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**Decentralization and Governance Performance in Ethnically Diverse States:
The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa**

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Declaration of Honor

I, **Vitus Ikenna Egwu**, herewith certify that while preparing this Doctoral Dissertation, I did not consult the help of another person or made use of a different source other than the ones stated hereafter. I have indicated the positions where I adopted the exact or abstract content of all my sources and credited their origin accordingly. This dissertation has never been presented to any other examination board in this or any similar format. I know that any false declaration will lead to legal consequences.

Darmstadt, January 14th, 2022

To my mother:

Ad occursum futurum nostri

Acknowledgement

The course of writing this dissertation was that of sharp contrasts: of blood and water, pain and joy, hope and despair, losing a mother and gaining a son, breaking up and getting married, falling and rising many times. While I take full responsibility for its completion and probable mistakes, I acknowledge the support of those who were instrumental in getting the dissertation across the line.

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Abstract

Decentralization theorists are of the view that decentralization improves governance by bequeathing citizens with numerous points of access to participate in governance, which, in turn, improves governance by enhancing allocative and productive efficiencies. But practice shows otherwise, namely: that decentralization does not always produce positive effect on governance. This fluctuation in the relationship between decentralization and governance raises an important question: “why does variation in governance performance exist in decentralized countries?” In other words, “Why does decentralization increase the performance of governance more significantly in some countries than in others?”

I address this question in this research. By combining some classical theories of behavior with the implications of Ekeh’s Theory of the Two Publics, I argue that ethnic diversity (a dimension of social networks and groupings), under the preconditions of democracy and postcolonialism, represents one of the social structures upon which the governance outcome of decentralization depends; and that this dependence occurs through the negative impact of ethnic diversity on the citizens’ behavior toward accountability. In addition, I also contend that another variable, which I call “state-exploiting mentality” (SEM), exists as a mechanism between ethnic diversity and citizens’ negative accountability behavior (NAB).

These contentions of mine are subjected to an empirical test in sub-Saharan Africa, using a quantitative cross-country study, and data from Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Afrobarometer, and Ethnic Fractionalization Index. In line with my theoretical propositions, the findings support a mediational model between ethnic diversity, SEM, NAB, and governance performance, revealing that ethnic diversity predicts a positive effect on SEM, SEM a positive effect on NAB, and NAB a negative effect on governance performance. This result not only contributes to scientific answer as to why some countries do not benefit from decentralization, it also highlights two new areas to focus on when trying to address the problematics around governance and development in sub-Saharan Africa.

Zusammenfassung

Dezentralisierungstheoretiker sind der Ansicht, dass die Dezentralisierung Governance verbessert, indem sie den Bürgern die umfangreiche Teilnahme an Governance ermöglicht, was wiederum Governance verbessert, indem die alloкатive und produktive Effizienz gesteigert wird. Aber die Praxis zeigt etwas anderes, nämlich: dass Dezentralisierung nicht immer positive Auswirkungen auf Governance hat. Diese Schwankungen in der Beziehung zwischen Dezentralisierung und Governance werfen eine wichtige Frage auf: „Warum gibt es Unterschiede in der Governance-Leistung in dezentralisierten Ländern?“ Mit anderen Worten: „Warum steigert die Dezentralisierung die Governance-Leistung in einigen Ländern deutlicher als in anderen?“

Dieser Frage gehe ich in dieser Forschung nach. Indem ich einige klassische Verhaltenstheorien mit den Implikationen von Ekeh's Theory of the Two Publics kombiniere, argumentiere ich, dass ethnische Vielfalt (eine Dimension sozialer Netzwerke und Gruppierungen) unter den Voraussetzungen von Demokratie und Postkolonialismus eine der sozialen Strukturen darstellt, bei denen das Governance-Ergebnis von der Dezentralisierung abhängt; und dass diese Abhängigkeit durch die negativen Auswirkungen der ethnischen Vielfalt auf das Verhalten der Bürger gegenüber der Rechenschaftspflicht entsteht. Darüber hinaus behaupte ich, dass eine andere Variable, die ich „Staatsausbeutungsmentalität“ (SEM) nenne, als Mechanismus zwischen ethnischer Vielfalt und negativem Rechenschaftsverhalten der Bürger (NAB) existiert.

Diese meine Behauptungen werden einem empirischen Test in Subsahara-Afrika unterzogen, wobei eine quantitative länderübergreifende Studie und Daten aus dem Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, dem Afrobarometer und dem Ethnic Fractionalization Index verwendet werden. In Übereinstimmung mit meinen theoretischen Vorschlägen unterstützen die Ergebnisse ein Vermittlungsmodell zwischen ethnischer Diversität, SEM, NAB und Governance-Leistung und zeigen, dass ethnische Diversität einen positiven Effekt auf SEM, SEM einen positiven Effekt auf NAB und NAB einen negativen Effekt auf Governance-Leistung vorhersagt. Dieses Ergebnis trägt nicht nur zur wissenschaftlichen Antwort auf die Frage bei, warum einige Länder nicht von der Dezentralisierung profitieren, es hebt auch zwei neue Bereiche hervor, auf die man sich konzentrieren sollte, wenn man versucht, die Probleme im Zusammenhang mit Governance und Entwicklung in Subsahara-Afrika anzugehen.

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Acronyms

ACS	The American Colonization Society
AOI	<i>Africa Orientale Italiana</i>
CBOs	Community-based organizations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DFID	Department for International Development
EFI	Ethnic Fractionalization Index
ELF	Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCI	Global Competitive Index
GED	Georeferenced Event Dataset
ICT	Information Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IIAG	Ibrahim Index of African Governance
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAR	Missing at Random
MCAR	Missing Completely at Random
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MI	Multiple Imputation
NAB	Negative accountability behavior
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PSI	Polity Score Index
PVOs	Private Voluntary Organizations
SEM	State-Exploiting Mentality
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SUR	Seemingly Unrelated Regression
TFR	Total Fertility Rate

UCDP	The Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	The United Nations
UNDP	World Bank and the United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
USAID	United State Agency for International Development

1.0 Introduction

Decentralization theorists claim that decentralization is a valid mechanism for improving governance. Their argument follows a simple logic: by bringing government closer to the people, decentralization bequeaths citizens with numerous points of access to participate in governance (Norris, 2008; Fisman & Gatti, 2002). These points of access, granted to the citizens, improve governance quality by enhancing both allocative and productive efficiencies¹ in turn (Smith & Revell, 2016; Smoke & White, 2005). Despite the plausibility of this argument, practice however shows that decentralization does not always have a positive effect on governance. While it has improved the quality of governance in Bolivia and Indonesia, for instance, its effects on governance are undetermined in Chile, and even outright negative in Brazil and Russia (Faguet 2004; Simatupang, 2009; Qibthiyyah, 2008; Winkler & Rounds 1996; Treisman 2000; Blanchard & Schleifer, 2000).

In sub-Saharan Africa, this pattern of mixed relationship between governance and decentralization persists as well. In Nigeria and Uganda, for instance, the effect of decentralization on education – an important factor for quantifying overall governance – is recorded as positive (Uwakwe, Falaye, Emunemu, & Adedire, 2008; Murphy, 2005). In Nigeria, Uwakwe et al. (2008) remarked that decentralization boosted access to education for both boys and girls. Nigeria was ranked among the lowest in the world in terms of girl-child education in the 1990s (UNESCO, 2003). But this condition changed through the introduction of decentralization in Nigeria in the late 1990s. By 2005, the percentage of girls enrolling in both public and private schools in Nigeria improved tremendously, in comparison to that of boys. A similar result was also recorded in Uganda, where Murphy (2005) accredited a dramatic improvement in the education sector, particularly in the area of access to primary education, to decentralization. According to Murphy, children enrollment in Ugandan schools increased from 2.4 million in 1992 to more than 7 million in 2006. In addition, the education sector in Ugandan also experienced significant changes in the number of and proportion of trained teachers, the classrooms built and available, and textbooks purchased and distributed (Murphy, 2005: 139).

