting national government’s central development objectives that have informed planning and development processes within South Africa since the inception of democracy. These overarching development policies and their central objectives are then linked explicitly to the way in which such policy has focused on the prevention of violence and crime.

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#### 4.2.1 Reconstructing development: the road towards growth, employment and redistribution

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Economic sanctions and international marginalisation in opposition to the ruling apartheid government ended with the dissolution of legitimised repression policies, as the move into democracy brought with it an unprecedented opportunity for South Africa to showcase itself to the world as the rainbow nation. A united country that had overcome the odds in avoiding an all-out civil war worse than that of the 1980s suddenly presented itself to the global community, opening up its borders to trade, foreign investment and tourism, all with the aim of fuelling growth and prosperity to which all citizens would have access. The promise of the new democracy is well encapsulated in South Africa's Constitution, the primary source of optimism, laying out the original foundations on which a re-imagined, equally inclusive and progressive country was to be built.

South Africa's newly elected National Government released policy documents after the 1994 elections, citing growth, wealth and redistribution to address the inequalities and repressions of the former State. The first embodiment of an "all-round policy of social and economic transformation" (Turok and Parnell, 2009, p.164) sought to confront the overarching issues of poverty and exclusion across South Africa and was presented in the form of the African National Congress's (ANC's) Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

For a brief period in 1996, the newly elected government presented the National Growth and Development Strategy (NGDS) as its primary vision for the significant undertaking of creating and implementing development objectives throughout South Africa in order to ensure "accelerated growth and development...(to) attain a better life for all" (African National Congress 1996). The NGDS focused on 6 central pillars for development, encompassing the ideals as set out by the RDP:

- i. job creation
- ii. human resource development
- iii. infrastructure and service delivery
- iv. combatting crime and the creation of a safe environment for all
- v. transformation of the state machinery and the civil service
- vi. building social security for all

(African National Congress, 1996)

Overall, the NGDS was the strategic realisation of the RDP, which maintained that the development of more compact, higher density, mixed-use areas, both urban and rural, would benefit from transportation connectivity and more integrated spatial planning decisions, meeting the basic needs of all South Africans. As Atkinson and Marais (2006) point out, the RDP failed however, to provide clarity on the particular issues facing urban development throughout the

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country. More specifically, it failed to focus on any issues related to urbanisation processes and increasing urbanisation pressures entirely. In effect, the RDP was mainly concerned with the provision of housing and services, locating these elements as equally important in both urban and rural settings.

During the course of 1995 and 1996 the government's RDP office simultaneously developed two independent strategies; the Urban Development Strategy (UDS), subsequently to be known as the Urban Development Framework (UDF) from 1997 onwards, and its rural equivalent, the Rural Development Framework (RDF). In a mere matter of months, however, the RDP offices were closed and the social development strategies on which they had so diligently worked, were all but rendered incongruous. Arguably, this was not without merit, as both the UDS and the "softened" latter version in the form of the UDF were heavily criticised in their inability to guide the, views, policy developments and implementation processes of development projects within the government's various departments. The lack of guidance simply resulted in different government departments continuing to introduce and implement a plethora of alternate strategies based on differing views concerning the challenges of urbanisation and migration (Atkinson and Marais, 2006).

The short-lived welfare-state-oriented economic governance policy that was the RDP was thus set aside by the introduction and implementation of GEAR – the Growth Employment and Redistribution – Strategy, which was launched in late 1996. The austerity policies that formed the key components of GEAR directly contrasted earlier development discourse encapsulated in the objectives of the RDP. The vision of South African development as centred on ideologies of integrated programmes, based on the needs of the majority of the population and which would aim to provide peace and stability, as well as security for all citizens through the promotion of a society in which equality would be the norm, was not to be (Maharaj, 2002).

The fiscal stringency of GEAR as an austerity strategy that would associate public expenditure with cost-recovery strategies and private sector expansion as well as trade liberalisation and the attraction of foreign direct investment clearly depicts the national government's shift towards the implementation of neoliberal policy structures that continue to have profound effects on governance at all levels throughout the country. International economic discourses on development heavily touted by the World Bank's definition of cities as the vehicles of modern growth, global recognition and economic prosperity (World Bank, 2000) underpinned this new paradigm in national government strategy.

At the expense of the majority of the country's population, which required focused development to address the prevalence of unemployment, inadequate human settlements and inequality, GEAR's principle aim to establish a market-oriented economy that encouraged privatisation and lowered public spending resulted in a failure to promote domestic demand and job creation and worked against any previously considered "equitable forms of development" (Turok and Parnell, 2009, p.164). The shift towards neo-liberal policy ideologies that places emphasis on urban competitiveness and that reinforces free trade, "laissez faire", market-led urban devel-

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opments has meant that developmental emphasis in recent years has been placed primarily on developing cities that are “safe for capital” (Mabin, 1998, p.13)(Todes, 2006).

In assessing GEAR as a strategy meant to support social development practices, one can see the ideology in attempting to work towards poverty eradication using the neo-liberal economic practices of deficit reduction through austerity. Despite the fact that these neo-liberal economic approaches have not adequately addressed enduring poverty and unemployment issues, one could however argue that GEAR has achieved some of its primary goals in the reduction of previously high government debt, the stabilisation of inflation rates and overall increases in economic growth from 3% to 5% between 2003 and 2005 (Chagunda, 2006). The central problem here however, is that despite initially rendering positive growth percentages, this growth has been what one may refer to as “jobless growth”. In order to rapidly enter the global market, and in doing so develop adequate competitiveness, many South African organisations and businesses developed towards highly capital intensive production methods that have resulted in widened skills gaps (Pieterse, 2007b). The needs of South Africa’s poor majority have thus not been met, as they remain poor and unemployed, leaving the problems of poverty and unemployment largely unresolved (Chagunda, 2006). Essentially, urbanisation processes have occurred in the absence of industrialisation, thus essentially decoupling it from economic development (Watson, 2007).

Poverty eradication thus remains somewhat of a pipe dream and levels of unemployment estimated to be as high as 40%<sup>23</sup> remains one of the priority concerns of policy-makers for whom enduring squalid living conditions for many of South Africa’s urban residents and survivalist, as opposed to entrepreneurial, informal economic activities remain to be adequately addressed. The following section addresses the objective of poverty reduction through development processes and urban renewal, the most recent trends in policy direction within South Africa.

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
#### 4.2.2 Poverty reduction through economic development and urban renewal

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Criticism levelled towards national government’s failure to adequately introduce complementary social and economic development policy did not go unheard and in 2005 the State released its subsequent economic policy document, promising rapid poverty reduction in the form of ASGISA, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa. Despite its status as a less than fully developed macroeconomic policy, ASGISA, as more of a statement of policy intent, represented, at the very least, a conscious shift from GEAR’s market-led economic development approach and was delivered on the premise that public-sector infrastructure investments will better work towards the stimulation of both foreign and local private investments in fixed assets, regarded as a key promoter of growth.

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<sup>23</sup> Official unemployment estimates stand at around 25, however this rises to between 35 and 40% when one considers the expanded definition of unemployment, which includes those frustrated job seekers who have given up looking for employment (Pieterse, 2007a; Bond, 2000).



**Figure 4.1.:** South Africa’s Annual GDP Growth Rate between 2005 and 2012. Source: Statistics South Africa, <http://www.statssa.gov.za..>


Underpinned by the ANC’s election manifesto in 2004, ASGISA, along with its sub-component - the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) - committed government to employ development policy, which would halve both unemployment (from 28% to 14%) and the poverty rate by 2014. Achieving this required average economic growth rates of between 4.5% from 2005 to 2009 and at least 6% from 2010 onwards (RSA, 2006). Despite its best intentions, ASGISA continues to fail in meeting these targets as the country has experienced annual growth of only around 3% since 2008<sup>24</sup> (Figure 4.1) alongside unemployment rates that remain, on average, around 25% (Lunsche, 2010).

In parallel to government’s economic policy implementation in the form of GEAR and ASGISA, and based on the experiences of past development initiatives in the form of the RDP and its NGDS strategy, the UDS and the UDF, government launched the Urban Renewal Programme (URP) alongside its rural development counterpart, the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP)<sup>25</sup> in 2001. President Mbeki’s announcement of the URP occurred almost momentarily after the completion of the democratic government’s structural reform process, which resulted in the creation of South Africa’s nine provinces, supported by the establishment of 284 local government offices (Donaldson and du Plessis, 2011).

For cities across South Africa, the URP was to provide a platform from which resources from all spheres of government – national, provincial and local – would work in a coordinated manner towards conducting a sustained campaign against urban poverty and underdevelopment. The national vision of the URP is to “attain socially cohesive and stable communities with vi-

<sup>24</sup> South Africa’s Annual GDP Growth Rate averaged 3.22 Percent from 1994 until 2013, reaching an all-time high of 7.10 Percent in December of 2006 and a record low of -2.70 Percent in June of 2009 (Statistics South Africa – <http://www.statssa.gov.za>).

<sup>25</sup> Further focus is not given to the extrapolation and discussion of the ISRDP as this thesis focuses specifically on urban development challenges.



**Figure 4.2.:** South Africa’s pre-democratic provincial structure.

able institutions, sustainable economies and universal access to social amenities, able to attract skilled and knowledgeable people, equipped to contribute to their own and nation’s growth and development” (CoCT, 2011c, p.14).


The URP places emphasis on three key principles:

- i. the mobilisation of people so that they can take up roles of active citizenship and thus contribute to their own development
- ii. the coordination of activities, initiatives and budgetary resources across all three governmental spheres and,
- iii. the leveraging of private-sector investment through initial public-sector investments as stimuli

(Rauch, 2002b)

The initial implementation phase of the URP strategy involved the identification of nodes within South Africa’s poorest and most underdeveloped urban areas that were to receive immediate attention. Eight nodes were identified and are situated in six cities across South Africa:

- Alexandra township – Johannesburg
- Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha – Cape Town
- Inanda and KwaMashu – eThekweni Municipality (formerly Durban)
- Mdantsane – Buffalo City Municipality (formerly East London)
- Motherwell – Nelson Mandela Bay (formerly Port Elizabeth)
- Galeshewe – Sol Plaatje Municipality (formerly Kimberley)




**Figure 4.3.:** South Africa's current provincial structure. Source: Statistics South Africa, <http://www.statssa.gov.za>.

These urban development nodes were specifically selected as areas of URP intervention based on a set of common features that established a basis for the development agenda to be implemented within these areas. In addition to all areas having being established as former apartheid Townships, these features included significantly high levels of poverty and crime, low levels of resident education and skill levels, dilapidated formal infrastructures, housing shortages, insufficient operations and maintenance budgets, low internal economic opportunities, and poor connections to surrounding areas, particularly economic centres (DPLG, 2006b).

The eight URP nodes and the urban renewal projects associated with these areas serve as implementation points for strategic “pilot” interventions aimed at gathering local experiences within severely deprived and underdeveloped urban communities and are destined to serve as support mechanisms for the development of a national urban renewal strategy that can be transferred and applied across all of South Africa's urban areas (Rauch, 2002b). This area based approach was essentially to be used to create laboratories for the testing of innovative ideas (Donaldson and du Plessis, 2011).

Touted as both a social development and crime prevention policy, the URP is strongly correlated with the issue of crime prevention and, as discussed in the following section, is placed at the centre of local and national government's attempts to address the mix of social and economic factors that are recognised as precursory risk factors that underpin the continued high rates of violence and crime within URP nodes, as well as throughout the rest of the country.



**Figure 4.4.:** Urban renewal nodes (Donaldson and du Plessis, 2011, p.2).

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#### 4.2.3 Resistant to change: Crime prevention as part of the South African development agenda

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It is important for the purposes of this research and the case study to follow not simply to provide an overview on the ways in which social and economic development policy have seemingly worked in opposition to one another in national government's attempt to address the inequality issues of historic policy implementation, while simultaneously achieving global competitive economic status, but also to relate this to the ways in which these policies have attempted to address the challenge of the country's high levels of violence and crime. The endurance of unacceptably high levels of serious crime, and more importantly the violent nature of crime in South Africa, is not only recognised as one of the central limiters to successful development but also that the root causes of violent crime extend from the convergence of risk factors that occur in the inadequate and fragile social contexts within which many urban citizens are forced to live, as highlighted in the first chapter.

Despite post-apartheid urban development policy in South Africa having significantly engaged with international development policy (Boraine et al., 2006) in placing emphasis on social development and prevention approaches in responding to violence and crime, a misalignment persists between the acknowledgement of the causes of violence and crime as being inherently social in nature and the actual approaches that have been taken in addressing the problem of

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crime, particularly with reference to traditional policing modalities. This challenge is explored here in more detail.

*“In addition to successes, there were opportunities missed which may be of use when other countries consider South Africa’s experiences. This included too little attention to job creation for youth and risks of criminal violence. It meant that we did not fully address the critical need to ensure that the new generation who had not lived through the apartheid struggle as adults were provided with a strong stake – and economic opportunities – in the new democratic state. There was also too much of an assumption that 1994 marked the culmination of a process of democratization and reconciliation. Relatively little attention was given to what was meant by the transformation to a constitutional state; the continued role of civil society in deepening not just democratization and accountability but also delivery. And there was a need for a deeper and more thorough on-going debate on racism, inequality, and social exclusion.”*

Jay Naidoo former South African Minister for Reconstruction and Development and Chairperson of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (The World Bank, 2011, p.14).

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#### 4.2.3.1 National Crime Prevention, Safety and Security

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Two major policy documents have underpinned the recognition of crime as a major hindrance to development and thus outline national government’s approach to addressing issues of violence and crime: The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) and the 1998 White paper on Safety and Security.

With the introduction of the NCPS, government displayed its intention to address crime as a focused development priority and firmly placed the NCPS within the framework of the RDP’s implementing strategy, as one of the “pillars” of the NGDS. This linkage of crime prevention and government’s economic development ideology was something previously unseen in South African governance.

The NCPS proposed to address crime and implement innovative prevention strategies based on four main categories of intervention:

- i. The re-engineering and development of an efficient and legitimate criminal justice system as the foundation for all crime prevention.
- ii. Situational crime prevention interventions that would address the physical elements associated with the creation of opportunities for crime. This to be undertaken through environmental design principles to be applied to new developments as well as to the upgrading of existing infrastructure.

- 
- iii. The promotion of community participation and value structures so as to promote community involvement in crime prevention and
- iv. Addressing the influence of “transnational crime” – well-organised international and regional criminal syndicates – through improved border controls and regional cooperation.  
(NCPS, 1996, section 6)

These four categories were supported through the identification of seven forms of crime that were to be specifically targeted:

- Crimes involving firearms
- Organised crime
- White-collar crime
- Violence against women and children
- Violence associated with inter-group conflict
- Vehicle theft and hijacking
- Corruption in the criminal justice system

(NCPS, 1996, section 4)

Fundamentally, the NCPS provided an innovative approach in South Africa in responding to crime, as it provided a problem-solving framework to promote multi-agency solutions, linking crime prevention activities across governmental spheres and civil society organisations (Rauch, 2002a; Pillay, 2008). A number of authors have produced reviews on the development and implementation of crime prevention policy in democratic South Africa, all of whom display negativity in being able to conclude that crime prevention policy implementation and political discourse on the issues of crime have been adequately effective (Frank, 2003; Rauch, 2002a; Pelsler, 2002; Holtmann, 2011), particularly when it comes to “on-the-ground” implementation (Dixon, 2006) and community governance (Pillay, 2008). Perhaps the most thorough of policy reviews is contributed by (Rauch, 2002b), who outlines the disappointments of the NCPS implementation as being based on three primary failures:

Firstly, Rauch notes that the NCPS’s fundamental failure lies in the assumption that was made that spontaneous cooperation would arise between departments and organisations through the implementation of national crime prevention programmes, linked to governmental development policies such as the NGDS and later the URP. In addition to this assumption, the policy documents distributed provided almost no detail as to how such programmes should actually be implemented. Additionally, the assumption of spontaneous cooperation extended also to assuming the ability (and willingness) of government departments and other stakeholders to reach consensus on intervention priorities as well as the sharing of key information. This, unsurprisingly, did not occur.

Secondly, despite the progress and innovation in the discourse relating crime prevention to socio-economic development, the targeted categories of the NCPS were not explicitly related to

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the seven forms of identified priority crimes that were set out in the strategy. The failure to link the categorical, strategic pillars of the strategy with the forms of crime being addressed resulted in the creation of processes for crime prevention that were disconnected from the specific kinds of crime they were (or should have been) designed to address.

Finally, in addition to assuming spontaneous cooperation and creating missed connections in NCPS programme development and specific crime targeting, national government also failed to provide dedicated financial support for the implementation of NCPS projects. The expectation was for government line departments to re-allocate already strapped budgets to NCPS programmes as a priority<sup>26</sup>.

By 1997, the NCPS was under review. The result of this review would underpin the provisions made towards crime prevention in the 1998 White paper on Safety and Security. The '97 NCPS review and implementation experience resulted in the recognition that not only would law-enforcement and other (social) forms of crime prevention have to work in congruence with one another but so too would more broad-based institutional reform be required in meeting crime prevention objectives. The 1998 White Paper therefore focused on these three fundamental themes: law-enforcement, crime prevention and institutional reform and sought to bridge the gap between crime prevention and policing existent in the NCPS and its (lack of) interaction with the South African National Police Services (SAPS).

Additionally, the White Paper created a far greater role for both local and provincial government involvement in the prevention of crime and made provision for the creation of local policing services and community policing forums (CPFs), providing several possibilities for the ways in which local governments could implement social crime prevention. These included:

- designing out crime (CPTED)
- education
- promoting social cohesion
- supporting youth, families and groups at risk
- breaking cycles of violence
- promoting individual responsibility and
- socio-economic interventions to undercut the main causes of crime.

(Palmary, 2002, p.33)

On paper, progress was evidently made in relating the complex issues and challenges to development posed by stubbornly high levels of violent crime in the country. Social and situational intervention strategies, alongside the recognition of the need for institutional cooperation between government departments at all levels, was made clear. At the same time, recognition and

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<sup>26</sup> The expectation of local spheres of government to allocated existent budgets to new mandates still largely persists and will be explored further in the VPUU case study. Such mandates are commonly referred to as “unfunded mandates”.

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importance was also placed on the support of civil society and government organisations being able to rely on working in conjunction with a functional law enforcement and criminal justice system. Such cooperation would enable the tackling of the roots causes of violence and crime while simultaneously address criminal activities as they occur, thus balancing preventative and reactionary responses.

These approaches can certainly be seen as reminiscent of the international shifts in thinking towards the notion of safety as a public good, to which all members and levels of society and government should contribute. When one investigates the actual implementation of these highly progressive policy objectives more closely, however, another picture emerges entirely.

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#### 4.2.3.2 Post-Apartheid policing: Safety and the “war on crime”

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The advent of South Africa’s second democratic election in 1999 saw a rather ill-fated return to contradictory discourses from socially-oriented crime prevention to old-school tactics of crime fighting, as the impetus for crime prevention was all but lost due to a renewed emphasis on policing strategies that would aggressively enable the “war on crime” (Frank, 2003). An era of law enforcement emphasis thus began with the implementation of a new National Crime Combatting Strategy (NCCS), launched by the South African Police Services (SAPS) in April 2000.

The NCCS comprised an initial police “crackdown”, targeting all police station areas that were responsible for the reporting of more than half of all the country’s reported serious and violent crimes, including organised crime activity. Unsurprisingly, all nodes identified as intervention sites for the URP were within the bounds of the targeted areas. The policing crackdown sought to stabilise local crime rates which was to be supported by on-going law enforcement actions within these areas (Dixon, 2006). The NCCS and the political declarations of the war on crime ushered in a new era of paramilitary policing structures and ranks within the national policing forces that could once again only be regarded as a *force* (Holtmann, 2011, p.12).

These zero tolerance policing tactics are based on the “tough on crime” policing methods introduced by New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani and NY Police Commissioner William Bratton in the United States, where policing emphasis is placed primarily on the maintenance of “order” (Newburn, 2010). This approach is based on the hypothesis that active targeting of misdemeanours by police will prevent violence and crime from rising further (Buur, 2007). This kind of zero tolerance policing in South Africa was epitomised in 2008 as a justified means through which to address violence and crime as the country’s Security Minister and National Police Commissioner at the time publicly expressed support for a “shoot-to-kill” law enforcement policy. Support for such policy directly contrasts the United Nation’s Basic Principle on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Abrahams, 2010).

Within the South African context, it is most often mooted that this return to zero tolerance policing and the waging of the war on crime is backed by national government as a means of reducing crime statistics, even if temporarily, in order to ensure that tourists feel safe and foreign




**Figure 4.5.:** Social media call for death penalty referendum. Source: facebook, 2012.

investment funds continue to flow into the economic market, a trend based on an embedded neoliberal development ideology (Newburn, 2010).

On the other hand however, the call for harsher punishments resounds regularly from the public, something, which is supported by the violent retaliations against criminals throughout the country as vigilante violence in the form of mob justice continues to be metered out. The frustration felt by the average citizen concerning the unacceptably high levels of violence and crime and the daily fear with which they live is obvious through media reports<sup>27</sup> and calls issued through social media platforms (Figure 4.5). Researchers at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) confirm this trend in reiterating the pressure being felt by politicians and police to “react decisively”, something that often also results in severe police brutality and torture (Interview, February 2013).

The return to crackdown policing and the on-going prevalence of violent crime throughout the country’s cities is exemplary of what some refer to as a crisis of governance where urban governance is synonymous with the establishment of urban social order based upon systems of punishment, discipline and security (Robins, 2002). Within this context, spatial segregation continues to be supported through the micro-management of certain urban areas, which most often involves the implementation of exclusionary approaches where the poor, and most

<sup>27</sup> Recent surveying established that “more than three in four young South Africans think the death penalty should be reinstated as the highest form of punishment for criminals” News24 online article “Youth want death penalty reinstated”, published 22nd February 2013.



**Figure 4.6.:** South African post-apartheid development and crime prevention policy. Source: author's own.

often homeless, are forced out of middle-class areas and are pushed back into the peripheral townships.

Here, the state continues to struggle to establish any form of governance, leaving these areas to be dubbed unruly, dangerous, no-go zones. The problem is that these so called no go zones are home to millions of the population. As authors such as Robins (2002) make their point, governance problems in South Africa's cities as well as within specific areas within cities are exacerbated by macro policy shifts, such as those related to the move towards creating a liberal, globally competitive, service economy.

Although this dissertation does not aim to present a fully extensive analysis of the social and economic development policies and their relation to crime prevention since the end of apartheid, what it does do is confirm the chaotic situation of policy change and shifts in approaches that have occurred. Despite recognition that, in order to prevent crime, social development must play a central role, reoccurring shifts (back)towards tough on crime policing approaches means that despite the existence of progressive policy, implementation on a broad scale has been arguably limited over the past two decades. Others argue this point more forcefully in simply stating that the essential point surrounding South African crime prevention policy is that "it has never been implemented" (Pelser, 2007, p.2).

Post-apartheid development cannot be understood without a focused understanding of broader national development processes that have been set in motion by the emergence of South Africa as a neoliberal contract state, characterised by privatisation, out-sourcing and cost-recovery service provision strategies, all of which contradict the aims of the welfare state's

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equal opportunities through social development approaches. Turok and Parnell (2009, p.167) summarise the situation perfectly in illustrating the political and economic debates central to the issue of government strategies in South Africa: “*Unresolved tensions between the objectives of accelerated growth and broader transformation, economic efficiency and social equality, productive potential and social need and market forces and long-term planning have often resulted in policy diversity and inconsistency*”. These authors highlight that the South African case is a particularly interesting one in that local government systems as well as inter-governmental cooperation are relatively well developed.

Perhaps therefore this is wherein most hope may lie in that, should the implementation of innovative crime prevention methodologies draw success in pilot cases, the potential to expand and institutionalise such practices may be less challenging than if local governance and inter-governmental cooperation mechanisms were less well developed.

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### **4.3 South Africa’s Turn to Developmental Local Government**

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Within the context of national policy presented in the previous sections, this chapter now turns to taking a closer look at the local government level and community policing, drawing specifically on the case of Cape Town as the primary site of the research undertaken.

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#### **4.3.1 Local government mandates, social development and crime prevention**


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South Africa’s governance structure incorporates three interrelated yet interdependent spheres of government: National Government, Provincial Government and Local/Municipal Government. Each sphere of government adheres to principles of co-operative government and inter-governmental relations, which determine that the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of the other spheres are respected. Furthermore, each sphere is to exercise their powers and perform functions within their bounds so as to avoid encroachment on the geographical, functional and/or institutional integrity of government in another sphere and in doing so, co-operate with one another with mutual trust and good faith through assisting and supporting one another, consulting on matters of common interest and co-ordinating legislation and actions according to agreed procedures (DPLG, 2006a).

The post-apartheid decentralised system of government was established within the constitutional framework of South Africa. Within the scope of governmental autonomy, as laid out in section 154(1) of the Constitution, a key responsibility of national and provincial government is to “support the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs” (DPLG, 2006a, p.6).

Under the auspices of National and Provincial Government, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) mandates local government to:

- Provide democratic and accountable government for local communities.
- Ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner.



**Figure 4.7.:** South Africa’s three spheres of government. Source: Authors own.

- Promote social and economic development.
- Promote a safe and healthy environment.
- Encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.

(RSA, 1998)

The democratic-phase restructuring of government in South Africa was advanced as an opportunity to transform local government through decentralisation processes in order to meet the perceived “challenges of the next century”. This restructuring sought to provide autonomous local government structures with a distinctive role in building democracy and promoting socio-economic development as the sphere of government closest to communities, thus being positioned to best to identify and address the specific needs of communities in realising targeted service and infrastructure delivery (RSA, 1998).

The development of the White Paper on Local Government (RSA, 1998) introduced the concept of Developmental Local Government (DLG). The DLG approach put forward a vision of developmental local governments, which would focus around working closely with local communities in finding sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve overall quality of life.

DLG approaches are characterised through the exercising of municipal powers and functions in a way that maximises impact on social development and economic growth. This is achieved through fulfilling an integrating and coordinating role to ensure the alignment of public and private investment objectives within the municipal boundaries, by democratising development, building social capital through developing community vision and leadership capabilities and

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through empowering marginalised and excluded groups within communities. DLG urges local government to focus on realising development outcomes such as the provision of housing, infrastructure and services and on creating liveable, integrated cities, towns and rural areas as well as promoting local economic development, community empowerment and redistribution (CoCT, 2006; RSA, 1998; Maharaj, 2002).

*“Developmental Local Government, puts forward a vision of a developmental local government, which centres on working with local communities to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives. It discusses four characteristics of developmental local government, namely exercising municipal powers and functions in a manner which maximises their impact on social development and economic growth; playing an integrating and coordinating role to ensure alignment between public (including all spheres of government) and private investment within the municipal area; democratising development; and building social capital through providing community leadership and vision, and seeking to empower marginalised and excluded groups within the community. It urges local government to focus on realising developmental outcomes, such as the provision of household infrastructure and services; the creation of liveable, integrated cities, towns and rural areas; and the promotion of local economic development and community empowerment and redistribution.” (RSA, 1998, p.8)*

Since its inception, DLG has been credited with significant poverty reduction through the provision of basic services to under-serviced communities. However, the primary focus of basic service delivery to the poor is criticised in its insufficiency in being able to adequately address the fundamental development crisis of systemic uneven development (Pieterse, 2007a). Furthermore, the restructuring of local government into unified municipalities, which resulted in the promotion of DLG objectives also pushed forward a contradictory set-up of neoliberal governance structures where, despite unifying the city’s tax base, municipal operations were implemented using private business principles. A lack of funds to support the expanded responsibilities of local governments (so-called unfunded mandates) required entrepreneurial thinking in order to improve local revenues through market-based strategies, heavily involving the private sector, shedding more and more responsibility and also costs through privatisation. This situation resulted in cash strapped cities thinking and acting like private sector entities, cutting costs and recouping investments, essentially “dissolving the public realm” (Miraftab, 2007, p.604).

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#### 4.3.2 Integrated Development Planning

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The movement towards developmental local governance strategies in South Africa once again mirrors international trends in moving away from the master plan towards institutionalising

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planning through the creation of linkages between sector line departments, aimed towards integrating local line department mandates and the actions/objectives of all spheres of government. A process referred to as Integrated Development Planning (IDP). Cities across South Africa have therefore developed 5-year integrated development plans in order to set out the central development priorities and focus, using budgeting as the central integrating mechanism (Watson, 2009b). IDPs are supported through the development of locally targeted Spatial Development Frameworks (SDF), which essentially act to spatially coordinate the IDP sectoral plans, promoting new urban forms. However, this is not without persistent difficulties in aligning the land use management system with the realisation of the “new”, more inclusive urban forms embodied in the SDF ideology,

*“There are very few linkages between the SDFs and the land use management system- in many places the latter dates from apartheid days, while the SDFs are new. There is therefore a disjuncture between the zoning ordinances, many of which promote urban modernism and social exclusion, and the SDFs, which try and promote a different urban form, but lack the tools to do so.”* (Watson, 2009b, p.180)

At local level in Cape Town, Donaldson et al. (2011) similarly highlight points of misalignment between the metropolitan SDF and the nodal governance approaches fostered under the URP. Cape Town’s metropolitan SDF speaks to inner city densification and corridor development and although this could potentially link well to the area-based approaches advocated for the development of peripheral township areas, these linkages have yet to be made clear.

Despite these contradictory elements, city-based IDPs and SDFs do play a key role in fostering urban development that promotes urban safety and since the latter half of the 1990s, local government’s role in crime prevention has also been more duly recognised. Despite the fact that the involvement of local government in violence and crime prevention is something relatively new in South Africa, as policy development for crime prevention has progressed so too has the realisation that local government has a key role to play in effectively targeting these issues. This is primarily based on the acknowledgement that prevention programmes are most likely to be effective if strategies and interventions are developed in the locations where the problems actually occur (Shaw, 1998), meaning at local level as opposed to nationally.

In line with this, the White Paper on Local Government (1998) specifies social crime prevention as a local government mandate based on the fact that it is the local sphere of government that is privy to local dynamics and thus better placed to approach these challenges (Holtmann, 2011).

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#### 4.3.3 Violence and Crime Prevention: A local government mandate

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*“If local government fails, South Africa fails.”*

*– Deloitte (2012, p.1)*

With the inception of the NCPS and the realisation of the requirement for preventative as opposed to simply reactive responses to the problem of crime in the country, a specific role was

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outlined for local government in that this sphere of government would be responsible for the coordination and promotion of inter-agency crime prevention methods within local boundaries. The NCPS recognised local government as a key player in addressing crime through the implementation of social development and situational measures. However, once again, little was elaborated on as to the detail of how this involvement was best to be achieved (Shaw, 1998).

The 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security went further in detailing the specifics of local government expectations in terms of crime prevention and outlines that, as the level of government closest to the people it serves, local government is uniquely placed to actively participate and coordinate social crime prevention initiatives, particularly through the provision of services that facilitate crime prevention. Additionally, the White Paper on Safety and Security also states that local government should pay particular attention to working with community policing forums in ensuring that development projects and service provision take serious account of crime prevention principles. All prevention initiatives would be implemented in line with the broad guidelines set out by national and provincial government.

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#### 4.3.3.1 Integrated Social Crime Prevention

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
In facilitating this mandate, an integrated social crime prevention strategy (2011) was developed based on the Constitution, White Paper on Safety and Security, the White Paper on Local Government and the National Crime Prevention Strategy. This integrated strategy sought to solidify social crime prevention as a means of contributing to National Government's strategic outcome that "all people are and feel safe" and details local government's specific role according to six strategic social crime prevention objectives:

- i. The strengthening of internal and external capacity to sustain better service delivery.
- ii. Facilitating targeted partnerships with other government departments and civil society organisations.
- iii. Ensuring equitable and integrated site-based service delivery for local service providers.
- iv. Promoting sustained institutional mechanisms in communities
- v. Improving social fabric and cohesion within families.
- vi. Ensuring investment in prevention and early intervention services with long-term benefits.

(RSA, 2011, pp.41– 42)

Fundamentally, this integrated social crime prevention approach supports an inversion of the typical hierarchical pyramid with national government at the pinnacle, as the strategy "emphasises a more community-focused representation of government" (RSA, 2011, p.48) (Figure 4.8).

Here, the role of National Government is determined to be the provision of political leadership and guidance, enacted through the development of policy and a legislative framework and enabled through treasury functions (RSA, 2011, p.49). Provincial Government acts as a "virtual"



**Figure 4.8.:** Community focused local governance for crime prevention (RSA, 2011, p.48).

environment that can only achieve its objectives, which are laid out in national policy and legislative frameworks, at local level. Local Government is thus directly responsible for the delivery of goods and services to local communities and is tasked with engaging in partnerships with civil organisations to “uplift and sustain communities and local environments” (ibid.). The mechanism for achieving this is through the locally developed IDPs, which set out the specific objectives of local government across South Africa.

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#### 4.3.3.2 Local learning for national solutions

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As presented above, local government level is where national policy is implemented and the theoretical argument of complexity that supports this research (See chapter 2) provides credence to the necessity to investigate development and crime prevention within a localised context. Local experiences provide a significant learning opportunity in that they are key sources of knowledge about the systemic drivers, dimensions and dysfunctions that promote increasing levels of criminality and violence. As the Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy (2011, p.41) states, local solutions should be explored and used as the basis for provincial and national strategy.

The focus of this chapter therefore now turns along this vein to the province of the Western Cape and the experience of Cape Town as the province’s largest metropolitan region. The intention being to shed light on how it is that national development policies have impacted on local urban development and the ways in which crime and violence are thus addressed at local government level.

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## 4.4 Post-Apartheid Governance and Crime Prevention in Cape Town

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This section usurps a local governance perspective with a view on the City of Cape Town (CoCT) and the formative qualities of the national level economic and social development policies outlined in the previous sections of this chapter on local urban development. Furthermore, this understanding of local-national governance provides the basis from which the main policy mechanisms used in promoting urban safety in the city are discussed.

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### 4.4.1 Neoliberalism and post-apartheid urban development in Cape Town

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Best known for its natural wonders and almost unrivalled beauty, Cape Town tops the list of the world's most popular travel destinations (CoCT, 2011a), providing visitors and those locals who can afford it with seemingly endless entertainment and leisure opportunities. An archetype of opulence on one hand, Cape Town offers a pronounced opposing and more sinister reality for the vast majority of its citizens who carve out an existence, tormented by an enduring history of abuse and segregation.

This reality lurks in the shadow of the city's other face, where the "successes" of neoliberal development policy and policing reflect clearly within the city bowl through mounting economic prowess, global recognition, diverse business developments as well as booming property and tourism industries. The critique of this developmental trajectory however lies in the fact that international competition, driving market-led policy, has created "a growing marginal unrepresented working class (reliant on unskilled, outsourced jobs, part-time work etc.) as well as an entrenched population of long-term unemployed with no skills and very poor prospects of rising out of poverty" (Standing, 2006, p.22). South Africa, and Cape Town, therefore fulfil what critics refer to as the "Brazilianisation of advanced capitalism", a state in which society is socially divided in a system led by the "super-rich, with a squeezed middle and large, immiserated poor" (ibid. p. 59).

Essentially, despite the various mechanisms that reproduced inequality in the past having changed under democracy, the majority of South Africa remains divided both spatially and economically as these mechanisms have merely been traded for a macro economic situation that continues to fail in wide-spread poverty alleviation and the inclusion of historically marginalised populations (Standing, 2006). Cape Town similarly conforms to this model.

Neo-liberal development policy is said to have made Cape Town into one of the most – if not the most – unequal cities in the world (Seekings, 2010). The socio-economic divides between Cape Town's inner city and the historically white suburbs to the south and the sprawling black and "coloured" townships firmly remain. Socio-spatial legacies are expounded and reinforced by development strategies that realise international and national capital investment, focused exclusively in and around middle-income residential and business areas located vast distances from the former township and informal settlement areas (Robins, 2002). As a direct consequence of the support for urban modernist ideals in planning norms, as they have been

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conducted for much of the past century, the delivery of the desired quality of life for political elites and the growing middle-classes has occurred at the expense of continued spatial and economic exclusion of those unable to access such development, in the form of access to land and in an ability to participate in formal economies (Watson, 2009b).

The shift from welfare state policies to the overarching macro economic policy GEAR has, as in many other cities across South Africa, had significant impacts on development in Cape Town, particularly related to social development and the approaches taken towards dealing with violence and crime (Samara, 2005, p.214). On a number of levels, the development processes that have been implemented in Cape Town under the auspices of national government directives coupled with IDPs at local level as the city's major planning initiative, have been duly criticised. From the assertion of the influence that apartheid and even colonial planning approaches still have in that little has fundamentally changed in terms of how planning operates in dealing with rapidly changing urban environments (Watson, 2009b) to the critique of what McDonald (2008) refers to as the world city syndrome, where development overall, particularly the provision of infrastructure and services remains heavily skewed towards the creation of a world class city<sup>28</sup>.

Here focus remains firmly on the attraction of foreign capital through tourism and big business investments alike, meaning that the majority of the city's population remains marginalised in their on-going contention with situations of increasing inequality, unemployment and under-serviced urban environments.

Directly linked to this, crime prevention forms a central part of Cape Town's integrated development plans, however, similar criticism has arisen in that the focus placed on crime prevention is realised in the main interest of making the city safe for tourists and businesses within the inner city and wealthy formerly-white suburban neighbourhoods (Samara, 2005, 2011). As is the case across the rest of the country, the implementation of market-oriented economic growth and development policies and the subsequent privatisation of municipal services, are based on principals which have arguably, as Seekings (2010, p.13) points out, "prevented the de-commodification required to realise the progressive ambitions of the Reconstruction and Development Programme and the Constitution".

In the same respect however, despite the well-based concerns raised against the neoliberal development foci of cost-recovery and privatisation, Cape Town has in many ways still made significant progress in terms of the provision of basic services to the poorest parts of the city and has likewise implemented an array of social assistance programmes, funded through redistributive financing principles as opposed to according to market based principles (Seekings, 2010). In addition to the provision of basic services and the recognised need for social welfare support in the City, Cape Town too places focus on creating a safe city for all of its residents (CoCT, 2007). The following section explores the key policy mechanisms and frameworks through which urban safety, on the basis of crime prevention and policing, is governed in Cape Town.

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<sup>28</sup> "From privatisation, to prepaid electricity meters, to massive public spending on elite infrastructure projects (think Fifa 2010 or the International Convention Centre), the city has become a neoliberal policy-making machine that rewards those who play the game and disciplines those who do not" McDonald, D. 2008. Why inequality prevails in Cape Town. *The Cape Times*, October 21st 2008, p. 11.