Together with Uganda, South Africa appears consistently in the top ranking of overall decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa (Ndegwa, 2002). Yet the effect of decentralization on South African education system cannot be compared to that of Uganda. Instead of producing positive effects, devolving power and authority to subnational governments in South Africa unleashed a new set of power dynamics that undermined South African education system. Particularly, from the point of view of the quality of teachers training, it was discovered that managers of teachers training institutes were caught up in conflicting bureaucratic processes that made it difficult to

¹ I refer to allocative and distributive efficiencies here in accordance with Smoke and White (2005), who define allocative efficiency as the tailoring of public services and regulations to the demand of the local citizens, and productive efficiency as the fostering of public accountability and the reduction of administrative red tapes.

optimize teachers training programs (Nieuwenhuis & Mokoena, 2005). Not only that, Sayed and Soudien (2005) also found that inclusion in South African schools was hampered because of decentralization. Instead of enhancing inclusion, new forms of exclusion started appearing in South African schools in the areas of: (1) governance (the ways in which schools govern and manage their activities); (2) access (who obtains access to school, how, and what admission policies are implemented), and; (3) curriculum (the ways in which school and teachers mediate the national curriculum in relation to inclusion) (Sayed & Soudien, 2005: 116).

This ambivalent effect of decentralization on governance in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere raises an important question: “Why does variation in governance performance exist in decentralized countries?” In other words, “Why does decentralization produce different effects on governance in different countries? I shall elaborate on existing answers to this question in Chapter 3 of this work. But, for now, suffice it to say that the attempt of scholars to answer this question so far can be classified into six streams of literature, grouped along the explanatory factors they highlight. These include: (1) those that suggest that the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of decentralization depends on the structure of political institutions (Agrawal & Ribot, 2000; Ostrom, 2000; Anderson, 2003; Rodden et al., 2003); (2) those that stress local governments’ capacity to respond to local demands as the condition for effective decentralization (Deininger & Mpuga, 2005; Grindle (2007)); (3) those that stress on the degree of institutional authority as sine qua non for a successful decentralization (Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Hartmann & Crowford, 2008); (4) those that emphasize the importance of citizen participation (Litvack & Seddon 1999; Kauzya, 2007; Azfar, et al., 1999); (5) those that focus on transparency of government (Darbishire, 2010; Daruwala & Nayak, 2007), and; (6) those that believe that the success of decentralization is determined by the structure of a society itself (Schönwalder 1997; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Putnam, 1993).

Now, within the last stream of literature, where social structure is believed to determine successful and unsuccessful decentralization, there are sub-streams of literature that concentrate on different aspects of social structures as well. Some sub-streams concentrate on economic heterogeneity, whereas others focus on lack of social trust, divisive cultural norms and traditions, and social heterogeneity. The subset of literature focusing on economic heterogeneity argues that variation in the governance outcome of decentralization has a lot to do with the gap between the poor and the rich; that a large gap in economic status constitutes a polarizing factor capable of reducing the ability of the citizens to push for improved governance as a unified force (Tendler, 1997; Schönwalder, 1997). The sub-stream focusing on lack of social trust, on the other hand, suggests that the variation occurs because of varied degrees of trust existing among the people themselves and between the people and the government in different countries; that less trust among the citizens affects service delivery, for example, by decreasing the possibility of the citizens acting collectively (De Mello, 2004; Knack & Keefer, 1997). A third sub-stream of literature would have us believe that differences in governance output has more to do with different levels of civic engagement in different societies; that decentralization affects the output of governance in a more positive way in societies with stronger tradition of civic engagement than in those with weaker one (Putnam, 1993;

Merrey & Wolf, 1986). Lastly, the subset of works focusing on social heterogeneity often centers on ethnic diversity as the varying factor (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005; Timol, 2020), and argues that, when ethnic diversity is combined with decentralization, it produces outcomes such as corruption that are detrimental to governance.

This dissertation aligns with the views expressed in the last subset of literature, namely, that ethnic diversity produces detrimental effects on governance. But unlike previous works in the subset, which approach the relationship between ethnicity and governance from the perspective of ethnicity's divisive impact on governance coordination, my dissertation approaches the relationship from the point of view of ethnicity's effect on citizens' accountability behavior. The idea of employing this perspective stems from the use of bottom-up accountability to justify decentralization in the literature, where it is argued that decentralization improves performance of governance by improving bottom-up accountability (Pesqué-Cela, 2017; Smith & Revell, 2016; Smoke & White, 2005). This approach positions bottom-up accountability as an important mechanism for improving governance performance through decentralization, to the extent that decentralization is claimed to improve performance of governance to the degree the individuals or groups of individuals living in a society are willing to take up active role in holding their government officials accountable (Sujarwoto, 2017).

Building on this claim, I contend that the governance outcome of decentralization partly depends on ethnic diversity; and that this dependence occurs through the negative impact of ethnic diversity on citizens' behavior toward accountability (Norris, 2008; Fisman & Gatti, 2002). In addition, I also contend that another variable, which I call *state-exploiting mentality* (SEM), exists as a mechanism between ethnic diversity and citizens' negative accountability behavior (NAB).

My intention in this research is to subject these arguments to an empirical test in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. My focus on sub-Saharan Africa is informed by two reasons: the fact that focusing on one region would keep context variation low, and the fact that a good number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by ethnic pluralism (Isaksson, 2013; Alesina et al., 2003). In what follows, I outline my research question in detail as well as provide an overview of the aim of my investigation.

1.1 Research Question and Aim of Study

Underlying my theoretical claims above are distinct questions circling around the relationship between ethnic pluralism, negative accountability behavior, and governance performance. I make these questions explicit in this subsection, for the sake of analytical clarity, as well as reframe them to suit the context of my research. Given my interest on the role of citizens' accountability behavior in the relationship between ethnic diversity and governance performance as well as my focus on sub-Saharan Africa, I can state these fundamental questions as follows: Is there a nexus between ethnic diversity and NAB in decentralized sub-Saharan African countries? If yes, what mechanism explains it? And how does NAB itself relate with governance performance? These questions can

fundamentally be tackled individually, but for the sake of clarity I have reformulated them into an overarching query:

What implication(s) does ethnic diversity entail for governance performance in the decentralized countries of sub-Saharan Africa?

To examine this question, I pursue a quantitative study of sub-Saharan African countries characterized by both decentralization and ethnic diversity. With this quantitative cross-country approach, I investigate the explanatory power of ethnic diversity in relation to the discrepancies we observe in governance performance across decentralized countries. More precisely, I explore, with the approach, whether the presence of ethnic pluralism results in variations in SEM, SEM in NAB, and NAB in governance performance.

It should be noted that, by pursuing the link between ethnic diversity and governance performance as well as their connection through SEM and NAB, my intention here does not consist in fully explaining variations in governance performance. Instead, my goal is simply to investigate the associations between ethnicity and governance performance from the point of view of citizens' accountability behavior.

1.2 Justification of Study

Because this dissertation seeks to understand how ethnic diversity relates to governance performance in decentralized countries from the point of view of citizens' accountability behavior, it is relevant to the following groups of people: (1) academics, (2) policy-makers, and (3) development practitioners.

The dissertation is of high relevance to academics because it contributes to what science already knows about the cause(s) of variations in the governance outcome of decentralization. What is previously known till now is that ethnic diversity is one of the factors responsible for inconsistency in the governance outcome of decentralization around the world, and that the relationship between ethnicity and governance is mediated through the divisive nature of ethnicity. This dissertation not only reassesses this popular knowledge, but also suggests other mechanisms through which the relationship could occur. Through the introduction of new mechanisms in the discourse, the research provides new insights on how ethnic diversity decreases governance performance in certain societies.

The question of how to mitigate the impact of ethnic diversity on governance has always been a topic of interest to policy-makers. But finding a practical way to achieve this goal has proved abortive so far. Previous studies emphasize the divisive character of ethnicity as the sole link between ethnicity and governance performance, arguing that ethnicity is detrimental to government

performance by virtue of its ability to pitch ethnic groups against each other and prevent them from working together (Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al., 2007). Although this is true, the greatest problem with this perspective, however, is its intolerance to policy-related solutions. Because it is not easy to manipulate peoples' identification with a particular ethnic group through policies, policy-makers working on governance-related issues in ethnically diverse societies have had no other alternative than to wait for the gradual and more difficult process of identity change and/or assimilation to occur. But based on the contribution of this research, they can now generate policy solutions for the problem by targeting SEM and NAB.

Also, the idea of what constitutes the central aspect of development remained elusive to development experts until the 1990s. First, following the success of Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II, experts thought that transfer of capital and technical expertise constitutes the essential catalyst for achieving development (Rapley, 1996). This idea lasted until the late 1960s, before development scholars and practitioners realized that Marshall Plan with its dependence on technology and capital transfer was not the real approach to development. Marshall Plan was discovered to not only be context-blind, but also to provide little to no positive externalities with regards to development. As a result of these deficiencies, focus was shifted to human capital as a more integral foundation for development. With human capital considered central to the concept of development, emphases were laid not only on the development of the elites but also on those of the masses. Priority was given to areas that enhances human capital such as adult education and universal primary education. But then again, it was realized by the end of the 1970s that relying on human capital as the key strategy for development was tantamount to relying on the technical and bureaucratic capacities of the state – an entity that was not considered by many as a good allocative mechanism for public resources. As a result, emphasis shifted once again from human capital to free market. With emphasis on free-market, development scholars and practitioners started to treat development as an apolitical phenomenon and hoped that development would happen when non-governmental organizations pick up more significant roles in the development process. The concept did work and even lasted well into the late 1980s, before being replaced by the concept of governance which is still the dominant approach to development till today. Given the centrality of governance to discussions on growth and development today (De Haan & Romp, 2007; OECD, 2008; Canning & Pedroni, 2004), it is certain that this dissertation extends its relevance to development practitioners also. Again, since empirical evidence show that good governance and development are positively related (Ukwandu & Jarbandhan, 2016; Mills, 2010; Adetoye & Omilusi, 2016), development practitioners might want to emphasize on SEM and NAB on matters of development as well.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The dissertation consists of seven chapters dealing on specific aspect of my investigation. Chapter 2 provides an overview of what I mean by *governance*, by specifically distinguishing governance

from control theory, a theory with which governance is often mistaken. Chapter 2 also connects this understanding of governance to how I use the expression *governance performance*.

After exploring the concept of governance and explaining how I derived the expression *governance performance* in Chapter 2, I provide, in Chapter 3, an overview of the concept of decentralization, its justifications, its criticisms, and its relationship with governance performance. In chapter 3, I also introduce the question of what drives variations in the governance outcome of decentralization, discuss how scholars have already attempted the question, and then show how my research fits in and improves those previous attempts, especially the attempt focusing on the effect of ethnic diversity.

Because my research focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, I go on to provide more context on the region in Chapter 4. I achieve this through a historical and hermeneutical discourse on the role of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa polity. First, I define what I construe as *ethnicity*, followed by a walk-through on the scale of its existence in sub-Saharan Africa. Thereafter, I discuss the colonial historicity of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa in detail, as well as provide information on the scale of its influence on the kind of decentralization being practiced by countries in the region. My hope is that Chapter 4 puts the arguments I presented in previous chapters as well as the analyses and discussions to come in subsequent ones into context.

The adoption of an approach in which citizens' accountability behavior mediates the effects of ethnicity on governance performance has one clear consequence for my analysis: the use of a mechanistic framework. So, in Chapter 5, I dedicate myself to the task of explaining what a mechanistic framework is all about and how I apply it in my analysis. Thereafter, I develop nuanced hypotheses on the relationship between ethnic diversity, SEM, NAB, and government performance by carefully applying mechanistic framework on Ekeh's (1975) Theory of the Two Publics and some classical theories of human behavior.

In Chapter 6, I empirically explore the theoretical arguments I developed in Chapter 5, using Zellner's (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. Overall, my findings support, in line with my propositions in Chapter 5, a mediational model between ethnic diversity, SEM, NAB, and governance performance, revealing that ethnic diversity predicts a positive effect on SEM, SEM a positive effect on NAB, and NAB a negative effect on governance performance.

The dissertation comes to an end in Chapter 7, where I explore the theoretical and policy implications of my result and make recommendations for future studies.

2.0 Governance: Concepts and Overview

A textbook definition of governance² does not exist. Instead, there are different understandings of governance in the literature (Kooiman, 2002; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997: 46- 60). In social sciences, the term enjoys widespread usage, as can be observed in the frequency of its use in the field of political science, policy research, and administrative sciences, where it is spoken of in the area of the nation state as well as in international politics, in local and regional politics as well as at the central government level (Benz & Dose, 2010). In the American context and in some cases in the European context, the term governance is perceived very strongly from the perspective of its “original steering conception” (Braithwaite et al., 2007: 3). Pierre and Peters (2000: 1), for instance, refer to it as "... the capacity of government to make and implement policy - in other words, to steer society". Salamon (2002) also refers to it as a concept based heavily on the original control tradition, which is clear from its focus on the various control instruments.

Among German scholars, too, there have been attempts to present the concept of governance as an advanced version of the control theory (Burth & Görlitz, 2001; Mayntz, 2006). But the truth is that the term “governance” is no synonym for “control”, as it embodies more than the activity of controlling a society in specific directing. Benz and Dose (2010) rightly refer to it as “... the manner of this activity”, meaning the manner of governing, steering, and controlling a society. They also refer to it as a term that encompasses not only procedural but also structural, functional and instrumental aspects of governance, control and coordination (Benz & Dose, 2010:16). This distinction between governance and control is central to the definition of governance performance I provide in this work.

2.1 A Contrastive Definition of Governance

2.1.1 Political Control Paradigm

The term *control* found its way into the social sciences through the Systems Theory of Talcott Parsons, which in turn took up suggestions from the then popular Cybernetics (Mayntz, 2006). The Parsonsian formulations “control hierarchy” and “control media” were later, in the wake of Luhmann's system theory, also used in the analysis of the political system (Willke 1983). At this time, control was conceived as a systemic function, as a process that is detached from the action of specific actors. (Easton 1964; Deutsch 1966). But in the wake of rapidly developing empirical

² The term *government* can sometimes be misconstrued as *governance* (Ansell & Torfin, 2016). It is important to point this error out and clarify the difference between the two terms right away. The government perspective sees the state as an institution that differs from the market and society; the market and society are seen as independent and special institutions. But the governance perspective weaves the state, the market, social networks and communities together into institutional forms of regulation that are useful for variable combinations (Benz & Dose, 2010). Unlike with government, where conflicts are resolved, through authoritative decisions by the executives and the courts, and the enforcement measures from the administration, the focus of governance is on the control and coordination function of these institutions, in which elements of authority, competition, and negotiation are intricately bound together. The concept of governance is simply far more extensive than that of government.

policy research, actors and their actions became more important, and an actor-centered concept of control emerged as a consequence. The historical context to this development, according to Mayntz (2006), was the then great practical and theoretical interest in planning and steering for society as a whole, in the possibilities of an "active policy" in which the state functions as the central steering body. This is well expressed when Burth and Görlitz (2001: 7) describe the term control as "the technical specification of state interventions in society" and add that control theory includes our knowledge of the forms, processes, and effects of such interventions.

In addition to thinking in terms of actors, one of the cognitive premises of the political-scientific control theory is a traditional continental European understanding of the state, according to which politics is not understood as rule, but action in the public interest (Mayntz 2001; 2006). According to the core paradigm of control theory that was completed towards the end of the 1970s, political control therefore meant the concept-oriented shaping of society by - democratically legitimized - political authorities. It was this tacit assumption of democratic legitimacy that made it possible for authors to neglect the input aspect of the political process and to concentrate on the output aspect, whereby political action was assumed as the solution to social problems (Mayntz, 2006: 12).

Inspired by the findings of empirical implementation research, this control-theoretical core paradigm was initially expanded by including the addressee behavior and the structural characteristics of various regulatory fields in the analysis and supplementing the legislative perspective with a bottom-up perspective. The dynamics of the control object and the question of its controllability moved to the center of scientific discussion and interest, and eventually ushering in the second stage of the development (Mayntz, 2006). The focus on the actors of the political-administrative system was abandoned and the participation of social actors in the development and implementation of politics was included. This step, too, was stimulated by the results of empirical research which, when examining various policy fields more closely, came across the existence of neo-corporatist decision-making structures, political networks, and private governments. At the end of this expansion of the control-theoretical paradigm, emerged the model of the cooperative state, in which the clear distinction between the *control object* and the *control subject* disappeared. Accordingly, political control could no longer be related solely to the actions of state actors or members of the political-administrative system but had to include all actors who represent and realize a *public interest* with their actions (Bang, 2003), including non-state actors in business and society (Behnke 2018).