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## 4.4.2 Crime and violence prevention governance and policing in Cape Town

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The governance of violence and crime prevention and the implementation of policing at local government level constitute the primary means of addressing the challenges of violence and crime throughout the country. According to national policy directives local governments are directly responsible for the implementation of all social crime prevention policy and therefore cities such as Cape Town employ urban planning mechanisms and development approaches that seek to contribute to the key objective of ensuring that all people are and feel safe in South Africa. The key mechanisms for crime prevention include the implementation of the national URP programme according to an area-based approach with two identified areas of intervention in Cape Town (Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain), the IDP process and of course the implementation of law enforcement and policing. Each of these fundamental mechanisms is explored in more detail individually.

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### 4.4.2.1 Urban Renewal in Cape Town

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National Government's Urban Renewal Plan (URP) entered into effect in 2001, with an initial 10 year mandate and comprised the following specific objectives:

- the promotion of local economic development (LED) to relieve poverty and unemployment
- the provision of safety and security by fighting crime
- the support of education as well as training and skills development
- the creation of quality urban environments where people can live with dignity and pride and
- the development of efficient and user-friendly transport systems.

(Thomas and Mengel, 2008)

Despite being a national programme, no national policy or framework exists that guides the URP implementation and as a result, experiences of URP programme implementation vary widely across the eight national nodes. A specialised URP unit was thus established and situated within the CoCT which was tasked with the implementation and management of the URP programme in the nodal areas on Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain (Urban-Econ, 2011) (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.10 provides a representation of the institutional framework of the URP at city level in Cape Town.


The overarching national URP objectives have informed the developmental planning processes and approaches in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain since the adoption and implementation of the URP in 2003. According to local authorities, the URPs objectives have had a distinct



**Figure 4.9.:** Urban renewal nodes in Cape Town; Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain (Q SJ Consultants, 2006).

influence on the overall IDP process in that these objectives are directly aligned with the CoCT's corporate strategic objectives (Interview with CoCT Official, September 2012). The CoCT's strategic objectives include:

- Promoting local economic development to reduce poverty and unemployment.
- Providing a safe and secure environment by fighting crime
- Supporting education, training and skills development.
- Creating quality urban environment where people can live with dignity and pride.
- Developing efficient, integrated and user-friendly transport system.
- Creating job opportunities through the extended public works programme.



**Figure 4.10.:** Institutional structure for the implementation of URP projects in Cape Town (CoCT, 2003).

- Delivering well-managed safety nets (cohesive and sustainable communities)

(CoCT, 2011c, p.5)

As it pertains to Safety and Security, the focus on “fighting crime” stands out clearly whereas the recognition of and attention to distinct aspects of violence and crime prevention methods are not explicitly detailed. The URP strategic objective of providing “a safe and secure environment by fighting crime” includes only four broad indicators: % decrease in crime levels; % decrease in gangsterism; % decrease levels of substance abuse and increase in recreational opportunities for the youth. Although these indicators, should they result, may be attributable to either preventative (social crime prevention initiatives) initiatives and/or reactive (policing and the criminal justice system) measures, no clear distinction of how these targets should be realised is made.

Interviews (September/October 2012) with local officials and other experts attribute this to the fact that social crime prevention is inherently inferred, as a cross-cutting issue, in other urban renewal processes and strategic objectives focused on creating urban environments that provide education, employment and high quality living for residents, all of which are expected to impact violence and crime in the targeted areas. The nature of the wording of the strategic objectives however arguably propagates the sentiment of safety and security as the dominant realm of law enforcement with only the goal of achieving an “increase in recreational oppor-

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tunities for the youth” hinting at the contribution of improved social facilities as a direct factor to reducing crime rates, gangsterism and substance abuse.

The complex interrelationships between the elements involved in attaining such goals remain largely unaddressed. As a focused crime prevention programme and one of the key mechanisms used to inform IDP planning with a focus on creating a safer city for all, this omission in the URP is considered in terms of this research to be a fundamental flaw<sup>29</sup>.

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#### 4.4.2.2 Integrated Development Planning for Urban Safety

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The Integrated Development Plan is the CoCT’s five-year strategic guideline plan that informs all planning, management, development and service delivery actions undertaken within its municipal bounds. Similarly as with the alignment to the City’s corporate objectives, so too are the IDP strategic focus areas directly aligned with the URP objectives. Comparatively, the IDP of the City of Cape Town well represents community safety concerns and displays a positive level of sophistication in handling the topic. Themes of community safety, crime and other forms of social insecurity appear in all components of the IDP and the analysis thereof is generally clear (GIZ, 2012, p.124).

The Cape Town IDP (2007-2012) identifies five key pillars on which development is focused, namely the opportunity city; the safe city; the caring city; the inclusive city and the well-run city. Supporting these key pillars, eight strategic focus areas relate to the City’s strategic objectives for which various directorates are responsible. These focus areas are likewise supported by the core objectives of ensuring efficiency and institutional effectiveness (Figure 4.11).

In terms of promoting urban safety through reducing violence and crime, the IDP is considered a valuable mechanism to ensure that planning against crime and violence is empirically realised at local level as it is recognised that the systemic institutionalisation of safety and prevention strategies is essential in realising extended spatial and social integration (GIZ, 2012). The experience of safety and security promotion through the IDP in Cape Town, as the country’s second largest city, is largely a positive one. As outlined by recent research conducted by the GIZ (2012) (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), virtually each section of the IDP addresses the theme of safety and security and as a major component of the IDP, safety and security comprises seven pages of analysis and strategy formulation (GIZ, 2012, p.121). Furthermore, the same study highlights the recognition of the IDP of the negative impact that crime has on local residents as well as the holistic understanding of community safety that recognises the positive impact that the development of community infrastructure and activities, particularly for youth groups, has on reducing violence and criminal activity (ibid.).

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<sup>29</sup> Current research and policy development (2013) towards a new national integrated urban development framework (IUDF) for South Africa does however seek to address this more directly in investigating the linkages between the promotion of urban safety and all other development themes. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 6

Visionary goals:	
a)	A prosperous city
b)	Effective and equitable service delivery
c)	A well-governed and efficiently run administration
Strategic focus areas:	
1.	Shared economic growth and development
2.	Sustainable urban infrastructure and services
3.	Energy efficiency for a sustainable future
4.	Public transport systems
5.	Integrated human settlements
6.	Safety and security
7.	Health, social and community development
8.	Good governance and regulatory reform
<b>Urban Efficiency</b>	<b>Institutional Effectiveness</b>

**Figure 4.11.:** Cape Town IDP 2007-2012 vision and focus areas (CoCT, 2012b, p.12).

As the IDP states, “Cape Town would benefit from investment in the development of holistically integrated, healthy communities from both a spatial and a social perspective (CoCT, 2012b, p.33)”<sup>30</sup>.

Overall, Cape Town has clearly centred safety and security as a primary challenge to be addressed through integrated development planning at local level and drawing on the strategic objectives of the URP has carved out a developmental trajectory that, in policy terms at least, recognises the importance of targeted intervention within severely affected communities through the use of area-based approaches and nodal governance, community engagement and the development of civil-state partnerships (Interview with local government official on Safety and Security, September 2012). Despite the integration of safety and security into the IDP, on-the-ground implementation on a scale that will significantly reduce the prevalence of violence and crime across the city remains a challenge (ibid.).

A vast number of factors influence a) the prevalence of violence and crime in certain areas and b) the ability to partner with local communities. Therefore it becomes key to engage with the question of how it is that prevention policy is implemented at a local level, gaining insight into the successes and hindrances being experienced by pilot projects (of which the VPUU is a prime example).

The implementation of community safety initiatives however cannot be effective alone and despite the appreciation of the fact that crime prevention extends beyond a purely law enforcement mandate, the understanding of safety and security provision and policing remains a vital factor in the creation of safer cities.

<sup>30</sup> Despite the significant focus on safety and security within the IDP in Cape Town, no clear provincial support for safety planning is evident in the Western Cape (GIZ, 2012, p.10).



Figure 4.12.: Urban safety as part of the IDP process (NPC, 2012, p.38).

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## 4.5 Prevention and Reaction: Local level security and policing

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### 4.5.1 Safety and Security

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*“Continued high levels of crime and disorder in South Africa, including Cape Town, not only affect residents’ quality of life, but also harms the country and region’s economy by limiting its attraction to tourists. Improved safety and security is crucial for shared and accelerated economic growth. If the City wants to win public and investor confidence, it needs to be proactive in its efforts to address crime and disorder.”*

*– CoCT (2012b, p.108)*

As part of the CoCT IDP, the section on safety and security begins with a direct reference to the importance of tackling crime and disorder in the City in order to ensure an improved quality of life for residents and remain attractive to tourists and investors. Focused on the key problems of statistically significant increases in drug and alcohol-related crime and persistently high levels of disorder and non-compliance on the City’s roads, the IDP details its approach to these problems through focused expansion of by-law enforcement and traffic policing capabilities through the addition of more staff. Furthermore, despite the absence of a clear definition of safety and security within the main document, the IDP (2012b, p.108) recognises the necessity to extend the concept of safety and security beyond a focus on crime and disorder, addressing urban vulnerability to “fire, flooding and other natural or human-induced hazards”.

The governance of safety and security in Cape Town on one hand reflects the international call for good governance in that crime and violence prevention have become “everybody’s business”,

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a public good to which all sectors of society have a right and for which all sectors of society are responsible, hence the inclusion of local-level community safety plans and the focus on participatory processes. On the other hand however, safety and security in the city are criticised for their reflection of the broader neoliberal development policies in place across the nation. As do others referenced throughout this chapter, Benit-Gbaffou et al. (2008) highlight how the management of security likewise fits perfectly into the adoption of the nationally-driven neoliberal development policies as urban spaces are targeted and “secured” based on their strategic positioning that fulfils a key role in the development strategies of attaining world class city status. As Standing (2006) previously noted, in contrast to the optimistic stance taken that the tourism boom experienced in Cape Town over the past decade could contribute to the development of the entire city, it has in fact arguably made matters worse, as economic benefit flows freely into the city’s beautiful, affluent areas, which raises prices and encourages “private and public actors to make the city safe and to erect ever greater systems of security to keep those who spend safe from those who may beg, steal and generally downgrade the image of the city...” (ibid. p. 24).

The most significant of security schemes implemented in order to achieve these goals created in the post-apartheid context is embodied in the City Improvement District (CID), a public-private partnership funded through private property levies within a designated area and ring-fenced for expenditure within the CID bounds. The CID partnership mandate includes the maintenance of public space and aspects such as refuse collection in addition to the control and implementation of security (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2008). For authors such as Miraftab (2007) and Samara (2005, 2011) the CID model and its (negative) influences on socio-spatial relations and access to the city is epitomised in the implementation of CIDs within Cape Town’s city centre, managed by the Cape Town Partnership<sup>31</sup>.

The key argument here being that although the implementation of CIDs may in fact improve security and result in the reduction of crime in targeted areas these benefits occur for a marginal few, increasing overall social and spatial inequalities as CID implementation in lower-income areas is unrealistic on the basis of additional payments for privatised services that should be supplied by the state. According to one local expert, despite the dominant negative impacts associated with the establishment of CIDs in inner city and wealthier suburban areas, research is being pursued into how it is an adapted version of the CID model may be made functional within lower income areas (Interview, September 2012). The most important aspect of this, as is also detailed in relation to the VPUU programme experience, concerns the ability of improvement district models to ringfence funding for reinvestment within a specified area.

The current status quo and propensity towards the implementation of urban development policies that promote mechanisms such as CIDs, that also place a primary focus on security, demonstrates the skewed dominance of the provision of security (protection from that

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<sup>31</sup> The Cape Town Partnership was formed in 1999 as a non-profit (Section 21) organisation to mobilise and align public, private and social resources towards the urban regeneration of Cape Town’s Central City. It was initiated by the City of Cape Town, the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA) and the Cape Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry, among others. – <http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za>.



**Figure 4.13.:** South Africa’s criminal justice system. Source: Supplied by CoCT Department of Safety and Security 2012.

which is feared) in the city rather than investment in the provision of safety for all (the reduction/elimination of that which causes fear).

#### 4.5.2 Policing<sup>33</sup>

Despite decentralised modes of governance and almost sole responsibility for social crime prevention placed at the doorstep of local government, policing in South Africa remains highly centralised with the South African Police Service (SAPS) directly controlled and mandated by National Government under the auspices of a National Police Commission appointed by the President.

Chapter 11 of the South African Constitution sets out the functions of the SAPS, which includes three primary roles:

- a. The national police service must be structured to function in the national, provincial and, where appropriate, local spheres of government.

<sup>33</sup> In addition to primary and secondary literature, this section draws heavily on field research conducted in Cape Town; most particularly expert interviews conducted with local safety and security authorities in September and October 2012.

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- b. National legislation must establish the powers and functions of the police service and must enable the police service to discharge its responsibilities effectively, taking into account the requirements of the provinces and
  - c. The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.

(South African Police Services, 2013)

The SAPS therefore provides the primary policing service to provinces, metropolitan regions and municipalities throughout South Africa. In line with the broadened definitions of crime prevention and the recognition for the need to actively include local communities in crime prevention efforts, Community Policing Forums (CPF) have been established in neighbourhoods across South Africa with the central aim of facilitating dialogue between the SAPS and residents at local level based on the necessity to establish a relationship of trust after years of politically motivated policing under apartheid (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2008).

The relative success of the CPF system is questionable, particularly since the original powers given to CPF bodies in being able to hold the SAPS directly accountable for their actions in communities have been reduced through subsequent regulations allowing for little more than consultative involvement (ibid.) A detailed investigation and description of the successes and failures of the CPF system is beyond the scope of this research but what remains important here is that despite this attempt to bridge the gap between social crime prevention and policing at local level, the heavy centralisation of policing is lamented by local safety and security authorities in Cape Town (Interview September 2012) and a number of severe hindrances to functional policing at local level are raised.

At local government level, Metro Police Departments (MPDs) have been set up in South Africa's largest metropolitan areas including, Durban, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and Cape Town (Faull, 2008). MPDs serve under the direction of local municipalities and fulfil the primary mandates of traffic<sup>34</sup> and by-law enforcement and crime prevention. The definition of crime prevention as it pertains to the operations of MPDs is limited through restrictions imposed by the SAPS and therefore MPDs do not have any jurisdiction on the investigation and/or prosecution of crimes as defined in the SAPS Act. Metro Police can however employ visible policing tactics and can "use city by-laws creatively to deal with public issues" however there is a "distinct limitation" in that the reality is that in order to really address criminal offences investigation is required (Interview CoCT Department of Safety and Security, September 2012).

According to local officials, based on this centralised policing system and the limitations imposed on MPD functions, the control over policing within municipality bounds is limited to a mere 3% (Interview September 2012). Local authorities therefore strongly advocate for a more decentralised police service with more control (and funding) allocated to provincial and local

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<sup>34</sup> Jurisdiction on highway patrol and traffic law enforcement is situated with the Provincial sphere of Government.

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government<sup>35</sup>. However, considering an on-going discussion at national level concerning the inclusion of metro police into the larger SAPS framework such decentralisation seems highly unlikely in the near future (Interview September 2012).

In Cape Town, the City's safety and security department have taken an active role towards tackling crime and violence in the city and proactively engage with local communities as far as possible, attending CPF meetings to discuss crime patterns and identify the potential for intervention in crime hot spots so as to prioritise the allocation of local resources<sup>36</sup>. In 2012 the CoCT policing budget allocation rose from R4 million in 2011 to R20 million.

Significant importance is levied towards the establishment of a broadened understanding of urban safety promotion and the need for a more systemic approach to crime prevention, utilising social and policing capacities. The CoCT has therefore established a number of specialised units that seek to develop more workable relationships with both the MPD and the SAPS. These policing units work with other City departments in understanding the current situation of urban development and planning, infrastructure constraints and the various social aspects recognised as risk factors for the presence of increased violence and crime. Similarly, cooperative relationships are being established with local pilot projects such as the VPUU and VPUU programme leaders are delivering specialised training on social crime prevention methods to metro police staff. Furthermore, in the interests of knowledge management and dissemination, the CoCT is now for the very first time paying for research that can further develop and support local crime prevention initiatives<sup>37</sup>.

In working towards an improved balance between social crime prevention and policing deemed necessary for to improve local levels of crime and violence, local government continues to seek to gain more control over preventative policing. This has been achieved most distinctly in the development of partnerships with local communities in establishing neighbourhood watch, something that was previously a Provincial Government competency. The CoCT is now the main provider of neighbourhood watch training and the introduction of neighbourhood safety officers (NSOs) provide a key linkage between local government and communities in responding to localised community safety needs.

A number of significant challenges still exist, particularly with regard to the development of functional relations between City departments, communities and the SAPS. These challenges are primarily concerned with problems attributed to a lack of local policing accountability by the SAPS<sup>38</sup>, severe levels of police corruption and high levels of community-police mistrust.

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<sup>35</sup> This is based on the opinion of local government officials that the provision of safety and policing is a localised issue and should therefore be determined by the local sphere of government.

<sup>36</sup> With the recognised constraint that without functional cooperation with the SAPS results are limited (Interview September 2012).

<sup>37</sup> Concern was raised during expert interviews with the CoCT department of safety and security that much knowledge and critical skills still lie predominantly with a very small number of experts working in violence and crime prevention.

<sup>38</sup> An estimated 400 out of 500 pieces of correspondence with the SAPS have gone unanswered in the year preceding the interview in September 2012.

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Attributed to these issues, the severely low reporting levels<sup>39</sup> and prosecution rates of crimes committed, underpinned by even lower conviction rates, particularly in the most crime-ridden areas of the city<sup>40</sup>. Even when prosecuted, convictions can take up to three years and as CoCT official bluntly stated, “justice delayed in this manner is justice denied” (Interview September 2012).

Unsurprisingly, this situation means a persistently tense relationship between the CoCT and the SAPS, which makes the implementation of necessary social crime prevention initiatives supported by appropriate policing methods and a fully functional criminal justice system nothing short of exceedingly challenging.

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## 4.6 Conclusions

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This chapter has engaged with the provision of an overview of social and economic development policy in post-apartheid South Africa, with a focus on the approach to violence and crime prevention in the country. Established primarily as local government mandate this chapter has subsequently explored the key policies supporting crime prevention at local government level and based on both academic literature and the results of empirical field research identifies some of the central factors supporting and hindering the implementation of violence and crime prevention in the City of Cape Town, as the case study focus of this research.

This conclusion thus seeks to draw parallels between the macro and micro level challenges identified, presenting some key deductions on the status and implementation of urban development and crime prevention in South Africa that support the highly localised investigation into the VPUU programme and the resultant development of the specific conclusions of this research, elaborated on in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The conclusions presented here are similarly recognised as structural governance challenges that, in combination with the specific implementation challenges facing the VPUU programme at the local level, add to the complexity of programme transfer, both within Cape Town itself and across the rest of the country.

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### 4.6.1 Misaligned social and economic development objectives

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Despite its status as a world-class tourist destination, Cape Town’s apparent “rise to success” on the world stage has not come without persisting tribulations. Amidst growth and economic success, the city, as does the rest of the country, remains plagued by rampant unemployment, rising inequality and excessive levels of serious and violent crime alongside drug and alcohol abuse. The relationship between development, planning policy and the forms of policing set

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<sup>39</sup> For example, an estimated 1 out of every 35 rapes is reported to the police in South Africa (Loots, 2005).

<sup>40</sup> In high crime areas such as Nyanga, Gugulethu, Hannover Park and Manenberg the prosecution rate hovers around 10% or lower. If you disaggregate violent crime out of that, gang related violent crime, robberies and shootings have a 2-3% conviction rate (Interview September 2012).

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out to tackle the enduring tribulations of serious and violent crime outlined in this chapter, highlights the disjuncture between the development objectives of targeted economic growth and international competition and welfare-state objectives of the provision of opportunity and access for all through urban renewal, citizen inclusion.

These contradictory development trajectories thus similarly determine the approaches to and implementation of law enforcement and crime prevention policies that has resulted in focus still being placed largely with reactive policing measures aimed towards garnering short-term wins and the maintenance of surety for tourists and investors. The existence of crime prevention policy that recognises the need for systemic, socially oriented development and active citizenship has simply fallen short in terms of broad-based implementation as the pursuit of economic interests relies on forms of prevention and hard-line law enforcement approaches that ingrain segregation along class lines, often criminalising the urban poor<sup>41</sup>.

Furthermore, authors such as Pieterse (2009, p.11) infer that the sheer volume of new policy developed post 1994 quite simply left political leaders and policy managers with “no idea how to navigate their way through the morass of new, and ever changing, policy imperatives”, rendering realisable implementation virtually impossible.

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#### 4.6.2 Government departmental alignment towards a common vision

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The research undertaken here confirms and reiterates the broad conclusion drawn previously elsewhere (Pieterse, 2009; Atkinson and Marais, 2006; van Donk and Pieterse, 2006) on the difficulties of inter-departmental cooperation across governmental spheres and lack in alignment of development objectives required in order to realise true change in the persistently segregated and unequal society that is South Africa. In addition to the overly complex policy landscape, coupled with legal frameworks that encourage risk aversion and innovation (Pieterse, 2009), this research

*“South Africa has some phenomenal strategies in place, probably the best constitution in the world, encouraging social development and employment...but in reality it seems like the implementation of policies is where things are falling apart”*

– Researcher, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR),  
Interview February 2013

purports that the lack of a common guiding vision for central developmental priorities, such as violence and crime prevention that need to be supported by social development policy and appropriate policing strategy alignment (Rauch, 2002a), similarly hinders the ability of government departments to work in unison, sharing resources and increasing efficiency in the pursuit of a common vision based on strategic and realistic objectives. This sentiment is supported by local development experts working on urban safety in South Africa (Interviews October 2012).

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<sup>41</sup> Samara (2005) extends this discussion focusing on the plight of street children in Cape Town’s CBD, raising doubts about the City’s “progressive approaches to both crime prevention and development”.

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As so succinctly put by Atkinson and Marais (2006, p.22), departments across the spheres of government continue to work in isolation, heeding “no appreciation for the impact of their policies and programmes on broader development dynamics”. Essentially, a deficit in strategic capacities and agreement on central objectives within central government impedes policy coordination across departments that results in the experienced situation of fragmented and inconsistent implementation (Turok and Parnell, 2009).

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#### 4.6.3 The challenge of “unfunded mandates”

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In addition to a deficit in functional intergovernmental cooperation between spheres and the lack of common driving visions to support local level development initiatives, the difficulties of local government are compounded by the delegation of “unfunded mandates”, including urban renewal and crime prevention. In this context, the urban renewal programme and the implementation of social crime prevention policy that originates under the directorate of national government is almost entirely separated from national budget allocations with provincial and local spheres of government expected to incorporate these large mandates without the allocation of additional funds from national treasury. Although some grant allocation does exist for urban renewal nodes, the total sums remain relatively minor.

Furthermore, unfunded mandates likewise occur within government spheres, as IDP and the budgetary process at local level also remain somewhat disengaged from one another. This means that line departments within local government structures may be allocated mandates for the provision of services to local communities, under the auspices of integrated planning, that must be funded by already strapped line department budgets<sup>42</sup>. Although some improvements in intergovernmental cooperation have been noted, the flow of resources between spheres of government and the challenge of unfunded mandates still remains (van Donk and Pieterse, 2006) and requires attention if policy implementation is to be more effectively realised.

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#### 4.6.4 Resilient reactive measures

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Innovative policy measures and the recognition of crime prevention as a more complex social problem, beyond the control of law enforcement and policing mechanisms alone, define South Africa’s overall approach to violence and crime progressive and is certainly in line with present international discourses and good governance. The inability of the South African government however to address social segregation, unemployment and inequality and the persistence in high levels of violence and crime throughout the country have led to a renewed focus on the fight against crime, with calls for hard-line policing and tougher punishments for criminals, resulting in a situation in which “both government and civilians reflect a conviction that security is more important than safety” (Holtmann, 2011, p.2).

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<sup>42</sup> Confirmed by local officials and VPUU programme staff (Interviews September/October 2012).

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Similarly, the need for government to “be seen to be doing something” (Interview January 2013) to appease investors as much as the public results in zero-tolerance policing tactics that are by no means in line with, nor supportive of, broader social crime prevention strategies. The centralised control and dominance of policing by national government exacerbates this misalignment in that local approaches to crime prevention mandates are impaired by the inability to effectively coordinate local social development initiatives and appropriate, supportive policing practices. The impact of aggressive policing tactics may yield short term results however, as the next chapter will also discuss, can have seriously damaging effects on community-police and community-state relationships that require the development of trust in order to work. Overall, the perpetuation of more intrusive policing and addressing the problem through the building of more prisons is merely a failure in achieving the longer-term aim of developing a society in which the development of social, internal controls can be realised based on a culture of inclusion and involvement where communities work together with local governments and police in promoting safer urban environments.

The relevance of the present development trajectories and law enforcement approaches outlined in this chapter are further explored in their relationship to on-the-ground urban renewal and crime prevention practice occurring at local level within the City of Cape Town’s most marginalised areas through the case study on the experience of the VPUU initiative. Within this policy and governance context presented in this chapter, the following chapter investigates the on-the-ground experience of the VPUU programme and seeks to develop an overview of the pertinent challenges facing the programme and which may directly impact on the successful transfer of the programme to other areas.

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# 5 INTEGRATED VIOLENCE PREVENTION IN CAPE TOWN – THE VPUU PROGRAMME

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## 5.1 Introduction

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The motivating hypothesis that underpins this thesis asserts that institutional misalignment within and between governance structures presents a hindrance to the broad-based transfer of integrated violence prevention initiatives. This assertion is investigated through an assessment of post-apartheid social and economic development policy and its relation to the implementation of crime prevention strategies in South Africa (chapter 4) and, more specifically in this chapter, through an in-depth case study investigation of an integrated violence prevention programme currently in its third phase of implementation in the City of Cape Town.

The core purpose of this case study is to better understand the success and challenges present in the delivery of integrated intervention strategies under the auspices of such a programme and in doing so provide insight into the institutionalisation processes that are required if interventions are to be implemented at scale throughout the rest of the City, the Province and the country.

The violence prevention through urban upgrading (VPUU) programme<sup>43</sup> is a bi-lateral international financial cooperation programme between the City of Cape Town (CoCT) and the German Government, partially financed through the German Development Bank, KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau).

The initial phases of the programme, which began implementation in 2005 have been focused in the Harare district of Khayelitsha, one of South Africa's most resource deprived and reputedly most dangerous urban areas. Since its inception the programme has progressed implementation to other areas within the greater Khayelitsha township and have similarly begun implementation in a number of informal settlements across the CoCT.

Thus far, this thesis has conceptualised and presented urban violence and crime as examples of complex problems, requiring integrated intervention across a number of levels if solutions are to be found. The continued and sustainable delivery of integrated intervention on a broader scale, beyond the pilot programme phases is suggested to be reliant on coordinated institutional alignment. Therefore, as the empirical focus of this research, the purpose of the analysis of the VPUU programme is three-fold.

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<sup>43</sup> The VPUU programme refers to the broader agenda, which includes the implementation of a range of specific interventions seeking to contribute to the establishment of sustainable urban neighbourhoods within the areas in which the programme is being implemented.

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Firstly, in-depth insight into the development and implementation of the programme, its structures and implementation processes is presented, providing the contextual understanding of how the programme has been established and operates.

Secondly, focus is placed on the way in which the concept of programme transfer is understood and is being implemented as part of the programme's broader mainstreaming objectives.

Finally, the case study experience draws out the key challenges being experienced by the programme in realising implementation beyond the original pilot project sites in Khayelitsha. The realisation of this purpose is mobilised through the assessment of both public and non-publicly available documentation and draws heavily on expert interviews as well as on-site observations and personal engagement with programme leaders and local stakeholders, including community members involved with the programme, local and provincial government authorities.

Overall, the information gained through this case study is focused towards furthering the development of discourse on the integrated programme implementation processes observed and their relation to local level institutional structures. The primary motivation of which is to develop a critical analysis of these processes, identify the key challenges being faced and thus determine how it is that broad-based programme transfer can be conceptualised within such a context.

In achieving the objectives set out here, this case study likewise constitutes three main parts. As a starting point, the chapter begins with an introduction to the contextual setting of Khayelitsha as a formerly planned dormitory township and provides insight into the social, economic and environmental development challenges that characterise the area and which have led to the development and implementation of the VPUU programme, its approach and methodologies, as described in detail in the second part of the chapter.

Finally, the case study turns to focus on the issue of programme transfer, drawing out the key difficulties facing the programme in realising implementation elsewhere and outlining the way in which programme transfer is being conceptualised by programme leaders and local authorities. It is on the basis of the in-depth case study presented here that the discussion of how the complexity sciences and a contextual understanding of broad-based programme transfer may impact violence prevention on a more significant scale is presented in chapter 6.

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## **5.2 Khayelitsha: a point of departure for urban renewal**

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### **5.2.1 From racial division to socio-economic marginalisation**

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Khayelitsha, meaning “new home” in the local language, isiXhosa, was an allocated township settlement, developed under the apartheid regime as part of their segregated urban planning objectives. Originally planned and established in 1983 as a “black township”, with a maximum capacity of 250.000 residents, Khayelitsha has grown to become one of the country's



**Figure 5.1.:** Khayelitsha Township, 35km from Cape Town CBD. Source: Map adapted from Google Earth.

largest township areas with the highest population estimates hovering around 1 million today (Khayelitsha Community Trust, 2011).

Keeping to the form of apartheid regime planning, the characteristics of Khayelitsha as a peripheral, dormitory township are still clearly visible, as the township remains distanced both spatially and socio-economically from Cape Town’s more developed central and former white suburban areas (Figure 5.1).

With the relief of the apartheid influx control policies in the early nineties, that regulated migration to South Africa’s cities, Khayelitsha became the fastest growing residential area in the Cape and, as residential influx continued to increase, informal housing solutions evolved. Continued migration from surrounding rural areas and smaller towns led to an increasing number of residents residing in informal housing structures without the provision of basic services and infrastructure. Khayelitsha rapidly came under pressure due to in-migration<sup>44</sup>, as the approximate 140.000 formally built, freestanding houses could simply not house or service the rapidly growing population. Today, more than 80% of residents thus currently live in informal housing, referred to as “backyard shacks” (VPUU Programme - AHT Group, 2011; CitySpace Cape Town, 2009)(Figure 5.2. According to estimates issued by the Affordable Land and Housing Data Centre (ALHDC) the number of newly constructed informal dwellings continues to grow at a rate of 10.000 units per annum<sup>45</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Research estimates an average of 2000 people migrate into Khayelitsha per month, mainly from the rural areas of the Eastern Cape (VPUU Programme - AHT Group, 2011).

<sup>45</sup> Data available online at <http://www.alhdc.org.za/>



**Figure 5.2.:** Informal housing in Khayelitsha. Source: Author's own.


Khayelitsha has thus essentially developed from a previously planned township area under apartheid into a sprawling, largely informal urban area characterised by a lack of basic services and infrastructure where over-crowding and inadequate living conditions prevail for the vast majority of its residents.

As South Africa's second largest township, second only to Soweto situated South-West of Johannesburg, Khayelitsha is the largest township in the Western Cape and its population comprises an estimated 25% of Cape Town's total population, a solid primary indicator of the importance of addressing the needs faced by its residents. Furthermore, Khayelitsha is defined by a highly youthful demographic as almost 30% of the entire City's youth call Khayelitsha home. Within Khayelitsha itself, the youth bulge is even more pronounced with an approximate 65% of the population falling into the 20-24 year age category (Figure 5.3).

As an anomaly in terms of the overall population demographics of the Western Cape, which has a largely coloured population, the vast majority (97%) of Khayelitsha's population are Black Africans<sup>46</sup> and predominantly (95%) speak Xhosa as their mother tongue (QJSJ Consultants, 2006).

Residential density is high and basic services lack, particularly in the more informal settlement areas. Due to the continuing influx of residents, existing infrastructure is being continually subjected to increasing pressure, quickly worsening living and mobility conditions. Poverty, insufficient education and unemployment are at the heart of Khayelitsha's socio-economic challenges. Accordingly, approximately 38% of the total population in Khayelitsha are unemployed. This number rises to a staggering level of more than 50% when one considers the unemployment levels amongst youth in the area and includes data on discouraged job seekers. The primary motivator for job seekers to cease their search for work is driven by the hopelessness attached to the

<sup>46</sup> The South African government continues to denote racial classes according to the following broad classifications: Black, White, Indian and Coloured.




**Figure 5.3.:** Demographic profile of Khayelitsha according to age. Source: QSJ Consultants 2006.

existence of perceived prospects (QSJ Consultants, 2006). Intensifying the challenges of finding work the demand for unskilled labour in a globalising economy, for which the populations of townships such as Khayelitsha were a fundamental source, continues to decline. Those that do have jobs most often travel long distances to reach their places of work, spending valuable time and economic resources as job opportunities exist far from the still marginalised, largely dormitory areas these populations call home. Moreover, the fear of crime and victimization is cited as being the most dominant hindrance to local economic participation and the establishment of entrepreneurial micro-enterprise activity in the area (Cichello et al., 2011) (Figure 5.4).

Crime and the fear thereof thus directly stifle the ability of residents to make use of any, albeit few, economic opportunities that may exist.

As a direct result of the depressed socio-economic conditions present in Khayelitsha, not only do residents have to contend with overcrowding and a constant struggle for access to services and employment, the spread of communicable diseases such as pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/AIDS is also intensified by over-crowded and under-serviced living conditions. The HIV infection rate, for example, is estimated to be twice that of the national average (CitySpace Cape Town, 2009). The only superseding cause of death relates to violence, as homicide contributed the largest number of deaths in the area (16,4%) in 2001, followed by TB and pneumonia (Mathey et al., 2002).

In Cape Town overall, despite a recorded decline in the percentage of deaths related to homicide in the city from 2001 (18%) to 2006 (14,4%), murder remained second only to HIV/AIDS as the leading cause of death and premature mortality across the city (Figure 5.5). In the period 2003 to 2006 Khayelitsha maintained the highest levels of premature mortality in the city, attributed to “poverty-related conditions”, HIV and injuries (including homicide) (Groenewald et al., 2008, p.18).




**Figure 5.4.:** Barriers to economic entry in Khayelitsha (Cichello et al., 2011).

Today, these issues remain as the leading causes of death however according to a presentation delivered by Koena Nkoko from the CoCT Health Directorate in October 2012, although HIV/AIDS and TB infection is seen as the primary health related issue in these urban contexts, substance abuse is increasingly viewed as a primary health concern. Most particularly, the abusive consumption of alcohol is at the forefront as a public-health concern. According to Manshil Misra from the WC Provincial Department of Health, alcohol is registered as a causal factor in over 50% of violence related deaths (Workshop presentation, October 2012).


### 5.2.2 Dehumanising spaces and manifestations of violence in Khaya

Khayelitsha, dubbed the “rape capital of the Western Cape” (Slamdien, 2010) has also been referred to as a township under siege in relation to the problem of violent crime (CitySpace Cape Town, 2009), a title that reflects in the reported violent crime statistics for the area. With rape, assault and murder numbers way above the national average<sup>47</sup>, residents of Khayelitsha are continually at risk of victimisation. Khayelitsha has, as do many other township areas throughout South Africa, a history of violence associated with political oppression and control under the apartheid government. Prior to the end of apartheid many of these township communities suffered severe bouts of violence in the name of freedom fighting where communities and armed

<sup>47</sup> With a total of 75 murders per 100.000 of the population registered in 2003/2004 Khayelitsha’s murder rate exceeds that of the already high national average of 50 murders per 100.000 population by 50% (VPUU Programme - AHT Group, 2011).



(a)



(b)

**Figure 5.5.:** Leading causes of premature mortality in Cape Town 2001 and 2006 (Groenewald et al., 2008, p.18).

police forces clashed. With the end of apartheid and the realisation of democracy, the inability of municipal structures to cope with large influx rates has meant that despite much effort, the socio-economic situation within the vast majority of these communities has all but stagnated.

Generally accepted as the result of weak governance in combination with the fragility of urban contexts under pressure (Bruce and Gould, 2009), the severity of violence in Khayelitsha cannot be pinpointed to one particular cause. Rather, as detailed in the opening chapters of this thesis, the underlying drivers of violence are attributable to the complex interaction of a number of underlying causal

*“it’s not lekker – there’s not a lot of green space. We need oxygen and our kids to learn nature is important”*

– The Heights Resident, personal communication September 2012

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issues, both visible and invisible in their manifestations. The manifestations of violence in areas like Khayelitsha are no different.

The visible appearances of violence in Khayelitsha mirror those of the numerous similar contexts spread throughout the country in displaying disturbingly high levels of direct violence (Galtung, 1996) including murder, assault, rape and robbery with aggravated (read violent) circumstances. It is the invisible, what Galtung 1996 refers to as the indirect structural and cultural forms of violence that underpins these visible expressions of violence. In defining structural violence as the presence of social and economic policy structures that do not facilitate, or in fact proactively hamper, the satisfaction of peoples' needs, structural violence is linked to the limitation on equal access to resources for all levels of society. Put more simply, structural violence describes social arrangements that put people in harms way (Farmer, 2004). In this sense, individual will is not the primary consideration but rather historically determined and often economically driven processes in place act to constrain individual agency (ibid.).

Arguably, the structural legacy of apartheid coupled with the on-going propagation of neo-liberal development supported through social and economic policy that focuses resource distribution to areas based on exclusionary action entrenches apartheid segregation rather than addressing it (Samara, 2011).

It is this development trajectory, detailed in chapter four, that has played a central role in developing the situation in which areas such as Khayelitsha find themselves today. This kind of class-based allocation of urban space and resources determined by a local elite encapsulates Galtung's reference to cultural violence as the second form of invisible violence that supports the structural violence hindering equitable social and economic development.

Once again the point is to be reiterated that the processes resultant in the growing inequality being experienced acts to entrench segregation in post-apartheid Cape Town, no longer along the lines of forced racial divisions but certainly according to income and class divisions. Populations at the bottom of the income scale reside in these continually growing, poorly designed, under-resourced urban areas where unemployment and the loss of hope in attaining even the most simple of objectives leads to rising substance abuse and coalesces into violent expressions fuelled by marginalisation-driven frustration. As one senior mayoral committee representative for safety and security in the City of Cape Town put it, these urban contexts of which Khayelitsha is prime example have developed largely due to an inability of the City to cope resulting in problematic urban design where slum conditions, poor sewerage and services has realised areas that are "overall fairly dehumanising spaces...producing the kinds of living conditions that do not lend themselves to creating a safe environment" (Interview, September 2012).

Consequently, within the fragile social contexts<sup>48</sup> that continue to exist, a normalisation of violence and crime, both within the private and public realms, means that residents live in constant fear of victimisation, something that affects their daily lives. The normalisation of

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<sup>48</sup> Fragile social systems are described by Holtmann 2011, p.iv as those social contexts where the perpetrators of criminal acts are people who have fallen through every crack in our society and who cannot display empathy or compassion as they have never been shown empathy or compassion. These criminals do not represent a failure in policing alone, but rather a failure of a society that fails its people.

Category of crime	Recorded crimes April 2003-March 2004
<b>Murder</b>	<b>358</b>
Total sexual crimes	588
Attempted murder	395
Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm	3089
Common assault	2020
Common robbery	824
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	1484

**Table 5.1.:** Violent crime in Khayelitsha 2003/2004. Source: SAPS.

violence in these contexts is brought to light by the comments of one Cape Flats resident who described the evolution of gun fights as something that residents used to flee from whereas nowadays they “run to go and watch it” (personal communication, September 2012).

In putting numbers to the most visible form of violence in Khayelitsha, prior to the implementation of the VPUU programme interventions, 358 murders were recorded between April 2003 and March 2004<sup>49</sup> (SAPS Crime Statistics, 2012) (See Table 5.1).

Overall, with less than desirable living conditions, rampant unemployment and a lack of obvious opportunities for the youthful population, Khayelitsha developed into an area well worthy of its reputation and therefore also worthy of a targeted situational, social and institutional programme aimed towards improving livelihoods and reducing violence and crime in the area. For these reasons, along with Mitchell’s Plain, Khayelitsha was identified as one of the targeted “hot-spots” under the auspices of the national urban renewal programme (URP) (Seechapter 4), which would be the testing ground for innovative pilot projects that would seek to implement area-based approaches to tackling the problems of physical, social and economic deprivation highlighted.

The VPUU programme is one such example of a progressive, integrated approach targeting the reformation of the physical and social context present in Khayelitsha.

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### **5.3 The VPUU Programme: A comprehensive, integrated approach to violence prevention**

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Having provided insight into the contextual situation of Khayelitsha as an urban area characterised by inadequate urban space and persistent spatial and social marginalisation that fails in its ability to provide social and economic opportunities to its residents – intensified by the severity of violence and crime – this section focuses on exploring the VPUU programme as a hallmark example of an innovative international cooperation programme borne of the issues outlined above. Heavily influenced by international discourses and the dissemination of best-practices,

<sup>49</sup> This included the Harare area. From 2004 onwards the Harare police station became active, recording data independently from the rest of Khayelitsha.

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German financial cooperation programmes have developed a comprehensive, integrated approach to violence prevention and sustainable urban neighbourhood creation through urban upgrading drawing on experiences of prior implementation in El- Salvador and Colombia. As its third direct experience with integrated violence prevention, the South African (VPUU) example encompasses similar elements however, according to senior programme managers, importance has been placed on locally adapting approaches through focusing on the specific elements deemed most critical to the local context where the interventions occur (Interview, August 2012).

The following sections of this chapter therefore concentrate on the particularities of the VPUU programme's development, including its main vision, key objectives and goals, the prevention approaches and methodologies being employed and, most importantly, its institutional structure. This detailed investigation into the set-up and organisational structure of VPUU provides the basis from which the issue of programme transfer through broad-based implementation is discussed in the final parts of this chapter

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### 5.3.1 German financial cooperation for integrated violence prevention

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The development of financial cooperation (FC) programmes as part of the German KfW Development Bank's programme mandate is founded on the overall experience of violence having reached epidemic status within rapidly urbanising areas, most predominantly in developing countries of Central America and Africa.

The need for this kind of structured international cooperation stems from the identified inability of countries to cope alone with the social, economic and political complexities driving increases in urban violence. In this respect, evaluation experiences of urban development and slum upgrading initiatives revealed particular determinants of success that international cooperation programmes would seek to employ from the early 2000s onwards. These experiences are outlined in KfW documentation as follows:

- The combination of social and economic problems in cities indicates that individual, sector strategies targeting particular areas will only be effective if included as part of larger urban crime and violence prevention programmes.
- The experienced increase in violence and crime in informal (slum) settlements involves the economic, political and social exclusion of a substantial part of the poor urban population.
- Violence and violent crime in urban areas is linked to the failure of the state to provide appropriate political responses to the lack of basic social and economic needs. Therefore, local authorities need support in the creation of responsive and accountable administrative structures, in the development of comprehensive policies and in the efficient provision of local services and infrastructure.

(Bauer, 2010, p.4)

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It is based on these concerns that local government authorities, metropolitan regions and the international community began to expand the scope of interventions through new collaborative programme development with the ultimate goal of developing the means to achieve socially inclusive and sustainable urban neighbourhoods (ibid.). This approach solidifies the recognition of violence and crime as complex issues by international development agencies and practitioners and is recognisant of the necessity to implement systemic, integrated solutions that tackle multiple causes and risk factors simultaneously.

This overarching determination of the need to implement an array of programmatic interventions across the levels of spatial, institutional and social development has supported the initial development of the VPUU programme and its implementation approach. This kind of integrated approach however not only requires an array of programmatic interventions to be implemented through formal institutional mechanisms, which underpins the concentration on institutional reform targeted by these kinds of programmes, but is likewise acknowledged to be inherently reliant on the participation of local communities. The concepts of active citizenship and community ownership thus form a central pillar of the VPUU approach, as explored further on in this chapter.

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### 5.3.2 Prioritising integrated violence prevention in Cape Town

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#### 5.3.2.1 Programme phases

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The feasibility study for Khayelitsha was conducted in 2002, with the first implementation phase beginning in the latter half of 2005. The programme is divided into 4 distinct phases, the third of which is currently being implemented. A fourth phase specifically aimed at targeting the transfer of the VPUU programme to other areas within the Western Cape Province has been agreed upon on the basis of an additional feasibility study and is planned to begin in mid 2014:


Phase I:	2005 - 2007
Phase II:	2008 - 2011 (June)
Phase III:	(July) 2011-2014 (June) - currently in implementation
Phase IV:	July 2014 onwards

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#### 5.3.2.2 Financing VPUU

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Structured as an international cooperation programme set-up under the auspices of an inter-governmental bi-lateral agreement between the German National Government and the City of Cape Town, the VPUU programme and all its respective programme interventions are thus jointly funded on the basis of financial cooperation agreements between the German Government, through its Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the



**Figure 5.6.:** KfW VPUU funding structure. Source: Supplied by KfW, 2012.

CoCT. The City is therefore the receiver and proponent of the financial support provided by the KfW Development Bank on behalf of the BMZ (KfW Entwicklungsbank, 2011). Similarly, as the financial institution responsible for the dissemination of BMZ funds as well as the development of the specific implementation agreements, including monitoring and evaluation, the KfW Development Bank enters into a funding agreement with the partner government (in this case the CoCT) as well as with an appointed implementing agency.

Additionally, the partner government likewise signs a project implementation agreement with the project implementation agency that hires consultants to carry out the project implementation “on-the-ground”. Figure 5.6 provides an overview of the legal agreement structure and funding lines regulating the implementation of the VPUU programme.

The total budget allocated to VPUU for the implementation of the first three phases (2005-2014) equates to approximately 52,3 million Euros. This sum is comprised of the German Government funding of 15,5 million, local CoCT funding of 35 million Euros and an additional 1,8 million Euros contributed by FIFA prior to the 2010 World Cup Event (KfW Entwicklungsbank, 2011)(Table 5.2).

Phase	BMZ/KfW	CoCT (approx.)	Other (FIFA)
I	€ 7,5 million	-	-
II	€ 3 million	-	-
III	€ 5 million	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>€ 15,5 million</b>	<b>€ 35 million</b>	<b>€ 1,8 million</b>

**Table 5.2.:** VPUU funding distribution phase I-II-III.

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According to a senior project manager at the KfW Headquarters in Frankfurt, the VPUU programme represents a significant achievement for international cooperation programmes in that the CoCT provides the majority portion (67%) of the overall programme implementation costs. This significant financial commitment of local funds is seen to be a clear demonstration of the seriousness with which the CoCT considers the VPUU programme as well as the evident commitment to addressing urban violence and crime in the city's most vulnerable areas (personal communication, April 2012). Despite this financial commitment on behalf of the CoCT however, the institutional set-up of the VPUU programme is based on an intermediary institutional structure, a set-up viewed by KfW representatives as essential to ensuring adequate accountability and the transparent usage of allocated funds (ibid.).

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### 5.3.3 The VPUU Consortium: an intermediary institutional construct

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
As outlined above, the legal structure of the international financial cooperation programme stipulates the employment of a project-implementing agency according to the contracts signed with the local government partner. This project-implementing agency in-turn employs expert consultants to undertake and oversee actual implementation. In this instance, the VPUU Consortium constitutes the project-implementing agent led by a team of consultants from a proprietary development company, SUN Development Pty. SUN Development is the local subsidiary of the larger AHT Consulting group headquartered in Essen, Germany.

Functioning as an intermediary between local communities, civil organisations and local and provincial government departments, the implementing agency's key roles include:

1. The management and co-ordination of all proposed programme components
2. Liaison with external agents and partners
3. The facilitation of partnership development between local communities and local authorities as well as other public and private stakeholders
4. The facilitation of on-the-ground community participation
5. The administration of allocated funds

Figure 5.7 provides a graphic representation of the functions performed by the implementing agent in negotiating and implementing VPUU interventions.

Since its inception, the VPUU programme has been strategically aligned to the objectives of the National Urban Renewal Programme (URP), acting as a supplementary activity to those stipulated by local government as part of the city-wide IDR. In the case of the VPUU programme, the implementing agent is also referred to as the Project Management Unit (PMU). The VPUU PMU is institutionally anchored within the CoCT municipal governance structure and essentially takes all responsibility for the implementation and management required to ensure the realisation of viable projects based on the holistic, integrated approach developed. Accordingly, the



**Figure 5.7.:** VPUU’s intermediary implementing agent model. Source: Supplied by VPUU 2013.

programme has received significant political backing and is situated as one of the City’s flagship pilot projects under the direct control of the mayoral office.

The intermediary implementing agency model and the establishment of the VPUU PMU within the CoCT mayoral office is viewed specifically as part of this case study in terms of how it is that this institutional set-up can or does contribute to the mainstreaming objectives of the VPUU programme and similarly, to the question of programme transfer. Based on interviews with VPUU programme leaders and local professionals involved in the programme (Interviews, September 2012 - January 2013), the intermediary set-up has been directly credited with enabling the programme’s launch, the speed with which progress has been made and the realisation of a number of successes, particularly in terms of garnering community support, enabling community engagement and participation and developing workable partnerships between communities, local police, local authorities and other civic organisations.

Interim programme reports, confirmed through personal communication (September and October 2012), attribute the necessity for an intermediary set-up, such as the one that was implemented, to the following three key elements:

- i. The intermediary is viewed as an apolitical entity. Such an apolitical status is regarded as essential in gaining community support in the initial phases of the programme. In many of the intervention areas political support is heavily divided and a culture of mistrust in government is present. In terms of the VPUU experience the perceived apolitical nature of the programme has been a valuable position from which community trust could be (re)established. Community-government relations are often tense based on community anger resulting from, among other things, an on-going lack of basic service delivery, inadequate infrastructure and limited access to social and economic opportunities. For example,

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in a meeting with community members from one of VPUU's intervention sites to establish a local committee and identify local resources, community members recounted numerous instances of having been let down by unfulfilled government promises.

In one of the most significant points of memory recounted, community members spoke of the "meeting with the mayor for the 2010 Olympics"<sup>50</sup> and a sum of R7 million allocated to the upgrading of their settlement and the provision of electricity, which, by the time of the meeting in September 2012, was yet to be seen. Similarly, the apolitical stance projected by the programme in the areas of intervention has aided in developing social cohesion and consensus on the basis of more equal participation as opposed to via channels of political connection and control. As referred to directly by programme management during formal interviews and during site visits, the ability of the programme to move into areas with differing political support bases is reliant on the communication that irrespective of political affiliation, local councillors represent only one voice, as one of many stakeholders in the establishment of community representative forums. As described in the same interview, what is most interesting to programme staff is that the majority of political difficulties arise in areas of implementation where local councillors are in fact supporters of the ruling Democratic Alliance (DA) as opposed to areas, such as Khayelitsha, which are opposition (ANC) dominated. These difficulties arise due to the ideas held by local councillors that political influence similarly denotes influence within programme operations; as the interviewee puts it, they believe that "by the virtue of being aligned to the mayor he has now a bigger stake than somebody in Khayelitsha".

Political championing for the programme is established as far as possible to be reliant on the position (i.e. the Mayor and/or the Provincial Premier) as opposed to the political party. This distinction between the person and the position they hold is therefore seen as a means by which vulnerability to political change at City or Provincial level is mitigated.

- ii. As a supported yet operationally independent unit, the intermediary implementing agent has been able to "cut red-tape" in sourcing and allocating resources enabled largely by the agent's ability to ring-fence funding for the specified intervention areas. The risk of relying on cash-strapped budgets of individual line departments and budget allocations that may not occur is thus mitigated. As a local project leader explained during a site visit to Khayelitsha (September 2012), the by-passing of line department bureaucracy extends from the most simple of matters such as the purchasing of basic supplies and replacing office equipment to ensuring that funds generated through local projects are able to be reinvested in the area as opposed to "lost" in what are described as the complex and non-transparent budgeting processes of many key line departments. Additionally, the point was definitively made that if equipment takes forever then basic resources to hold meetings don't exist.

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<sup>50</sup> this statement was made in reference to the promises made for settlement upgrading prior to the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

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Even relatively small issues take a lot of time to be processed through CoCT channels and it makes a big difference if they can be fast tracked.


- iii. Similarly to the second point made, the intermediary set-up allows for the avoidance of the City's "complicated staffing policies and procedures" which would have significantly delayed the progression of the programme since its launch. In terms of the employment of people working at VPUU intervention sites under contract with the CoCT, progress has been made, however problems which were avoided through by-passing difficult employment procedures were crucial in the first two phases of implementation where timing, partnership development and the maintenance of community support were critical (personal communication, September and October 2012).

The key question that remains for this VPUU staff member concerns how bureaucracy within the CoCT can be reduced to allow them to take over more responsibility for the programme and implement the VPUU methodology where time can be a critical factor. Essentially, the point made was that the VPUU model needs to be tailored not just to the community but also to the governance structures in place, an element that will be key in moving the programme to other areas, beyond the pilot phases.

As much as these features of the intermediary model have proven highly valuable to the survival and success of the VPUU programme thus far, one key objective of the international cooperation programme concerns the mainstreaming of interventions using local government structures. Developments have thus been made towards ensuring that knowledge transfer occurs from the expert consultants to locally employed individuals within the City's governance structures. Although the implementing agent structure remains in place, a number of individuals working within the PMU and on-site at the places of intervention are in fact employed and financed by the CoCT directly. This integration appears to be working well and is seemingly supported by staff members from both sides (personal communication September 2012) who are working within the more established implementation sites. Although, as mentioned above, certain challenges related to staffing regulations and reporting duties still need to be addressed, particularly as the implementing agency withdraws further.

The challenges mentioned in this respect relate primarily to issues of hierarchy and reporting between CoCT and VPUU employees as well as to employment regulations (and benefits) that differ between working for a government institution (CoCT) or a private entity (SUN Developments Pty). As one local employee stated when asked whether or not it matters for whom they work, "definitely it does...it shouldn't matter, but it does" (Interview, September 2012).

Similarly important to the objective of mainstreaming programme implementation, the situation of the VPUU programme within local governance structures has allowed the programme to not only strategically align itself with the focus areas of the CoCT and its local IDP, but so too has the programme aligned to the WCP strategic foci and national objectives that speak to the creation of urban settlements that are inclusive, sustainable and, most importantly, safe (Figure 5.8).



**Figure 5.8.:** VPUU strategic alignment to local, provincial and national development objectives. Source: Elaborated by author.

This alignment, in conjunction with the mainstreaming objectives being targeted, renders VPUU’s potential to contribute to the dissemination and learning from local experiences to inform provincial and national action towards creating safer cities highly significant in that it provides a politically supported, strategically focused basis from which to do so. Such a platform, in the opinion of high-level government officials championing the VPUU programme, presents a great opportunity as this kind of focus and realised implementation of integrated prevention methods is something that has not been seen before (personal communication, October 2012).

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### 5.3.4 Urban upgrading for reductions in violence and improved quality of life: VPUU’s Vision and Mission

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The central purpose and primary aim of the VPUU programme as an international financial co-operation programme is defined by the bi-lateral agreement as “the level of violence in Khayelitsha has reduced and the quality of life and environment quality have improved on a sustainable basis” (Liebermann et al., 2004, p.1). This primary purpose is supported by the VPUU programme’s main goal of reducing violence through urban upgrading and is understood to constitute the short, medium and long term impacts of the range of interventions that constitute the programme as a whole (ibid.).



**Figure 5.9.:** The VPUU programme’s goals and objectives. Source: Elaborated by author.

The desired end result of the initially agreed upon 3-phase<sup>51</sup> programme is to realise;

- i. a reduction of violence in Khayelitsha
- ii. an improvement in the quality of life of residents within the Safe Node Areas (SNAs) and
- iii. an improvement in the quality of the environment in the three initial SNAs. (ibid.).

The overall goals of the VPUU programme that work towards the achievement of the programme’s desired end results include:

- a. The general upgrading of low-income neighbourhoods as well as a better provision of public and private social and commercial services to the population.
- b. The strengthening of the capabilities and competencies of democratic community structures.
- c. An increase in the self-help potential of the population through an improvement of the prospects for local economic activities and income generation.
- d. The introduction of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms to mitigate violent reactions.
- e. Promotion of an effective and integrated justice system within the intervention area with a focus on gender based violence.
- f. The focused mainstreaming of violence prevention planning within Local and Provincial Government Departments.

<sup>51</sup> Agreements to extend the financial cooperation between the CoCT and KfW Development Bank for a further 4th phase have been reached. This phase is projected to begin in 2014 and will primarily concern the mainstreaming and replication of the programme in other areas of CT and the WCP

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In seeking to achieve these outcomes, the programme is structured placing central importance on systematised community engagement and participation, what the programme leadership refers to as the implementation of a holistic, “community-driven approach”. Through such an approach it is deemed feasible that the programme should contribute towards the mitigation of the four main types of exclusion that characterise the areas within which VPUU works: Economic, cultural, social and institutional exclusion.

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#### 5.3.4.1 VPUU target group and beneficiaries

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The original feasibility study for VPUU conducted in 2002 identifies the programme’s target group to be the entire population of Khayelitsha, which it estimates to comprise approximately 700.000 people, although other population estimates are much higher, in excess of 1 million people. Generally, the target group comprises the range of stakeholders who might influence the achievement of the programme’s objectives.

Considering the obvious fact that no programme or intervention can address the entire Khayelitsha area at once, the programme’s direct beneficiaries are identified as being those inhabitants who live immediately adjacent to the three safe node areas (Harare, Kuyasa and Site C), as they will benefit most directly from the programme’s interventions. The beneficiaries of each safe node are estimated to include approximately 50.000 residents. It is thus anticipated that some 150.000 people will directly benefit from the improved conditions and expected safer living environments.

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#### 5.3.5 VPUU approach, methodology and implementation


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The focus of German FC violence prevention programmes was developed in order to specifically address the three key domains that are purported to enable a holistic approach to violence and crime prevention, identified and made popular internationally by the UN-Habitat through its safer cities programme<sup>52</sup>. These key domains, or spheres of intervention as they are referred to in this research, include; the upgrading of the physical environment, engaging and involving local communities in the implementation and management of interventions and a focus on the creation of a supportive political and institutional environment (Figure 5.10).

Drawing on this basis, the VPUU programme and its individual interventions employ a comprehensive approach developed and adapted from this kind of international best-practice experience. As confirmed by programme developers during site visits, each of the “branches” of violence prevention employed draw on both international and local experiences. The overall development of the VPUU concept for violence prevention is fundamentally based on the “assumption that the causes of violence are complex and interrelated and represents a set of linked factors operating at various scales: individual, family, community and society” (VPUU, 2011a)(Interviews, September 2012). Pragmatically, it is the UN-Habitat’s safer cities model

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<sup>52</sup> <http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=375>.




**Figure 5.10.:** German FC - levels of cooperation. Source: Provided by KfW, 2012.

that has formed the basis on which the VPUU programme has taken its lead, focusing on the core branches of situational, social and institutional prevention interventions, constituting their integrated approach (Figure 5.11).

In addition to the foundational concept of integrating situational, institutional and social development approaches to violence prevention, the VPUU programme draws heavily on other international best-practices in placing key importance on combining approaches that target not only prevention but also the development of social cohesion, allowing for improved detection through cooperative policing. As a final element, key importance is placed on the role of research and evidence-based knowledge management through monitoring and evaluation practices that allow for continued learning from the experiences being had. Together, these elements constitute the VPUU’s hybrid model for violence prevention (Figure 5.12).

This hybrid model combines the three-pronged safer cities model with the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) life cycle approach, emphasising the importance of “cradle-to-grave” interventions that support early childhood development as well as providing targeted support to vulnerable populations, most particularly youth, women and the elderly. Supporting the delivery of interventions to key population groups, all programme activities recognise the need to develop social capital in realising sustainable neighbourhood development. The development of social cohesion through participatory practices and the encouragement of active citizenship is thus viewed as key to realising implementation and the sustainability of interventions across the various situational, institutional and social spheres. The following sections outline the main focus, objectives and interventions associated with each of these interrelated branches of prevention in order to demonstrate the various levels at which the VPUU programme operates.



**Figure 5.11.:** Situational, social and institutional approaches to violence prevention as part of the VPUU approach. Source: VPUU, 2011.


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### 5.3.5.1 Situational prevention

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Situational crime prevention often referred to in practice as environmental (urban) upgrading draws primarily on theories of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) (See chapter 1). Urban design principles developed under the CPTED umbrella target the redesign of urban space, particularly public space, with the aim of reducing the opportunity for crime to occur.

Within the VPUU programme, significant focus is placed on situational interventions in that the identified communities experiencing the highest occurrences of violence and crime, such as Khayelitsha, are expressively deprived in terms of the quality of the urban environment, lacking usable public space and facilities. Situational interventions include all the physical upgrading activities that VPUU has implemented such as the provision of community infrastructure and well lit, paved walkways connected by active boxes that encourage more community activity through the provision of usable public spaces, which in turn seek to enhance passive policing through the provision of “more eyes on the street” (Interview, September 2012). Furthermore, VPUU’s concept of situational upgrading extends beyond the mere physical elements of upgrading purported through CPTED methodologies in placing significant focus on community participation in the prioritisation of physical upgrading interventions. Active citizenship and ownership of delivered infrastructure is also assured through enabling the community to partake in the post-delivery operations and management of the relevant infrastructures.



**Figure 5.12.:** VPUU’s hybrid approach to violence prevention. Source: (VPUU, 2012).

The situational element of the programme constitutes the vast majority of programme resources used. Up until the completion of phase 2 of the programme in 2011, 76% of the overall programme funding has been allocated to situational interventions (VPUU, 2011b, p.85).

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### 5.3.5.2 Institutional prevention

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Institutional prevention initiatives are fundamentally concerned with the development of key partnerships between all stakeholders, including local communities as well as both public and private entities. The VPUU programme focuses on institutional prevention on two important levels: Firstly, institutional prevention in terms of on-the-ground implementation is concerned with garnering support and community involvement, identifying local community resources and establishing community linkages with the aim of developing social capital and thus improving community cohesion. This basis of social capital and community involvement is central to the necessary establishment of community structures that support more formal forms of violence prevention, for example, local neighbourhood watches and cooperative partnerships with area-based Community Policing Forums (CPFs) and the South African Police Services (SAPS). Also, as part of the institutionalisation process at this level, operations and maintenance plans that ensure community ownership and direct activity in the management of the infrastructure provided are being implemented.

Secondly, as part of the overall VPUU programme, institutional prevention also refers to the necessity to strengthen local government capacities and institutional cooperation both between line departments at City level as well as between local, provincial and national government structures (horizontal and vertical collaboration). Improving institutional cooperation in this

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way seeks to establish the ability of local governments to do more in addressing violence and crime holistically. This kind of holistic approach requires prevention focus to be placed on the creation of liveable urban spaces and the implementation of economic and social development policies that are supported by appropriate policing mechanisms as opposed to limiting violence and crime prevention to the mandate of law enforcement and the criminal justice system alone. Key to this is the mainstreaming of VPUU's principles, methods and knowledge gained through their empirical implementation experiences throughout local, provincial and eventually national government structures. In this context, programme leaders envisage that this kind of principled mainstreaming approach is necessary for the "replication" of the programme elsewhere as state-driven implementation would be better realised on the back of VPUU's "tried and tested" approach (Interview, September 2012).

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### 5.3.5.3 Social Prevention

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As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, social violence/crime prevention focuses on the development of local populations and improved standards of living, which are linked to reductions in violence and crime. Interventions are focused on stimulating self-help methods that contribute to community development at the local scale. Social prevention also includes the provision of access to community-based services, such as legal advice and community support mechanisms, most importantly victim counselling services.

As part of the VPUU programme these objectives are achieved through a) the establishment of the Social Development Fund (SDF) for Khayelitsha which provides small grants (500 - 5000 South African Rand) to community-based projects, run by local residents that support social development and well-being and b) through partnerships with local NGOs and CBOs, for example the Simelela partnership and its rape crisis and counselling centre, which provides 24 hour services for victims of sexual and domestic violence<sup>53</sup>. The institutionalisation of partnerships, supported by VPUU's approach that aims to draw in contributions by both local and provincial government departments as well as the nationally controlled SAPS is recognised as a key factor in being able to develop social prevention initiatives such as the SDF and Simelela Partnership (Interview, October 2012).

Additionally, targeted social development interventions in Khayelitsha specifically address children and youth, where early childhood development and youth-oriented interventions seek to break the cycle of violence and crime by addressing social issues pertinent to the provision of opportunities for young people. Previous cooperation experience in Colombia's capital city Bogota demonstrated the value of focused preventative work with youth, a former experience on which VPUU's social prevention initiatives draw. Similarly the potential of these initiatives to be linked to broader social development interventions that enable and support communities to realise self-help projects in cooperation with local NGOs drew on prior experience gained with a programme implemented through the KfW in El Salvador where the programme realised

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<sup>53</sup> <http://www.mosaic.org.za/simelela.html>.

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a number of social development objectives through leveraging the services of a local NGO, FUNDASAL (Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima), an NGO focused on social development initiatives in the city<sup>54</sup>.

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### 5.3.6 Principles for Implementation and VPUU's eight steps to healthy development

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*“As part of the methodology you ensure you have a good foundation, your foundation being the community”*

*– VPUU community participation expert, September 2012*

As a holistic approach the VPUU programme highlights the importance of investing a significant amount of time in local residents and their people-centred approach is based on a set of 7 core principles that programme management deems necessary to achieving implementation of healthy development processes. These concepts include:

1. Trust
2. Accountability
3. Voluntarism
4. Participatory approach
5. Developmental approach
6. Mutually beneficial
7. Local ownership.

(VPUU Programme - AHT Group, 2011)

These fundamental principles that drive all VPUU programme implementation processes is essential to the “research-based and highly participatory methodology” they employ (Interview, September 2012). This methodology constitutes 8 distinct elements that form the lifecycle of the programme (Figure 5.13).

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
#### 5.3.6.1 Ensuring a-political community representation

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Supported by continuing capacity development and mentorship through the establishment of partnerships the VPUU implementation process begins only once the formation of a representative community structure known as a Safe Node Area Committee (SNAC) has been secured. The SNAC is made up of 16 “seats” taken up by community members that represent the various stakeholder groups identified during initial community consultations and an in-depth stakeholder analysis conducted by VPUU's community participation team. This process requires

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<sup>54</sup> <http://www.fundasal.org.sv/>



**Figure 5.13.:** The VPUU’s 8-step methodology. Source: (VPUU, 2012).

significant engagement with communities so as to identify all the respective “players”, based on the creation of awareness around the VPUU programme and its mandate.


Overall, this representative structure constitutes local residents who represent a variety of community functions from religious institutions to local early childhood development centres and business (informal and formal) owners. SNAC Committees are made up of representatives that speak in the interest of the function that they represent and a 50/50 balance is kept between SNAC members who represent community-based (CBOs) or Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and those that represent civil society interests (Figure 5.14).

***“SNAC is a body a made up of local community representatives who are a driving force/agent for a specific development project”***

*– VPUU ToR for Safe Node Development Committees*

Despite the fact that participation is levied on a voluntary basis, the normal procedure for setting up a SNAC revolves around extended, sometimes very difficult, negotiation processes. One primary challenge in establishing the SNAC was cited by a community participation work-stream manager as being the necessity to explain the reasons behind the creation of an entirely new representative structure. In many communities, formerly established representative (usually politically oriented) structures are already in place but despite this the VPUU programme insists on starting fresh. The underlying motive in this approach concerns the establishment of a representative community body that is not, as far as possible, influenced disproportionately by any single stakeholder group.

The aim is to establish an equal footing on which programme engagement can be based. This is a process which is described as requiring significant amounts of patience. Regardless of the length of time this takes the VPUU programme does not begin any form of implementation until this representative structure is in place. For example, VPUU staff emphasised during a site visit (September 2012) that delays in implementation in the Site C section of Khayelitsha were



**Figure 5.14.:** Safe Node Area Committee Structure. Source: Adapted from (2012, p.33).

largely attributable to a particularly tenuous relationship with community members, where trust and community buy-in was difficult to establish. In this instance it took four years to properly engage the community and establish a functional SNAC. In Harare this process took approximately one year.

When questioned on the importance of this a VPUU staff member and participation work-stream leader reiterated the fact that in order to get these kinds of integrated programmes moving you need a proper foundation and that foundation is the community (Interview, September 2012). The VPUU approach believes strongly in the idea that without community participation beyond problem analysis a healthy development process is not possible and that without community ownership of the interventions (particularly physical infrastructure) being delivered, no intervention would be sustainable long term. Once established, all SNAC members undergo leadership and community management training, including elements of how to run a workshop and deal with potential conflicts that may arise during further negotiations. This training occurs over a period of eight training sessions<sup>55</sup> and once complete the SNAC oversees the undertaking of the baseline surveys in close cooperation with VPUU staff. During an on-site opportunistic

<sup>55</sup> These initial training sessions are supported by monthly mentoring sessions which address any on-going issues that community representatives may be faced with and provides further training in leadership, negotiation and conflict resolution methods.

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interview, a SNAC committee member for Monwabisi Park<sup>56</sup> described his training experience and involvement with SNAC as “tremendously good”, something he attributed directly to the training he received in order to become a community mediator. According to the same SNAC member, the mediation training was especially important in that it had been delivered by staff from the University of Cape Town.

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### 5.3.6.2 Establishing the status quo: Baseline data and crime mapping

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In all identified areas of implementation a baseline survey is undertaken within the targeted community. According to VPUU’s team leader for monitoring and evaluation these baseline surveys typically account for a random sample covering 10% of the surrounding population<sup>57</sup>. Despite random selection distribution of sample data from all areas within the community is ensured through the use of GIS-based geo-location methods. In addition to random samples, specific points of interest to the VPUU programme including local businesses and community-run services such as kindergardens and soup kitchens are also surveyed. In ensuring community involvement from the start and in order to develop buy-in, fieldworkers who collect the baseline data are employed by the programme from within the local population. The responsibility for the selection of fieldworkers is often driven by the SNAC.

The baseline survey typically comprises four key sections including i) household composition (number of people per household, education level, income, employment status etc), ii) land tenure issues (particularly in terms of informal settlement areas), iii) existing community services, infrastructure and disaster history and iv) perceptions on crime and safety. As a final step, surveyed residents are given the opportunity to make suggestions as to how to improve safety in their community (Figure 5.15).

Essentially, the baseline survey provides all the necessary baseline data on which the monitoring and evaluation of interventions is conducted. In conjunction with the carrying out of the baseline survey, community focus groups are established through which a process of participatory rapid appraisal is conducted. Using large aerial maps of the areas community members map out problematic areas perceived to be most dangerous in terms of crime and victimization.

Similarly, along with the identification of core areas of concern, the mapping process likewise requires communities to establish the presence of existing community assets around which prioritised interventions can focus. The baseline survey along with the information drawn on the core problems and opportunities identified by the community, informs the drafting of a local area development strategy, commonly referred to by VPUU as the Community Action Plan (CAP).


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### 5.3.6.3 Resource allocation through community action planning

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<sup>56</sup> Monwabisi Park is an informal settlement neighbouring the Harare site and is officially part of the Informal Settlements Transformation Programme (ISTP)

<sup>57</sup> Workshop presentation on the implementation of the VPUU methodology, September 2012



**Figure 5.15.:** Baseline Data Surveys. Source: Elaborated by author.

*“In the Community Action Planning process people are considered to be the primary resource rather than the objects of development.”*

*– UN-Habitat (nd, p. 13)*

Modelled based on the experience of international community action planning best-practices<sup>58</sup> the in-depth community participation activities undertaken within the VPUU methodology culminate in the development of a highly specific, area-based community action plan (CAP).

The established CAP details community-identified priorities for short, medium and long-term intervention and essentially acts as what programme management refers to as a “mini IDP” for the area. One of the most important elements in the development of any CAP according to UN-Habitat’s Community Development Unit (<http://www.unhabitat.org>) is the compatibility of these plans with local municipality development objectives. VPUU similarly acknowledges the need to align the development of the CAPs with the CoCT’s IDP strategies. This is something that has been achieved according to VPUU staff on the basis that the existing IDP, despite providing core pillars for citywide development, only speaks to the role of the City. The CAP therefore focuses on alignment with the City’s core strategies however also places emphasis on the role that the community itself will play in ensuring the achievement of set development objectives. It is on this basis that the VPUU implementing agency and City-employed staff oversee the allocation of resources. This process is something that the VPUU programme contends as being a unique experience in community-driven development in South Africa (Interview September 2012).

<sup>58</sup> Vulnerability and capability assessment (VCA) methods and the establishment of community action plans on the basis of intense local participation are approaches adopted from the experiences of international organisations such as UN-Habitat’s Community Development Unit in urban upgrading and the International Federation of the Red Cross in relation to post-disaster and conflict recovery processes.

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It is on the basis of the CAP and the respective resource allocations that prioritised interventions are designed so that implementation may begin. On-going processes of monitoring and evaluation are undertaken during all implementation phases and plans are developed for the operations, maintenance and management of the resultant infrastructure. Not only is community participation key to these processes as outlined above, but so too is the ownership and management of facilities by local community members, some of whom receive additional training and subsequent employment as community facility managers.

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#### 5.3.6.4 Monitoring and evaluation


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Within the VPUU programme methodology monitoring and evaluation are seen as an on-going priority. From the beginning of implementation the perception of safety in the intervention areas is monitored on a weekly basis. As part of this process, respondents are asked to rank their perception of safety within particular settings (i.e. while at home during the day, while at home at night, when travelling to work or waiting for public transport). A rank of 0 represents a perception of absolute unsafety whereas a ranking of 10 represents a feeling of absolute safety. As is discussed in more detail further on in this chapter, the VPUU programme seeks to achieve an average perception of safety rating of at least 5 for an extended monitoring period of at least 2 months. This has yet to be achieved at the time of the most recent site visits (September-October 2012), with the average perception of safety hovering around the 4.2-4.5 mark.

To put this in perspective, in Harare the baseline survey estimated a perception of safety rating of 2.8. Programme report documentation as well as personal correspondence with VPUU staff responsible for the monitoring and evaluation processes view the intensive monitoring efforts on the perception of safety as one of the programme's key strengths in that they provide a good basis from which learning can occur based on the pilot interventions, supporting the transfer of the VPUU approach to other areas. Evaluation reports that outline the achievements of each programme phase as it draws to a close collate the outcomes monitored with the programme's core objectives, however there is still a way to go before any solid medium and long term impacts can be assessed based on the fact that in the original pilot site of Harare implementation is still within its first ten years.

Overall, insight into the VPUU programme's approach and methodology involves a number of parallel activities, which extend from the basis of community buy-in and participation in order to realise interventions across the spheres of situational, institutional and social prevention.

The implementation of this kind of integrated approach thus requires the carefully structured establishment of priorities and coordinated efforts in line with the overall approach, implementation principles and methodology so as to deliver coordinated yet also highly independent action across the various spheres of implementation. In order to achieve this, the VPUU methodology is delivered through an organisational structure that consists of five dedicated departments, referred to within the programme as workstreams.



**Figure 5.16.:** VPUU's five workstreams. Source: VPUU, 2011.

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#### 5.3.6.5 Coordinated yet independent action for delivering integrated violence prevention

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The VPUU programme's organisational structure is formulated around a process of independent yet integrated workstreams. The five workstreams relate directly to the five core elements that are perceived necessary in ensuring a healthy development process and include three workstreams dedicated to the three core pillars of intervention – situational prevention, institutional prevention and social prevention – as well as two cross-cutting workstreams that focus specifically on community participation and knowledge management (monitoring and evaluation) (Figure 5.16).

Each of these workstreams has independent mandates worked on within the workstream teams. All activities are however aligned with the overall approach and implementation principles of VPUU as a whole and regular meetings occur so that progress can be gauged and plans developed for on-going implementation. This kind of coordinated independence is necessary so as to ensure that all elements work towards the achievements of the overarching programme objectives. The functional mandate of each of the five workstreams is detailed briefly:

##### **Workstream on situational crime prevention:**

The situational crime prevention workstream designs and implements situational upgrading projects for the designated Safe Node Areas. This includes a particular focus on the construction of safe pedestrian walkways, neighbourhood facilities, sport and recreational facilities, public buildings (e.g. libraries) and business premises. Importantly for the interventions, all buildings and facilities are designed to have more than one function to encourage multipurpose use.

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### **Workstream on institutional crime prevention:**

The institutional crime prevention workstream targets means of stimulating local economic development, improved partnerships with state and civil organisations to support community delivery of services and ultimately seeks to realise financial sustainability using an area based approach, ensuring the longer-term viability of the initial and subsequent interventions.

### **Workstream on social crime prevention:**

The social crime prevention workstream leads interventions that involve developing and ensuring the viability of local patrols and neighbourhood watch in cooperation with community police forums (CPFs) as well as supporting the implementation of the Social Development Fund (SDF), early childhood development (ECD) programmes and the provision of free legal advice regarding civil matters. A core focus of this workstream concerns the development of interventions that specifically seek to reduce gender-based violence.

### **Community participation workstream:**

The community participation workstream, as a central, cross-cutting principle of the entire VPUU programme, is dedicated to community participation, ensuring dialogue and participatory engagement with communities. Importantly, this workstream is present and accessible in the intervention areas so that people become aware of VPUU and its interventions and is directly responsible for coordinating the establishment of the community representation forum (SNAC).

### **Knowledge management workstream:**

The VPUU programme places significant value on knowledge management due to the realisation that violence is a highly complex social problem with no one overarching solution. In this sense knowledge management refers to gaining insight and understanding the impact that programme interventions have on communities through on-going monitoring and evaluation activities. The refinement of the overall VPUU approach and increasing the value of the programme's contribution to integrated urban planning for violence prevention relies on continuous monitoring and evaluation of the programme's interventions and will also provide an increasingly important basis on which the programme can be adapted to suit additional contexts, based on detailed experiences of what has worked well and what may need to be re-thought. It is therefore the knowledge management workstream that assumes the lead responsibility for the programme's monitoring and evaluation set-up in developing and coordinating the baseline survey activities and the household surveys used to determine any changes in perceptions of safety.