2.1.2 Governance Paradigm

In contrast to the understanding of many scholars, who conceive governance as an advanced version of political control paradigm, Mayntz (2006) highlights that political control paradigm did not expand from the idea of a cooperative state to that of governance. Rather, it came to a point where changes in reality, necessitated by increasing denationalization, multilevel interdependence and non-separation of state and society, gradually evolved into a terminological change. The changes were complex, affecting not only the state, but also the economy and society (Benz &

Dose, 2010). They took place at local, national, and international level, affecting institutions as well as procedures, modalities, and results of the fulfillment of public tasks, and fall very much into various fields of activity. As a result of these changes, the term political control became unconvincing, forcing scholars to adopt the term governance in interpreting the new reality. Even where authors avoid the word governance, people no longer speak simply of control, but choose such conceptual solutions like *new statehood* (Grande & Prätorius, 2003) or *new forms of governance* (Mayntz, 2006).

But how did the term governance actually come to be? Weiss is quick to remind us that the term “governance is as old as human history” (Weiss, 2000: 795). Originating from the Greek *kybernetes* which implies steering, navigation, and helmsmanship (Frischtak, 1994), the term was for a long time used in the Anglo-Saxon literature to denote the process aspect of politics: governance meant governing (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1991). However, as a scientific term, the terminology was actually coined in economics, in the context of economic transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985; 1996; 1998) and was defined by Williamson as follows:

“Governance is also an exercise in assessing the efficacy of alternative modes (means) of organization. The object is to effect good order through mechanisms of governance. A governance structure is thus usefully thought as an institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided” (Williamson 1996: 11).

The term governance drew attention in economics to the "existence of rules and the manner in which rules are enforced in the economic process" (Benz, 2003: 18). Soon after, Williamson's (1996) pair of terms *market* and *hierarchy* was supplemented by others such as clans (Ouchi, 1980), associations (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985), and networks (Powell, 1990), all of which were also found in the field of economics (Hollingsworth & Lindberg, 1985). Just like Williamson expressed in his definition, the term began to represent all essential forms of action coordination. The interventionist action took a back seat: it was not the intervention or the steering action of actors that had come into prominence, but rather the regulatory structure and its effect on the actions of the actors. The governance perspective thus transitioned seamlessly into an institutionalist way of thinking.

It was at this point - when governance was understood to include all forms of action coordination beyond the market and hierarchy - that the terminology broke away from the field of economics and was increasingly adopted into the field of political science (Mayntz, 2006). In international relations³, the term governance was used to describe structures of power that lack a superordinate

³ The adoption of *governance* into the field of international relations is historically connected to the collapse of communism and the bipolar world order. The end of communism had highlighted the importance of multilateralism in the new world order, as well as the necessity for a generally accepted pattern of behavior to facilitate cooperation at the international level. Accordingly, scholars of international relations adopted the term governance to mean a

sovereign authority. In policy research, the term fitted well to the specialty of *the cooperative state*, that is, political control with the participation of civil society actors. Studies of program development and implementation processes (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995) showed that when it comes to fulfilling complex societal tasks, one can less and less trust the assertiveness of the supposedly sovereign state. It was recognized that governments and administrations mostly cannot fulfill their tasks autonomously, but only in cooperation with other actors. These can be actors from the public or private sector. It also became apparent that numerous collectively binding rules are being set and enforced even without the state. In modern societies that function without a control center, politics must generally be understood as the management of interdependencies. In both international relations and policy research, the control subject and control object can no longer be clearly distinguished because the control addressees themselves participate in the drafting of the rules and their implementation. In development studies, the terminology often mirrored the perspectives of international development organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Though these organizations, as a result of their diverse programmatic needs, differ in their entry points to what constitutes governance, they seem to agree with one another on the fact that governance is a tool for achieving development, through the participation of both the public and the private sectors⁴ (Abdellatif, 2003). Applied to the context of the nation-state, governance therefore means

the total of all forms of collective regulation of social issues that exist side by side: from institutionalized civil society self-regulation to various forms of cooperation between state and private actors and sovereign action by state actors. (Mayntz, 2003: 72).

The fact that this definition does not speak of the *state* but of *state actors* expresses the insight that is more characteristic of the governance perspective than of the developed control theory, that *the state* is not a unitary actor, but a differentiated network of only partially hierarchically interconnected actors. Mayntz's definition above also represents a comprehensive understanding

process, involving multiple actors, which produces new norms and rules for international cooperation in solving global problems and/or conflicts (Redfern & Desai, 1997). This conceptualization runs contrary to the realist or neo-realist approach to international politics, which stresses the importance of national interest above everything, but fits well into the constructivist's mode of global politics, where rules are perceived as the most important ingredients for stabilizing international relations (Holsti, 1992).

⁴ I illustrate this with examples from two prominent development organizations around: the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB). In line with its specific mandates, the UNDP defines governance as mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups formulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences (UNDP 1997b: 2-3), although it still recognizes it as "the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels." (UNDP 1997: 2-3). The same trend can be observed in the World Bank's approach. The approach adopted by the World Bank partially recognizes the importance of non-state actors in the process of development, while strictly emphasizing on the steering character of governance as: (1) the form of political regime, (2) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development, and (3) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions (World Bank, 1992).

of governance as a collective term for all forms of social action coordination. But in addition to it, a narrower variant of the term has also developed in a different context. In contrast to governance as a collective term for all forms of social action coordination, the term has also been used in different contexts to emphasize the contrast between *hierarchical control* and *cooperative regulation*. For example, it means for Rhodes (1997) a fundamentally non-hierarchical type of guidance, in which private corporate actors participate in the formulation and implementation of politics. H eritier (2002: 3) also defines it in a similar way: "... governance implies that private actors are involved in decision-making in order to provide common goods and that non-hierarchical means of guidance are employed ..."

2.1.3 Distinguishing Between Control and Governance

Mayntz (2006) suggests that the major source of confusion in decoupling the concept of control from that of governance is their widespread conception as actions or processes oriented towards the solving of collective problems. Following this understanding, Dose, for instance, defines control in his article as "an intentional and communicative influencing of action with the aim of shaping the common good" (Dose, 2003: 20-21), whereas governance for H eritier as cited above "... implies that private actors are involved in decision-making in order to provide common goods ... "(H eritier, 2002: 3). So, it is not uncommon for a selective interest in problem solving to be expressed in the definition of the two concepts.

But just as I mentioned above, both terminologies are not synonymous. When governance is spoken of as a dynamic interaction between structures and processes, between institutions and actors, between rules and the application of rules, it becomes obvious that control and coordination represent its central function. It is based on this centrality that Benz and Dose (2010: 24) rightly identify the concept core of governance as follows:

1. Governance means steering and coordinating (or governing) with the aim of managing interdependencies between actors. As a rule, corporate actors are considered, that is, groups of individuals capable of acting.
2. Control and coordination entailed in governance are based on institutionalized control systems which are supposed to guide the actions of the actors, whereby there are usually combinations of different control systems (contractual rules, rules of competence and control powers, majority rule, and negotiation rules).
3. Governance also includes interaction patterns and modes of collective action that arise within the framework of institutions without being determined by them (networks, coalitions, exchange relationships, mutual adjustment in competition).
4. Processes of control and coordination as well as interaction patterns, which the term governance aims to capture, generally transcend organizational boundaries, but in particular also the boundaries of state and society, which have become fluid in political practice. Politics in this sense usually takes place in the interaction of state and non-state actors (or actors inside and outside organizations).