A key aim of this workstream is also to publicise and disseminate information on the programme's activities, for example through the development of VPUU Handbooks which collate and summarise the programme's implementation experiences. These are seen as a valuable resource to be distributed to key stakeholders and experts in the fields of urban planning and violence prevention, which in turn supports the programme's mainstreaming objectives.

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On another level, the knowledge management side of VPUU is also concerned with the role that academic research plays in furthering the development of the programme's methodology. The complexity of violence and crime as fundamentally social problems is recognised and confirmed by the VPUU programme and therefore much value is placed on both learning from experience (practice) as well as on establishing and developing strategic partnerships with local universities such as the University of Cape Town (UCT) and other research institutions of which the Medical Research Council (MRC) is one example<sup>59</sup>. As seen in relation to community training, some elements of which are delivered in cooperation with UCT, the partnerships with these kinds of institutions extends beyond the undertaking of purely academic research that may inform implementation. One idea that was presented was the concept of having intervention areas "adopted" by universities or research institutions so that research can be better coordinated and resources shared in terms of yielding useful results that may inform intervention development (Interview September 2012). VPUU project leaders do however underscore the fact that although such relationships can bring many advantages they do need to be carefully managed, particularly since research involvement can impact on the established relationship and levels of trust between the programme and the community.

To provide a concrete example, an experience was had with the VPUU programme where a group of students were given a real-life practice case to work on, designing a community centre for one of the intervention areas. The community centre was part of the established community action plan and had been agreed upon with the community at large. Once the designs were completed however certain copyright issues arose resulting in the fact that the design could not be built. The failure to deliver on promises made impacted significantly on the relationship with the community and the implementation process therefore lost some credibility. This example is illustrative of the caution with which these kinds of external interactions with communities need to be handled as unintended consequences can arise and need to be managed.

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### 5.3.7 Programme outcomes, key achievements and lessons learnt

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This case study by no means intends to be representative of a fully comprehensive evaluation of the VPUU programme, something which is far beyond the scope of such a limited case study, confined by finite resources and restricted time spent gathering the information being presented here. What this section does do however is provide an overview of the implementation experience of the VPUU programme thus far and raises some points on the primary achievements that have been made and key lessons that have been learnt. These achievements, and more importantly the lessons learnt, provide the basis from which this study engages in-depth with the challenge of programme transfer, referred to commonly by programme staff as "the scaling-up" of the VPUU programme through expansion into other areas.

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<sup>59</sup> This recognition of the value of pursuing research-based approaches to tackling violence and crime is further supported by the expressed interest in collaboration and provision of internships for students from various Universities, including the TU Darmstadt.

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### 5.3.7.1 Outcomes and achievements

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The VPUU programme is delivered through a series of pre-defined, pre-funded phases for which particular objectives have been established. In short, phase one involved ensuring the set-up of the programme and the establishment of functional institutional systems and procedures within the CoCT and with programme partners and external stakeholders as well as the concept development and preparatory work towards implementation in the original SNAs, Harare, Kuyasa and Site C.

Phase two concentrated on the first implementation processes in the SNAs of Harare and Kuyasa as well as the elaboration of an extended crime prevention model for low income areas in conjunction with plans for the enablement of rental income from built interventions and infrastructure developments that would co-finance the operations and maintenance of these facilities, employing local people.

Phase three focused on the consolidation of the initial implementation projects as well as the extension of the programme to other SNAs in Khayelitsha as well as on establishing mainstreaming approaches that would allow the methodology to be adopted by local government for implementation in other areas. Particular to this phase in terms of transfer, is the adaptation of the VPUU approach to the informal settlement context and the use of the approach in other CoCT operations and the preparation for “replication into additional areas” (Interview, September 2012). The topic of programme “replication” in other parts of Cape Town and the Western Cape Province is highly pertinent at this stage as the recently agreed upon fourth phase of the VPUU programme intends to specifically target the mainstreaming and replication of the approach to other municipalities in the Western Cape Province. A specific feasibility study has been completed in determining how the fourth phase should progress from mid 2014 onwards, detailing a number of methods by which the ability of the programme could best be implemented elsewhere (Rudner and Boulle, 2011). This feasibility study and the options it presents for programme transfer is discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter (subsection 1.3.3).

In providing more detailed insight into the first three stages of implementation thus far, Table 5.3 provides a detailed overview and summary of the VPUU phases of implementation, phase-specific objectives, major achievements and the various challenges experienced during each phase. This information is drawn on from documentation accessed through the KfW archives (on-site archive work, April 2012), including VPUU progress reports, terms of reference and meeting minutes, as well as through personal correspondence with VPUU programme staff.

**Table 5.3.: VPUU programme objectives, achievements and challenges. Source: Elaborated by author from multiple sources**

Project phase	Phase-specific objectives	Interim results	Major achievements	Phase-specific challenges
Phase I 2005 - 2007	<p>The building and functioning of three SNAs: Harare, Kuyasa and Site C. The establishment and operation of the SDF fund to financially assist small-scale neighbourhood-based projects. Training and advice to be administered to the community and to the facility maintenance workers in the SNAs.</p> <p>The Khayelitsha Project Management Team has been set up and operates within the enabling environment for urban renewal in the City of Cape Town.</p>	<p>Baseline studies were completed and analysed in two of the SNAs (Harare and Kuyasa).</p> <p><b>Situational CP:</b> Planning conducted with support and input of local community in Harare and Kuyasa.</p> <p><b>Social CP:</b> Safety patrols developed - made up of civilians to be present in SNA to improve safety - were paid using system of "points" redeemable for training courses. Established based on baseline survey results as an identified "need".</p> <p>Training exchange system developed and implemented in Kuyasa and Harare. Set up of initiative to address gender-based violence in cooperation with Simelela an established local NGO - active in all SNAs.</p> <p>Social development fund (SDF) implemented with a total of 19 funded projects (66 applications), focusing primarily on children and youth.</p> <p>Local capacity development - Implementation of training courses on organisational development and conflict management - 343 people received training.</p> <p><b>Institutional CP:</b> Baseline study informed plans for local economic development. VPUU team developed M&amp;O philosophy for the management and organisation of SNAs by local citizens - training in Harare began.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation - participation processes ensured through local community inclusion, community surveys and regular reports delivered to local communities concerning project progress.</p> <p>Mainstreaming - Guidelines on the VPUU approach presented to the CoCT.</p>	<p>VPUU presents a coordinated approach to violence prevention. The approach allows for flexibility to include additional project components where necessary allowing for new opportunities to be incorporated and made use of.</p> <p>Due to the strong involvement of the local community a sense of ownership on the part of the population could be achieved.</p> <p>The establishment of partnerships with national and regional partners enabled a wide network of organisations, allowing for multi-level interaction and linkages.</p> <p>Flexibility of funding allocation was ensured through SDF and the maintenance of a separate budget external to the CoCT finance system.</p> <p>Major successes have been achieved in mobilising additional resources: The Ministry of Finance and the Development Bank of South Africa, for example, have pledged additional funding. FIFA also expressed willingness to support the project prior to the 2010 World Cup.</p> <p>VPUU programme presented at international conference on violence prevention in cities through participation.</p>	<p>Potentially negative impacts to the project inputs have not been identified - some of the measures might create detrimental effects, which need to be considered. For example, improved local infrastructure might encourage greater numbers of local beneficiaries to access these during the evening hours when it is dark. This could lead to increased opportunities for criminal activity. However, it is assumed that the greater number of legitimate users will increase the risk for criminals thus these impacts could balance each other out.</p> <p>The risks attached to achieving the overall objectives as per monitoring schedule: impacts and outcomes are considered medium-high owing to the difficulties attached to measuring violence reductions and much of the violence being caused by issues beyond the control of the programme. For this reason the targets have been set at achievable rates but are dependent on the carrying out of the baseline and follow up victim and/or quality of life surveys.</p> <p>A number of implementation challenges were experienced. E.g. Approvals by the Planning and the Environment Agency were delayed and thus hindered planned construction in Harare and Kuyasa SNAs.</p> <p>Scheduled meetings between VPUU and city council departments were not held as regularly as planned.</p>

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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page

Project phase	Phase-specific objectives	Interim results	Major achievements	Phase-specific challenges
Phase II 2007 - 2011	<p>The general population and specifically women should experience noticeable improvements in safety by the end of the Phase, achieving a measure of at least 5 on the survey scale for more than two months. To be measured through surveys using a scale from 1 (totally unsafe) to 10 (completely safe).</p> <p>Exemplary buildings and groups of buildings will be constructed to illustrate the guidelines of situational violence prevention (CPTED).</p> <p>Sustainable use and operation of the infrastructure is to be realised.</p> <p>Sustainable use and operation of the activities funded through the SDF is to be assessed.</p> <p>Number of civil society organisations working in the field of violence prevention should be increased.</p> <p>Principles of urban planning for violence/crime prevention are to be anchored within the CoCT and Province.</p>	<p>The perception of safety has risen from 2.8 to 4.3 over the recent 28 month period (evaluation July 2009).</p> <p>Phase 2 saw the development of an urban park including the FIFA "Football for Hope Centre", three additional Active Boxes, sports venues on a local school campus, a public square, craftsman houses and well constructed and lit walkway connections. Agreements with Khayelitsha Community Trust (KCT) successfully in place. Competent user groups and facility management within KCT exist.</p> <p>More than 100 non-profit micro-projects (e.g. crèches, Music groups, sports, gardens) have been funded locally by the SDF.</p> <p>The network of partners (local NGOs, University of Western Cape) was further expanded and thus also the range of social violence prevention initiatives.</p> <p>4 new offices for Social CP initiatives were established. The quality of services by NGO's and CBO's has risen. Simelela staff members increased by 15%.</p> <p>City and Province approved VPUU safety principles and they have been made part of the IDP and used in other projects. VPUU approach is planned to be rolled out in Manenberg.</p>	<p>The programme exceeded in all areas of implementation in relation to the agreed goals. According to the programme, the murder rate has dropped in Khayelitsha in the last year by an estimated 30%, while it has increased nationally by 2%.</p> <p>Construction of a "house of learning", based on the VPUU principles implemented by the Social Services of the CoCT. Furthermore, the Western Cape Department of Education (adult education), a music foundation (in arts education) and local neighbourhood groups (as caretaker/security) are involved in the planning and construction to provide an integrated solution for the benefit of local residents. This allowed for better use of existing resources in terms of the needs of the population and reduces running costs for the CoCT.</p> <p>Major success achieved in institutional prevention - all constructed facilities have a clear user-group capable of managing the facilities either directly or through an intermediary consisting of local groups and programme partners. Training and coaching courses are offered and financial plans are in place for some of the facilities. Management training manuals have been developed.</p> <p>Significant improvements in public participation. Active participation in planning supported by regular meetings at the neighbourhood level (fortnightly) and on the overall project level (monthly). Local solutions have been developed and planned.</p> <p>In the area of knowledge management, the existing monitoring system was developed. The weekly household interviews continued, supplying valuable information on the impacts and levels of goal achievements to the programme.</p>	<p>Most challenges relate to operational and institutional issues, attributed to the fast-growing and successful nature of the programme.</p> <p>The programme's success in Harare and Kuyasa has led to raised community expectations in other areas and has resulted in some "unrealistic expectations" from both communities and politicians alike.</p> <p>The management of the SDF in providing easily accessible funds without causing community divisions as well as development of measurement instrument to assess the impact of the SDF</p> <p>Government approaches to LED in Khayelitsha remain top-down, disjointed and broad in scope thus not in alignment with VPUU strategies and objectives.</p> <p>Challenges experienced in institutional arrangements regarding the ownership, management and maintenance of facilities, which hampered community ownership.</p> <p>Delayed appointment of technical staff due to bureaucratic processes within the CoCT delayed development of operations and maintenance strategies.</p> <p>Marketing and improved use/occupation of built facilities particularly in terms of rent-paying clients to improve financial sustainability.</p>

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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page

Project phase	Phase-specific objectives	Interim results	Major achievements	Phase-specific challenges
<p><b>Project phase</b> Phase III (on-going) 2011 - 2014</p>	<p><b>Phase-specific objectives</b> Situational violence prevention - consolidation/ completion of construction projects in Harare and Kuyasa. Legalities for planning implementation in Site C will be conducted and situational interventions to begin. The incorporation of urban economy as a planning layer is to be tested in Site C. Financial sustainability application in Harare as well as the setting up of a financial system in Kuyasa and Site C is a focus of Phase 3 supported by strategic partnership development with a service provider to assist with Business Development Support. In TR Section and Monwabisi Park - legal planning documents developed in parallel with the implementation of the first construction projects.</p>	<p><b>Interim results</b> Growing positive relationship with the CoCT Specialised Technical Services (STS) Facility Management Department Gazetting of the Harare-litha Park Trading Plan is a practical example of institutionalising an approach via strong community participation and City and Council legal processes. Gazetting of the Harare and Kuyasa Trading Plans has been achieved. This significantly supports the operations and maintenance of the facilities provided. The CoCT employed an O&amp;M Work stream manager; also an important step towards mainstreaming. Close relationship with Metro Police has been developed around the provision of Neighbourhood Safety Officers in the VPUU areas</p>	<p><b>Major achievements</b> “VPUU is increasingly realizing an understanding of the concept of interdisciplinarity in the city administration. The project is gaining more interest from City departments that have previously not worked together and there is an improvement in willingness of City and Provincial departments to cooperate. Additionally, partnerships with the South African National Ministry of Finance have been strengthened.” The CoCT has created a further 9 staff positions to be dedicated to the VPUU project within the city. Representatives of the city administration and the responsible national Ministry (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs - CoGTA) have presented the concept internationally at the World Urban Forum 5 in Rio de Janeiro 2010. South Africa also presented the project at the Expo 2010 in Shanghai and interest from local municipalities in VPUU methods continues to grow.</p>	<p><b>Phase-specific challenges</b> Trading plan development for the areas is very labour-intensive. The majority of challenges faced in Phase 3 involve organisational issues attributed to the fast growing nature of the organisation. Operational challenges such as delayed plan approvals for construction projects, delays in supply chain management processes, frustrations concerning unfulfilled expectations by VPUU and/or CoCT line departments were also faced. External factors such as the change in ward boundaries have also had a major impact on the ability to deliver interventions. For example, in Kuyasa, a shift in a ward boundary resulted in the location for the regional library falling into another ward creating conflict over the access to resources.</p>
<p><b>Project phase</b> Phase III (on-going) 2011 - 2014</p>	<p><b>Phase-specific objectives</b> Situational violence prevention - consolidation/ completion of construction projects in Harare and Kuyasa. Legalities for planning implementation in Site C will be conducted and situational interventions to begin. The incorporation of urban economy as a planning layer is to be tested in Site C. Financial sustainability application in Harare as well as the setting up of a financial system in Kuyasa and Site C is a focus of Phase 3 supported by strategic partnership development with a service provider to assist with Business Development Support. In TR Section and Monwabisi Park - legal planning documents developed in parallel with the implementation of the first construction projects.</p>	<p><b>Interim results</b> Growing positive relationship with the CoCT Specialised Technical Services (STS) Facility Management Department Gazetting of the Harare-litha Park Trading Plan is a practical example of institutionalising an approach via strong community participation and City and Council legal processes. Gazetting of the Harare and Kuyasa Trading Plans has been achieved. This significantly supports the operations and maintenance of the facilities provided. The CoCT employed an O&amp;M Work stream manager; also an important step towards mainstreaming. Close relationship with Metro Police has been developed around the provision of Neighbourhood Safety Officers in the VPUU areas</p>	<p><b>Major achievements</b> The communities in which VPUU operates tend to see VPUU as a desirable programme, which enables trust and workable partnerships. The area based inclusive approach towards urban upgrading has received full support at all local administration levels and from the political leadership. CoCT staff members take the lead in implementation of VPUU approach and methodology in Hanover Park, demonstrating effective mainstreaming and acceptance/integration of approaches at local government level. Provides foundation for continued replication (transfer) of the programme.</p>	<p><b>Phase-specific challenges</b> Trading plan development for the areas is very labour-intensive. The majority of challenges faced in Phase 3 involve organisational issues attributed to the fast growing nature of the organisation. Operational challenges such as delayed plan approvals for construction projects, delays in supply chain management processes, frustrations concerning unfulfilled expectations by VPUU and/or CoCT line departments were also faced. External factors such as the change in ward boundaries have also had a major impact on the ability to deliver interventions. For example, in Kuyasa, a shift in a ward boundary resulted in the location for the regional library falling into another ward creating conflict over the access to resources.</p>

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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page

Project phase	Phase-specific objectives	Interim results	Major achievements	Phase-specific challenges
	<p>Active boxes (neighbourhood centres), public toilets and water points to be built during phase 3.</p> <p>Social violence prevention - existing partnerships will continue to be strengthened.</p> <p>Work with the various departments of the City and the target groups are to create an extension of partnerships around violence prevention targeting early childhood education. Nurseries and kindergartens could thus offer improved services to communities.</p> <p>Continuance of work on Community Delivery of Services (CDS) and the support with the O&amp;M system development for ISTP Provision of support for CoCT officials in delivering interventions in the new areas will become more and more important.</p> <p>Institutional violence prevention - it is necessary to continue coaching existing user groups and establish user groups for newly developed buildings (Kuyasa &amp; Site C).</p> <p>In Harare and Kuyasa trading plans are being established for the areas. Similarly the implementation of developed trading plans in the intervention areas will be a major task.</p> <p>Citizen participation - comprehensive neighbourhood development plans as basis from which all municipal departments will deliver services and infrastructure.</p> <p>Knowledge management - realisation of a series of planned interventions based on experience thus far -, replication of the approach to other areas in CT where infrastructure will be financed from municipal funds directly.</p> <p>The development of the VPUU Handbook as well as linkage of the logframe to the concept of "Quality of Life Indicators" envisaged as well as an Impact Assessment in the first half of Phase 3.</p> <p>Mainstreaming - Replication of the VPUU approach to Hanover Park and Manenberg and application of the VPUU methodology within the Informal Settlement Transformation Pilot Programme.</p> <p>The setting up of an entity to ensure VPUU institutional continuation and to prepare for Phase 4 of the programme.</p>	<p>Although significantly delayed the work on the Nongile Station Precinct Plan has commenced in Site C and community participation process has started</p> <p>A Contextual Framework was designed to understanding the broader planning work and linkage to Harare VPUU projects.</p> <p>The partnership approach in providing social services to communities continues to be a strength.</p> <p>A clear strategy has been developed and is followed through that provides access to a tailored menu of services per area throughout VPUU</p> <p>Regular meetings with provincial government have allowed for a better integration between interventions within VPUU areas</p> <p><b>Project replication:</b> Hanover Park - full social preparation including SNA underway. No built environment interventions identified yet. Will be developed once community action plan (CAP) is complete.</p> <p>Initiation of second crime prevention initiative in close cooperation with VPUU = Ceasefire project that aims to reduce gang related shootings.</p> <p>Manenberg - no concrete initiatives identified - Hanover Park has been prioritised. Planning for the Manenberg intervention(s) should be complete by end of Phase 3.</p>	<p>On 15.11.2011 the CoCT MAYCO approved the commencement of the "Mayors Urban Regeneration Programme" in eight areas throughout the City, to be implemented in close cooperation with VPUU. Alongside the Informal Settlement Transformation Programme (ISTP) programme, this will be the second major CoCT driven initiative where VPUU methodology is applied.</p> <p>VPUU has worked very closely with the establishment of the Global Network on Safer Cities by UN Habitat.</p> <p>VPUU was shortlisted as one of 6 finalists for the Lee Kuan Yew World City Prize 2012.</p>	<p>Staffing delays within the CoCT remains a challenge as do delays in institutional set up in terms of the authority to deliver services in the field of operation, maintenance and management on an area basis, which leads to reputational damage for the VPUU programme within CoCT line departments and communities.</p> <p>Efforts to re-establish SNACs in various areas required significant attention during phase 3.</p>

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Table 5.3 – Continued from previous page

Project phase	Phase-specific objectives	Interim results	Major achievements	Phase-specific challenges
Phase IV 2014 - onwards	Transfer and implementation of VPUU approaches and methodology in other municipalities within the Western Cape Province.			

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The detailed information presented for each programme phase, along with the empirical evidence collected through site visits and interviews with programme staff and local authorities, allows for the identification of key successes that the programme has realised since its inception. These key achievements include the physical impact of the upgrading efforts, the establishment of workable community relationships and buy-in, the establishment of key political support for integrated prevention initiatives including social development and registered improvements in the perception of safety within safe node areas. Each of these key achievements is discussed in more detail below:

**Key achievement 1 - (Re)humanising the urban environment:**

Arguably the most obvious achievement of the VPUU programme thus far, due to its tangible nature and the relatively limited time of implementation, is the significant impact that the urban upgrading interventions have had on the local environment. From the provision of much-needed infrastructure and the creation of functional public space and well-lit walkways connecting transport hubs and newly constructed neighbourhood centres, the VPUU programme has unarguably delivered in terms of their mandate to improve the urban environment in Khayelitsha as the photo documentation clearly shows:



**Figure 5.17.:** Formalised well-lit walkways connecting the SNAs in Harare. Source: VPUU, 2002; VPUU, 2011.

These kinds of physical environmental upgrades work towards addressing the issue of the urban environment and the situation of dehumanising urban spaces that characterise township and informal settlement areas across Cape Town. These kinds of situational upgrades do not necessarily linearly correlate with reductions in violence and crime in these areas but they certainly (re)humanise them and provide functionality to these spaces, improving usability and thus changing the perception of the urban environment. It is these factors that come together with preventative design principles in contributing to violence prevention. It is crucial here to reiterate the point that design alone cannot achieve prevention but as VPUU experience shows, it is a fundamental basis for integrated prevention in that urban design can be developed in a participatory manner and provides the necessary basis from which institutional and social prevention initiatives can extend. VPUU programme leaders highlight two additional achieve-



**Figure 5.18.:** Harare community centre. Source: VPUU, 2011; Authors own.



**Figure 5.19.:** Usable public space in Harare - Children's playground. Source: Authors own.

ments that are directly affiliated with the successful realisation of this kind of urban upgrading (Interview September/October 2012).

Firstly the VPUU programme has managed to showcase the potential for targeted urban upgrading on an area-based intervention basis, something that has been credited with maintaining the support of local government.

Secondly, and deemed essential to the sustainability of the interventions, physical and otherwise, the programme has been able to develop local partnerships and work with communities through the development of trust based on the delivery of tangible results and an improved environment that encourages community interaction and participation.

A point reinforced through a majority of the interviews conducted with VPUU staff, a lack of trust and community support is always one of the biggest risks to the successful implementation of an intervention, both in the short and longer term. One external expert (Interview, Febru-



**Figure 5.20.:** Harare Library. Source: Authors own.



**Figure 5.21.:** Harare Business Hub, Live-Work Units. Source: VPUU, 2011; Authors own.

ary 2013) who is familiar with the VPUU programme and works in a number of surrounding communities did however raise concern as to the truly extendable impact that such an intensive upgrading programme can really have. This doubt is fuelled once again by the same reiteration that violence prevention overall is reliant on integrated initiatives that in themselves require a strong basis of social cohesion to be present within a community with which programmes such as VPUU can work. The point was then raised that in areas where limited social cohesion exists, which are similarly plagued by violence and crime but are not in as great a need of dramatic urban upgrading interventions, other means by which to establish community buy-in other than the provision of tangible infrastructure needs to be considered when contemplating programme implementation in other areas.

## Key achievement 2 - Community-led partnerships and local government support:

The VPUU integrated area-based approach to sustainable neighbourhood creation with the central aim of reducing violence and crime in highly vulnerable community contexts is not possible without the input and cooperation of a number of public and private stakeholders. As a local community development expert put it “What I’ve found in all my work that regards implementation of interventions the most significant factor in determining the success or failure is people.” (Interview February 2013). People here refers not just to the community members themselves but all people representing the various stakeholder groups, including of course the people situated in local government offices, policing bodies and key NGOs and CBOs interested in working towards common development targets. Accordingly, the establishment and development of partnerships between civil and state entities as well as within state structures has been a primary focus of the VPUU programme from its inception. The necessity for multiple inputs that service the integrated approach relate directly to the recognition of violence and crime as complex problems that cannot be solved without intervention on a number of levels, across all development sectors.

One of the key achievements of the programme is therefore deemed to be the successful community partnerships that have been developed and continue to function within Khayelitsha, albeit of course with some remaining challenges. VPUU’s community and evidence-based approach, which places significant focus on community engagement and participation as well as the creation of democratic community structures that foster active citizenship and instil ownership for the infrastructure provided, has been credited for fostering improved social cohesion. A recent impact assessment of the VPUU’s SDF has shown positive results in terms of stimulating community cohesion (CoCT, 2011b).



**Figure 5.22.:** Community engagement – identifying community assets. Source: Authors own.

Furthermore, the initial successes of VPUU in obtaining and maintaining community support for the programme thus far has enabled the provision of a platform for collaboration both within local government, between line departments, as well as between local and provincial government sectors. The ability of VPUU to leverage interest and support based on the implementation

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work in Khayelitsha was demonstrated through the VPUU stakeholders workshop held in October 2012 at the Harare Library. This workshop brought together both local government and provincial government departments as well as representatives from the SAPS in order to discuss pressing challenges for further interventions. A primary objective was to (for the first time) establish connections between these stakeholders under the common objective of addressing violence and crime that seemingly may not otherwise have occurred (See Appendix B). Personal correspondence (October 2012) with attendees at the workshop confirmed the lack of horizontal and vertical<sup>60</sup> cooperation existent within government structures and bodies. Similarly, during a feedback session attendees also confirmed the need for further workshops of this nature to encourage integration and information exchange between departments. This is seen as a precursor to improving institutional alignment particularly as it relates to agreeing on development objectives, which would in turn allow for improved efficiency in the allocation of available resources, also limiting duplicated efforts.

**Key achievement 3 – Leveraged resources, political backing and raised priority of addressing violence and crime through social development:**

A major success raised on a number of occasions by project leaders during the field research undertaken relates to the successful placement of the VPUU programme within the institutional structures of the CoCT. Specifically, the strong political support that has been garnered and reinforced through the international cooperation with the German Government saw the programme placed directly under the auspices of the Mayor Committee (Mayco). The CoCT is administered according to an executive mayoral system. Under this system the elected mayor of the City is awarded executive authority and appoints the Mayco, which is comprised of 11 councillors representing different areas of municipal government. The placement of the VPUU programme within this structure, as opposed to being situated within any specific line department, has leveraged one of the key benefits of the executive mayoral system, which according to the national Ministry for Cooperative Governance Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), allows for “decisive leadership and rapid and responsive decision-making”<sup>61</sup>. The ability of decision-making to be fast-tracked under the executive mayoral system has been credited with the relatively smooth and rapid progression of VPUU implementation, as it primarily enables the avoidance of bureaucratic “red tape” associated with the functioning of the City’s line departments (Interview October 2012).

Despite the obvious benefits of this situation, which has clearly allowed the VPUU programme to progress relatively unhindered by additional bureaucratic processes in being politically championed within local governance structures, some resentment is evident from external entities. This resentment arises based on the opinion that such preferential treatment for one project

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<sup>60</sup> Horizontal cooperation refers to cooperation between line departments of sectors within local government structures. Vertical cooperation refers to the alignment of common objectives between the various sphere of government, in this instance between the local CoCT government and the Provincial Government of the Western Cape.

<sup>61</sup> See <http://www.cogta.gov.za>

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has only been warranted on the basis of the VPUU programme's strong international support, extensive financial resources and resultant political leverage. Some argue that had the same decision-making access and resources been awarded to other departments and/or existing community-based projects equally beneficial results would have been realised (Personal correspondence September/October 2012).


Notwithstanding these understandable arguments against the preferential placement of any programme, it must also be stated that the VPUU programme has raised the priority of the necessity for violence and crime to be addressed through social development means as opposed to through hard-line policing and law enforcement measures. The extensive political backing that has been achieved is an essential element of extending this realisation beyond the level of local government and aligning common objectives across the three spheres of government. The response from VPUU programme management is that this philosophical change in approach to violence prevention as a social issue will have beneficial effects on all local departments and existing projects.

#### **Key achievement 4 – Reductions in crime and improved perceptions of safety:**

Possibly the most contentious “result” of the programme, project leaders and politicians alike credit the VPUU programme with both actual reductions in violence, particularly violent crime, in and around the SNAs as well as with improvements in the perception of safety in the areas of intervention.

The overall programme objectives included a reduction in the levels of violent crime in the intervention areas by a targeted 25% and a substantial improvement on the perception of safety. In this respect the specific goal was to record perceptions of safety at a level of 5 on a scale of 1 (completely unsafe) to 10 (perfectly safe) for a period of at least two consecutive months. This measurement is determined through weekly household surveys conducted in the SNAs. At the end of 2010, VPUU programme reports claimed a 30% reduction in the murder rate in Khayelitsha, despite a national murder rate increase of 2% over the same assessment period of one year (KfW Entwicklungsbank, 2010). The CoCT quotes similar statistics in stating that the Harare area has experienced a 33% reduction in crime and a 24% reduction in crime throughout Khayelitsha since the start of the VPUU programme (Turner, 2013). However, a number of critics both represented in the media (*ibid.*) as well as experts interviewed for this research question the validity of such statements, primarily due to the fact that such measurements are inherently unreliable largely due to the severity of underreporting and concerns over local police documentation practices and reporting. The most widely accepted indicator of violent crime is the murder rate, as reporting problems are minimised.

Despite a drop in murder recorded by the Harare and Khayelitsha police stations between 2008 and 2011, it must be highlighted that the murder rate has once again begun to rise with a recorded 315 murders for the year 2011/12. This is not dramatically different from the 358 murders recorded in 2003/4, or the 298 murders reported in 2004/5 just prior to the initial implementation of the VPUU programme. Respectively, this represents a decrease in murders



**Figure 5.23.:** Annual number of recorded murders in Khayelitsha, including Harare 2003/4 - 2011/12.


of 12% or alternatively an increase of 5-6%, dependent on which year one refers to as the benchmark (Figure 5.23).

The marked difficulties of relying on violent crime statistics in measuring the impact of interventions is mitigated through the use of perception of safety surveys as in addition to the actual threat of violence, so too does the fear of violence affect the quality of life of local residents, determining daily activities and community interaction (Pain, 2000; Lemanski, 2004; Whitzman, 2007). Therefore, the VPUU programme similarly sought to improve not only the frequency of occurrence of actual violent crime but also to register improvements in the perception of safety within their intervention areas.

The perception of safety in and around the VPUU sites of implementation in Harare are recorded through household surveys and, over the course of the first two phases, the weekly surveys registered an increase in perceived safety from 2,8 in 2008 to 4,3 in 2010/11 (CoCT, 2011b). This measure of 4,3 however remains short of the set objective of VPUU to achieve a perception of safety rating of at least 5 over an extended period of at least two months.

The average measure of the perception of safety is composed of independent measures of perceived safety for a number of individual categories that include the perception of safety at home during the day, at home during the night, walking to public transport during the day, walking to public transport at night, while using public transport, perceived safety in schools and while children are walking to school. Figure 5.24a and Figure 5.24b show the annual average levels of perception for each category as well as the change that has occurred in the perception of safety between 2007 and 2010.

As these figures demonstrate, despite an overall increase in the average perception of safety (2,8 to 4,3) since 2007, this increase can be mainly attributed to improvements in the perception of safety related to public spaces, the primary focus of intervention of the VPUU interventions. Important to note however is that despite the increases in perceived safety for the categories relating to public space, overall, people felt increasingly unsafe at home both during the day and at night in 2010 than in 2007.



**Figure 5.24.:** (a) Annual average perception of safety ratings per category 2007-2010. (b) Registered change in perception per category 2007-2010. Source: VPUU Household Surveys (Aldana Diaz, 2012).

This data is only representative of the situation in Harare as the most progressed VPUU intervention area (SNA) and therefore there is little other data from surrounding areas with which these numbers can be compared at this point. Furthermore, more than one expert interviewed (September 2012; October 2012; January 2013) also raised the question of displacement. Reductions in and around SNAs in the experience of violent crime as well as improvements in perceived safety must in the opinion of these experts be carefully considered in relation to changes in the greater Khayelitsha area and surrounding suburbs due to the potential of interventions in specific areas to result in the displacement of criminal activity to other areas.

As the point is being made, drawing solid impact conclusions on the VPUU programme's ability to significantly reduce violence and crime and improve perceptions of safety in the intervention areas is inherently wrought with challenges. Similarly however, the VPUU's contribution to the upgrading of the urban environment as well as the extended progress made in solidifying institutional partnerships to provide access to infrastructure and services within the SNAs cannot and should not be discounted. Rather monitoring and evaluation practices must continue in order to establish more sound data from which impact can be better assessed. As VPUU implementation continues to progress more focus is being placed on more definitive evaluation and impact assessment methods. The VPUU programme in collaboration with a number of local research institutions and experts have successfully submitted a proposal (2013) to the IDRC<sup>62</sup> for a research project entitled "Evaluating the effectiveness of urban upgrading for violence prevention in selected low income communities in the Western Cape Province, South Africa". The aim of the research is to assess the effectiveness of VPUU's participatory intervention approach for the reduction of interpersonal violence and the improvement of safety. The research will focus, according to the proposal, on the implementation sites of Harare, Kuyasa and Monwabisi Park.

This kind of targeted research in conjunction with the recognition of lessons learnt through the first three phases of implementation is expected to pave the way for further interven-

<sup>62</sup> International Development Research Centre – a Canadian Crown Corporation that supports researchers and innovators in developing countries build healthier and more prosperous societies – <http://www.idrc.ca>.

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tions based on the VPUU approach and implementation principles across the City and the WC Province. Here, the recognition of the VPUU programme as a long-term initiative is key.

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### 5.3.7.2 Lessons learnt

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Based on the experience of the first two Phases and the fact that VPUU is, as a primary focus of phase III, in the process of being extended via a number of additional interventions to other areas in CT and the WCP, the lessons learnt and outlined by the programme provide valuable feedback information based on experienced had that, if used appropriately, may inform the future adaptation and implementation of the VPUU approach and methodology elsewhere. The key lessons outlined here are those that have been highlighted directly by the VPUU implementing agency (PMU). This information has been drawn from recent, non-published programme reports and corroborated through personal communication with PMU staff and senior project management at the KfW development bank:

- Community Participation as part of the VPUU approach is proactive, principled and methodologically grounded. This approach has produced positive results but more needs to be done to transform CoCT approaches to local development projects that lack this feature and are predominantly constituted by strategies that act as a response to problematic situations at a later stage.
- In the more established intervention areas a change of leadership in the SNACs must be considered as necessary. Where this was done, it allowed for the application of lessons learnt within this sphere of intervention and formed the introduction or reconfirmation of operational principles.
- The transformation from an ad-hoc interaction with communities and structures towards routine process development requires continuous support on a strategic level as well as on an operational level.
- Limited skills and organisational capacities of Facility Management Committees (FMCs) and trader organisations, as well as the experience of regular turnover of committee leaders, requires that more intensive training and mentoring be provided over a longer period of time.
- The buy-in of CoCT line departments as well as provincial departments is easier to achieve when the goals and interventions of VPUU assist in delivering the core mandate of the department. For example, in the provision of water and sanitation via the locally employed operations and maintenance (O&M) workers, particularly in the informal settlement intervention sites. Complex processes and holistic approaches seem to overload the capacity of departments, especially in service delivery, as utility departments are often called to crisis management situations rather than focusing on process development.

- There is a substantial time factor required to achieve integration amongst workstreams within the VPUU programme itself as well as in terms of the programme's interactions with the various local government line departments.
- Integration is better achieved in workstreams that hold regular meetings on the particular function of the workstream while actively seeking targeted collaboration with other workstreams as necessary.
- Progress towards institutionalisation and the mainstreaming of the programme's approach and methods takes a lot more time and human resources than anticipated.

These lessons mainly deal with institutional issues, operations, processes associated with the VPUU programme methodology and implementation and as confirmed in interviews with project leaders and local officials (September-October 2012) has led to careful consideration of the institutional set-up of VPUU in the future and, most importantly in terms of this research, as it relates to how it is that continued mainstreaming and the scaling up of the programme's interventions is foreseen.

Overall, it is clear that the VPUU programme has had a significant impact on situational, institutional and social development in the intervention areas and holds the potential to contribute far more to the creation of safer, more sustainable neighbourhoods throughout Cape Town and beyond. What this research considers most urgent however is that such successes cannot afford to be lost due to a failure to carefully consider the challenges facing the scaling up of the programme and its implementation in other areas.

This fact renders the discussion on how it is that VPUU is and will be transferred to other areas all the more important. The next section of this chapter therefore engages with the issue of programme transfer directly in identifying the way in which the eminent transfer of the programme is currently perceived and occurring. The final section of the chapter builds on the initial parts, subsequently identifying the key challenges across the three spheres of intervention that are found to affect the realisation of programme transfer.

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## 5.4 VPUU: Beyond the Pilot Project

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### 5.4.1 Mainstreaming and Programme Transfer within the City of Cape Town

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Mainstreaming of the VPUU programme is a central focus of the institutional prevention component which aims to embed the VPUU approach, its principles and methods within local government structures, enabling interventions to be implemented under the direction of local-level line departments, making use of existing department budgets. This is considered of the utmost importance by VPUU programme team members (Interviews September-October 2012) in ensuring the "replication"<sup>63</sup> of the programme in other areas and the longer-term sustainability of

<sup>63</sup> The term replication, as opposed to transfer, is used here as a true representation of the discourse in both VPUU documentation that was assessed as well as the term used by project experts during interviews. This

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existing projects, particularly in terms of the operations and maintenance of the infrastructure provided thus far. During the VPUU programme's second phase, the KfW lobbied for phase three to focus on achieving "more ownership and mainstreaming on behalf of the CoCT in order to achieve a higher degree of institutional sustainability" (Rudner and Boule, 2011, p. 7). In the opinion of VPUU programme leaders, South Africa has the resources to "do it right" but organisational structures, processes and budgeting mechanisms need to be developed and be able to rely on cooperative and implementation capacity across all spheres on government before this can become a reality. The initial VPUU programme as it currently exists has a maximum life span of 11-12 years by the end of the fourth phase at which point the German funding partner will largely withdraw and thus it is only through mainstreaming and developing institutional processes according to common objectives that the programme will be able to continue with any level of long-term success. It takes at least ten to fifteen years to really change an urban setting and anywhere upward of twenty years to realise any social development impacts. Therefore, despite the short-term urgency of the situation in many of Cape Town's (and South Africa's) urban areas, the longer-term vision cannot be lost.

Currently, VPUU is working in close cooperation with the CoCT with the full political support of both the ruling and opposition party<sup>64</sup> in replicating the VPUU approach and its methods in other areas. These challenges are explored in more depth further on in this chapter. Overall, the current mainstreaming of VPUU is being realised through two additional pilot programmes at City level; the Informal Settlements Transformation Programme (ISTP) and the Mayoral Urban Regeneration Programme (MURP).

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#### 5.4.1.1 Informal settlement transformation programme (ISTP)


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The CoCT has embarked on an "incremental programme to transform informal settlements in five identified areas using an in-situ developmental approach" (Sun Development, 2012, p. 12). The core aim of the in-situ upgrading approach is to upgrade and provide services to informal settlement communities with as little relocation of residents as possible (ibid.). The five informal settlement sites selected for the ISTP pilot programme include; Monwabisi Park, TR Section and BM Section/France in Khayelitsha, Lotus Park in Gugulethu and The Heights in Lavender Hill (See Figure 5.25)

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distinction is discussed in detail and forms part of the key outcomes of this case study presented in chapter six.

<sup>64</sup> Some resentment was noted in interviews with CoCT line departments however when this issue was raised VPUU programme leaders confirmed that despite some challenges at local line department level "for whatever reason", senior decision makers support the programme across the board both within the CoCT and now also at Provincial level (Interview September 2012). Some serious challenges do however remain with line department dedication to implementing VPUU methods. This is being experienced in the ISTP pilot projects (Sun Development, 2012).



**Figure 5.25.:** Informal Settlement Transformation Programme Pilot Sites. Source: Google maps, adapted by author.

### Objectives and mandate

The vision of the ISTP pilot programme is “to build safe and integrated sustainable neighbourhoods to overcome social, cultural, institutional, economic and spatial exclusion as apartheid’s legacy by incrementally upgrading the existing settlements of Monwabisi Park, TR Section, BM/France, Lotus Park and The Heights using a participatory methodology to improve the quality of life of residents” (Sun Development, 2012, p. 13). The ISTP programme mandate is described as:

- A revised approach to informal settlements upgrading that is based on participatory methodology that includes an intermediary to facilitate the process between CoCT and the communities of the five settlements.
- Moving from an approach focused on the provision of only infrastructure to an all-encompassing approach focusing on the incremental improvement of the living environment by ensuring an improvement in quality of life and the built environment.
- An approach primarily based on the needs and priorities identified through the involvement of the community and the development of contextually specific Community Action Plans (CAPs).
- Implementation of five pilot sites to test and review the principles - these initial implementations are seen to be experimental rather than demonstrative.

- Mainstreaming the tested and proven methodology and principles of VPUU.
- Improve the overall quality of life of residents.


The following objectives of the ISTP programme are thus aimed at fulfilling the mandate described above as the programme seeks to;

- Improve the living environment within informal settlements incrementally.
- Ensure a sustainable built environment that meets the basic needs of communities (community ownership to reduce costs).
- Apply an integrated management approach.
- Address quality of life (QoL) needs such as health and safety, social development, job creation and skills development (EPWP<sup>65</sup>), development of SMMEs, whilst improving the built environment.
- Transform informal settlements into sustainable neighbourhoods and make them part of the City.
- Integrated disaster risk management
- Introduce a form of tenure and provide an address to foster a sense of ownership, pride and dignity.
- Make communities less dependent on government (help people to help themselves)
- Develop Community Action Plans (CAPs) with communities
- Allowing people to stay where they are and provide security of tenure
- Creative solutions to accommodate all residents within the constraints of limited available resources.
- Public space development; well-managed spaces
- Upgrading of services (infrastructure, social, income opportunities.
- Co-operation with line departments and eventual mainstreaming of the programme.

(Sun Development, 2012, p.13-14)

In terms of funding, the objective is to make use of existing line department budgets in order to finance implementation in the ISTP pilot sites. External VPUU funding does still play a role, particularly as it pertains to the financing of community-based social development initiatives through the Social Development Fund (SDF), as described previously in this chapter. See subsection 5.3.5 on VPUU approach and methodology. Additionally, German capital funds will also be allocated to the ISTP for situational upgrading interventions, following the safe node, “Active Box” model employed by VPUU in the original pilot sites Harare, Kuyasa and Site C (VPUU, 2012).

<sup>65</sup> This refers to collaboration with the provincial government’s extended public works programme (EPWP), supported by national government. See [http://www.westerncape.gov.za/eng/pubs/public\\_info/E/242810](http://www.westerncape.gov.za/eng/pubs/public_info/E/242810) and <http://www.epwp.gov.za/>.



**Figure 5.26.:** VPUU intermediary implementing agency setup. Source: Author’s own.

### **Institutional set-up**

SUN Development (Pty), the same subsidiary acting as the implementing agent for the original VPUU programme was appointed as a service provider to the CoCT in line with the ISTP programme mandate in July 2010. The intermediary structure employed for the VPUU programme itself thus remains a central institutional element in the set-up and functioning of the ISTP pilot projects (Figure 5.26). Furthermore, to ensure continuity and enable the use of knowledge gained during VPUU implementation, the ISTP projects operate according to the same five workstreams used by VPUU with all CAPs developed for the individual communities being aligned accordingly (Sun Development, 2012).

The ISTP annual report for 2011/12 (2012, p.15-16) provides a detailed outline of the institutional roles and expectations of the major actors, including the CoCT line departments, the intermediary implementing agent and the community:

#### **The role of the City:**

- Acceptance of VPUU methodology and importance of working with local communities as partners.
- Ensuring dedicated line department support.
- Budget allocation and provision.
- Operational arrangements.
- Appointment of specialise technical expertise where needed.
- Provision of land.
- General oversight.

#### **The role of the intermediary agent:**

- 
- Facilitation of process and methodology (according to VPUU philosophy).
  - Implement specific elements of the projects, including;
    - community participation,
    - stakeholder management,
    - reporting,
    - urban design,
    - land-use management including development of tenure regime,
    - certain social interventions and
    - M&E
  - Skills development of City officials.
  - Partnership development.

#### **The role of the community:**

- Acceptance of methodology and partnership with the City as a pre-requisite for programme commencement.
- Competent leadership to ensure community buy in.
- Assistance during implementation and maintenance via community delivery of services.
- Ensure that number of households remain stable throughout project implementation.


The ISTP programme has provided an opportunity to test the VPUU approach and methodology in the informal settlement context however, the focus has shifted somewhat beyond violence prevention in its own right to encompass a far broader scope of activity. As the programme manager states, they do “everything except housing” (Interview September 2012). Despite implementation still very much in its infancy in terms of the ISTP programme, some key results and challenges have already been realised. These were highlighted during site visits, workshop participation and through interviews with ISTP-involved VPUU staff.

#### **Key results of the ISTP pilot projects**

Since beginning implementation in the five pilot sites according to VPUU principles and methods, the ISTP has realised the social engagement preparations for all sites and is well into the implementation stage in Monwabisi Park and Lotus park, has begun implementation in TR Section while the CAP and spatial reconfiguration plan for BM section is being developed. Finally, the community asset identification process that supports the development of the CAP has begun for The Heights<sup>66</sup> (Figure 5.27).

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<sup>66</sup> Participant observation undertaken at asset-identification and problem analysis workshop with The Heights community representatives in Cape Town, September 2012. See Appendix B.



**Figure 5.27.:** ISTP Pilot Sites – stages of intervention. Source: elaborated from Sun Development 2012 p. 8.

Furthermore, local workers from the pilot communities are being employed by the programme, which is supported by the partnerships established with the intermediary and a number of key line departments within the CoCT that provide urgently needed basic services to the informal settlement communities. Regular reporting takes place via the intermediary to both the CoCT and to the communities. Monitoring and evaluation exercises in the form of local household surveys also take place as per the VPUU programme on a weekly basis and are likewise funded by VPUU. The ISTP has been successfully launched and can be seen as the first real effort to mainstream the VPUU ideology and methodological approach within the existing channels and structures of local government. Furthermore, communities from the ISTP areas demonstrate enthusiasm in contributing proactively to the development of their communities. As some community representatives for The Heights made abundantly clear during the asset identification workshop (September 2012) being enabled to contribute to their own future development within the settlements they have struggled to build up is about dignity. Under the former status quo, development in these areas was very much a top-down process driven by agendas to which the community had no input. As one community representative stated “we do not want to show we are ungrateful but other people are making decisions for the community”.

Despite the clear willingness of the communities to engage with the kind of community-based approach that VPUU advocates, the mainstreaming process as part of the ISTP has not been without challenge.

### Challenges of the ISTP

Once again, the ability to realise rapid social preparation, the gaining of community support and to progress with the CAP, spatial reconfiguration plans and implementation in the

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ISTP sites is attributed to the employment of the intermediary implementing agent model, employing the same team responsible for the original VPUU programme who have gained the much needed experience and knowledge through the programme's primary interventions in Khayelitsha (Interview October 2012).

However, despite the first two years of the ISTP programme having rendered noteworthy progress as illustrated above, as with VPUU, a number of key challenges exist, mostly attributable to the institutional set-up and operational functionality in terms of cooperation with local line departments, all of which pose difficulties for the mainstreaming of the VPUU approach. Specifically, the most significant institutional hurdle with which the ISTP programme has had to deal has been an unwillingness of the core responsible line department, in this instance the Department of Human Settlements, to adopt the VPUU approach. According to unpublished report documentation, the adoption of both the intermediary set-up itself as well as the VPUU methods and participatory processes have been strongly contested. This contestation has resulted in outstanding invoices being left unpaid for more than half a year and the withdrawal of previously agreed-upon and contracted implementation budget for the financial year 2011/12. Seeing as it is this department that should lead the programme, taking ownership on behalf of the CoCT as a whole, this discontent has resulted in a) significant delays in getting projects off the ground and moving from one phase to the next, b) unpaid invoices and stoppages in CoCT funding which have run the risk of severely damaging the fragile partnerships that have been established with communities and c) has posed reputational damage to the intermediary agent and the VPUU methodology overall.

An experience highlighting these challenges was had during a site visit to Harare. During a coincidental meeting with a community resident and SNAC representative from neighbouring Monwabisi Park, a primary site for the ISTP, this resident stated "The people who are working for VPUU are not good, not at all...they are not honest". The qualification for this statement trailed off as she said "It's because...I don't want to talk...it's a joke". This encounter was then clarified by the VPUU staff member guiding the site visit who explained that in the case of Monwabisi Park there had been a number of delays on the part of government line departments in delivering electricity to the area, which had caused communication difficulties and which in turn impacted on the credibility of the programme and the perceived ability to deliver on promises made.

***"It doesn't matter where the hold is, VPUU is seen as a driver."***

*– VPUU workstream leader, September 2012.*

As this incidence highlights, credibility is easily lost as promises made via the intermediary to communities have been delayed and/or not fulfilled on the part of the City, resulting in raised tensions and a breakdown in trust.

In order to mitigate these risks, the intermediary was able to mobilise external financial cooperation (VPUU) funds in order to deliver on promises made to the communities thus maintaining the established partnerships. It is however recognised that this is not a sustainable solution and

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at the time of the field research undertaken in Cape Town in September/October 2012, the intermediary, SUN Development, lodged an official recommendation to the CoCT to continue the programme under the guidance of a different local government champion and line department in order to re-establish “institutional flows”.

This recommendation was made on the basis that the assurance of follow-through on promises made to communities, which is essential in realising further success, requires first and foremost dedication by the respective line department(s) to the programme’s approach and methodologies if mainstreaming is to be realised. The alternative scenario offered, should a dedicated CoCT line department not be found, involved the closing of the ISTP programme entirely. This meeting in which the report was delivered occurred in October 2012 at the end of the field research visit and unfortunately further detailed information as to how this panned out has not been made available, however, it is clear that work on the ISTP is continuing.

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
#### 5.4.1.2 Mayoral urban regeneration programme (MURP) – VPUU Lite

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The second means by which the VPUU approach and methodology are being mainstreamed at local level is in the form of the Mayoral Urban Regeneration Programme (MURP). This programme is referred to by VPUU programme staff as “VPUU lite” (Interview September 2012). This reference adheres to fact that MURP focuses around one specific element of the VPUU methodology, being the operations and maintenance of existing local infrastructure. Therefore the VPUU methods are followed and applied however the City does not go into “full implementation” in the newly identified MURP areas. All VPUU intervention sites are automatically included under the MURP umbrella and additional sites have been identified by the CoCT for the initial roll-out of the programme. The MURP intervention sites include: Harare and Kuyasa, Manenberg, Hanover Park, Lotus Park (VPUU) and the new sites, Bishop Lavis, Valhalla Park, Bonteheuwel, Bellville/Voortrekker Road corridor, Athlone CBD and Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre (Figure 5.28).

In addition to these sites that fall within the general area of VPUU implementation in CT, two additional sites, further away from the central metropolitan area of CT are also included as part of MURP; The Westfleur Business Node in Atlantis and Ocean View, situated near Kommetjie (Figure 5.29).


Aiming to employ a holistic approach in line with the philosophy of the VPUU programme without going into full implementation in these areas, the central objective of MURP is “to uplift areas that have been identified as neglected and dysfunctional and are seen to be degenerating rapidly” (CoCT, 2012a). This objective aims to improve the socio-economic situation in the implementation areas, improving both quality of life and safety. Particular focus is again placed on the upgrading and improvement of public spaces, however these spaces do not require the kind of dramatic provision of infrastructure, as is the case in Khayelitsha and the ISTP areas. The areas identified under MURP are characterised by existing infrastructure that has already been delivered or requires refurbishment so as to uplift areas seen to be degenerating.



**Figure 5.28.:** Pilot sites ISTP and MURP. Source: Google maps adapted by author.

The concentration on the institutional level of the VPUU approach in the form of maintaining public infrastructure and facilities in partnership with local communities is therefore the driving ideology behind MURP. In pursuing such an approach the City hopes to provide income opportunities for local residents, stabilising these areas in order to initiate further public and private investments. This highly participatory approach to operations and maintenance through the stimulation of community involvement and ownership is to be included as a key objective within the CoCT IDP and it is “the City’s intention, based on the success of this programme, to extend it to other areas that would benefit from such intervention” (ibid.).

In terms of realising the programme’s aim, following a participatory approach that stimulates community ownership, Area Coordination Teams (ACTs) are set up within the communities using the local Sub councils as the point of entry and engagement. The ACTs, in similarity to the VPUU SNA committees, provide a representative body for the local community, businesses and NGOs through which to engage with the City at regular intervals concerning issues such as the operations of public buildings, maintenance of infrastructure, cleaning of public areas, law enforcement, safety and security, informal trading concerns, etc. These ACTs thus also drive the preparation of CAPs as well as area-based monitoring of performance levels and service delivery according to criteria jointly agreed upon with the City and other stakeholders. By the end of April 2012, the Cape Town City Manager had appointed conveners for the establishment of ACTs and held initial meetings with the relevant stakeholders in the areas. With the long-term



**Figure 5.29.:** MURP Pilot Sites in Atlantis and Ocean View. Source: Google maps.

operations and maintenance of infrastructure being a key question and challenge to ensuring the sustainability of VPUU interventions in all areas, the MURP is seen as essential in gaining much needed experience as to how community ownership and long-term local economic development can be sustained through the participatory, evidence-based methods developed through VPUU.

Due to its very recent inception, implementation results and impacts of the MURP remain to be seen. As VPUU team leaders note, the main objective is to implement in varied urban settings so as to end up with a “menu of experiences” from which knowledge can be drawn and managed for implementation in similar urban contexts throughout the city, province and eventually, the rest of South Africa (Interview September 2012).

Another major part of this collection of knowledge and additional experiences involves the expansion of the VPUU methodology to smaller towns and cities within the Western Cape. With approximately 85% of the province’s population, the CoCT is by far the most well resourced municipality in the Western Cape. Therefore, a key question arises as to how it is that smaller municipalities will be able to adequately implement a programme as holistic and complex as the VPUU without similar institutional capacities and the relative wealth of resources enjoyed by the CoCT.

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#### 5.4.2 Integrated violence prevention beyond the City of Cape Town – VPUU Western Cape

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In 2011, the KfW commissioned a feasibility study for an agreed fourth phase of the VPUU programme. The objective of the study was the development of a conceptual scenario approach to the wider scaling up of the VPUU programme that would enable the programme to be im-

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plemented in other target areas outside the CoCT. The phase four feasibility study thus focused on developing scenarios detailing the pros and cons of varying institutional set-ups that would allow such scaling beyond the CoCT. This feasibility study also set specific criteria for the selection of intervention areas in the Western Cape Province and developed an estimated budget and timeline for implementation.

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#### 5.4.2.1 Beyond the City of Cape Town – VPUU Western Cape

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Based on a SWOT analysis of the existing VPUU programme and the scenario assessment conducted as part of the feasibility study (Rudner and Boulle, 2011) as well as the realisation early on that the only clearly feasible option would be an “agency model”, various agencies were assessed according to set criteria. Out of four agencies assessed<sup>67</sup>, three agencies emerged as possible suitable fits. These agencies included the Cape Town Partnership<sup>68</sup> (CTP), the Independent Development Trust (IDT)<sup>69</sup> and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA)<sup>70</sup>. Appendix D provides an overview of the various scenarios proposed by the feasibility report while Table 5.4 provides an overview of the key elements in the institutional design required to implement provincial up scaling, which were used to shortlist institutional options for the implementation of VPUU in the Western Cape.

Subsequently, the various agencies were assessed in terms of a) their institutional footprint in the WCP, b) alignment with the VPUU approach, c) financial management history, d) ability to deliver infrastructure and d) experience with operations and maintenance (See Appendix D).

Accordingly, the feasibility recommendation made to the KfW was to pursue the scaling up of the VPUU programme at provincial level using the institutional structure of the Cape Town Partnership as the VPUU Western Cape implementing agent. This was based on the key advantages that the CTP set-up would supposedly bring to the programme implementation, namely; a) the understanding of area-based management embedded within the CTP; b) the fact that it already employs a similar structure in implementing inner city crime prevention initiatives which likewise include social, community/economic development and infrastructure aspects; c) the fact that it is already the agency for the World Design Capital for which VPUU is a case study; d) it is not a fully public entity, which is thus still relatively small, flexible and adaptable; and e) it has an established track-record based on more than 10 years of implementation experience. Finally, and possibly most importantly, the CTP already has the full participation of the CoCT and the Province in its governance structures. This particular advantage is one that cannot be replicated in that this set-up was only possible due to the fact that the Partnership was established prior to the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), a policy change that renders this kind of

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<sup>67</sup> The Housing Development Agency (HDA) was also part of the original assessment but was not considered further due to its limited footprint in the WCP and lack of expertise in financial management and operations and maintenance of interventions (Rudner and Boulle, 2011). See <http://www.thehda.co.za/>

<sup>68</sup> See <http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za/>


<sup>69</sup> See <http://www.idt.org.za/>

<sup>70</sup> See <http://www.dbsa.drm-za.com/>

Primary institutional elements		
A structure, which can contract with KfW and other donors.	An institutional arrangement able to work in multiple jurisdictions within the Western Cape.	An institutional set-up which can service VPUU for the duration of the project cycle (+/- 10 years) within the confines of the KfW and South African public sector procurement systems.
Secondary institutional elements		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A structure, which is able to relate to all three spheres of government.</li> <li>• A structure that is suited to building partnerships and relationships with a broad range of stakeholders.</li> <li>• An institutional arrangement that is able to attract, retain and train up a skilled team to drive the programme. Ideally this structure should be able to tap into the existing VPUU expertise pool.</li> <li>• A structure flexible enough to contract in skilled staff as and when required by the programme.</li> <li>• An institutional arrangement that is suited to building municipal capacity to engage in VPUU processes.</li> <li>• An entity which can facilitate and follow community lead processes and allows for community delivery of services, including the employment of local people.</li> <li>• A structure, which can execute decisions and implement projects quickly as this, is critical to building and retaining community confidence in the process.</li> <li>• A structure, which can implement capital projects.</li> <li>• An arrangement, which can facilitate and manage lease agreements and permits in a defined area.</li> <li>• An institutional set-up that can manage, collect and disburse funds on an area basis.</li> <li>• A structure that allows for government ownership and control of the programme.</li> </ul>		

Adapted from Rudner and Boule (2011, p.12)

**Table 5.4.:** Primary and secondary institutional elements required for VPUU Western Cape.



**Figure 5.30.:** Proposed Cape Town Partnership/VPUU governance structure. Source: Rudner and Boulle (2011, p. 22).

institutional set-up no longer viable for newly established not-for-profit entities. Under current regulations any newly established not-for-profit entities would need to exclude the public sector from decision-making processes (Rudner and Boulle, 2011).

Within the institutional structure of the CTP, the establishment of a VPUU Board was proposed, similar to the Central City Improvement District Board already in place. It was envisaged that such a Board would be able to absorb an existing Provincial transversal committee into its decision-making structures while also including local municipalities that would be incorporated into the CTP's decision-making structures (ibid). Figure 5.30 represents this proposed institutional structure.

This recommendation made by the feasibility study however was not to be followed and instead, the KfW in cooperation with the current VPUU implementing agency has decided to pursue one of the scenarios discounted in the phase 4 feasibility report - the establishment of a private not-for-profit (Section 21 company) entity to be known as VPUU Western Cape.


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#### 5.4.2.2 VPUU Western Cape: A not-for-profit intermediary

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The establishment of a private VPUU Western Cape entity was originally discounted as an option during the feasibility study's investigations. This was due to the fact that, "while recognising that a private company would offer an opportunity to develop the market for VPUU-type services it was ruled out as it is effectively the status quo with VPUU I-III. This option is not sustainable in terms of the current PFMA and MFMA procurement regulations, which do not provide a mechanism for a sustained engagement of one firm outside of a public-private partnership" (Rudner and Boulle, 2011, p. 22).

Despite this strong denouncement of the sustainability of such a model in the feasibility report, personal correspondence (March 2013) with experts involved in the process confirmed that the KfW is to continue with this structure in order to implement phase four of VPUU in



**Figure 5.31.:** Proposed institutional set-up for VPUU Western Cape intermediary. Source: Elaborated by author.

the Western Cape Province and that preparations for the establishment for such an entity are already underway.

On questioning the justification behind the decision to pursue such an institutional construct for the transfer of the VPUU programme into smaller municipalities in the Western Cape, the decision taken is generally supported by the consultant involved. This support is justified by the fact that the feasibility report’s recommendation presents a “fully fledged pathway to transfer the Cape Town project to the Western Cape Province”. This kind of fully fledged transfer however requires sufficient time and is estimated to take a minimum of 10 years to both settle institutionally and realise achievements on-the-ground (Personal correspondence March 2013). Furthermore, this kind of mainstreamed transfer demands two conditions to be met which are not yet present, namely, i) adequate funding to be made available to the Province so as to enable support to local municipalities and towns and ii) a minimum agreed extension on the project for a further 2-3 phases, spanning at least 10 years (ibid.).

The inability of governance structures to meet these two (pre)conditions essentially rendered the feasibility report’s recommendation unfeasible. As a head VPUU programme manager bluntly reminds us, one has to be “realistic that in some municipalities there is only one architect or urban designer, nevermind the social workers required [to implement VPUU interventions]”. In addition to this, the Cape Town Partnership also refused to take on the role of implementing agent. The precise reasons for this remain unknown due to the inability to secure any personal correspondence with the CTP in this regard.

Based on this situation, it has been decided that the same institutional set-up as followed at local level within the CoCT will be pursued at Provincial level. This will involve the establishment of a non-profit (Section 21) company that will act as the intermediary implementing agent for provincial VPUU implementation (Figure 5.31).

It is foreseen that the same experts involved as the consulting agents for VPUU Cape Town (SUN Development) will lead the development of the VPUU Western Cape private entity. According to experts interviewed, this is considered to be the only institutionally feasible means of

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being able to by-pass the significant bureaucratic hurdles that exist at Municipal and Provincial level and adequately leverage both external and internal funds while simultaneously ensuring access to the necessary capacities and expertise. As has been seen in the experience at CoCT level, much importance lies in the programme's ability to realise fast-tracked implementation within the first phases of any new intervention so as to demonstrate the programme's potential and value to local municipalities, to secure the necessary community participation and establish the levels of trust needed to generate support for the VPUU approach (Interviews September-October 2012).

Overall, on one level these arguments make sense however it must be kept in mind that as the original feasibility report highlighted, it is not strictly a mainstreaming exercise and is thus also not sustainable over the longer term. That being said, in reality, perhaps it is simply too soon to expect such a high level of institutional transfer and mainstreaming to be feasible at provincial level. This is especially pertinent considering the limitations of smaller municipalities in comparison to the CoCT and the significant challenges that still need to be overcome on the local level in terms of realising any form of fully-fledged mainstreaming of the VPUU programme within the CoCT.

It is these specific challenges drawn out through the case study undertaken here to which the final section of this chapter now turns. As established within the theoretical framework (chapter 2) and the research questions formulated (chapter 3), the discussion on broad-based programme transfer for integrated violence prevention is supported through an assessment of the overarching challenges identified, determining the impact that they have on the replication/transfer of the VPUU programme.

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## **5.5 Challenges facing the Broad-Based Implementation of Integrated Violence Prevention**

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The case study thus far has presented a myriad of information concerning the VPUU approach, its methods, the institutional set-up of the programme as well as the way in which mainstreaming and programme replication/transfer are being pursued. In order to make sense of this wide array of information and the complexity of the vast number of issues determining and challenging these processes, this section highlights the overarching key challenges that are being experienced by VPUU and which most directly affect the question of programme transfer.

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### **5.5.1 VPUU's situational, institutional and social intervention challenges**

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These key challenges identified here are drawn from the more extensive, detailed list of phase-specific programmatic challenges highlighted throughout the beginning sections of this chapter as well as from additional information gathered through expert interviews and internal programme documentation review, as presented throughout the course of this case study. These

principal challenges are also raised in light of the difficulties facing the implementation of national crime prevention policy, law enforcement and policing being experienced in South Africa and Cape Town in general, which were outlined in chapter 4.

Based on the complexity with which the programme's interventions are operating the challenges being experienced by the programme are classified across three main levels, aligned to the three spheres of intervention: Situational (environmental upgrading), institutional and social, all of which pose some difficulty to the transferability of the programme (Table 5.5):

**Table 5.5.: Key challenges to transferring the VPUU programme.**

	Key Challenge(s)	Importance/Impact
<b>Situational/ Environmental</b>	E1. Resource intensity	76% of funding spent on environmental upgrading. Capacities and time required for institutionalisation and intervention implementation initially underestimated.
	E2. Support infrastructure and service delivery	Remaining lack of supportive infrastructure in larger surrounding areas. Lack of basic infrastructure and adequate access to services is a challenge on a massive scale.
	E3. Operations & Maintenance	Responsibility of operations and maintenance transfer to communities and details of how costs are to be carried once programme implementation is concluded remains unclear - which department within the CoCT will carry these costs and with what budget? This challenge thus also relates directly to institutional problems of budgeting (12).
<b>Institutional</b>	I1. Silo operations	Lack of cooperation between various local government line departments impacts heavily on mainstreaming efforts. Overlapping boundaries of City and Provincial Departments hinders the coordination required for focused efforts - leads to duplication and inefficient resource allocation.
	I2. Financial resources and budgeting processes	Limited financial resources/public funding. Local government budget allocation process through various departments means inability to ring-fence funding for particular areas to be used as necessary, preventing reinvestment within the same area.
	I3. Political lobbying	Political support from City and Province however only area within SA not run by ruling national party. Politicians either exaggerate or ridicule project successes for political gain, which affects community opinion/expectations.
	I4. Expertise in local government	Capacity of local authorities and government departments poses a significant challenge for transferability as VPUU implementing agent moves on to other areas. VPUU has had to leverage external sources on a number of occasions due to failure of City to deliver on promises. Similarly the risk exists of VPUU's experts being spread too thin too quickly in terms of replication to other areas, within and beyond the CoCT.

*Continued on next page*

Table 5.5 – Continued from previous page

	Key Challenge(s)	Importance/Impact
	15. Spheres of governance/control	A number of key infrastructure and services not controlled at local or provincial level such as education, criminal justice system and most importantly, policing. Lack of common vision and objectives results in uncoordinated activities, overlapping boundaries at local level and thus inefficient resource allocation.
	16. Policing control and reliability	Links to mistrust of police by community members (S2) - despite improved cooperation major problems with policing at local level still exist, particularly as it pertains to reactive measures. For example, the call for military intervention in gang wars on-going in areas such as Manenberg and the on-going enquiry into policing misconduct and corruption in Khayelitsha.
Social	S1. Mistrust and anger	Broken promises and non-delivery has resulted in mistrust of politicians and ability of local government to deliver - mediating role of VPUU helps here in maintaining an a-political status. Police inefficiency, corruption and brutality has bred general dislike and mistrust between communities and police who should be working together. Communities are generally frustrated and angry and this has resulted in violence through service-delivery protests as well as vigilante responses to crime. This poses a challenge to the establishment and maintenance of functional civil-state partnerships.
	S2. Varied interests/needs	Although general needs are identifiable, at the social level specific needs of communities vary from one place to another depending on existent infrastructure and level of existent community engagement/self-organisation. Similarly, cultural differences between communities pose challenges to the establishment of local community leadership structures. For example, this was considered simpler in Khayelitsha as decision-making in the black African culture is “developed around consensus” but remains a significant challenge in other (coloured) areas where culture differs (Interview September 2012).
	S3. Culture of expected delivery and non-participation	South African communities generally exhibit cultures of expected delivery by government and local authorities. No solid culture of participation is present on a larger scale and therefore these possibilities need to be developed and demonstrated, something VPUU certainly does address through its methodology.

Each of the key challenges highlighted here is elaborated on below, detailing their specific risk for programme transfer and drawing again on key empirical examples gathered through the case study investigation.

#### 5.5.1.1 Resource Intensity of the VPUU approach

This research has determined that a primary point of resistance that hinders that quicker adoption of the VPUU principles and approach across local line departments concerns the perception

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of the programme's resource intensity, most pointedly, financial resource intensity. This kind of holistic approach to the creation of sustainable urban neighbourhoods and violence prevention undoubtedly requires focused resource allocation across the relevant municipal departments. The programme's counter argument is that any integrated programme intervention, not just VPUU, will require similar resource input and furthermore, not only does the sustainability and lasting impact of these interventions require inter-departmental budgetary allocations but these resources are in fact already available for use by line departments. The point of difficulty here is seen rather to be ensuring an efficient allocation of resources as opposed to a lack of available resources. In the opinion of programme management, the budgets exist, they simply need to be "used smarter" (Interviews September 2012). This statement was substantiated through the example of the Harare Library, which was built in the primary pilot intervention site of the VPUU programme. According to local development requirements, prior to the implementation of VPUU the CoCT was required to build a local library to service the Harare neighbourhood. What VPUU brought in was the ability to leverage the support of other line departments through their social development workstream, turning the original plan for a single focused library into a more mixed-use "house of learning". This was done according to the life-cycle approach to development adopted as a key pillar of the VPUU approach and advocated internationally by the World Health Organisation. When one works on this basis and considers the multiple benefits that one site now offers in comparison to what was originally planned VPUU team leaders insist that the VPUU approach, despite being resource intensive on paper, is not resource intensive when one considers the benefits yielded.

The core challenge here lies in convincing sceptical entities within local government that when looked at holistically and in terms of longer-term sustainability, the VPUU approach may in fact offer a viable, resource efficient approach. As long as the perception remains that the programme is in fact too resource intensive, the chances of promoting uptake of the VPUU approach across local government line departments remain low. This is clearly seen in the reaction of the Human Settlements Department during the more recent ISTP pilot implementation experience (subsubsection 5.4.1.1). It must also be said that the need to convince stakeholders on the benefits of the VPUU approach likewise remains a challenge with local experts and development professionals working in similar areas. In a number of interviews questions were raised by non-government officials about the opportunity cost of the money being channelled into a single methodology.

The core criticism being that it is yet to be established whether or not everyone (not just elite politicians at local level) in fact agrees that this is the methodology that should be followed (personal correspondence, 2012). As one expert interviewed stated, the risk is that a vast amount of resources (approx. 76% of the total budget) are being focused into the mere creation of "a nice place in the middle of hell" (Interview, October 2012).

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### 5.5.1.2 Support infrastructure and service delivery

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The comprehensive delivery of basic services and infrastructure beyond that which is provided via VPUU implementations is an essential part of sustaining and expanding the programme's interventions to benefit many more local residents beyond those communities in the pilot SNAs. Therefore it is imperative that the delivery of supporting infrastructure and services to these areas must be efficient so as to maintain community buy-in and support that will encourage more active citizenship, lasting beyond the pilot programme phases. Currently, the challenge still remains that there are large backlogs in service delivery in the areas being investigated and a number of (often violent) civilian protests occur regularly across these neighbourhoods, the main driver of which is cited by the Khayelitsha-based Social Justice Coalition as being inadequate service delivery. Similarly, the maintenance of existing infrastructure is problematic and the assurance of the operational capacity of existing infrastructure remains to be clarified at local level.

As presented in the original sections of this chapter, the VPUU programme itself supports a process of employing local residents to undertake service maintenance work in their areas, a system that the CoCT also seeks to employ, however this has not yet been institutionalised on a larger scale according to VPUU staff members (Interview, October 2012).

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### 5.5.1.3 Operations & Maintenance

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The VPUU approach to operations and maintenance (O&M) is to employ local community members to manage and maintain local facilities. This method focuses on instilling community ownership of delivered infrastructure once the upgrade has taken place and works on the premise that finances generated through the facilities provided, such as rentals from the live-work units, are to be reinvested into the area for continued improvement and the stimulation of local economic development.

This approach is motivated by the need to ensure direct community ownership of interventions if they are to remain sustainable and similarly works towards re-establishing hope and providing access to opportunities that currently lack. The capacity building required by local workers thus needs to remain a focus and training must continue to be provided in order to ensure that such a set-up is sustainable. Progress has been made in the CoCT's recognition of this VPUU O&M approach and, as described previously, forms the basis of the MURP pilot programme to upgrade additional areas. All programme staff interviewed during the course of the case study cited the operations and maintenance of the SNAs post pilot programme interventions as the most significant risk to the long-term sustainability of the projects delivered. Despite the intention of the CoCT to adopt the VPUU O&M approach, real experience with this method is yet to be gained and no formal strategy for local government structures to assume the operations and maintenance of the established VPUU intervention sites exists. This challenge is inherently linked and exacerbated by one of the central institutional challenges highlighted

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through this study (see I2), in that the CoCT financial and budgeting structures do not allow for the ring-fencing of funding generated in an area to be used for reinvestment directly.

The concern held by the VPUU implementing agency is that this general financial policy implemented across line departments means that community trust may be easily destabilised if finances generated through LED activities in the area are not seen to be directly reinvested.

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#### 5.5.1.4 Institutional silos

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The challenge of institutional silos refers to an identified lack of integrated planning, resource allocation and horizontal cooperation between local government line departments responsible for local community-level development, service delivery and infrastructure provision. Rather, line departments within the CoCT continue to work largely independently from one another with little to no exchange with one another. As highlighted in interviews with local authorities and VPUU programme staff (Interviews September-October 2012) as well as in the empirical challenges being experienced in the ISTP pilot projects, the buy-in, cooperation and input of all relevant line departments is essential to the successful implementation and sustainability of the VPUU's holistic development approach. Without integrated horizontal cooperation, resource allocation will remain inefficient and increases the likelihood of overlapping or neglected interventions. This challenge impacts heavily on the mainstreaming efforts of the VPUU programme and thus poses a threat to the successful transfer of the programme, which is dependent on the capacity of local institutions to adopt and implement VPUU's holistic approach and integrated development methods. During personal site visits it was gauged through some opportunistic informal interviews had with local authorities during a VPUU stakeholder workshop that up until this point, key departments working with the same communities where to a large extent unaware of the specific activities of other departments within common area boundaries. A disconnect in communication and alignment in development objectives between local and provincial government was thereby also established. As has been demonstrated by the internal organisational structure of VPUU and the lessons learnt, the delivery of integrated prevention requires independent yet collectively oriented action across implementation spheres.

In terms of the embedding of the VPUU approach within local government structures integration based on effective communication is a two-way street. One representative from a CoCT line department involved in social development described a situation in which his department had begun work with a local informal settlement community only to find out after an extended period of time spent engaging with community structures that the VPUU programme had already been active in the area working on establishing the community representative structure for a period of more than two years. This kind of occurrence clearly demonstrates that access to knowledge and the sharing of information is problematic not only between local line departments themselves but also to a certain extent in terms of the VPUU programme itself. Similarly to the various line departments, the implementing agency for VPUU needs to likewise provide more comprehensive and easily accessible information on their activities if improved

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mainstreaming through local government buy-in is to occur. Supporting this, it must be kept in mind that the integrated interventions developed and started by the VPUU programme need to feed in to and be supported by the activities of already active and established programmes and interventions working towards similar objectives of creating sustainable urban neighbourhoods in former township and informal settlement areas.

Finally, beyond the City and Province, the challenge of institutional silo operation is something that directly correlates the key point raised in chapter four, which highlights the lack of directive provided by national government in terms of the precise means by which national policy implementation is to be realised at local and provincial level. This directive includes the need to support allocated mandates through the provision of national treasury funding, so as to make financial resources available for the additional, heavy mandates of local-level urban renewal and crime prevention.

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#### 5.5.1.5 Financial resources and budgeting processes

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The broader challenge of unfunded mandates as highlighted in chapter 4 is experienced directly at the local level. Unfunded mandates, including crime prevention, refer to mandates that are required to be fulfilled by the local sphere of government yet which receive little to no funding support from national treasury. This means essentially that local governments are expected to allocate already limited financial resources to cover these “extended” mandates. The end result is that local line departments do not (and often cannot) re-structure their budgets to provide for additional mandates. Consequently, much effort is needed in terms of demonstrating the potential of improved line department integration and cooperative planning and budgeting in order to ensure more efficient resource allocation.

Expounding this problem in terms of the VPUU programme are the budgeting mechanisms and processes of financial resource allocation that are in place at local level. While a programme such as VPUU propagates an area-based, reinvestment approach to upgrading as well as an operations and maintenance strategy that promotes nodal local economic development, the City’s financial system does not allow for the retention (ring-fencing) of finances generated in an area to be automatically reinvested within the same area. According to local experts (Interviews October 2012) this financial system results in leakage from the area and a failure to immediately reinvest the funds at the community level results in stagnation of the interventions and stifles further progress. Therefore in this respect, a prime advantage of the intermediary implementing agent model is recognised as being their institutional ability to by-pass City structures and budgeting processes, implementing a nodal governance approach that is supported by their ability to retain and reinvest any finances generated through the urban upgrading and infrastructure delivered.