Yet control theory and governance theory express two different realities. Control theory can be described as actor-centered and governance theory as institutional. The genesis of the control theory is linked to a continental European conception of the state (see Section 2.1.1). With it, the acting control subject is in the foreground, but with governance theory, on the other hand, the regulatory structure, becomes a major focus. Again, control theory has never cut the umbilical cord to "politics" in a relatively narrow sense of the term; it cannot be detached from what was considered from the start - the shaping of society through legitimized political authorities (Mayntz, 2006). Conversely, governance theory, which is related to the regulation of public or collective issues, cannot deny its origin in economics (see Section 2.1.2): it looks primarily at the effect of various regulatory structures and is less interested in their emergence, from an economic perspective through rational choice or the evolutionary perspective. Unlike with control, governance takes place in different structures and processes than those that were central to traditional government and administrative science (Benz & Dose, 2010); its operational space exceeds the territorially and functionally defined areas of competence of the state.

The distinction between the concepts of *control* and *governance* is important for my investigation because it plays a central role in the development of another concept I prefer to call *government performance*, my dependent variable: The concept of good governance as "an efficient state and administrative practice based on the rule of law and closeness to the citizen" (Benz 2003: 20) and as a parallel to the concept of the "cooperative state" emerges from this distinction (Section 2.2), and my concept of governance performance follows, in turn, from my critique of the use of the concept of good governance as a criterion for measuring governance (Section 2.3).

2.2 Good Governance

Several quantifying prefixes have been used in quantifying governance. These include good governance (Doornbos, 2001; Weiss, 2000), bad governance (Collier, 2007; Diamond, 2007; Halleröd et al. 2013), local governance (Cammack, 2011; Denters & Rose, 2005), multilevel governance (Benz et al. 2007; Hegele & Behnke, 2013; Schakel et al. 2015; Benz 2015; Behnke et al. 2019), and polycentric governance (McGinnis, 2005; Ostrom, 2010; Shivakumar, 2003). Of all these expression/concepts, only good governance (and its other extreme, bad governance) is relevant for my next line of argument. I intend to consider both concepts in this section. But, since the meaning of bad governance is inferable from that of good governance, I shall keep matters simple by focusing solely on the concept of good governance.

The most authoritative definitions of good governance are found in the field of development policy, where good governance is conceived as a program to improve governance⁵ in national and

⁵ The interest of development policy in good governance is embedded in the belief that it constitutes a viable route to development. The literature on development supports this claim with lots of evidence. Please confer Kioe Sheng (2010), Smith (2007) and Dhaoui (2019) for an overview of these evidence. Although the application of the word development in this literature varies (cf. Myrdal, 1974; Sen, 1985), one thing still common among them is the idea that development has expanded beyond mere economic growth (Hyden & Court, 2002; Koponen, 2020). They all

international political systems. The World Bank, for instance, has normatively used the terminology since the 1980s as a criterion for dishing out its development loans and packages: only countries with conditions of good governance are eligible for financial support from the World Bank. According to Benz and Dose (2010), the reason for this was the sobering experience the World Bank had made with its previous development approaches. Loans were granted on generous terms, with particular emphasis on the fight against poverty. Very often, however, the desired success did not materialize because of unfavorable political and institutional environment. The World Bank, therefore, pushed for structural adjustment programs, the implementation of which was linked to the granting of further credit. These programs mainly start at the macroeconomic level and in some cases also on a sectoral basis. But these structural adjustment programs also proved to be unsuccessful. With time, it was recognized that there was a particular lack of basic state functions in most countries aspiring development, and the term good governance was introduced for the first time in development policy as a consequence, to denote an efficient state capable of receiving development funds and packages. The then President of the World Bank, Barber B. Conable, described good governance, the new term and criterion for development aid, as "... a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public "(World Bank 1989: xii).

Other development corporations offer definitions of governance that are similar to that of the World Bank. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for example, conceives governance as a participatory, transparent, accountable, effective, and equitable governance (UNDP, 1997). It promotes the rule of law and "ensures that political, social, and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in the society, and that the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources" (UNDP, 1997:21). Just like the UNDP, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also ascribes the capacity for "ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector and tackling corruption" to good governance (IMF, 2005:1) whereas the Department for International Development (DFID) highlights the key capabilities that relates to good governance. These include to:

1. operate political systems which provide opportunities for all people;
2. influence government policy and practice;
3. provide macro-economic stability;
4. promote growth necessary to reduce poverty;
5. implement pro-poor policy;
6. guarantee the equitable and universal provision of effective basic services;
7. ensure personal safety and security;
8. manage national security arrangements accountably; and
9. develop an honest and accountable government (DFID, 2001:9).

conceive development as including a set of similar growth goals such as reduction of poverty, increased economic welfare, improved health and education, increased political and social freedom, and environmental protection.

Without deviating from the previous definitions, the United State Agency for International Development (USAID) directly relates good governance to democratic governance while highlighting “transparency, pluralism, and citizen involvement in decision-making, representation and accountability” as its essential elements (USAID, 2005:1). The inclusion of citizen involvement or participation here and as well as in the previous definitions of good governance points to a direct conceptual link between the concept of good governance and governance itself as a dynamic interaction between institutions and actors, and not as a hierarchical, one-directional framework in which the state is a unitary actor.

2.3 Governance Performance

No matter how perfectly well the concept of good governance connects to the core tenets of governance paradigm, the idea is still less convincing as a measurement for governance. Good governance as a concept has a far-reaching nature. It involves virtually all aspects of the public sector: from institutions responsible for the organization of economic and political interaction, to the structures that determine the most important public problems and accordingly allocate resources in response to them, to the administrative systems responsible for delivering goods and services to the citizens, to the quality of staffing at government bureaucracies, and to the interface of citizens-officials interaction in both political and bureaucratic spaces (Grindle, 2007; 2004). The problem with using good governance as measurement for governance consists then in the fact that it grades a far-reaching concept like governance in bipolar terms. Countries that meet the criteria for good governance are considered as having good governance whereas those that do not meet the criteria are simply tagged with a “bad governance” label.

A number of scholars have pointed out that this practice of using the concept of good governance to rate governance may even produce adverse effects in the translation of governance paradigm into developmental outcomes (Sundaram & Chowdhury, 2012; Grindle, 2004; 2007). Grindle (2007) specifically contends that poor nations are more likely to land into despair as a result of the extensive nature of the good governance concept. But, apart from that, what I consider absurd in the use of the term is the implicit acceptance of governance paradigm as a bipolar target that can either be achieved or not be achieved.

To avoid this conceptual loophole in this study, I distinguish between what I call the absolute idea of governance (good and bad governance) from the none-absolute concept of governance (governance performance) and adhere to the non-absolute concept of governance. Like the concepts of good governance and bad governance, I use the expression governance performance to quantify governance; but unlike in good and bad governance, I speak of governance performance as a concept that measures degrees of governance rather than the absolute value of governance.

3.0 Decentralization and Governance: Theories and Evidence

Despite contradictory empirical findings, a plethora of theorists insist that decentralization is a valid mechanism for improving governance. These theorists base their argument on the fact that decentralization's ability to bring government closer to the people encourages participation, which is considered a necessary condition for both productive and allocative efficiency. The contradictory empirical findings on how governance and decentralization relate, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, raise the questions: "why does variation in governance performance exist in decentralized countries?"

In this chapter, I pay attention to how scholars have tried to answer this question in the past. But before I do that, I first provide an overview of the concept of decentralization, its justifications, its criticisms, and its relationship with governance performance. Thereafter, I introduce the question of what drives variations in the governance outcome of decentralization, discuss previous attempts to answer the question, and then show how my current research fits in and improves the previous attempts, especially the attempt that projects ethnic diversity as the cause of the variation.

3.1 Decentralization

Unlike centralization, which is commonly understood as the concentration of resources, power, and authorities in a center usually controlled by a few (Schneider, 2003), the concept of decentralization has no universally acceptable definition. Like the concept of governance, the concept of decentralization means different things to different people, and has, therefore, been variedly applied in different disciplines such as business administration (decentralization of firms), political science (decentralization of government systems), political economy (financial decentralization), sociology (decentralization of structures), and administrative science (decentralization of administrative structures) (Mewes, 2011). In the field of political science, Eryilmaz (2011) identifies two ways scholars have conceptualized decentralization: the classical sense and the modern sense. The modern sense of decentralization, understood as the process of transferring competencies and resources at any given level of government through processes like delegation and privatization, is very much akin to Rondinelli et al's concept of horizontal decentralization⁶. It captures, in essence, the delegation of legal and political authority from the central government to (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities, and; (e) NGOs/PVOs (Rondinelli, 1981). This means that decentralization in the modern sense implies the transfer of administrative authorities to nongovernmental federal units, semi-autonomous public institutions, as well as professional and voluntary organizations that operate outside the established structure of government (Eryilmaz, 2011), and, therefore, makes the inclusion of non-state actors in politics and developmental processes sacrosanct when empirically working with the concept. For this reason, scholars criticize

⁶ According to Rondinelli et al. (1989), horizontal decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities, or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or nongovernmental private or voluntary organizations.

the conceptualization of decentralization in modern terms as a broad categorization that generates complications and analytical weakness in the conduct of empirical research on decentralization. As a result of these complications, authors like Crawford and Hartmann (2008) suggest the adoption of the classical sense of decentralization as an alternative to the modern sense when empirically working on the subject of decentralization. The argument is that the classical sense of decentralization is more suitable for cross-national comparison because it rejects the transfer of authority to non-state actors and their representatives as part of decentralization. This view is widely represented in the works of authors like Falleti (2004) and Crawford and Hartmann (2008)⁷. Despite the understanding that authority transfer should happen solely between state actors and their representatives, decentralization in the classical sense is not seen as a simple shift of resources and competencies to subnational governments and their parastatals (World Bank, 2008). Rather, quite similar to Rondinelli et al.'s (1989) concept of vertical decentralization⁸, it is conceived as a phenomenon that creates a relationship of accountability between different tiers of government, and their representatives (Ozmen, 2014). In this dissertation, following scholars like Crawford and Hartmann (2008), I am primarily concerned with decentralization in the classical sense, and how its impact on governance performance is related to the presence of ethnic diversity in a society. In doing this, I use the term decentralization here to mean the transfer of political power to state actors at lower levels of government.

Treisman (2002) would have us classify decentralization in the classical sense into: structural decentralization, decision decentralization, resource decentralization, electoral decentralization, and institutional decentralization⁹. But the rest of the literature speaks rather of three types of decentralization. These include: political decentralization, which focuses on the transfer of state administration, legislative authority and judicial autonomy to local governments (Rondinelli, 2000); administrative decentralization, which refers to the transfer of some classical functions of the state to autonomous public institutions (Köse, 2004), and; fiscal decentralization, which includes intergovernmental fiscal relations such as constitutional and statutory powers of taxation, as well as budget and expenditure rights (Rondinelli, 2000). Though minor controversy exists in the literature concerning which of these three elements constitute the major types of decentralization¹⁰, it is common practice to include all the three types in the analysis of

⁷ Crawford and Hartmann understand decentralization as the transfer of power, responsibilities and finance from central government to sub-national levels of government at provincial and/or local levels (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008). Falleti (2004) argues that it constitutes a set of state reforms aiming for the transfer of responsibilities, resources and authority exclusively to lower levels of state.

⁸ Vertical decentralization, according to Rondinelli et al. (1989), represents the relinquishing of control over public resources and decision-making by the central government and extending them to lower levels of government.

⁹ By structural decentralization, Treisman (2002) refers to the number of tiers of government; decision decentralization captures the scope of issues on which subnational governments can autonomously decide; resource decentralization refers to how government resources (revenues, manpower, etc.) are distributed between central and subnational tiers; electoral decentralization refers to the method by which subnational officials are selected, and; institutional decentralization concerns the degree to which subnational communities or their representatives have formal rights within the procedures of central decision-making.

¹⁰ For instance, authors like Ribot (2002), Treisman (2002), and Larson and Ribot (2004) list political and administrative decentralization as the two main forms of decentralization, arguing that, rather than being a separate category of decentralization, fiscal decentralization is only a crosscutting element of devolution and deconcentration. Again, based on the fact that the real-world claims and expectations of decentralization always assume a devolved

decentralization (Larson & Ribot, 2004). Thus, in addition to adopting the classical sense of decentralization in this research, I also subscribe to the practice of including political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization to the concept, and define decentralization as

a process of transferring power from a central government to a subnational government, which involves, within an appropriate legal framework, various components, such as political decentralization, administrative decentralization, and fiscal decentralization.

3.1.1 Political Decentralization

Political decentralization as a system of government ensures a vertical division of power among multiple levels of government. Political decentralization occurs when a central government establishes or strengthens an additional subnational level(s) of government with a meaningful decision-making autonomy (Brancati, 2006). In addition to guaranteeing decision-making autonomy to subnational units, political decentralization requires a set of constitutional or statutory reforms, development of pluralistic political parties, strengthening of legislatures, and encouragement of effective public interest groups to succeed (Rondinelli, 2000; Falletti, 2004). Again, politically decentralized states usually have popularly elected regional legislatures and executives with separate spheres of autonomy because political decentralization requires that subnational executives and legislators are not appointed or hindered in policymaking by central leaders (Treisman, 2007).

Decentralization scholars argue that political decentralization improves the quality of subnational representation because the election of local representatives from local electoral jurisdictions allows the citizens to better know their political representatives, and helps the elected officials, on the other hand, to better know the needs and desires of their constituencies. Through the direct election of local authorities, political decentralization does not only increase the quality of subnational representation. It also supports democratization by providing more opportunity for the citizens and their elected representatives to collaborate in the design and implementation of public policies affecting their political constituency (Topal, 2005).

3.1.2 Administrative Decentralization


The goal of administrative decentralization is to share the authority, responsibility, and financial resources for providing public services across different levels of government. Accordingly, Rondinelli (2000) conceptualizes it as the transfer of the responsibility for planning, financing, and managing certain public functions from the central government to subordinate units or levels of government. In the classical sense of decentralization, administrative decentralization has three

form, some other authors like Mawhood (1993) have even proposed the disregard of deconcentration as a form of decentralization.

major forms, namely, deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. But scholars like Ferguson and Chandrasekharan (2005), who subscribe to the modern concept of decentralization, would include privatization (a particular form of devolution in the form private ownership) as another form of administrative decentralization. Since I am only interested in the classical sense of decentralization in this research, I shall discuss only deconcentration, devolution, and delegation as the three forms of administrative decentralization below, by concentrating on their distinction based on the relationship between the central and subnational government in each of them. But, before I do this, I argue first for the necessity of this kind of distinction.

It is usually argued that deconcentration involves a bureaucratic, hierarchical relationship between the central and the subnational governments; delegation, a contractual relationship, and; devolution, an arm's-length kind of relationship (see Figure 1 below). Though such arguments are surely a simplistic way of representing the difference between deconcentration, devolution, and delegation (Schneider, 2003), they are nevertheless useful for the measurement of administrative autonomy in this research. Following Ndegwa (2003), I measure administrative decentralization based on criteria corresponding to deconcentration, devolution, and delegation: the clarity of roles for national and local governments provided by the law, the clarity of where the actual responsibility for service delivery resided, and the clarity of where the responsibility for (hiring and firing) civil servants resided.

Figure 1 The Difference Between Deconcentration, Delegation, and Devolution



Source: Karmel (2017).

Deconcentration

Deconcentration is usually considered the weakest form of administration decentralization, mostly practiced in unitary states. In a document listing definitions of decentralization, deconcentration, devolution and other related concepts, Yuliani (2004)¹¹ highlights that the literature often refers to deconcentration as:

1. The process by which the agents of central government control are relocated and geographically dispersed (Sayer et al., 2004).
2. One of administrative decentralization which redistributes decision-making authority and financial and management responsibility among levels of the central government; there is no real transfer of authority between levels of government. It may involve only a shift of responsibilities from federal forest service officials of the capital city to those stationed in provinces, districts, etc. (Gregersen et al., 2005)
3. Administrative decentralization, i.e., a transfer to lower-level central government authorities, or to other local authorities who are upwardly accountable to the central government (Ribot J. , 2003).
4. The transfer of administrative responsibility for specified functions to lower levels within the central government bureaucracy, generally on some spatial basis (Ferguson & Chandrasekharan, 2005).