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#### 5.5.1.6 Political lobbying

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*“The political will of authorities to push and support initiatives is a precondition for programme implementation”*

*– Bauer (2010)*

The VPUU programme enjoys significant political support and is championed by both the Mayor of the CoCT and the Premier of the Western Cape. The issue of violence and crime in South Africa is however heavily politicised and this too poses a challenge for the transfer of the VPUU programme in that some of the programme’s success is inherently related to the political situation in the CoCT. As the only opposition-run City and Province, any political gain from such success stands exposed to political criticism. Essentially, political pressure is often applied to the programme and its interventions in that the programme’s successes are either exaggerated or underrepresented according to political purpose. This creates situations of unrealistic project delivery expectations or otherwise works to damage fragile community relationships and trust, as the case may be. Another challenge raised by local authorities in this regard concerns the fact that any change in current government in terms of the ruling political party may still have severe consequences for the transfer of the VPUU programme as it remains firmly tied to individual champions and experts at local level and is not yet unanimously adopted as a central strategic approach to development and/or adequately embedded within standard City structures and procedures. This leaves the programme and any transfer plans vulnerable to political dynamics. An underlying assumption that was expressed but not explicitly cited is that the contestation of the VPUU approach within certain CoCT line departments may also be linked to opposing political motivations.

Another serious political element with which this thesis cannot fully engage but must acknowledge concerns the political power struggle present in the WCP. Being the opposition in the CoCT and the WCP the ANC, particularly its Youth League are blamed for creating dissent within local communities, fuelling the fires of community dissatisfaction with post-apartheid service delivery. The intention to cause such dissent is clearly illustrated through direct threats by the ANC Youth League to render the city and province “ungovernable” (ANC Youth League, 2012, p. 5), an approach which is primarily associated with violent protest action and the vandalism of state property.

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#### 5.5.1.7 Local government capacity and required expertise

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In addition to the programme’s political vulnerability, the transfer of interventions and the broad-based mainstreaming of the VPUU approach are appreciably reliant on the capacity of local authorities and government departments to deliver integrated interventions independently. Challenges experienced with the VPUU interventions cite local capacities and staffing constraints as key hindrances to the timeous delivery of services and project infrastructure, as clearly demonstrated in the former sections of this chapter.

For example, as experienced with the ISTP pilot programme, the VPUU implementing agent was forced on a number of occasions to leverage external funds due to the failure of the respec-

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tive CoCT department(s) to deliver on promises made to local communities. At the same time, the transfer process to smaller municipalities outside of the CoCT exacerbates this challenge as experts risk “being spread too thin, too quickly” (Interview October 2012) while concentrating on programme interventions elsewhere. The successful mainstreaming of the programme is posited to be heavily reliant on the ability of local government departments to deliver on promises, ensuring the maintenance of community buy-in and the trust necessary to sustain the civil-state partnerships required for the implementation of such an integrated, holistic development approach. External to the VPUU programme itself, the ability of local governments across South Africa to employ the necessary processes and structures required for the implementation of such an approach is lamented (Interviews September 2012 and February 2013). This is based on a perceived lack of public administrative capability, something which annual audits for municipalities across the country continue to confirm. For example, in August 2013, South Africa’s auditor general again demonstrated the administrative stagnation of local municipalities as, for the third year running, only 5% (17 out of 278) of all municipalities across the country received clean audits (Mail and Guardian Online, 2013).

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#### 5.5.1.8 Spheres of governance/control

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A holistic approach to violence prevention, as purported by the VPUU programme, fundamentally requires the coordinated input of all government sectors and departments responsible for various mandates including social development, transportation and infrastructure, education services, health, land-use and zoning, planning and of course, policing. The challenge posed to the transfer of holistic programmes and approaches such as that employed by VPUU therefore concerns the coordinated cooperation and intervention of multiple government departments simultaneously at the local level.

The second workshop attended during the course of this research addressed this challenge directly, highlighting the existing difficulties in cooperation and integrated intervention between local line departments and provincial government departments. The workshop led by the VPUU programme marked the first time that stakeholders from local and provincial government departments as well as the SAPS met to openly discuss holistic, area-based approaches to development and violence and crime prevention. The need to address this challenge is recognised by both representatives of the CoCT and the PGWC (Interviews October 2012, Workshop presentations) and a key focus of VPUU’s mainstreaming strategy includes retaining a focus on ensuring further collaboration between the CoCT and Provincial Government departments in terms of targeted interventions and the necessary resource allocation.

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#### 5.5.1.9 Policing control and reliability

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As previously discussed, all social crime prevention falls within the mandate of local government however, as with the challenge described above, local-level control over policing is limited in

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that all law enforcement and the SAPS are nationally mandated. Local CoCT authorities express on-going frustration at the lack of adequate cooperation and functionality of the SAPS in general as well as within municipal borders (Interview September 2012) and continue to fight for more direct control over SAPS activity at provincial and local level. In March 2013, the majority of the Western Cape Members of Parliament voted in favour of the provincial community safety bill, which represented a decentralisation of power over the SAPS lending provincial government “more control over the police”<sup>71</sup>. This is viewed as a dramatic step forward in improving partnerships with the SAPS working at local level, improving accountability and being able to create more functional partnerships between the SAPS, local metro police, local authorities and communities. The current status of the SAPS and the lack of local accountability negatively impacts on the implementation of holistic interventions reliant on partnerships and community support (Interview September 2012).

Despite this positive step in what seems to be the right direction, SAPS cooperation remains a distinct challenge to the VPUU programme, particularly in the context of Khayelitsha where in August 2012 Helen Zille, the Premier of the WCP, established an independent commission of inquiry into allegations of police inefficiency and corruption which is determined as the lead cause in the severe breakdown in relations between the Khayelitsha community and the SAPS which has occurred in recent years<sup>72</sup>. This commission remains challenged by the national police commissioner and has been the platform for a number of local-level protests led by the Khayelitsha-based Social Justice Coalition (SJC)<sup>73</sup> and community supporters, demanding that the commission be allowed to continue (Figure 5.32).

This highly volatile challenge relates directly to the social challenge (S1) of community mistrust and anger, which often leads to communities taking the law into their own hands, another aspect that does not aid in the maintenance of cooperative partnerships with communities.

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#### 5.5.1.10 Community mistrust and anger

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Community anger and mistrust occurs on two specific levels relevant to the challenges facing the transfer of the VPUU programme and its initiatives. Firstly, the mistrust held by communities towards local authorities and politicians based on a feeling of “broken promises” (Interview September 2012) and the perception that government has failed to deliver adequate housing, infrastructure and services to a vast majority of the population since the end of apartheid. This challenge is by no means localised and is demonstrated by the rise in community-led service delivery protests across the country, many of which result in serious cases of violence (Jain, 2010).

*“The City doesn’t listen, we [the community] do not want installation of flush toilets to continue. The basic services provided are a cheap job and cause*

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<sup>71</sup> News24 – Western Cape Safety Bill Approved, March 28, 2013. Available at <http://www.news24.co.za>.

<sup>72</sup> Full information on the commission of inquiry can be accessed at <http://www.khayelitshacommission.org.za/>.

<sup>73</sup> “Safety and Justice for all” - <http://www.sjc.org.za/>.

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# 'The commission is necessary - we won't back off'

Despite Nathi Mthethwa's efforts to stop the commission of inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha, township residents refuse to be silenced.

12 Nov 2012 19:24 - Glynnis Underhill



Despite Nathi Mthethwa's efforts to stop the commission of inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha, township residents refuse to be silenced. (David Harrison, M&G)

**Figure 5.32.:** Community protesters in favour of commission of inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha. Photo: David Harrison. Source: Mail & Guardian Online, November 2012.

*more problems, particularly sanitation as they are regularly blocked and overflow...We do not vandalise them as the City says...there is a difference between vandalism and overuse”*

*– Community representative on the provision of flush toilet sanitation. Personal correspondence, September 2012.*

It is the institutional structure of VPUU as an “a-political intermediary entity” that is credited with the programme’s ability to establish solid community relationships and enable participation practices, community involvement and ownership for provided infrastructure. Some local authorities (Interviews October 2012) question whether or not this would be possible in direct community-government relations due to a lack of trust in the capacity of local government to deliver on promises made. Similarly there is always a question of the political affiliation of community members and how this may impact on direct community-state relationships should the intermediary no longer bridge this gap.

Secondly, and just as importantly, community relations with police, both the local MPD and the SAPS are often also strained based on mistrust that arises from the perception of a police force that is brutal, corrupt and unable to protect the communities they serve. Again this

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results in dysfunctional partnerships between local community members and police who need to work together to effectively address the multiple causes and manifestations of crime and violence in these areas. In terms of its affect on the transfer of the VPUU programme, this is similarly not a localised issue and affects large areas across the province and country. In a recent report, the CSVR (von Holdt et al., 2011, p.3) detail police inefficiencies in responding to community protest situations and points to the role that police in fact play in often inciting further community violence through “a peculiar combination of absence and unnecessary and provocative violence”. Supporting this, community representatives spoken to during the asset identification workshop attended in September 2012 openly describe police action within and towards the community as “inhumane” and demonstrates pride in the communities ability to defy aggressive police action – “they destroyed our houses but we rebuilt them and the second time law enforcement didn’t come”. It is however exactly these displays of strong will and determination that VPUU programme staff seek to turn into positive energy, channelling this existent determination into a pro-active development agenda.

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#### 5.5.1.11 Varied interests, needs and community structures

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The fragile urban environments and social contexts being discussed within the framework of this research certainly means that community development needs, most particularly in terms of physical infrastructure requirements and services, are to a large extent generally identifiable. At the social level however, the specific needs of communities vary more greatly and are not only dependant on existing infrastructure and services, but also on levels of social cohesion and community networks as well as on prevailing cultural differences in how it is that community

*“In Khayelitsha people were super eager to be part of something that would really make a difference, they were happy to work with each another and there wasn’t really any political rivalry in that area... this has a huge impact on whether or not one can go in and work with the community... Other spaces might be a lot more difficult”*

– Local community development expert,  
Interview February 2013

organisation occurs. This challenge is represented by the varied levels of difficulty with which VPUU have been able to establish working partnerships with local communities in areas with differing social demographic structures. In this respect, programme leaders admit that the establishment of Safe Node Area Committees in Khayelitsha has been relatively smooth in comparison to other areas as decision-making in the “black” African culture is “developed around consensus, although it may seem very confrontational on the surface” (Interview September 2012). In other areas, some of the gang-run “coloured” areas such as Manenberg and Hanover Park provide the most illustrative examples, where such consensus building processes are severely hampered by existing community structures and hierarchy, which are all but impossible to work alongside. Here community hierarchies are driven and controlled by the interests of gang leaders who fight

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(violently) to maintain control over their livelihoods, which are based on economic interests in gunrunning, and the control of drug markets.

One local expert interviewed expressed serious concern as to the ability of VPUU to replicate the success of the Khayelitsha interventions in other areas, particularly those where social cohesion does not appear to exist or where social cohesion is strongly tied to gang hierarchies. These kinds of community hierarchies and the danger they pose to communities as a whole makes it, in the opinion of this expert, highly unlikely that the formation of a representative community body such as SNAC would be realisable (Interview February 2013). This sentiment echoes Watson's (2007) prior warning in relation to the fact that due to crime and violence itself having been present for so long in communities across the country the resultant normalisation of violence and crime has worked over a long period of time to erode social cohesion. Alongside this, the parallel development of increased sophistication in the operations of drug gangs and other criminal syndicates, means that the possibilities of (re)building social capital within these communities similarly continues to deteriorate.

This situation thus poses a severe challenge to the transfer of a programme such as VPUU that employ holistic approaches reliant on active community involvement.

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#### 5.5.1.12 Developing a culture of participation

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Community participation, from decision-making involvement to actual ownership of the various interventions being implemented, is arguably the most important element of the VPUU programme. Significant resources and human capacity are invested in the development of local community representation committees and the programme aims to ensure that community action plans are developed that speak to the particular needs of the individual communities. This also involves the longer-term development of employment opportunities for local residents, as community members themselves take over facility management roles for the infrastructure provided through the programme. Despite VPUU's obvious success in being able to gain community trust and buy-in for the programme in Khayelitsha in particular, a challenge to the extended transfer of the programme is still identified in that, in general, a culture of participation within South African communities does not exist. Rather, a situation of a paternalistic state ideology in which government is seen as the sole provider of infrastructure and services to the people prevails. The general promotion of the concept of active citizenship on a broad scale will thus need to be developed based primarily on the targeted establishment of a participatory culture at community level, something which local-level urban planning and modes of delivery must contribute to. It is the inherent complexity of the social challenges being addressed at community level in areas such as Khayelitsha that requires that communities actively participate in the development of their urban environments.

Essentially, "without co-operation and trust between local authorities and citizens, the ability of the welfare state to function properly disappears" (Kildal, 2003). Similarly, effective urban planning is heavily reliant on the existence of stable, operational and accountable local

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government as well as strong civil society (Watson, 2007). This is intrinsically linked to the institutionalisation processes of how strategic planning is undertaken in that the debate and formulation of any plan is as important as the end product itself. Institutional arrangements need to be developed that create the space for active processes and enable change in the mind sets of all stakeholders. This in turn requires the support of institutional arrangements across government spheres that can move from strategic planning and “the plan” towards realising implementation (Steinberg, 2005; Watson, 2007).

The necessity for civil-state partnerships and particularly the stimulation of community capacities and networks that allow residents to self-organise and actively contribute to local social development is something that is undeniably recognised by the VPUU programme. This is most keenly represented through the SDF initiative that provides resources to residents in order to implement self-designed and self-organised community projects. The mainstreaming of this ideology however is reliant on two things; a) the recognition of the importance of community participation beyond merely the consultative phase and which is focused on stimulating real activity and community ownership and b) a nation-wide approach to fostering a participatory culture through the provision of practical means of demonstrating how it is that individuals and community groups can participate. Realising this could include the implementation of education initiatives on residents’ rights, responsibilities and the provision of clearly recognisable opportunities for residents to participate.

The VPUU programme has demonstrated how, through area-based interventions targeting community identified problems and through rapid implementation, community trust can be established, stimulating a rapid increase in self-organised community-led project proposals which have been submitted to the SDF. Key to this, and something which will be elaborated on more thoroughly in the next chapter, is the balancing of short-term objectives through “quick-win” interventions that maintain such trust and the longer-term objectives of ultimately creating sustainable urban neighbourhoods for which communities themselves feel responsible and take charge. Essentially, it is about local government developing its capacity to create and appropriately support a culture of participation and active citizenship through self-organised community development, making the most of existing community resources and capacities. Realising this however is of course inextricably linked to the adoption and recognition of the need for this level of community participation, active citizenship and ownership throughout all spheres of government and their respective departments. Unfortunately this is something that this case study has shown still requires much progress and institutional change.

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## 5.6 Conclusions

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Overall, this chapter has provided an in-depth case study on the VPUU programme, its development and current situation of implementation. Furthermore, the main objective has been to provide detailed insight into the current status quo and specifically, how it is the programme is being transferred and implemented within other areas beyond the original VPUU pilot sites

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in Khayelitsha. The case study has provided answers to the questions posed in regards to understanding the dynamics of programme transfer as outlined during the construction of the theoretical framework that provides the lens through which this case study has been undertaken. These questions include; what is to be transferred? Who are the key actors involved? From where are lessons drawn? What different degrees of transfer exist or are envisaged? and most importantly for moving beyond the pilot project, what restricts/facilitates the transfer process?

Essentially, the case study has thus drawn out the key challenges facing the programme's three primary spheres of intervention and has related these challenges to the risks they pose to the successful mainstreaming of the VPUU principles and methodology, aimed at realising similar interventions on a broader scale.

From the case study, two overall conclusions can be drawn in direct relation to the research assertions and questions posed during the research process.

First and foremost the challenges exposed that most hinder the ability of the VPUU programme to be transferred, whether specifically referred to within the situational, institutional or social sphere of intervention, all similarly relate to issues of institutionalisation in terms of governance structures and organisation.

This demonstrates the second overall conclusion that, in general, the ability of the VPUU programme to successfully deliver its integrated preventions initiatives has been made possible through a maintenance of control over the institutional environment within which they operate. This control has been achieved through the fact that the VPUU programme and the implementing agent was able to maintain a level of independence as a "special-status" programme, which in turn enabled the by-passing of bureaucratic red-tape that may have severely delayed or derailed implementation on a number of occasions. Principally, the by-passing of such bureaucracy through the ability to ringfence a large proportion of programme finances and allocate funds without having to utilise local line department structures and budgeting mechanisms is important as it highlights the fact that even within one of the country's largest municipal governments with relatively strong structures in place, the capacity to implement a large integrated programme of this nature clearly does not exist.

Such an institutional capacity deficit is of course a fundamental element in considering how it is this kind of integrated approach, that is established as necessary to address the complex challenges facing large proportions of the population, can be realised on a larger scale.

Furthermore, what has similarly been realised through the empirical research is that in fact what is being referred to as the mainstreaming of the programme to other areas outside the CoCT is descriptive of the implementation of a series of additional pilot projects where the intention is to test the implementation of the VPUU programme in differing urban contexts, thereby creating a broader "menu" of experiences from which learning can be acquired. Therefore the question of how it is the programme moves beyond the pilot project phase through mainstreamed processes of programme transfer has yet to be dealt with and any conceptualisa-

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tion of how this could be achieved (beyond that of the phase four feasibility study suggestions) similarly does not yet exist.

In light of the case study presented here and the broader context of social development and crime/violence prevention policy in South Africa in general, the next chapter proceeds to engage with these challenges and the conclusions drawn here, questioning what they mean for programme transfer as it is defined by this research. In doing so, a conceptualisation of what these conclusions mean for broad-based violence prevention and urban upgrading initiatives is presented. This conceptualisation revisits the theoretical framework established in chapter two of this dissertation, linking the outcomes (practical elements) of this case study with the theoretical elements that underpin the research methodology employed.

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## 6 BEYOND THE PILOT PROJECT: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAMME TRANSFER

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### 6.1 Introduction

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Chapters four and five, representing the empirical part of this dissertation, have outlined a number of overarching conclusions as to the challenges of preventing violence and crime in terms of both policy and the implementation of integrated programme interventions (Figure 6.1).

Drawing on the specific conclusions realised through the empirical research, this chapter argues that a new means of thinking about violence prevention and urban safety is required if the broad-based implementation of integrated development approaches that service the objective of creating safe urban neighbourhoods is to be made realisable. This argument is extrapolated on in the first part of this chapter, which revisits the notion of transfer in terms of the case specific context of the VPUU programme implementation and discusses what it is that programme transfer in fact constitutes. The crux of this reiteration of the need to define programme transfer contextually is supported by the demonstration of the pivotal role that institutional alignment plays in determining the ability of the programme to expand beyond the current series of pilot project implementations.

This chapter therefore revisits the original research assertion that institutional misalignment hinders the successful transfer of the integrated approaches used by the VPUU programme on a broader scale. In doing so, the chapter is composed of four main parts. The first part considers the definition of programme transfer developed in terms of the theoretical framework that supports this research, demonstrating how it is that programme transfer is currently viewed in terms of the VPUU programme itself. This section outlines the important difference that exists between understanding programme transfer in terms of implementing additional pilot projects and the kind of mainstreamed programme transfer, required in order to address challenges on a much larger scale. In other words, programme transfer that takes implementation *beyond the pilot project*. The significance of institutionalisation and the embedding of processes within local governance structures in achieving the latter is stressed while simultaneously acknowledging the difficulties demonstrated in the case study, which contribute to what is referred to here as the *mainstreaming dilemma* facing the delivery of integrated prevention initiatives.

Based on this initial discussion, the second part of the chapter turns attention to the question of institutional alignment and elucidates the impact that the institutional challenges highlighted



**Figure 6.1.:** Key policy and implementation challenges facing integrated violence prevention in South Africa.

during the case study have on the potential to realise the mainstreamed transfer of the VPUU programme within local government structures.

Consequently, due to the confirmation of the original hypothesis on institutional alignment, in conjunction with the realisation that, despite a recognition of the situational, institutional and social challenges being faced, no developed concept for programme transfer exists beyond that of programme replication to other pilot areas, the third and fourth parts of this chapter are dedicated to exploring the potential that the complexity sciences holds for contributing to the conceptualisation of how integrated intervention programmes may be mainstreamed. This is achieved through the presentation of a conceptual framework as to how it is the foundation of theoretical knowledge provided by the complexity sciences can inform the way in which broad-based programme transfer may be conceptualised, balancing what we know about complex systems with that which we know about how an integrated programme such as VPUU is being implemented.

This assertion has been developed based on the very broad foundation that the complexity sciences offers significant potential to contribute to the formulation of planning practice, which has motivated the development of this research from the start.

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## 6.2 Contextualising programme transfer

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In working now towards determining what it is that programme transfer constitutes in terms of the implementation of the VPUU programme in the South African context, the view is maintained that key lessons are to be learnt through the understanding of the particular constraints placed on the ability for programme transfer to be realised. Therefore, it is the challenges that have been identified and the processes that the VPUU programme has employed in order to

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overcome these challenges, alongside the comprehensive insight into the political and social context within which programme implementation occurs, that provides insight as to how one can begin to conceptualise moving beyond the pilot programme towards broad-based (mainstream) implementation. This is deemed as significant due to the fact that, in any context, the ability to enable programme transfer is inherently reliant on the availability of appropriate resources and capacities of the institutions responsible for implementation. Moreover, as Altman (1995) reminds us (chapter 2), the sustainability of any pilot programme is more likely secured the moment plans are made for its transferral.

Programme transfer, as it is broadly defined within the context of this research, refers to the implementation of a programme in additional areas outside that of the original site of implementation. Furthermore, as stipulated in the development of the theoretical framework that supports this research, the term transfer is specifically used in opposition to replication. Here, transfer is deemed to be more representative of reality in that a 100% replication of any programme in a different context, never mind within complex social systems, is all but impossible. Therefore, considering the VPUU programme as one that is primarily community-based and which employs intervention approaches that are heavily reliant on the involvement of people with a range of different social, political and cultural attitudes, discourse referring to the replication of the programme simply does not make sense within such a context. In line with this defined use of terminology, the definition of programme transfer according to the VPUU experience is discussed in more detail.

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### 6.2.1 Programme transfer according to the VPUU experience

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During the case study research it was observed that the term replication is almost unanimously used within programme documentation and by project implementers to describe the implementation of the programme in areas outside the original pilot sites in Khayelitsha. In this case, the term replication is indeed indicative of the current intentions underlying the implementation of the programme in additional areas. Despite the evident belief that the requirement for some adaptation to the actual variety of tangible interventions is required in contexts outside Khayelitsha, the core intention at this stage is to in fact maintain as much fidelity to the original programme as possible when implementing elsewhere. This firm replication ideology, whether it refers to the full programme as in the case of the ISTP implementation or to a specific part of the programme as is the case for MURP implementations, adheres to the belief purported by the experience of Elliott and Mihalic (2004) in implementing prevention programmes that fidelity, as opposed to adaptation, is of most importance to ensuring the realisation of success when a programme is implemented elsewhere.

In questioning this ideology based on the fact that it is not representative of the assumptions supporting this research that the transfer of programmes across highly complex social systems will always require a process of adaptation if the programme is to cater to the specific needs of different communities, what emerged is that according to project implementers, the VPUU

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programme is being replicated in other areas so as to “develop a menu of experiences” (Interview, September 2012). This high-fidelity transfer approach is being consciously taken in order to ascertain which elements of the programme render successes or failures when implemented in varying urban contexts. The comparability sought here thus requires that the programme be implemented with as much fidelity to the original programme design as possible.

What this means however is that programme transfer, as it pertains to the on-going VPUU experience, is representative of *pilot* programme transfer as opposed to the *mainstreamed* programme transfer, which is spoken of as the pilot programme’s institutional long-term objective. In other words, the transfer and implementation of the VPUU programme to other areas in Cape Town and in terms of the planned implementation in smaller municipalities within the Western Cape are still very much representative of additional pilot programme implementations, which seek to provide an additional set of “laboratories” within which implementation can be observed and learned from, based on supplementary experiences across a number of different contexts.

The realisation of the research conducted is therefore that due to the perceived need to continue with additional pilot programmes, based primarily on only minor mainstreaming institutional progress having been achieved since the programme’s start, no concrete conceptualisation of how more mainstreamed programme transfer exists beyond the testing of the programme approach and methods in differing contexts. As the next section elaborates on in more detail, this is directly related to the fact that much still needs to be achieved on an institutional level before any such experience can be gained.

The definition of programme transfer in terms of realising the implementation of additional pilot projects as part of the larger programme must be adequately distinguished from programme transfer as it refers to ensuring the broadened scaling up and the mainstream implementation of integrated interventions, something that renders the programme reliant on local institutional structures and processes. This distinction demonstrates the fundamental role that institutionalisation plays in determining the long-term sustainability of a programme, which in itself is determined to be primarily reliant on the realisation of transfer beyond the pilot project.

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### 6.2.2 Institutionalisation as a fundamental aspect of programme transfer

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As has been shown through the case study outcomes, the implementation of the VPUU’s integrated approach in other areas within Cape Town is no simple task – the planned extension of the programme to smaller municipalities outside the bounds of Cape Town even less so. Additionally, in terms of the challenges being experienced by the VPUU programme, the central challenges facing the programme’s on-going implementation all pertain either directly or indirectly to the institutional processes and structures that are required to support effective implementation across the various spheres of implementation and maintain the partnerships necessary to do so.

The success experienced by the VPUU programme in implementing an integrated approach, to an extent that has arguably not been achieved before, has depended largely on maintaining

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determined control over its institutional function and processes, as an entity largely removed from standard local government structures.

Within the original pilot project in particular, aside from the necessary political backing and funding allocations from national treasury and local government budgets, the actual hands-on involvement of local government departments in implementation has been distinctly limited. The improved inclusion and input of relevant line departments is being actively addressed during the implementation of the VPUU approach and methodology as part of the ISTP and MURP pilot programmes, however, experience has shown that in a number of instances programme implementation has suffered set-backs simply based on the inability of leading local line departments to adhere to deadlines and deliver on set agreements. This in itself demonstrates how fragile an integrated programme becomes within a more complex institutional environment. This fragility is similarly increased due to the highly complex nature of the social contexts where implementation is most needed.

In line with this, one of the fundamental things that this research therefore establishes is that the successful implementation of integrated interventions is most reliant on institutional structures and processes that are able to cope with complexity. chapter 4 validated that, in terms of violence and crime prevention, the South African national government certainly embraces the idea of holistic and integrated approaches to these problems and recognises the importance of social development and the provision of opportunity at community level in the formulation of social development and crime prevention policy. Despite such policy being relatively forward thinking, implementation on the other hand is seen to be all but non-existent. The inability for such policy to be realised has been attributed directly to a lack of appropriate thought given to determining pragmatically and on what basis it is that government departments can be enabled to achieve set objectives. This lack of specified direction is further compounded by a lack of appropriate capacities and resources to do so. In other words, implementation failure is correlated here to institutional inability. This is demonstrated clearly in terms of the VPUU programme and the fact that, at this point, implementation success is heavily reliant on a reduction of institutional complexity, with as much control as possible being maintained by an expert programme implementation team (implementing agent) through which a means for integrated programme delivery has been established.

Essentially, programme success thus far has been achieved through a severe simplification of the institutional environment within which the programme functions, via the creation of an institutional space over which control is carefully maintained.

The VPUU programme's longer-term mainstreaming objective calls however for the programme to be implemented in other areas, not as replications of additional pilot projects using the same institutional set-up but rather via integrated cooperation and action across all government spheres and sectors - in other words, within a highly complex institutional environment. Therefore, what is concluded here, is that the successful mainstreamed implementation of any integrated programme requires nothing short of fully functional government spheres and departments that are aligned to enable cooperation and the allocation of resources

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towards the realisation of shared objectives. The current status and experience of the VPUU programme thus realises a mainstreaming dilemma in the sense that the use of an intermediary as an implementation vehicle realises success based on its relative independence from local government structures. Broad-based implementation at scale however requires that lessons from the way in which VPUU operates need to be transferred into the institutional functionality of state structures, at least to the extent that an external implementing agent is not the sole driver of implementation.

As is seen through the case study, the attempts to mainstream the VPUU approach under the lead of local line departments has realised severe difficulties and therefore the current status quo demonstrates that institutional reform and the adoption of a common approach and principles that determine implementation are pre-requisite to any broad-based implementation being realised on the basis of aligned local government departments.

Similarly, this infers that creating institutional structures that can cope with and successfully cooperate in working together in complex, largely unpredictable environments becomes a pre-condition if mainstream programme transfer and thus the broad-based implementation of integrated prevention is to take place. The question that arises however is *how?*

In going beyond the identification of the challenges to broad-based implementation, the attempt here is to provide some answers to this question, as stated in the introductory outline of this thesis, the research conducted seeks to work towards the development of a conceptual understanding of the complexity of programme transfer through the use of metaphors derived from the complexity sciences. Drawing on the case study results discussed, the next sections of this chapter therefore engage directly with this objective in determining how it is that institutional ability to cope with complexity can be supported through an in-depth understanding of the way in which the VPUU programme operates.

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### **6.3 Institutional alignment: A common vision to promote urban safety**

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As presented in the first part of this chapter, the success of the VPUU programme in implementing integrated interventions can largely be attributed to the programme's ability to institutionally align and coordinate activities across workstreams in an integrated manner. This is reliant on the coordination of these workstreams, irrespective of their individually defined objectives, to implement interventions according to an overarching philosophy and common vision as to what it is that is trying to be achieved. Likewise, a set of clearly defined principles<sup>74</sup> that supports this holistic vision guides all interventions.

In order to mainstream these processes, the same applies in that all local, provincial and national government sectors and departments (workstreams) must aspire to a similar alignment of processes according to a guiding vision if broad-based implementation of an integrated ap-

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<sup>74</sup> These principles support implementation based on trust, accountability, voluntarism, a participatory approach, a developmental approach, mutually beneficial processes and the promotion of local ownership (see chapter section 5.3.5).

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proach is to be achieved. The assertion therefore is simply that if mainstreamed transfer is to occur, much can be learned from the VPUU programme on the importance of instilling a common vision and guiding philosophy for all implementation, regardless of which sphere of intervention is being specifically addressed. One can of course certainly learn from the more tangible experiences of interventions, as the next section discusses, however it is purported that perhaps one of the most valuable contributions being made by the VPUU programme concerns the development of the programme's vision and the guiding philosophy that informs all intervention implementation. Furthermore, this guiding vision recognises the extent of the complexity with which integrated implementation is faced and importantly merges internationally tested practices with the locally specific requirements of the neighbourhoods within which they work. Arguably, VPUU has thus already realised much in terms of outlining a common and contextually applicable vision for urban safety in South Africa.

The VPUU programme approach clearly recognises the inability of government or any individual to deliver solutions across the board, due to the complex nature of social systems and the variety of approaches needed in addressing the objective of improving urban safety and the quality of life of local residents. This is embodied in the implementation processes used by VPUU, as prime focus is placed on participation, community engagement, and the development of a culture of active citizenship through instilling ownership of tangible and intangible change in their communities. In this light, the VPUU programme provides proof that an integrated approach that fosters partnership development and relies on the input of local residents can be achieved. What remains however, is for the adoption of this philosophy within and across the sectors of local, provincial and national government, something that has to occur before integrated interventions for violence prevention and the promotion of urban safety can be realised on a broad scale.

It is therefore suggested here that this kind of broad-based change in institutional attitude must be guided in the first instance by national government through the establishment of a common vision for urban safety, supported by a philosophy of development that not only promotes the need for participation and the development of a culture of citizen engagement but also enables all sectors to recognise, understand and fulfil their respective roles in achieving the overall objective, based on a set of common guiding principles.

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### 6.3.1 South Africa's Integrated Urban Development Framework: an opportunity

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The recognition of the necessity of a common vision to guide integrated development planning across the three spheres of government in South Africa is in fact present to a certain extent in newly emerging development and planning discourses at the policy formulation level. In 2013, the South African national government commissioned the development of a national integrated urban development framework (IUDF). The main intention behind this IUDF policy document is to provide a holistic framework to act as a guide to all government institutions in contributing to the common vision of what urban South Africa should ideally look like in 2030 and beyond.

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This IUDF process is considered here as representative of an immediate opportunity to consider the role that all sectors need to fulfil in achieving more equal and inclusive urban development and in mobilising all urban capacities, particularly the capacity of local people to contribute to their own development. In light of the research experience presented here, the promotion of a common vision for urban safety and guiding philosophy for integrated prevention methods across spheres is concluded as constituting a vital part of this role.

Having contributed directly to the authorship of the position paper for urban safety as an integral part of the national IUDF<sup>75</sup>, this work supports and seeks to reaffirm the assertions that were made for the incorporation of urban safety into the IUDF not just in the form of a stand alone chapter but rather through an in-depth multi-sector analysis that highlighted the importance of developing clear linkages and examples for how it is that various government departments can and should contribute to the promotion of urban safety via the implementation of their delegated mandates. Furthermore, in doing so, the need for a systemic, integrated approach to urban safety was stressed, highlighting this as the most plausible means through which to tackle the complex interrelated factors that drive the prevalence of violence and crime. This assertion was developed on the basis of the case study results presented here as well as other research (i.e. Katsaura, Obvious (2013)) and expert reports (GIZ (2012)) on the dynamics of urban safety governance in South Africa.

One of the central tools for realising this kind of systemic approach towards providing solutions is suggested to be through the linkage of urban safety and the management of the multiple risk factors that are recognised as contributing to unsafety. It is proposed that the ability of all sectors to adequately identify, assess and manage the variety of risks that contribute to urban unsafety, whether spatial or social, will likewise enable and support holistic intervention towards violence and crime prevention on a national scale. Important research into the multitude of risk factors that contribute to urban unsafety highlights the broad spectrum of precise risks that are prevalent in unsafe communities and thus too proposes a systemic model to inform the integrated and systemic transformation of fragile social systems (Holtmann, 2011)(Figure 6.2).

In conjunction with a defined vision and organisational approach to implementation (such as that offered by the VPUU programme) it is believed that this kind of model holds exactly the potential to inform the institutional reform and action needed to deliver integrated development across government departments through identifying how each of these risks can be addressed under the respective mandates of all government departments.

Combined with the lessons garnered through the implementation experience of the VPUU pilot programme the necessity for a common vision and alignment across institutional spheres in promoting the creation of “safe communities of opportunity” is reaffirmed.

The realisation of integrated development for urban safety however does not stop at identifying the contributions to be made by government sectors and line departments according

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<sup>75</sup> The author formed part of the consulting team led by Prof. Dr. Peter Gotsch responsible for the formulation of a key position paper on the inclusion of urban safety in the IUDF. The IUDF development process is still in progress and is expected to be finalised towards the end of 2013.



**Figure 6.2.:** Creating safe communities of opportunity. Source: Provided by Dr. Barbara Holtmann 2014.

to a common vision and philosophy of what the sustainable development of safe communities requires. Rather, institutional alignment for the promotion of urban safety must extend to an alignment of the ways in which policing and the implementation of law enforcement is carried out, something that is reliant on the assurance of a functional criminal justice system.

Chapter 4 has highlighted the severe misalignment that currently exists between the recognition of the need for holistic social development in preventing violence and crime and the way in which policing continues to occur, involving hard-line tactics in the bid to win the proclaimed “war on crime”.

Politicians and citizens alike continue to demand a crackdown and advocate for harsher prison sentences that merely exacerbate the problem of overcrowded prisons and do little to address the core causes of the problem at hand. Integrated development for the promotion of urban safety is therefore also deemed to be fully contingent on the development of a police force and criminal justice system that works to support a unified vision and which are worthy of citizens’ trust. Only then will the establishment of workable partnerships across government sectors as well as between the state, local authorities, police and residents – without the precedential need for external intervention – be possible.

The confirmation of the importance of institutional alignment across government departments for the promotion of urban safety, that can and should be established through the development of a common guiding vision at national level, forms the basis from which the VPUU programme interventions are more closely looked at in the next section. The core aim here is to investigate the extent to which broad-based programme transfer can be supported through

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the pilot programme experiences, particularly as it pertains to the organisational set-up of the VPUU programme.

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## **6.4 The complexity of VPUU's integrated interventions – promoting mainstreamed programme transfer**

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### **6.4.1 Key concepts: from degrees of complexity and planning strategy to trust and programme longevity**

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The conceptual framework for programme transfer developed over the course of the research undertaken and presented here has been formulated based on a set of key concepts derived directly from the intersection between the theoretical approach used in conducting this research (chapter 2) and the results of the empirical research (chapter 4 and chapter 5).

These concepts include 1) the notion of varying degrees of complexity, 2) the importance of strategy formulation and keeping things “small enough to fail” when managing complexity, 3) the necessity to distinguish robust and dynamic elements of a programme to enable transfer processes and 4) the importance of balancing short-term wins with long-term development objectives in maintaining programme support and the vital stakeholder partnerships on which success relies.

Each of these concepts is detailed below and collectively they provide the basis upon which the specificities of the proposed conceptualisation of programme transfer has been developed according to the central challenges expounded through the case study results.


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#### **6.4.1.1 Degrees of complexity**

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The application of a theoretical lens supported by the complexity sciences to the analysis of the VPUU programme case study outcomes draws heavily – as outlined in chapter 2 – on the notion of variable degrees of complexity. Returning to Zuidema and de Roo's (2004; 2010) conceptualisation of variable degrees of complexity and their relation to planning approaches between states of relative order and chaos, this section assesses the means by which broad-based programme transfer may be supported using this kind of theoretical basis.

In the subsequent sections of this chapter, this model is applied directly to the VPUU experience and aims to assess the variable degrees of complexity identifiable across the situational, institutional and social spheres of VPUU implementation. Similarly, and deemed here as indispensable to considering the process of programme transfer, the classification of systems and/or issues as less or more complex likewise implies a determined level of robustness and certainty. Less complexity implies more robustness and thus also an increased level of certainty as to the outcomes that an intervention may realise. Conversely, this means that systems or issues deemed to be highly complex must be handled based on the recognition of increased dynamic interrelatedness and thus also an increased level of uncertainty (Figure 6.3).



**Figure 6.3.:** Variable degrees of complexity, between robust certainty and dynamic unpredictability. Source: adapted from Zuidema and De Roo (2004); De Roo (2010, 2011).

Directly related to this spectrum of certainty, and in correlation to the determined degree of complexity that various interventions within the larger programme display, interventions are thus also determined as being either more robust or more dynamic in nature. The identification of robust and dynamic intervention elements correlates as well to the ease with which interventions may be transferred as well as the relative requirement for adaptation to suit local, context-specific needs when implemented elsewhere. Semantically, the term simple, as used on the original model, is replaced here by the term “less complex”. This is merely due to the fact that within the kinds of urban environments in which the VPUU programme operates, the term simple is indicative of reduction to an extent that implies linearity and that interventions falling within this category can be simply and easily addressed through technical rational approaches to planning interventions. Due to the never ceasing need for the programme to develop relationships with local communities in the face of a long history of inadequate service delivery and deprivation, this is determined as part of this research as being somewhat utopic. Therefore, describing interventions as less or more complex as opposed to simple is considered more appropriate.