Based on these definitions, one can state that deconcentration occurs when a central government, within the scope of a particular policy, distributes its traditional responsibilities to provincial organizations. Deconcentration can shift responsibilities from central government officials in the capital city to those working in the regions, provinces, or districts; or create strong field administrations or local administrative capacities that are under the supervision of central government ministries (Rondinelli, 2000). This transfer of function affects the geographical distribution of authority but does not significantly change the autonomy of the entities receiving the authority. The central government retains authority over the field offices and exercises that authority through the hierarchical channels of the central government bureaucracy in way that allows just a little more autonomy than centralization (Schneider, 2003). The central government just transfers only some of its authority relating to decision-making and execution of public projects to administrators who are heading subunits in government hierarchy; nothing more (Eryilmaz, 2011). Now, since the redistribution of decision-making authority and management responsibilities in deconcentration happens without proper autonomy, what occurs is that local policies are decided from the center and can therefore vary from place to place in the same society.

¹¹ The definitions were used in the papers presented at the Interlaken Workshop on Decentralization, 27-30 April 2004, Interlaken, Switzerland. Some of the papers, such as Gregersen et al. (2005) and Ferguson and Chandrasekharan (2005), were later republished in edited collections a year after the workshop was concluded. I decided to cite the later publications in order to make access to the sources easier for readers, who might want further details.

Delegation

Delegation is, in comparison to deconcentration, a more extensive form of decentralization. The main difference between deconcentration and delegation is that, in delegation, the central government exercises its control through a contractual relation that enforces the accountability of local government (Schneider, 2003). Delegation is understood as the transfer of managerial responsibility for specified functions from the central government to other public organizations outside of central government control, such as provincial or local governments or parastatal agencies (Ferguson & Chandrasekharan, 2005); Or, as Gregersen et al.(2005) puts it, delegation is a form of administrative decentralization in which responsibilities and authorities are transferred to semi-autonomous entities that report to the central government but are not totally controlled by it. If we understand the expression *reporting to the central government* in Gregersen et al.(2005) to mean that, despite retaining some level of autonomy in decision-making and project execution, these semi-autonomous organizations are accountable to the central government, then one could further define delegation as the transfer of responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions from the central government to semi-autonomous organizations accountable to the central government (Schneider, 2003).

In a delegated system, central governments often allocate responsibilities when they create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, semiautonomous school districts, regional development corporations, or special project implementation units. But unlike in deconcentration, these organizations that function as state representatives are assigned a little more autonomy. And because these organizations usually have wide discretion in terms of decision-making, they may also be able to finance their own projects and services by charging users directly for products and services (Rondinelli, 2000).

Devolution

Devolution is that type of administrative decentralization that underlies political decentralization (Rondinelli, 2000). In comparison with the other two types of administrative decentralization, devolution provides the greatest degree of autonomy to the local units (see Figure 1). According to Yuliani (2004), the term devolution has been used in the literature in reference to:

1. The transfer of rights and assets from the center to local governments or communities. All of these processes occur within the context of national laws that set the limits within which any decentralized or devolved forest management occurs (Sayer et al., 2004).
2. The transfer of governance responsibility for specified functions to sub-national levels, either publicly or privately owned, that are largely outside the direct control of the central government (Ferguson & Chandrasekharan, 2005)
3. One form of administrative decentralization which transfers specific decision-making powers from one level of government to another (which could be from lower level to

higher level of government, in the case of federations, or government transfers decision-making powers to entities of the civil society (Gregersen et al., 2005).

In other words, devolution can be understood as the transfer of authority for decision making, finance, and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status. By quasi-autonomous units, I mean municipalities, regions, cantons, etc. that elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions. These units are bestowed with clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform public functions (Ozmen, 2014). The quasi-autonomous units are only accountable to the central government insofar as the central government can impose its will by threatening to withhold resources or responsibility from the local units (Schneider, 2003). Otherwise, the central government has no direct relation with the power of these local units in a devolved government system.

3.1.3 Fiscal Decentralization

Lower levels of government require revenue to carry out their functions, but to execute these functions effectively, they also require, among other things, fiscal autonomy. With fiscal autonomy they possess: (1) the authority to generate revenue themselves and/or receive revenue transfers from the central government, and (2) the power to make decisions concerning their expenditure (Rondinelli, 2000). These powers embedded in fiscal autonomy constitute the essence of fiscal decentralization.

By way of definition, fiscal decentralization, therefore, refers to series of policies designed to increase the financial autonomy of sub-national governments (Falleti, 2004). It can occur under different conditions such as: self-financing or cost recovery by charging local users; co-financing or coproduction between the central and subnational governments, in which users take part in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labor contributions; expansion of local revenues through property tax, sales tax, and/or indirect user charges; intergovernmental transfers of tax revenues collected by the central government to local governments for general or specific uses, and; authorization of municipal borrowing and mobilization of national or local government resources through loan guarantees (World Bank, 2001).

Scholars like Boschmann (2009) contend that full fiscal decentralization requires political decentralization and, at least to some extent, administrative decentralization. They argue that, though the mix of the components may vary in different contexts, all three components of decentralization need to be present for the occurrence of full fiscal decentralization. When administrative decentralization is predominant, the prevailing situation may have a bias towards deconcentration. On the other hand, when all three components are almost equally present, fiscal decentralization would have the features of devolution, which is regarded as the best practice in situations where the protection of subnational autonomy is of utmost priority. (Boschmann, 2009).

Authors from the fields of economics and managerial sciences also recommend devolution, when emphasizing the political and economic rationale for fiscal decentralization (Nadeem, 2016; Durmuş, 2006). It has been argued that more effective and productive use of resources¹² occur in fiscally decentralized system when resources are provided by local actors and the costs and benefits of goods and services provided by local governments are adapted to circumstances of the region in question. Local governments have better capacities to determine consumer preferences and offer goods and services more suitable to these preferences; whereas central governments' provision of these goods and services is more time consuming and costly. When services are provided locally, transaction costs may be significantly lower since local knowledge can be used, and decisions can be implemented faster. In developing countries, a large portion of the economy falls outside the tax net. Since subnational governments are more likely to have reliable information about the underground tax base, this knowledge might be used to capture more individuals for tax-paying (Nadeem, 2016). Furthermore, when local actors raise the resources in a system, local governments are more easily held accountable (Oates, 2006; Ozmen, 2014), leading to increase in productivity and development of local initiative and entrepreneurship.

It has also been argued that in a setting where fiscal decentralization is practiced, mobile households can always seek out jurisdictions which provide outputs that are better suited to their tastes, thereby increasing the potential gains from the decentralized provision of public services (Tiebout 1956). Here, the logic is that the mobility of households would create both vertical and horizontal competitions among subnational units, which in turn would constrain budgetary growth and pressurize subnational governments to provide efficient public services. Vertical and horizontal competitions between different government units can work as incentives for cost-efficient service delivery because they restrict the possibility of subnational governments endlessly increasing taxes to fund extravagant projects (Nadeem, 2016). They can as well encourage experimentation and innovation as individual jurisdictions are free to adopt new approaches to public policy. In this way, fiscal decentralization can provide a valuable *laboratory* for fiscal experiments (Oates, 2006).

But fiscal decentralization is not only about positives. Some arguments in favor of it have been shown to possess loose ends. A handful of powerful critiques against it can be found in Janeba and Wilson (2010), who argue that tax competition among local governments could constitute a source of inefficiency in the local provision of public goods and services, and in Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coates (2003), who show that a central government has neither theoretical nor practical restrictions not to adapt the output of public services to local circumstances and preferences as it is being implied by those who argue in favor of fiscal decentralization. My impression is that, although these counter-arguments seem to question the fundamental justifications for fiscal decentralization, they are viewed in contemporary scholarship as serving the purpose of fine-tuning

¹² Arguments relating to the efficiency advantages of decentralization often refer to higher consumer efficiency, competition, lower transaction costs and more efficient revenue rising. Consumer efficiency relates to the assumption that consumers' preferences differ within a country; and therefore, that uniform levels of services in all municipalities are inefficient. (Nadeem, 2016)

the concept and implementation of fiscal decentralization, in their own rights, and not jeopardizing in anyway the essence of fiscal decentralization as well as its political and economic relevance to modern governance (Oates, 2006).