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#### 6.4.1.2 Reducing complexity through strategy

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The theoretical standpoint of the complexity sciences in terms of the rejection of reductionism (subsubsection 2.2.1.2) is in effect utilised here not as a rejection of reductionism in its entirety but rather as a rejection of reductionism down to a level of inferred linear cause and effect assumptions that drive the outcome expectations of interventions. The conceptualisation of programme transfer offered here thus supports the reduction of complex systems to a certain extent, allowing for the relative simplification of highly complex intertwined systems into workable packages through the development of strategies targeted at mitigating identified challenges. The interdependence of complex systems inherently means that no system can be worked on in isolation from one another but at the same time it is pragmatically impossible to effectively address all challenges across all spheres of intervention concurrently, thus rendering a certain level of simplification essential. The VPUU programme itself demonstrates how a simplification of the institutional complexity in the existing governance system has enabled the holistic implementation of the integrated programme.

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In this sense, the development of strategy as a graded simplification of complexity is viewed as an essential tool that allows for a means by which complex problems can be addressed within complex social systems. Such strategy of course must be developed in a particular fashion that simultaneously allows for the concentrated development of suggested solutions within a particular *problem-space*<sup>76</sup> while at the same time considering the broader effects and impact that may be realised through interactions with other systems or, as is the case here, within the other spheres of intervention.

Effectively, it is about identifying intervention “packages” that are manageable through the creation of classified problem spaces. This involves considering the elements that make up these problems, assessing their respective degrees of complexity and subsequently developing appropriate solutions. Not all solutions will of course be successful, particularly due to the high levels of uncertainty in complex systems, and therefore the creation of structures that are “small enough to fail” should similarly inform programme design strategies for large-scale implementation.

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#### 6.4.1.3 Problem spaces and the concept of keeping things “small enough to fail”

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The simplification of complexity – without linear reductionism – to the extent that targeted strategies can be developed to address specific challenges within bounded problem spaces, while still recognising their interrelated interdependence on the broader environment, is seen here as a fundamental element in conceptualising programme transfer. The concept is to approach integrated prevention in a way that provides pragmatic means through which programmes such as VPUU can be rendered more manageable across the numerous sectors and departments on which broad-based implementation relies.

This concept relates very much to the suggestion that, in dealing with complex problems being realised within likewise complex systems, keeping things “small enough to fail” as opposed to creating programmes that are “too large to fail” (Mehaffy, 2013) is a fundamental principle to which planning professionals should pay closer attention. In a recent online post “*Beyond Resilience: toward antifragile urbanism*”<sup>77</sup>, strategic planner and urban development specialist Michael Mehaffy expresses this necessity to keep things small enough to fail, drawing on Nassim Taleb’s concept of the antifragile (Taleb, 2007, 2012). Antifragile is a term conceived in aiming to describe structures that are not only resilient in the sense that they can withstand disruptive perturbations but that actually draw benefit from such disruptions. The main point being made

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<sup>76</sup> Well-known in the realm of problem-solving research (Newell, 1979), the term problem space is used here as a descriptive expression for the defined “area” any particular solution may cover. It is thus a definition of symbolic boundaries within which specific problems can be assessed and responded to. These specific problems themselves consist of a set of initial states and goal states as well as a set of path constraints with which the operators working on a problem must deal. Furthermore, these problem spaces, despite being worked on somewhat independently, are inherently linked to other surrounding problem spaces (See for example Jones (1999) and Gershenson (2013)).

<sup>77</sup> Accessible at <http://bettercities.net/news-opinion/blogs/michael-mehaffy/20664/beyond-resilience-toward-antifragile-urbanism>.

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by Mehaffy is that key to creating structures or processes that are antifragile is the ability to “fail in small doses”, subsequently using these minor failures to benefit over time through processes of learning.

In order to enable this ability to fail and stimulate learning, programme implementation needs to be structured so as to ensure that when failures occur they do not damage the entire programme but rather can be used as a source through which to “transmit lessons” so that new strengths can be developed. Mehaffy uses the analogy of muscle development and human cells to illustrate this point quite simply; as the stimulation of muscles occurs through exercise the growth process involves the occurrence of small tears and strains within the muscle tissue that results over time in strengthening as the muscle responds and rebuilds.

The critique to planning posed by both Taleb and Mehaffy and previously also by renowned scholars such as Jane Jacobs (1961), is that the on-going need to plan in rational, linear and predictive ways will only continue to lead to spectacular failure, as contemporary models of planning continue to support the development of extensive programmes and structures that are “too big to fail”. These kinds of structures are thus incapable of learning from mistakes and when failure does occur it can be catastrophic, destroying the entire structure. This point is illustrated in the experience of the VPUU programme and the reliance of all implementation on one institutional entity, whether it be the implementing agent or a single local line department. The vulnerability of the programme to institutional failures in these isolated entities runs the risk of being absolute, resulting in the programme’s closure if an institutional element fails. This was one scenario suggested during institutional problems, which were experienced during the implementation of the ISTP.

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#### 6.4.1.4 Robust dependability - Dynamic adaptability

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Notwithstanding the difficulty, as with many terms, to definitively define that which is robust (Wiegand and Potter, 2006) the definition of robustness on which this work draws considers a robust system as one which is able to maintain its function despite various, unexpected perturbations (Mikolasek, 2009). In simpler terms, the robustness of an intervention refers here to those elements of an integrated programme that realise expected positive results even when implemented under different conditions. Complexity science tells us that there is no single correct way in which to achieve a task and thus also no single correct solution to unravelling a complex problem; what works in one place may not work in another. However, even within the most complex scenarios basic principles can be identified through experiences that have “very wide generality” (Horgan, 1995, p.109).

In this case, just as the degree of complexity in various systems changes, and the certainty and uncertainty with which one can predict outcomes varies, so too does the level of adaptability differ in terms of what is required to ensure that an intervention is similarly applicable to another context. This means that in seeking to identify the “basic principles” that are more broadly applicable between varying contexts it is suggested that integrated interventions must

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be closely analysed in order to identify those interventions that would be more easily transferable, with a relatively limited need for adaptation, across a variety of contexts<sup>78</sup>. As Kellam and Langevin (2003, p.150) acknowledge, “a major priority in research on tested prevention programs now involves their robustness when applied to social and cultural contexts different from the original testing site. A given program will not always work the same in different cultural contexts or among different social classes or even with different genders”.

Within the prevention sciences, a “dynamic tension” has therefore developed concerning the way in which innovative programmes can and should be implemented in contexts outside that of the initial pilot programme. This tension revolves around the debate as to the two imperatives of *fidelity* - the delivery of the programme exactly as prescribed by the programme developers - and *adaptation* - the modification of a programme to suit the specific needs of the identified consumer group (Castro et al., 2004, p.41).

The fidelity-adaptation debate surrounding the implementation of innovative programmes in new sites is nothing novel and has been discussed at length concerning the implications this debate holds for the extended implementation of public sector social programmes since the 1970s (Blakely et al., 1987). The discussion demonstrates the two opposing camps in the field of social innovation. Those that advocate the “profidelity” position argue that “validated” innovative programmes should be adopted elsewhere with as close a correspondence (fidelity) as possible to the original model due to the fact that alterations to a successful programme would result in a decrease in effectiveness (ibid.). This is similar to the propositions made by Elliott & Mihalic (2004) in their experience of creating “blueprints for violence prevention”.

The converse school of thought being “proadaptation”, argues that “*differing organizational contexts and practitioner needs have almost always demanded on-site modification of disseminated program models*” (Bermand & Mclaughlin, 1978 cited by Blakely et al. (1987)). This argument stems from the perspective that the more a programme user is able to adapt an implementation according to contextually specific needs, the greater the likelihood of programme success.

More recent research into the implementation of anti-bullying interventions in Norway (Stevens et al., 2001) and drug-abuse prevention programmes in school settings (Dusenbury et al., 2003) demonstrate that not only does experience in the dissemination of prevention programmes suggest that highly detailed, prescriptive protocols may be difficult to maintain in practice and that highly detailed protocols often render lower success rates in terms of institutionalisation, adapted interventions are more successful when core components of the original programme are identified and maintained during implementation. This means that not only is a balance in the fidelity and adaptation of programmes possible, it is also desirable to resolve the tension between the two through the identification of more easily transferable core (robust) components and those components that may require more adaptation to suit local needs more aptly.

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<sup>78</sup> This idea developed from the recognition that even highly dynamic complex systems display elements of robustness, which as Byrne Byrne (2003, p.174) expounds, can be valuable in terms of providing a form of control parameter, “...something which can have a profound influence on the kind of future which comes to pass”. Also see Wagenaar (2007)

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Just as this research aims to do within the specific realm of integrated violence prevention, Gershenson (2013) illustrates how adaptation is essential to solving problems within non-stationary problem spaces, in other words, within complex systems. Gershenson puts forward the same notions that are being proposed here in highlighting the importance of adaptation while likewise asserting that prediction should not be ignored, as it is both “useful and desirable”. In designing (implementation) systems, it is not only desirable to achieve robustness so that they do not collapse under the strain of that which is unpredictable but so too is it necessary to develop systems that address complex problems through a certain degree of creativity, so as to be “prepared to face the unknown” (Gershenson, 2013, p.11).

Principally, the argument here is that fidelity, based on prediction and certainty, should be balanced in programme design and transfer conceptualisation with adaptation in order to be able to address that which is determined to be more uncertain and thus less predictable.

Following this line of thought, it is asserted here that one can identify elements that display higher levels of robustness within the various spheres of intervention that make up the larger integrated programme. Further, it is thus suggested that based on the analysis of the case study and the various challenges highlighted that the more robust an element is the less adaptation will be required during transfer. For example, as is outlined in specific relation to the VPUU programme in the subsequent sections of this chapter, the situational upgrading of urban environments, involving the provision of infrastructure and basic services is viewed as a more robust programme element when compared to the institutional and social development intervention initiatives. This assertion is based simply on the relative predictability of the impact of situational interventions in achieving the overall objectives of improving perceptions of safety in communities and on the contribution made to improving residents’ overall quality of life.

The pragmatic importance as to why it is the identification of core, robust elements is so vital for the transfer and longer-term sustainability of the VPUU programme relates to the case study result that a major necessity exists for the programme to simultaneously maintain political support as well as develop workable partnerships with local communities based on mutual trust. The key means through which such trust has been garnered is identified as being through the timely delivery of promised action in the form of urban upgrading and the provision of tangible infrastructure within a relatively short period of time. Therefore, the necessity for the identification of robust and dynamic elements within the programme as a whole is related to the final concept presented here; the need to balance short-term wins with the achievement of the long-term overall programme objective of developing safe, sustainable urban neighbourhoods.

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#### 6.4.1.5 Short-term wins for achieving long-term objectives

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Through the case study research, the need to maintain both political and civil support for programme interventions has been identified as an essential element in terms of ensuring programme success, as the complexities of the problem and the integrated implementation required spanning the situational, institutional and social levels requires the coordination and

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input of multiple stakeholders, most importantly local communities. Furthermore, a key insight gained from the case study is that the fragile urban contexts where violence and crime are at their highest are also characterised by communities that generally distrust the ability and intention of local authorities and police alike to provide solutions to the problems they face.

Therefore, in order to work towards developing an improved culture of participation and civic-engagement, where all but none exists, partnerships need to be developed between key stakeholders based on mutual trust. The maintenance and strengthening of fragile community-state-programme relations was highlighted as central to the programme's long-term success by a number of local officials and project leaders during the course of the field research (Interviews and workshop presentations, September-October 2013) (See chapter 5). In terms of developing such partnerships, trust is identified as a key element in enabling the capacity of individuals to act collectively (Engle, 2011, p.649) and furthermore, is identified as an important element in the reciprocal relationships necessary in addressing violence and crime (Owen and Powell, 2011). In this context, the central means of building trust to redress the current state of severe mistrust resulting from the continued experience of "broken promises" and non-delivery on the part of local government is through the delivery of tangible results, in the form of "short-term wins" that can be celebrated at interim stages throughout the programme implementation.

This makes the realisation of short-term wins within an almost immediate time-frame essential in establishing the trust, functional partnerships and social cohesion required to effect longer-term social change through drawing on existent community resources and stimulating active citizenship and self-organisation through the promotion of identity and ownership. This in itself is something that is deemed vital to the realisation of the long term overall objective of improving local residents' quality of life and creating safe and sustainable urban neighbourhoods and is something that the VPUU programme has indeed begun to achieve. However, strategies need to be considered as to how these approaches can similarly be achieved under the auspices of local government line departments, either with or without the support of expert intermediaries.


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#### 6.4.2 Understanding the complexity of VPUU programme interventions

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Having drawn out the primary concepts that have been developed through the research undertaking and considering the established relationship between complexity and planning, this section enters into a more in-depth analysis of the VPUU's various spheres of intervention, placing them within the bounds of the conceptual framework outlined thus far. This analysis aims to consider the relationship between identified degrees of complexity, integrated planning and the VPUU experience, laying the foundation for the discussion as to how this analysis may realise normative implications for broad-based programme transfer.

The VPUU programme itself is made up of a number of components or interventions, which fall into the three key spheres of intervention; the situational, institutional and social. Responding to the various challenges being experienced as part of the VPUU implementation process



**Figure 6.4.:** Relative complexity of VPUU programme interventions across the situation, institutional and social spheres. Source: Authors own.

and in considering each sphere of intervention in relation to the concepts supporting the way in which we seek to answer the question “how can the complexity sciences aid in re-thinking the challenge of programme transfer?” the following graphic conceptualisation emerges and is used as the basis for the discussion that follows (Figure 6.4):

Within the overall VPUU intervention approach the key challenges uncovered during the case study investigation, resulted in a clear indication of specific challenges applicable to each sphere of intervention. This similarly implies a necessity to address such challenges as well as their impact on programme transfer within each sphere. This does not intend to infer that each sphere of intervention can be clearly distinguished within and from the overall programme but that, at the very least, an analytical reduction of the interconnectedness of each sphere aids in the identification of a number of elements, which distinguish the mode of delivery of interventions and that need to be considered during any transfer process. This approach follows the core concept of identifying not only particular degrees of complexity across the spheres of intervention but also the concept of identifying workable problem spaces. The placement of the spheres of intervention on such a “scale” is of course an oversimplification of all of the various factors that contribute to the programme delivery overall, however, it is maintained that this overarching conception has important implications for contributing to the way in which we think about the delivery of integrated planning and the means by which the mainstreaming process and thus programme transfer may be enabled.

In this respect, the individual spheres of intervention are considered as representative of macro-level problem spaces within the VPUU programme as a whole, all of which are com-

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posed of a number of more micro-level problem spaces in their own right. Accordingly, the placements of each macro sphere of intervention are justified individually in more detail below, drawing on the challenges experienced by the programme described during the case study analysis in the previous chapter. This justification draws on three core elements represented in the conceptual graphic; 1) the identified level of relative complexity associated with each sphere of intervention, 2) the relative robustness of interventions directly relating to the level of perceived predictability associated with determining intervention impacts and 3) on the relative time-frame within which outcomes may be realised.

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#### 6.4.2.1 Situational interventions

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The situational or environmental level of intervention is identified here as the least complex, most robust sphere of intervention overall. The communities which VPUU targets all require significant environmental improvements in order to create livable, humanised spaces. The pilot project in Harare has demonstrated that much can be achieved relatively quickly (within a 5-8 year period) in terms of creating more liveable public spaces that are conducive to improving perceptions of safety and in reducing opportunities for crime to occur based on sound principles of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). As a prevention methodology, CPTED provides well-tested, robust guidelines for environmental design and situational upgrading that aids prevention through creating urban environments that limit the potential for criminal activity through improved usability and passive surveillance. Furthermore, situational interventions are determined as part of the VPUU programme as providing an important, tangible platform on which institutional and social prevention interventions can build<sup>79</sup>.

A significant majority of programme funding (approx. 76%) has been spent on situational interventions - including physical infrastructure and the redesign of public spaces - in the initial stages of the programme (VPUU, 2011b, p.85), making this level of intervention particularly financially resource intensive. With regards to the complexity of situational interventions, despite their financial intensity, it is suggested here as being less complex to realise broad-based implementation in comparison to institutional and social interventions. Therefore less adaptation to implementation processes and designs will be required during the transfer process. Adaptation at this level will generally occur in terms of prioritising the specific kinds of infrastructure and basic services needed within different urban contexts. Similarly, the certainty of the outcomes that urban upgrades can positively impact on the quality of life of residents living in the kinds of inadequately serviced and infrastructure-poor neighbourhoods is determined as being high in comparison to the relative certainty with which specific institutional and/or social interventions may contribute to the overall objective of improved quality of life. Intensive community engagement and the identification of existent community resources supports the prioritisation process

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<sup>79</sup> The ability for a programme such as VPUU to realise similar success in urban environments, which display relatively good levels of infrastructure and access to basic services yet remain violent and which are characterised by low levels of social cohesion was raised during interviews with local community development experts (January-February 2013).

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and the development of individualised community action plans (CAPs) based on local needs but essentially, the process and outcome remain relatively stable in the various implementation areas and are, in terms of the rest of the programme's elements, more or less "replicable". As the point was made during detailed discussions with VPUU programme leaders, urban upgrading of the City's impoverished areas is already a local development priority. What is needed here primarily concerns the need for guidance on the way in which community priorities are determined and that design concepts (locally adapted CPTED principles) are incorporated into the delivery of infrastructure, which is scheduled to occur across the city regardless of the VPUU programme itself.


The objective of the programme is therefore to mainstream the situational upgrading approach implemented in the pilot project areas. This is being achieved through the development of a comprehensive handbook detailing urban design principles for the development of sustainable neighbourhoods in the South African context (Figure 6.5). This kind of handbook is a crucial aid in supporting the rapid transfer of the programme's experience with situational upgrading for violence prevention across the country, if it is made available to and implemented by responsible line departments across municipalities. Essentially, such a handbook represents the development of a common vision for locally specific urban design and upgrading processes that supports the promotion of urban safety through the creation of more usable, safer public spaces.

Essentially, in urban contexts such as Khayelitsha, situational upgrading and urban design interventions as part of the VPUU programme are identified as playing a fundamental role in having a large impact on the communities involved and, in addition to being the level at which tangible results can be "delivered", situational interventions also provide a more stable basis from which more complex institutional and social crime prevention interventions can be launched<sup>80</sup>.

The delivery of tangible upgrades to the areas within which VPUU works has proven very valuable in building community trust and maintaining support for the programme and, as previously highlighted, the establishment of trust is identified as an essential element in progressing with institutional and social interventions that are more reliant on solid working civil-state partnerships. It must be reiterated however that although the implementation of urban design principles are less complex and, through the development of such guidelines, are more easily transferable in their own right, they are also inextricably linked to the larger system of institutional and social prevention interventions. So too is the delivery of urban upgrading reliant on an established foundation of participatory community involvement. As seen through the case study experience with programme transfer thus far, establishing this participatory foundation can vary greatly in complexity. This linkage, which strives towards long-term social development and change within these communities, therefore also relies on the implementation of the

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<sup>80</sup> During expert interviews with research professionals working in Cape Town, the immediate impact of the VPUU programme due to environmental upgrading was highlighted consistently (Interviews, September 2012 and February 2013).



**Figure 6.5.:** VPUU Handbook on Urban Design Principles for a Sustainable Urban Neighbourhood. Photo: Authors own.

accompanying VPUU methodology, which puts community engagement and participation at the core of all intervention processes.

Essentially it is the dual-pronged institutional prevention initiatives that bridge the realisation of shorter-term situational wins described here with the social interventions required to realise long-term sustainability and the ultimate objective of creating inclusive, safe urban neighbourhoods.

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#### 6.4.2.2 Institutional interventions

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
Institutional interventions, as they relate to the VPUU programme, occur on two levels: a) the establishment of community ownership through institutional set-ups, which involve community members directly in the development of CAPs and in the operations and maintenance of spaces and facilities and b) the establishment of good governance through cooperation and partnerships between communities and local authorities as well as working towards ensuring inter-sector cooperation at local and provincial government level.

The central objective of establishing functional partnerships and institutional cooperation mechanisms is to mainstream<sup>81</sup> the principled approach and methods used by VPUU into the standard development and implementation frameworks of the City of Cape Town. This kind of mainstreaming has yet to be achieved. The VPUU experience shows the largest number of challenges facing the programme to be related to issues involving institutional processes and available capacities within local governance structures<sup>82</sup>.

The pilot programme implementation in Khayelitsha has demonstrated that within the first eight years, institutional networks and partnerships can and have been developed and strengthened. This is clearly visible for example, through the inclusion of the VPUU programme in the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) processes at City level. Much still remains to be done however, particularly in terms of developing workable institutional integration across and within provincial and local government departments.

The “silo” operations of local government line departments has been identified as one of the most significant challenges facing the VPUU programme as little horizontal integration exists between government sectors and departments, which often results in inefficient resource allocation and/or the duplication of initiatives within identified areas<sup>83</sup>.

It is therefore suggested here that movement towards the broad-based transferability required in order to really address the problem of violence within Cape Town, the Western Cape and in South Africa, requires solid institutional partnerships that exhibit levels of flexibility in order to adapt to the specific needs of the communities where interventions are to take place. The complexity of implementation at this level of intervention is determined as being comparatively complex, even within the bounds of working with one municipality. Both the degree of complexity and the perceived adaptation of how interventions are structured and implemented at the institutional level for the transfer of interventions to areas outside the CoCT will increase significantly. This



<sup>81</sup> Mainstreaming refers here to the adoption and embedding of VPUU processes and methodologies for violence prevention interventions within the normal governance structures and policies developed at local government level and are of utmost importance if VPUU projects are to be broadly transferred.

<sup>82</sup> This is demonstrated most clearly by the challenges facing the informal settlement transformation pilot programmes in that lead local government departments have failed to deliver on implementing budget allocations and agreements made with local communities.

<sup>83</sup> The problem of integration and cooperation between local government departments was raised in a number of expert interviews with project facilitators and local professionals. The issue of overlapping and non-integrated line department operations in Township areas was also a central topic of one of the programme workshops attended in October 2012, where it was specifically outlined as a central challenge to the programme’s implementation elsewhere.

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is largely dependent on the governance structures in place within other municipalities and is an issue that was specifically highlighted during the feasibility study for phase four of the VPUU programme. For example, the VPUU programme currently intends to leverage both provincial and local level government input in order to implement interventions within smaller Western Cape municipalities, something which was not necessary when working within the relatively strong local governance set-up present within the CoCT. Again, the ability for an intermediary to enable on-the-ground action, obtaining community buy-in and leveraging resources from municipalities and provincial government structures, is reliant on the alignment of institutional objectives across all spheres of government. The VPUU programme has in fact gained the political support of the Western Cape Premier (Cape Town's former mayor) and according to the programme these processes of strategic alignment between local municipalities and the Province are under development. The experience in Cape Town however demonstrates that alignment beyond simply setting strategic objectives, that are essentially descriptive of optimal outcomes, needs to occur if local-provincial (and ultimately national) collaboration is to be viable.

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#### 6.4.2.3 Social interventions

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Within the VPUU programme, social crime prevention initiatives refer to those interventions that support a public health (Life Cycle) approach through interventions for early childhood and youth development; the development of social capital within communities through awareness, service provision and community mobilisation and training; and the development of community safety partnerships with local police, through the elaboration of community-based policing approaches such as neighbourhood watches. The VPUU programme implementers recognise the complexities and hardships facing individuals and community groups in Khayelitsha and place significant importance on ensuring the establishment of active citizenship. This is simply based on the fact that at this level of intervention it is all but impossible to deliver prescribed solutions that fit the particular social development needs of community groups and individuals.

The social sphere of intervention is therefore placed on the upper section of the conceptual framework illustrating the increased degree of complexity and the corresponding level of uncertainty with which outcomes of interventions can (or should) be predicted. Furthermore, since any social change, in contrast to urban upgrading initiatives, will only be visible anywhere from fifteen to twenty years on, this level of intervention also has an increased time frame over which interventions can be implemented and "results" realised. Not only do social interventions require far longer periods of time before impacts are visible, but also, individual and community priorities are more difficult to identify, negotiate and balance and are thus dependant on an increased number of variables (many not easily identifiable) and possible interactions that determine outcomes.

What is interesting to note here, is that at this level, very often the implementation of interventions in comparison to those within the situational and institutional spheres are relatively simple. For example, the VPUU programme's social interventions have reached an ever-

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increasing number of residents through the provision of access to funds. This is done through their Social Development Fund, which is locally managed by the Khayelitsha Development Trust. The SDF funds local development projects designed and implemented by community members themselves.

As highlighted in chapter 5 interest from local communities has grown around the programme and in Khayelitsha alone the number of SDF funded programmes rose from 66 in phase two to over 100 in phase three. In this context, small interventions can certainly have far-reaching consequences. Therefore it can be argued that as the complexity of the issue with which one is working increases, the best forms of intervention from the side of project implementers reduce in terms of intervention-specific complexity. This adheres to the concept posited in chapter 2 (Zuidema and De Roo, 2004) that demonstrates the increased effectiveness of communicative and collaborative planning where issues are identified as being highly complex. As will be discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter and in terms of establishing a future research agenda, this realises the importance not only of fostering collaborative planning for social development but also the importance of the promotion of self-organisation within communities.

Overall, the placement of the various spheres of intervention on this kind conceptual scale of complexity demonstrates that even within the implementation of an array of highly integrated interventions within very complex urban institutional and social systems, differences can be observed in the level of complexity of the issues that various interventions seek to address. In the same respect, this correlates directly to the time implication imposed on the realisation of intervention outcomes, something that is proposed as being important to differentiating the robust elements, most important for rapid transfer and enabling the maintenance of intervention support through the realisation of short term wins, from those interventions which are more dynamic and thus reliant on increased adaptation to suit local needs.

Fundamentally, this kind of integrated programme deconstruction on the basis of the VPUU experience holds what this research deems to be some important normative implications for understanding and moving towards enabling transfer and the broad-based implementation of integrated violence prevention.

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## **6.5 Towards broad-based implementation: some implications for programme transfer**

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This chapter has thus far provided a conceptualisation of the VPUU programme's implementation processes using the theoretical lens developed in drawing on the complexity sciences to propose how it is such a highly integrated model can be "deconstructed" in order to consider new ways in which integrated programmes such as these can be better understood. In doing so, the assertion is that the adoption of this perspective will aid in the potential to mainstream the programme, promoting programme transfer on a broader scale. Overall, the central idea depicted through the conceptual framework developed is that, in line with the interconnectedness and complexity of the problem of addressing urban violence – which clearly requires a variety

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of interventions as part of holistically integrated approaches – it is suggested that it is most useful to distinguish between each sphere of intervention based on a) the perceived degree of complexity, b) the time period required for implementation and c) the impact that these two factors have on how and when interventions need to be structured and implemented.

The final parts of this chapter focus on what this analysis and conceptualisation of the VPUU programme experience may mean for the promotion of mainstreamed programme transfer by outlining some identified normative implications that such a conceptualisation may have. These implications include the provision of a unified definition of what is to be transferred, the ability to better understand and define the various roles applicable in delivering integrated interventions, and the ability to subsequently allocate finite resources more effectively. The conceptualisation presented above is therefore engaged with more closely in exploring each of these potential implications.

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### 6.5.1 A unified perspective on programme transfer at local level

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Understanding the challenges that face the implementation of the current VPUU programme is a first step towards developing an understanding of what it is that will be required in order to achieve the programme’s longer-term sustainability, which is inherently reliant on the ability of the programme to be mainstreamed. As highlighted throughout this chapter thus far, this kind of broad-based transfer demands that the programme be mainstreamed in a way that allows the local government to deliver this kind of integrated approach, utilising their respective local line department capacities and resources.

Through this research it has become clear that the mainstreaming process relies fundamentally on institutional alignment, where all sectors work simultaneously towards the achievement of a common vision and overall objective, in this instance the prevention of violence and crime and the promotion of common understanding of what constitutes urban safety. Just as a national common vision for urban safety is

***“It [a whole-of-society-approach to unsafety] also involves aligning resources to solutions and not the other way around. We tend to have a solution in place already and then we just pump resources into that or we have resources without thinking about solutions.”***

***– Julie Berg, Centre for Criminology, University of Cape Town, September 2011<sup>84</sup>***

important for the institutional alignment of the various spheres of government and determining the contribution that each level makes to the realisation of safer cities, so too is a common vision structured towards dealing with the specificities of local development needs, important for the alignment of local line departments at the municipal level. Just as the national IUDF holds the potential to provide this vision from above to which developmental local governance can

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<sup>84</sup> Statement made at the Safety and Violence Initiative (SaVI) Conference held at the University of Cape Town 8th-9th September 2011.

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respond, so too is it purported that local IDPs need to similarly define the role of all municipal line departments in contributing to the creation of safer human settlements.

It is therefore advocated that conceptualising the drivers and institutional processes required that determine the ability of integrated interventions to be implemented allows for a unified perspective to be reached as to what it is that programme transfer constitutes and requires across local government sectors, according to the relevant spheres of intervention. This is aided through an in-depth understanding of the VPUU programme's experience in implementing their interventions as well as the insight into those elements of their institutional structure that have contributed to realised successes. In this respect, the VPUU programme, as a pilot programme, fulfils its mandate as a laboratory of learning from which experiences can be assessed and adapted, balancing local priorities with the availability of public and private resources to address these problems.

The conceptual framework provided, that seeks to understand the varying degrees of complexity between spheres of intervention as part of an integrated whole, is viewed as a means by which the integrated programme can be reduced to determined, manageable parts. This reductionism forms the basis of a strategy that purports that in order to mainstream the programme, the various interventions need to be delivered under the auspices of a variety of line departments and sectors at local level that have the appropriate capacities and resources to implement specific interventions – whether they be situational, institutional or social – as part of the overall integrated programme.

Importantly, mainstreaming here does not rule out the use of intermediaries or external entities in order to assist with interventions entirely but it does suggest the necessity to utilise the resources, both financial and otherwise, of local government departments in achieving scaled programme transfer through more broad-based implementation. As previously asserted, this ideally should occur on the basis of commonly agreed objectives, principles and implementation methods. Until mainstreaming occurs to at least the extent where coordinated planning and action are integrated across local line departments, the ability to transfer the programme on a significant scale will always be limited. Adhering to the obvious fact that capacities within government structures are limited, it is acknowledged that this alignment of institutions may expectedly need to be facilitated through external intermediaries, most likely in the form of transversal expert teams that guide institutional processes. This structure would prospectively be similar to that of the current VPUU implementing agency, however, would concern itself more with institutionalisation, particularly the realisation of integrated planning processes, rather than the actual implementation of interventions, as is the case within the pilot programme.

Along these lines, the experience presented also demonstrates that various roles need to be fulfilled based on the type of intervention being implemented. The relative complexity of interventions, as discussed previously, determines the need for different planning approaches. Accordingly, it is concluded here that it is important to recognise that the implementation of different planning approaches also requires the fulfilment of different roles by those implementing an intervention. The VPUU programme experience similarly provides insight into the kinds of

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roles being fulfilled by the experts involved in the various spheres of intervention and, as is elaborated on further below, it is suggested that defining these roles is another important element necessary for the realisation of mainstreamed transfer and broad-based implementation.

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### 6.5.2 Defining roles: From technical provision to institutional management and collaborative enablement

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
In addition to fostering a unified perspective as to what it is that broad-based programme transfer requires from local line departments, the level of complexity associated with particular kinds of interventions likewise aids in not only informing the kinds of approaches required to best realise success but also provides an indication of the specific role(s) that implementers need to fulfil. These roles as identified on the basis of the VPUU programme have been observed to differ distinctly according to the respective spheres of intervention and are likewise directly correlated with the relative complexity identified with the types of intervention being delivered.

As discussed in chapter 2 and reiterated in earlier sections of this chapter, the central means by which the complexity sciences has begun to inform planning theory has been through the suggestion that due to the uncertainty associated with complex social systems, local governments and professional planners are not in a position to deliver tailor-made solutions able to singularly solve complex problems. This led to the description that in contrast to the handling of less complex planning issues through the implementation of technical rational approaches, increased complexity necessitates communicative, collaborative approaches to planning and development. Therefore, under conditions of increased complexity, the planning professional and the state are representative of only one form of expert within a much larger group of stakeholders. The expertise of local communities and individual groups in finding solutions to local problems is fundamental.

Similarly to what has been proposed on how degrees of complexity largely determine the kind of planning approach to be taken, the VPUU programme experience demonstrates that indeed interventions delivered in a more technical rational manner are limited to those spheres of intervention that seek to solve less complex problems. In this sense, being reliant on more state control, the situational level of intervention and urban upgrading can best be classified as being concerned with the *provision* of infrastructure and services. Regardless of the participative basis on which situational interventions are prioritised, fundamentally the realisation (delivery) of situational upgrading interventions are provided, either via the local government line departments directly or in the case of the VPUU pilot programme, under the auspices of the implementing agent.

Moreover, institutionalisation processes that support the delivery of solutions within complex systems requires particular governance and project *management* strategies whereas, as complexity increases and outcomes become more variable and likewise less predictable, the assurance of change through social development interventions calls for processes of *enablement*. This concep-


tualisation of the relative complexity of each sphere of intervention and the various overarching roles described are represented in Figure 6.6.



**Figure 6.6.:** Complexity - identifying implementer roles. Source: Authors own.

Through the analysis of the implementation of the VPUU programme, the identification of the need to distinguish stakeholder roles and appropriate planning approaches becomes clear. Dependant on the degree of complexity within a problem space and the corresponding degree of certainty with which solutions can be designed and delivered, the discussion extends beyond the need to employ technical solutions or develop collaborative planning approaches to demonstrating how the classification of problem spaces informs the specific role that local government and programme implementers need to play within each sphere of intervention. Consequently, as does the role of implementers differ across interventions so too does the form of community engagement evolve across intervention spheres (Figure 6.7).


Following Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7, within the situational sphere of intervention, the role of the programme implementing staff and local government is predominantly that of a provider; in this case referring to the provision of urban infrastructure and services where none exist. The context of implementation within severely infrastructure and service deprived neighbourhoods and the need to develop community trust through short-term wins requires the allocation of resources and implementation of interventions that are technically sound and fulfil the most desperate infrastructure and service access needs of the community. At this level, as local government retains the role of provider, the role of other stakeholders, primarily local communities, is to actively participate in communicating a true reflection of their needs.



**Figure 6.7.:** Complexity of interventions, defined roles and levels of community engagement. Source: Authors own.

The institutional sphere of intervention however requires a shift in this status, representing a relative end to the role of the intervention implementer as provider. In order to promote active citizenship and local ownership of the services and infrastructure delivered, the programme’s objective at this level is to ensure community management of infrastructure, supported through resource allocation across local government sectors and capacity building initiatives. At the same time, the assurance of coordinated efforts in and between government sectors in order to ensure the successful implementation of situational, institutional and social development interventions throughout the programme requires a stringent focus on the governance and project management structures in place.

It is therefore determined that the institutional level of intervention is largely concerned with the management of processes and relationships. The suggestion is thus that the practices that inform this management need to recognise and be informed by the complexity of the problem spaces with which they intend to deal. Moreover, in dealing with highly complex problems, the employment of agile methodologies, which ensure the retention of process flexibility and enable iterative adaptations to the implementation of programme interventions, needs to be closely considered. This kind of flexible process is iterative in that it focuses on on-going adaptation in an evolutionary fashion, incorporating learning through dynamic knowledge-management practices as implementation progresses. Figure 6.8 details what an iterative learning process may look like. Here, learning processes are built into every stage of the programme life-cycle and



**Figure 6.8.:** Creating an iterative learning process for improving, reframing and transforming implementation. Source: Author’s own. Adapted from Pahl-Wostl (2009).

adaptation occurs as the project moves forward as opposed to only implementing adaptations based on previous experience at the end of a project cycle.

Despite the identified ability of the VPUU programme implementers to realise integrated interventions based on an institutional structure that recognises the complexity of violence and the delivery of interventions across multiple spheres, the current monitoring and evaluation procedures and overarching knowledge management approach remains incremental and fundamentally linear in nature. This is largely attributable to the pilot status of the programme in that developed methodologies are purposefully being tested throughout an entire project life cycle with attention being paid to monitoring change. In this sense, the VPUU pilot programme follows a linear trajectory of knowledge management, otherwise referred to as a waterfall approach, where adaptations are only considered at the end of a set project cycle. If one follows what is known about the functionality of complex systems in their tendency to dynamically, and often rapidly evolve, the failure to move towards more iterative learning and adaptation in the future runs the risk of realising numerous missed opportunities. Exploring this kind of process development for the management of integrated planning or even merely for integrated violence prevention would constitute another thesis in its own right and, as a direct realisation of the empirical work here, is thus beyond the scope of this thesis to explore fully. This notion is however explored further in terms of the future research possibilities it opens up in the following chapter (chapter 7).

Returning to the notion of role definition on the basis of identified degrees of complexity, at the most complex end of the spectrum – building on the stronger, more robust basis of provision and management – social development interventions that are supported through the *enablement*

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of communities to self-organise, in actively working towards the creation of the neighbourhoods they desire, becomes key. Beyond the provision of access to services and infrastructure that promote and support social development on a general level, local government cannot provide prescriptive solutions towards solving the vast range of social challenges facing individuals and should thus focus on allocating resources in a manner, as the VPUU programme does, which recognises existent social energies and capacity and provides the means by which individuals can actively contribute to their own development. Hence the necessity to foster the development of a participatory culture and active citizenship through which communities and individuals identify, acknowledge, and embrace their personal abilities to solve problems is placed front and centre.

At the social level of intervention focus is placed by the VPUU programme on ensuring the provision of financial resources targeted at supporting locally developed community projects on an individual basis through the programme's Social Development Fund. This in itself is highly demonstrative of the recognition by the VPUU programme that social development interventions require a focus on enabling active citizenship and the promotion of social cohesion and self-organised practices. As much as this is the case within the implementation strategies of the VPUU programme itself, the support for establishing truly participative processes and developing active citizen engagement at local level within line departments remains underdeveloped. If broad-based implementation is to be realised, the level of social crime prevention and development needs to be recognised across the board as being primarily within the domain of civil society where local government recognises and adapts the role it fulfils towards enabling self-organised prevention and social development practices. As seen through the VPUU programme, this kind of enablement is well supported through the provision of resources that provides the means by which communities can enact change. VPUU staff, community development experts and academics alike promote active citizenship and self-organisation as a central means by which to achieve more livable, sustainable neighbourhoods.

The key here lies in the means by which positive self-organised activities and the required resources can be appropriately identified, something, which undoubtedly requires on-going civil-state engagement. The importance of the identification of these varying roles is deemed to provide important information as to how transfer needs to be conceptualised if the interventions that make up the VPUU programme are to be effectively mainstreamed across local government sectors. The policy and institutional experience of the empirical research reveals that these kinds of specific elements and a detailed understanding of transfer based on what mainstreaming entails at each level of intervention as well as the particular role(s) that departmental sectors need to fulfil have yet to be considered.

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### 6.5.3 Effective resource allocation

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The experience of the VPUU programme has demonstrated the importance of allocating resources, particularly financial resources, quickly and efficiently. This is particularly important

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in terms of delivering on promises made to local communities based on their participation in the development of community action plans that also determine urban upgrades to be undertaken and the provision of services to these areas. The VPUU programme experience has also demonstrated however that difficulties exist in the allocation of funds and targeted budgeting within local line departments, a problem which is further exacerbated by the fact that limited inter-departmental cooperation has resulted in the ineffective, often duplicated allocation of resources, as various departments seek to address area-based challenges without adequate cooperation.

Therefore it is also suggested that a clear definition of the roles that all line departments play in contributing to urban safety and the prevention of violence will in turn also allow for the more efficient allocation of resources, limiting overlaps as well as deficits due to the current inability to prioritise, or even recognise, interventions. In this light, a clear conceptualisation of how various departments and sectors are expected to contribute to urban safety at local level will also provide the basis for the development of more effective instruments for managing budget allocations and leveraging national treasury funds.

Improved efficiency in the ability to coordinate and allocate funds across departments is of course dependant on the establishment of clearly defined, transparent urban development objectives and management processes.

In addition to supporting the understanding of the various roles that line departments need to fulfil in developing more inclusive, safe cities, the conceptualisation of the kind of inputs required in terms of interventions is also suggested as being a starting point from which a culture of participation and recognition for the need to systemically involve local residents in integrated development can be advanced. For example, through its SDF and the vast increase in number of community-led projects financed through this social prevention initiative, the VPUU programme has demonstrated the wider-reaching positive effects that relatively small interventions on the basis of relatively small financial investments can have. Showcasing these benefits in the longer term can potentially also work towards garnering the support of local line departments in adopting the VPUU principles and participatory methodology. Currently, local line departments still shy away from the VPUU's intensive community engagement approach due to the perception that such an approach is too resource intensive and takes too long to implement.

This attitude needs to be changed and one way of doing so is through the demonstration that if participatory process can be developed from the beginning, once basic services and infrastructure have been delivered, small contributions from the side of the state that open opportunities and enable community members to realise their own development ambitions can realise effective, and importantly, resource efficient social development.

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## 6.6 Conclusions

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### 6.6.1 The mainstreaming dilemma

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This chapter has highlighted the central difference between programme transfer, as it refers to the implementation of a particular programme or set of interventions as additional pilot projects and mainstreamed programme transfer, which refers to the transfer of a programme to other areas on a broader scale, as an embedded part of existent institutional systems and structures.


The current status of programme transfer within the VPUU programme itself has been shown to be demonstrative of pilot programme transfer where high levels of fidelity to the original implementation are maintained as far as possible and where the aim is centred on gaining additional experience with a particular methodology within varied urban contexts.

It is on the latter form of mainstreamed programme transfer that this thesis has focused due to the fact that the attainment of at least a certain level of mainstreaming is required if the broad-based implementation of integrated prevention initiatives is to be achieved. Moreover, it is only through the achievement of broad-based implementation that the experiences gained through pilot programmes such as the VPUU can really contribute to changing the status quo of violence and crime in South Africa. Most pointedly, this pertains to the development and realisation of policy as well as the establishment of the institutional structures required to do so.

The movement from a pilot programme implementation towards more broad-based implementation realises a fundamental mainstreaming dilemma with which programme implementers need to deal (Figure 6.9). This movement however, naturally does not occur instantaneously and therefore it is clear that the mainstreaming objectives of any pilot programme will need to progress through a number of stages.

In beginning the mainstreaming process and enabling institutional change, the initial requirement, as Figure 6.9 shows, is to balance the need to realise broad-based implementation through transfer with the benefits offered by the implementing agency model. Here it is proposed that working towards realising this balance requires, in the first place, a clear definition of what it is that is to be transferred. Furthermore, based on the particularities of the VPUU programme, and the overall context of violence and prevention in South Africa, the realisation of the importance of the VPUU's overarching principles of prevention, their community-based approach and institutional set-up is stressed. These elements are considered as key parts of the transfer process in contributing to creating government institutions that are able to cope independently with the complexities of realising integrated situational, institutional and social interventions over the long term.

It is concluded that an adoption of a common vision for safe urban neighbourhoods and the set of principles that have successfully guided VPUU's interventions across local, provincial and national government departments would contribute to evolving the institutional alignment



**Figure 6.9.:** Addressing the mainstreaming dilemma. Source: Elaborated by author.

across spheres of government that is deemed necessary to achieving broad-based transfer. In essence this constitutes the foundational need for the development of a common definition and vision for urban safety, developed at national level. In an ideal case, it is purported that this kind of defined agreement as to what urban safety is about would guide the implementation of development policy along a path that enables all government sectors to understand the linkages between their respective mandates and the impact rendered on realising safer cities. As the case study makes clear, institutional misalignment in terms of non-existent cooperation between line departments as well as a functional disconnect between the availability of resources and the identification of appropriate solutions severely hinders programme transfer.

Overall, and probably the most fundamental point being made here, is that the realisation of broad-based integrated violence prevention requires a principle shift in mind set as to how both the concept of urban safety and prevention itself are perceived. Despite certain social development and crime prevention policy documents that state otherwise, the dominant understanding of violence and crime prevention as being in the domain of law enforcement and the criminal justice system still dominates in South Africa. Arguably, as crime and violence persists in the country, this perception is observed to strengthen. The situation is thus one where policing and law enforcement work in opposition, not in support of, broader social development objectives. This in itself hinders the ability of integrated prevention, based on core social development principles, from being realised.

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The necessity for a change in perception of urban safety and how the development of safer cities is to be achieved is advocated. This shift concerns the re-formulation of urban safety not as a stand-alone issue to which particular institutions (most frequently the SAPS and the Department of Social Development) are required to pay attention but rather urban safety should be perceived as a fully systemic, cross-cutting issue with which all sectors and institutions should proactively concern themselves. As has been seen with the inability to realise integrated policies in the past, this proactive alignment and coordination will not occur spontaneously. It needs to be driven on the basis of accumulated evidence to the benefits of such an approach – herein lies the fundamental contribution of the VPUU programme to achieving urban safety in South Africa.

In addition, the discourse used throughout this thesis has been one of violence prevention, including community-based prevention, realised through situational prevention, institutional prevention and social prevention. This vocabulary follows the lead of the internationally defined concepts that support these terms and the lexis being used within the V(iolence)P(revention)UU programme itself. The terminology itself is not in question here but as one development expert explained during a key interview, clarity needs to be levied as to what exactly is meant by prevention in the South African context. The contention made is that in South Africa, our definitions of prevention and what it is that constitutes a “prevention project” are too often skewed by inherent (or inherited?) prejudice.

This point is well made in begging the question “why is it that in a middle income neighbourhood a swimming pool is a leisure facility whereas the construction of a swimming pool or a soccer field in a township becomes a crime prevention project?” (Interview October 2012).

This thesis acknowledges that the assessment of the VPUU programme and the subsequent scenario of what is required in order to realise broad based integrated violence prevention in South Africa presented here is representative of a utopic ideal. However, the argument is that redefining the way in which urban safety and prevention are viewed and thus also approached, provides the first fundamental step towards creating the basis upon which institutional reform can be founded. It is not enough, as is seen from twenty years of democratic experience, to simply acknowledge the need for holistic approaches to violence as a complex problem, which underpins non-realised policy discourses.

The conceptualisation offered here by no means seeks to prescribe any single course of action but rather aims to demonstrate how it is a theoretical understanding of complex systems can aid in our understanding of what it is that has contributed to the relative success of the VPUU programme. The research outcomes reveal that in conceptualising a model for broad-based programme transfer a reform of the “operating system” so to speak is a determined must and it is this reform that should pay more credence to the theoretical knowledge base offered by the complexity sciences in developing processes that are able to respond to the highly complex and dynamic challenges that contemporary development brings.

This kind of progression raises a significant range of questions as to how this can be achieved, which are far beyond the scope of what can be covered within the framework of this research.

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The final chapter of this thesis therefore provides some summative remarks on the motivating research hypotheses and subsequently sets out an agenda for future research that holds the potential to further the results and extend the contribution presented here.

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# 7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA

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## 7.1 Introduction

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Extending from the premise that urban violence and the perpetuation of violent crime constitutes one of, if not the most, significant barriers to inclusive, sustainable urban development in countries such as South Africa, this research has engaged with the impediments of realising the internationally accepted need for the implementation of integrated, systemic approaches for violence prevention.

More specifically, this thesis set out to consider the current situation of the implementation of integrated approaches to urban violence prevention within the context of Cape Town, South Africa. The primary research objective sought to extrapolate a detailed understanding of the implementation practices and challenges facing the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) Programme, as a unique, exemplary pilot programme targeting integrated urban violence prevention. The focused intention was to highlight the programme's key challenges and thus consider how it is these challenges impact the realisation of the programme's mainstreaming objectives, which work towards the broad-based transfer of the programme to other intervention areas. In doing so, it was suggested that understanding the programme's philosophy, main objectives and implementation principles in conjunction with the challenges being experienced could better inform a contextual conceptualisation of programme transfer deemed necessary for the realisation of implementation on a much larger scale.

The fundamental contribution of this research is the application of the theoretical framework derived from elements of the complexity sciences and transfer literatures that has been applied in the analysis of the VPUU programme experience in achieving the described research objective. This analysis has resulted in a conceptualisation of how it is the epistemological understanding of that which is complex may inform the development of a mainstreamed implementation strategy for integrated prevention interventions based on the case study outcomes and the necessities prescribed by the programme in question. This conceptualisation is based primarily on a recognition of the varying degrees of complexity associated with the issues that specific interventions, as part of larger integrated programme seek to address, the acceptance of uncertainty and limited control in predicting planned outcomes and thus also the need to create institutions that are able to effectively manage complexity.

The necessity for urban planners to embrace complexity and open up the means to test theories from the complexity sciences in developing innovative methods for the delivery of inte-

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grated interventions that promote urban safety is strongly maintained. However, much remains to be done in determining exactly how this is to be achieved, calling for further, similarly contextualised research across the various spheres of intervention explored during this research. This final chapter therefore provides a concise summation and some final remarks on the research hypotheses explored and key research outcomes exposed. Subsequently, the concluding sections of this chapter outline a future research agenda aimed at furthering the outcomes presented here.

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## 7.2 Research Summary

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The development of the research theme, theoretical framework and structure of the empirical investigation undertaken arose on the basis of two key motivating hypotheses. Pragmatically, these hypotheses were formulated on the premise of a general knowledge base concerning a) the status of urban violence as a fundamental urban development challenge, b) the status of violence and crime prevention in South Africa and c) the apparent ineffectiveness with which urban violence, particularly in South Africa's most vulnerable urban contexts, is being addressed.

The primary hypothesis stems from the assertion that broad-based transfer of any integrated planning programme is reliant on the careful and effective alignment of institutional objectives. Similarly, this infers that any institutional misalignment will thus hinder processes of programme transfer, irrespective of any programme adaptation. This hypothesis is founded on the premise that no single government body or institution can effectively address the array of underlying issues that need to be considered and tackled if urban violence is to in any way be effectively curbed. This is fundamentally in agreement with prevailing international discourses that determine the delivery of holistic programmes and the implementation of integrated interventions that target prevention across the situational, institutional and social spheres to be of utmost importance in addressing urban violence as a complex, multi-dimensional social development challenge.

The recognition of urban violence as a highly complex social phenomenon underpins the second motivating hypothesis that has enabled this work. This secondary hypothesis asserts that, in dealing with complex urban challenges, the complexity sciences holds much potential in contributing to the way in which we can understand the implementation processes and challenges facing large integrated planning programmes. This in turn is perceived to enable the development of new thought processes and pragmatic tools for how complexity can be understood and dealt with more effectively as a basic requirement for the effective implementation of broad-based integrated interventions. Inherently, this advocates for a move beyond the dominant ontological use of complexity as a mere description of challenging situations, which are not at present fully understood. In doing so, the motivation is therefore that through the use of established scientific knowledge on the functionality of complex adaptive systems integrated interventions can be assessed and analysed in new ways resulting in the proposal of workable

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development strategies that embrace, deal with and even promote the opportunistic use of this complexity.

Within this overall context, this section revisits these two broad motivating hypotheses and provides concluding remarks on the research experience and the key outcomes that have contributed to the determination of whether or not these assertions hold true.

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### 7.2.1 On the hypothesis of institutional misalignment as a hindrance to programme transfer

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The analytical framework for this research formulated a two-pronged approach to investigating the status of institutional alignment as it pertains to the prevention of urban violence and crime in South Africa. The starting point was situated within the context of international discourses on the need for integrated approaches for violence prevention. Specifically, this concerned the on-going dissemination of international best practices promoting such integrated approaches as they influence a) the elaboration of development policy in countries such as South Africa and b) the development of integrated, international cooperation programmes such as VPUU.

In line with this analytical approach, Chapter four of this thesis outlined the post-apartheid policy experience in South Africa, placing focus on the particular development trajectories that have been enacted through the formulation of urban social and economic development policy since the establishment of the South African democratic state in 1994. The overarching development objectives embodied in such policy were subsequently discussed in relation to the establishment of prevention-specific policy aimed at reducing the stubbornly high levels of violence, particularly violent crime, in South Africa.

Subsequently, chapter five undertook an investigation of the institutional environment and implementation processes for integrated violence prevention being undertaken by the VPUU programme in Cape Town. At this level, the analysis placed focus on the institutional set-up and implementation processes as well as drawing out the specific challenges facing the programme's current and future implementation. More particularly, this was undertaken with the main objective of determining how the transfer of the programme is being perceived as well as how transfer has commenced to additional intervention sites within Cape Town.

In drawing the results of this dual-pronged enquiry together, it becomes clear that institutional misalignment in terms of achieving broad-based integrated violence prevention occurs on a number of levels.

Firstly, an assessment of post-apartheid development policy quickly enables the establishment of the conclusion that the overarching social and economic development policies set out for South Africa draw out opposing objectives. Despite the determined intention to promote a redistribution of wealth in the country through the promotion of economic growth based on securing the welfare of the majority of South Africa's citizens, the reality has realised the implementation of a strongly neoliberal economic development trajectory with economic growth being based on stringent austerity measures, free market trade according to global (read West-

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ern) standards and the on-going privatisation of numerous public services. In essence, the opposing social development policy advocating the creation of a social welfare state premised on the establishment of more equitable and inclusive growth has been rendered largely inconsequential. As a result, almost two decades after the establishment of the democratic nation, South Africa continues to jostle for the retention of the top spot on the world's most unequal countries list, with a Gini index estimate of approximately 63 (CIA, 2013). Alongside exhibiting increasing levels of inequality, so too does South Africa remain among the world's most violent countries with respect to homicide statistics (UNODC, 2010).

Secondly, these opposing objectives present in the economic and social development policy are similarly recognisable in the way in which approaches to violence and crime prevention, as well as policing, have been established and are being implemented. A well recognised need for a focus on social development and locally driven crime prevention is evident in South African crime prevention policy yet institutionally the dominant focus of the South African Police Services (SAPS) remains on hard-line policing tactics in the context of winning the so-defined war on crime. Enforcement and punishment are thus demonstrative of the political intent to be seen to be addressing the problem in a perceptually decisive manner so as to retain citizen support and most importantly a steady inflow of foreign economic investment, promoting South Africa's place on the global stage.

Exacerbating these opposing policy directions, the allocation of crime prevention as a local government mandate, although premised on a sound logic that the prevention of crime is a community-level concern, remains an unfunded one. Moreover, this is based on the unfounded assumption that government departments and sectors across the three fundamental spheres of government would spontaneously cooperate, coordinating activities and sharing resources effectively in order to realise set policy objectives. It is this situation that has been credited with the almost absolute failure to realise any form of real implementation of South Africa's crime prevention policy, something that is explanatory of an almost non-existent respite in the levels of violence and crime being experienced across the country. On the local level, the lack of integrated coordination across municipal departments in Cape Town is replicated much in the same way, as local government similarly suffers from silo operations of line departments where little cooperation between sectors exists. This is something that is clearly demonstrated as a key challenge for the future implementation and embedded sustainability of the VPUU programme, as an integrated programme dependent on the input of a number of sectors if extensive change, spatially and socially, is to be achieved.

The fact that current programme transfer is focused on the implementation of additional pilot programmes in the form of the Informal Settlements Transformation Programme (ISTP), the Mayoral Urban Regeneration Programme (MURP) and the suggested VPUU Western Cape programmes respectively, provides additional opportunities for testing the programme's approach and methodologies within different urban contexts and is certainly of great value. What the case study realises however, is that the attempts to promote the embedding of the VPUU approach and methodologies in local governance structures, as implementable under the auspices

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of coordinated action between local line departments, has yet to be realised. Rather, a primary challenge concerns the inability of responsible line departments to allocate resources – human and financial capital – as necessary, within a time-period that adheres to set agreements and enables the maintenance of necessary community trust and support.

Situations that have arisen and that have been described in detail in chapter 5 confirm the fragility of the programme where mainstreaming attempts have been compromised due to the failure of local government institutions to coordinate effectively and deliver on promises made. Therefore, the success of the VPUU programme is deemed as being directly attributable to the maintenance of control over the institutional environment that ensures the integrated delivery of the various interventions. Such maintenance of institutional control is possible in terms of realising the implementation of additional pilot programmes however deems broad-based transfer unrealisable since this would require the same forms of delivery making use of the existing institutional structures across local line departments.

Based on the above, the fundamental conclusion being drawn is that the suggestion that institutional misalignment hinders programme transfer is confirmed to the extent that this certainly holds true for the broad-based, or *mainstreamed* implementation of integrated planning approaches. Extending from this, it can thus so too be argued that institutional misalignment is a key barrier to realising the development of safe, sustainable urban neighbourhoods in South Africa. Overall, the implementation of broad-based prevention interventions that address the multitudinous drivers and resultant dimensions of violence and crime require nothing short of highly coordinated inter-sectoral cooperation supported by clear role definitions, enabling the efficient allocation of scarce resources towards achieving commonly agreed objectives.

The research outcomes therefore place significant value on the establishment of a common vision for urban safety in South Africa, of which violence prevention is one key element. Furthermore, it is also suggested here that the broad-based transfer of an integrated programme for urban violence prevention is perhaps most reliant on the embedding of the VPUU philosophy and key principles that advocate civil-state collaboration on the basis of trust, accountability and voluntarism. In order to realise an up-scaled developmental approach to ensuring urban risk reduction and the promotion of urban safety, the establishment of institutions and governance structures that are equipped to deal with complexity is essential if this kind of programme transfer is ever to be realised. It is exactly with this point with which the second motivating hypothesis engages.

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## 7.2.2 On the potential of the complexity sciences to contribute to broad-based urban violence prevention

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In her seminal work *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Jane Jacobs (1961) dedicates the final chapter to questioning, “the kind of problem a city is”. Here Jacobs presents the notion that in determining any means of action a fundamental recognition of the kind of problem one is facing is required simply based on the fact that not all problems can be thought about, nor

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dealt with, in the same way. In elaborating this with respect to the broadened ideology of the kind of problem that “the city” represents, Jacobs continues in identifying cities as “problems in organized complexity” (Jacobs, 1961, p.433). In this sense, problems of *organised* complexity are distinguished from those of *disorganised* complexity in that they exhibit any number of variables that are not simply “helter-skelter” but which are all highly interrelated, forming parts of a structured, organic whole.

Most importantly, Jacobs asserts that despite the seeming irrationality of interactions, problems of organised complexity can in fact be understood if analysed with the functionality of organised complexity in mind. The city is however not in its entirety representative of a singular problem of organised complexity but it rather constitutes a vast number of individual complex problems that formulate the interconnected whole (ibid.). It is precisely this thinking that has underpinned the development of the complexity sciences as a theoretical standpoint from which to assess urban planning and development challenges, something this research has also sought to elaborate on. As has been discussed in the formulation of the theoretical framework that supports this research (chapter 2), the complexity sciences have formed the backdrop to a growing number of social sciences research endeavours, including the development of planning theory and practice which has been based on the recognition of the complex nature of the wide array of planning challenges facing contemporary urbanisation.

Recently however, over half a century after Jacobs’ commentary on the city as a problem in organised complexity, Vanessa Watson and Babatunde Agbola (2013, p.1) pointedly remind us that, “*a shortage of urban planning and management professionals trained to respond to urban complexity with progressive pro-poor approaches exacerbates urban dysfunction*”. This comment demonstrates the still very much existent gap between the theoretical determination of cities as complex adaptive systems that exhibit varying forms of perceivable order and disorder and the epistemological impact that such understanding has had, or not had as it may be, on the development of urban planning education and practice over the past fifty years.

Similarly, scholars at the Santa Fe Institute, arguably the world’s leader in complexity sciences research, also assert the enduring challenge that exists in reconceptualising the city as a complex adaptive system, something that is emphasised as being key to developing more scientifically grounded urban planning practices based on complexity sciences principles (Betencourt, 2013).

This identified gap and the contention that the complexity sciences have yet to be appropriately implemented in devising solutions for integrated planning implementation was, and is, a key determinant of what it is this research has set out to achieve, supporting the broad hypothesis that the complexity sciences provides a fundamental starting point for the investigation of how it is broad-based programme transfer for integrated violence prevention in Cape Town can be explored. As ordinary as this may sound, the hypothesis stems from the humble assertion that planning practice targeting complex problems can benefit from analysis of both the existent problems and implementation strategies used to address these problems by drawing on the theoretical knowledge base that the complexity sciences offers.

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What the case study has demonstrated is that this gap, and thus also the hypothesis, remains prevalent. This claim rests in the clear observation that, despite a clear recognition of the “complexity” of cities, urban development and the challenges facing planning professionals (in this instance urban violence and crime prevention), little consideration of what this complexity means – beyond being an ontological description of these problems – can be observed. Essentially, the epistemological understanding of complex adaptive systems has yet to significantly impact the way in which integrated planning approaches are being designed and implemented in the South African context. Moreover, a continued failure to explore the opportunities that this knowledge base can offer integrated planning practice is representative of a perverse “sticking point” that will prohibit progress in tackling complex social challenges beyond pilot programme implementation.

In providing more specific clarity as to the value of exploring complexity science theories within the context of integrated planning for the prevention of urban violence in South Africa, the research context provides an answer that is two-fold in its formulation. Basically, there is both a theoretical and practical advantage to research on complex urban problems being explored from a complexity sciences perspective.

Theoretically, the scientifically grounded knowledge gained over fifty plus years of exploration into the functionality and implications of dynamic change within complex adaptive systems provides the platform from which a range of tools have been developed by which to understand complex system dynamics, something that has advanced the state of the art across a vast number of disciplines, both within and beyond the social sciences. In relation to planning and the further development of both planning theory and practice, this research stands firm on the necessity for academics and planning professionals to more seriously consider the potential that the complexity sciences holds in furthering innovative solutions and the creation of processes that embrace and, most importantly, seek to identify opportunity in complexity rather than limiting the word to a negative narrative for describing developmental challenges. At the very least, the complexity sciences holds the potential for the development of a new kind of urban planning episteme, opening up new ways of thinking about things that changes the expectations in practice of what is both desirable and/or even achievable.

Overall, the complexity sciences provides a basis from which one can work against predominant and highly resistant forms of linear thought and action, based on unfounded assumptions, towards acknowledging uncertainty through the acceptance that prescribed end results will likely never be achieved. Therefore the theoretical background provided by the complexity sciences requires a shift in approach, moving focus from prescribed outcomes to the development of dynamic processes guided, but not limited by, broadly defined end objectives.

Pragmatically, this theoretical approach in its application to a practical example in the form of the case study undertaken here demonstrates how the understanding of complex system functionality can determine the way in which integrated programme components can be perceived in new ways. Additionally, the means of understanding these intervention components and their interaction with the complexity of the systems, spatial, institutional and social, can aid

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very pragmatically in the identification of robust and dynamic aspects that can likewise enable a better ability to a) cope with uncertainty through the definition of workable problem spaces and b) the definition of necessary roles to be filled by key stakeholders at different points in the implementation process. The suggestion is that within any sphere of intervention these roles will shift between varying levels of provision, management and enablement, largely dependent on the robustness of the specific elements that constitute the intervention in question. This holds the potential to realise a better balance between the expectations of local communities and the capacities of state departments.

Furthermore, the difference between simplification in terms of strategy development within workable problem spaces and reductionism based on linearly defined cause and effect relationships plays an important role in moving beyond the pilot programme. Currently, the VPUU programme remains firmly identifiable as a pilot programme and the research demonstrates that in order to move beyond this status, the theoretical basis provided by the complexity sciences, as well as the range of tools being developed across a number of other professions, can indeed support the conceptualisation of how it is mainstreamed programme transfer (a far more complex endeavour) may be achieved.

Finally, this research highlights the lack of any concrete plan to realise this kind of transfer on a larger scale throughout South Africa and thus likewise underscores the necessity for this research to be continued, looking more in detail at the specific elements and ways in which tools derived under the auspices of the complexity sciences can be applied to planning for integrated violence prevention.

The theoretical framework established on which this research has been based has provided valuable insight and enabled the drawing of conclusions into how transfer can be considered based on the experiences of the VPUU programme, however, a large number of additional questions have arisen beyond the scope of this particular work. Therefore, the final section of this chapter is dedicated to the development of a future research agenda aimed at advancing the closure of the gap between sound policy formulation and the actual realisation of integrated implementation to achieve set objectives.

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### **7.3 Where to next? Elaborating elements of a future research agenda**

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This final section of the chapter by no means intends to provide a fully elaborated course of action for future research. Instead it elaborates merely a few of the possibilities for further research that have extended primarily from the issues raised during the course of the empirical research, which have extended additional questions with which this particular work was unable to deal.

These questions include developing further discourses on a) the value of urban upgrading and the provision of infrastructure beyond its tangible role of upgrading the physical environment, b) the value of identifying and incorporating self-organised prevention practices into integrated prevention programmes, c) the potential for planning practice to draw on a number

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of management tools existent across a range of other disciplines in ensuring that urban planners are appropriately equipped to respond to urban complexity and d) the contemporary role of planners in the delivery of integrated planning.

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### 7.3.1 Urban upgrading, trust and the development of participatory cultures

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#### 7.3.1.1 The intangible role of infrastructure provision

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Considering the specific urban context with which this research deals, the relationship between the provision of infrastructure through upgrading and the development of participatory cultures is deemed to be an area that warrants further focused research.

The research results presented here demonstrate the importance of infrastructure provision as a tangible, short-term win early on in the implementation of integrated programmes that ultimately seek to generate social change. Urban upgrading in general and the provision of infrastructure more specifically are thus determined in this context as fulfilling not only a tangible role in providing access to facilities and services but also an intangible role in terms of supporting the development of participatory cultures where none exist.

Here, the provision of infrastructure contributes importantly to the development of community support, garnered through a basis of trust, which is promoted through the delivery of promised infrastructure and services. Furthermore, an extended intention is to link the provision of infrastructure and services with the local economic development needs of communities, creating employment and stimulating opportunity where none has previously existed.

This means that much needs to be understood concerning processes of civil-state relationship building within this context, drawing on the experience of the VPUU programme and developing more in-depth understanding of the intangible roles that the provision of infrastructure and physical upgrading can realise.

This is hypothesised to be one way in which the development of functional civil-state relationships and the stimulation of social cohesion and ultimately a more broadened culture of participation can be supported. It is only through the development of such a participatory culture and a deviance from the paternalistic state expectation that collaborative planning and community ownership in these contexts will be realised. Similarly, it is only through collaborative and co-evolutionary planning that sustainable integrated urban development can be achieved and this requires the identification not only of existent challenges but also of opportunities that can be harnessed to further stimulate community-driven social change.

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### 7.3.1.2 Harnessing urban energies; the opportunity for self-organised prevention

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Urban energies<sup>85</sup> are existent in many forms, one of the most significant being the social energy existent within the people that reside in urban neighbourhoods. These people may be economically poor and living in under-serviced, infrastructure-deprived urban areas however they are often rich in creativity, unrecognised skills and the determination to create better lives for themselves, something that has been clearly demonstrated during participation in the community workshops undertaken as part of this research.

The opportunities to ascertain, better understand and thus make use of existing urban energies is therefore deemed a crucial element in the creation of a more participatory culture through the direct involvement of local residents in the development and implementation of locally determined plans for the spatial, economic and social development of their neighbourhoods. This is a topic in which the VPUU programme has made much progress and on which many points of learning from the programme can and should be drawn.

It is suggested that future focus should therefore be placed on research investigating the impact of programmes such as VPUU in developing social cohesion within communities over the longer-term. In conjunction with this, it is asserted that more insight into the existence of self-organised community development and in this instance particularly self-organised violence prevention practices needs to be gained so that more can be done to ensure that integrated programme implementation supports and further enables such processes. The provision of usable public space does not necessarily result in improved social cohesion or spontaneous cooperation within fragmented, distrustful communities. Therefore, more needs to be done to stimulate community organisation based on targeted research into existing community structures, the presence of social capital, community resources and a more in-depth understanding of how communities act to self-organise.

Overall, it is believed that the importance of this lies not just in an investigation of the particular methods employed by community groups and individuals but also in realising the innovation that they may be able to bring and the benefits they may be able to add if such methods are considered and supported by local authorities in implementing formal planning practice. The persistence of chronic urban violence and the knowledge of the complexities of the causes of violence calls for new approaches in research that comprehend the ways that formal and informal methods of prevention can be coordinated, targeting the enhancement of a community's own capacity to prevent violence and thus contribute to violence reduction on a larger scale.

Although research into how it is community groups organise themselves so as to be able to cope with situations of persistent urban violence has, as Diane Davis (2012) puts it, been largely ignored, her recently published report on a series of case studies across eight cities in

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<sup>85</sup> The concept of urban energies has been taken from a memorandum entitled "Urban Energies - Urban Challenges", which resulted from a multi-stage cooperation and consultation procedure with international experts in Berlin in October 2012. The memorandum is available at <http://www.bmvbs.de/SharedDocs/EN/Artikel/SW/urban-energies-memorandum.html>.

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Latin America, Africa and South Asia provides an obligatory point of departure for further, more contextually focused and pragmatically oriented research into understanding and making use of community-driven methods of self-organised prevention and social development approaches being employed at community level in South Africa. If anywhere, a good basis exists in the experience of Cape Town and the VPUU programme from which progress on this front can be made, building on local “principles and priorities that have already shown promise” and based on the assertion that “it is possible to draw an array of policy recommendations by better understanding the small but promising victories already being waged and won in the struggle to survive or restore liveability in situations of violence” (Davis, 2012, p.31).

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### 7.3.2 Managing complexity: The promise of agile methodologies for integrated planning

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In relation to the research conducted and the concluded necessity for institutional alignment as a key factor in the realisation of broad-based programme transfer, as well as the assertion that the achievement of such alignment and integrated programme delivery is dependent on institutions that can cope with and make use of complexity, further investigation into how it is governance tools developed on the basis of the complexity sciences may be applied to integrated development planning is warranted.

Integrated planning is clearly an activity in both individually and simultaneously addressing the innumerable, highly interconnected elements that contribute to the prevalence of urban violence and any other complex social problem. Dealing with and ultimately benefitting from complexity requires however a stark reformation of the institutional “operating system”, incorporating the establishment and maintenance of flexible systems that are able to learn from within, focusing on working processes rather than only on the achievement of pre-determined objectives. There is much progress that has been made on the management of complexity across a variety of disciplines, particularly in software development, from which it is suggested that planning can certainly learn.

Most directly, the pursuit of programme management and process development methods that have been evolved precisely to enable programme developers to work with heightened unpredictability remain under-explored in the domain of planning. This deficit has been reaffirmed in a very recent publication by Ben Ramalingam (2013) entitled *Aid on the edge of chaos*. Here, the author reasserts the lack of epistemological engagement with complexity and the scientific base of knowledge on how complex systems and interactions work in the realm of development planning, particularly the provision of aid, as large international organisations continue to fall prey to the quest for broadly replicable, cookie-cutter approaches and what he refers to as the infliction of “best-practicitis”.

On a more positive note, the author presents a number of cases where the knowledge of complex systems is being innovatively applied, realising positive results. These cases provide simply more credence to what is being suggested here, that the development of innovative thinking based on complexity as a scientific body of usable knowledge may potentially con-

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tribute immensely to the movement of integrated planning for violence prevention beyond the pilot project.

One possible track would be to further specific research on the application of agile methodologies to the challenge of creating governance institutions and integrated planning processes that are able to more adeptly deal with and flexibly respond to the complexity of the urban systems in question. As described in the development of the theoretical framework in Chapter two, flexibility is the means through which feedback can be responded to and learnt from, as processes are adapted in order to mitigate an experience of failure in future implementation.

Process flexibility however can only be implementable in addressing localised failures within defined problem spaces with the use of particular kinds of strategic development methodologies that are likewise agile. Agile methodology is a form of project management developed in the software industry that enables project implementers to respond to unpredictability, the kind of unpredictability, or as we refer to it the uncertainty, with which planners are faced when attempting to affect change through the implementation of complex, integrated intervention programmes. Agile methodologies promote iterative planning and implementation processes that value criteria such as: a) placing value on individuals and interactions over processes and tools; b) valuing customer (read community) collaboration over contract negotiation and, possibly most importantly, c) employing principles of responding to change rather than following a set plan (Ambler, 2009, p.4).

As in modern software development, from which agile methodologies have materialised, interventions seeking long-term social change are viewed here as being in need of the kinds of evolutionary approaches that agile methodologies advocate. Evolutionary approaches are by definition iterative and incremental as they acknowledge feedback and respond accordingly, adapting to current changes as well as perceived future change based on new information provided through continuous (pilot project) experience. Additionally, this kind of evolutionary approach is thus also highly collaborative and as established in the preceding chapter, it is precisely the more collaborative approaches to planning that are deemed most effective in working towards solutions for highly complex problems.

Overall, the logic of agile methodologies concerns the generation of behaviour as opposed to the specification of behaviours and is an ideology that closely relates back to Jane Jacobs' ideas on the kinds of solutions and processes that need to be developed if we are to realise the creation of liveable, inclusive and safe urban neighbourhoods under the auspices of "The City" as an interrelated, interdependent, complex system.

Just as the need exists to develop processes that embrace and benefit from complexity, the need to understand the dynamic roles that planning professionals play in implementing integrated planning approaches requires planners to similarly be able to cope with and respond to the dynamics of complex systems and their functionality. As previously pointed out, Watson and Agbola (2013) have very recently highlighted the fact that the implementation of integrated planning requires planning professionals and urban managers that have the skills to appropriately deal with complexity.

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### 7.3.3 Complexity and the planning professional

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In recent decades, the complexity of the challenges facing global urbanisation and the objective of achieving “sustainable” development in any or all of its forms has undoubtedly been recognised. Most particularly, this has occurred on a macro level through the shift in the understanding of planning as a determined action in the delivery of prescribed solutions based on technical rationality towards planning theory and approaches that evoke the necessity for civil-state partnerships, multi-stakeholder involvement and collaborative means of determining courses of action. In this complex macro environment the planning professional fulfils the role of being a particular kind of expert situated within a broader pool of experts where the non-technical knowledge of a broad range of stakeholders is given much credence. This shift has led to the development of a focus on participatory planning approaches that seek to draw out and engage local knowledge through the input of community residents. As Chapter two of this thesis has highlighted, it has become widely accepted that the addressing of complex social problems inherently requires multi-stakeholder partnerships, something that is underpinned by the simple impossibility for any number of government authorities or trained professionals to cater to all individual and community needs, which are as dynamic and changeable as the urban environment itself. Collaborative planning approaches as well as the recognised need for the presence of social cohesion and self-organisation in contemporary planning and development are all precisely indicative of the impact that the emergent understanding of complexity has begun to have on planning theory and practice.

On a more micro level, this research has sought to consider the impact of the complexity sciences episteme on the organisation and implementation of integrated violence prevention approaches. What emerges in doing so is that more than being representative of a single kind of expert within a pool of others, the urban design and planning professionals implementing the VPUU programme within the specific urban context of Cape Town’s former township areas and informal settlements are in essence fulfilling a role that is far more diverse.

The implementation of interventions, which can be determined as constituent of either more robust or dynamic elements, as they pertain to the larger integrated programme, have been identified as requiring these professionals to fulfil a variation of specific roles during the life cycle of the implementation process. As presented in-depth in the previous chapter, the particular context of informal townships, as well as the specific objectives of garnering community support and developing a currently non-existent culture of participation in order to move towards the ability to engage collaborative planning based on inclusive, representative participation, requires planners to recognise and fulfil a variety of roles. These roles range from the provision of technical expertise and dynamic, flexible project management to acting as enabling agents for communities to develop social cohesion, providing the basis from which self-organised activities can prosper.

The suggestion is thus that the role of the planning professional in such contexts shifts dynamically across a spectrum ranging from technical rationality and the provision of immediate

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solutions to the negotiation of highly dynamic stakeholder relationships and ensuring action that enables community members to participate in the development of their own urban futures.

The role of the planner within the delivery of integrated programmes can then perhaps best be described as fulfilling that of a *social entrepreneur*<sup>86</sup>. The term social entrepreneur infers flexibility based on learning from within the processes of implementation, requiring constant adaptation when negotiating the path from immediate urban infrastructure provision in improving the physical urban environment to managing dynamic institutional processes and enabling long-term social change.

With respect to this research it has been purported that an improved understanding of the variation of roles required in integrated intervention delivery may go a long way towards enabling coordination across local level line departments and government sectors. However in terms of looking forward, this experience also holds the potential to reassess the kind of professionals planners are and on this basis consider the way in which planning professionals should be educated.

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#### 7.4 Last words

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This thesis is representative of an ambitious research undertaking, which has sought to understand the dynamic and complex interrelations between policy and practice that affect the realisation of integrated violence prevention in South Africa.

South Africa does, as has been demonstrated through this thesis, enjoy a progressive policy environment, with what many refer to as some of the best social and urban development policies in the world. It is the implementation of this policy that remains at the core of our problems in being unable to realise equitable development.

There are no simple answers or silver-bullet solutions to these challenges and therefore the task remains to continually pursue new means of thinking about the issues being faced, continuously seeking to draw more robust parallels between the development of the theory on which we base intervention and the evidence-based experiences that in turn influence our theoretical standpoints. This is a continuous process of reassessing and questioning the status quo, iteratively adapting as we move along.

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<sup>86</sup> This description remains, as yet, undefined beyond the scope of the broadened understanding of a social entrepreneur as someone that works towards devising innovative solutions to pressing social problems.