Table 1 *Types and Dimensions of Decentralization*

Types of Decentralization	Forms of Decentralization		
	Deconcentration	Delegation	Devolution
Administrative			
Fiscal			
Political			

Source: Adapted from Muriu (2013).

3.2 Theories of Decentralization and Governance

There are two dominant theories regarding the relationship between decentralization and governance: the pro-governance and the anti-governance theories. While the pro-governance theory insists that decentralization improves governance performance, the anti-governance theory contends otherwise. The anti-governance theory even argues that decentralization can worsen the outcome of governance by causing deterioration in public accountability and poor provision of basic public goods and services. I shall explore, with evidence, the details of both the pro-and anti-governance arguments in what follows.

3.2.1 The Pro-Governance Theory

The pro-governance school basically argues that decentralization advances the outcome of governance. The mechanisms through which this occurs are well established in the political economy literature. First, it is argued that decentralization improves governance, through the promotion of downward accountability, which bolsters a society's level of public accountability (Pesqué-Cela, 2017; Smith & Revell, 2016; Faguet, 2014; Smoke & White, 2005). By placing the fate of local officials in the hands of the local electorate, decentralization re-orientes the flow of power by ensuring that local officials are no longer accountable to the central government, but

rather to the local citizens they represent in their jurisdictions. Placing the fate of local officials in the hands of the local electorate enhances accountability as local citizens are able to monitor the quantity and quality of services being provided and are thus capable of disciplining politicians by rewarding or sanctioning them in competitive elections. So, in the grand scheme of things, it is believed that the possibility of *exit* for local officials provides them with the incentives to provide better public services in order to improve their career prospect or upward mobility in the civil service (De Figueriredo & Weingest, 1997). In comparison to the top-down hierarchical governance structure (centralization), where local politicians are accountable to the central government alone, decentralization is thought of, in this sense, as the basic structure for making local governments more accountable (Escobar-Lemmon & Ross, 2014).

Second, it is claimed that decentralization improves governance by encouraging responsiveness to local needs from local politicians and public servants. The institution of subnational units in decentralized states reduces the problem of information asymmetry, with which centralized and hierarchical governance structures are characterized (Smith & Revell, 2016). In centralized systems, the multiplicity of vertical tiers of governance acts as barriers to information flow, partly due to coordination failures and differences in incentives across bureaucrats (Treisman *et al.*, 2009). This is not the case in decentralized systems, where public officials are equipped to make correct inferences on the prevailing needs of the electorate as a result of their increased proximity to the citizens as well as the lower costs of obtaining and verifying information. Correct inferences about the preferences of the electorate leads to the provision of public goods and services that are well tailored to the heterogeneous demands and expectations of the local population (Leeson, 2013). In addition to that, the spatial proximity between the electorate and public officials at the subnational level, puts the bureaucrats in a good position to collaborate with community-based organizations (CBOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to identify prevailing problems and respond to them through innovative and effective solutions (Hirschman, 1970).

Third, authors in the pro-governance school of thought argue that decentralization improves governance through the reduction of political and ethnic instability. In countries polarized across different cleavages such as ethnicity or religion, the decentralization of power to sub-national units can lessen the risk of violence and political tensions emanating from economic, social, or political exclusion of a part or parts of the population (Scherrer, 2008). Through decentralization, minority groups can be bestowed with the authority to control their resources and make decisions about them and other local matters (Mbate, 2017). In countries where natural resources are clustered in geographical regions cohabited by different ethnic groups, decentralizing power and guaranteeing political representation to local elites and disadvantaged minorities mitigates the risk of revolutions and conflicts against the central government (Miodownik & Cartrite, 2010). It also addresses the risk of public riots and dissatisfaction by ensuring that public goods and services as well as political power are distributed in a way that considers the needs and preferences of different ethnicities and minority groups (Mbate, 2017).

Fourth, pro-governance theorists argue that decentralization improves governance performance by deepening the levels and nature of political competition in a country. Mbate (2017) identifies three

potential channels by which decentralization improves governance by deepening political competition. The first is by increasing political entrepreneurship, which creates more avenues and opportunities for individuals to join the political arena and compete for electoral positions. By creating more avenues for people to participate and compete in politics, decentralization creates a pool of competitive candidates seeking elective positions, thereby increasing the incentives for candidates to align their policies with the preference of voters in order to get elected (Faguet, 2014). The second channel by which decentralization progresses governance is by promoting transparency and accountability. Increasing political participation and competition in a country promotes the culture of transparency and accountability. In fair and competitive system, candidates who lose elections join the local opposition parties, and thus act as ‘watchdogs’ that constantly mount pressure on elected incumbents to deliver public goods and services in accordance with established rules and procedures (Selee, 2011). The third and last channel is the formation of multiple political parties. Through political competition, decentralization leads to the formation of multiple political parties. This provides the citizens with the chances of switching their political affiliation from existing and well-established parties to new ones that reflect popular preferences the more (Faguet, 2014).

Lastly, similar to the argument presented in Section 3.1.3, pro-governance theorists believe that decentralization improves the output of governance activities by promoting inter-jurisdictional and yardstick competition (Tiebout, 1965; Oates & Schwab, 1988). The proponents of the inter-jurisdiction argument hold that, given the fact that factors of production such as capital and labor are mobile, subnational units will compete against each other in attracting entrepreneurial ventures and business firms. Consequently, public officials in a decentralized system have greater incentives to design and implement regulatory policies which boost the investment atmosphere of a society. According to Bardhan (2002), inter-jurisdictional competition lessens predatory tendencies among public officials, as jurisdictions that are marked with high levels of corruption and low provision of public goods and services are more likely to witness an outflow of mobile factors of production to other jurisdictions where local governments are more responsive and less predatory. In this sense, the inter-jurisdictional competition argument is related to Hirschman’s (1970) concept of exit mechanism, which states that local citizens have the option to switch to other local units when they are dissatisfied with the performance of their local officials. The thing about inter-jurisdictional competition is that it can also lead to better governance output, even in countries with weak electoral systems. The proponents of yardstick competition argument tread a similar line of logic as those of inter-jurisdictional competition. They argue that decentralization improves the outcome of governance by creating conditions for yardstick competition among the citizens. Through the creation of several subnational units in a country, decentralization imbues the citizens with the chance to compare policy outcomes in different local units, using the performance of other subnational units as a benchmark for evaluating the performance of their elected officials (Besley *et al.*, 2003). When citizens compare various local units of government and act on their observations, a healthy competition would ensue among subnational governments, leading to improved performance.

3.2.2 Anti-Governance Theory

In contrast to the arguments presented in Section 3.2.1, the anti-governance theorists have advanced several reasons in support of the argument that decentralization decreases the output of governance. First, these scholars believe that the decentralization of governance competencies across different tiers of government causes a rise in corruption. For instance, Treisman (2000), from an analysis of a cross-country data, concludes that decentralized countries have higher perceived corruption and poorer service delivery performance in public health services than countries that are centralized.

Secondly, the anti-governance theorists point to the classical problem of soft budget constraints, which leads to mounting fiscal pressures, debt default, and an increased risk of macroeconomic instability, as a feature that is common in decentralized countries (Rodden, 2006). According to this particular argument, decentralization creates perverse incentives for local leaders to engage in wasteful spending of financial resources in anticipation of bailouts from the central government. Local officials are aware that in the event of financial distress, part of the liability will be borne by the central government (Prud'homme, 1995). So, subnational governments “have strong incentives to overspend and reap the benefits, while nationalizing the cost of their behavior through central bailouts” (Faguet, 2014: 8). Under the strong possibility of a bailout, local politicians are also more likely to engage in corruption and rent seeking in the hope of receiving a bailout from the central government. Even where a central government decides to instill financial discipline by not bailing out local units, the commitment is often difficult to uphold, as the central government knows that part of the blame will rest on it and that it will be sanctioned by voters in competitive elections if a bailout does not follow. Owing to the existence of information asymmetry and the fact that government projects at the local level are implemented and financed in conjunction with the central government, voters are actually unable to differentiate, in case of soft budget constraints, whether the blame rests on the local or central government.

The next argument against decentralization focuses on the risk of capture by local elites and powerful special interest groups. The crux of the argument is that local elites such as tribal leaders, political brokers, landlords or even religious figures can influence local economic and political decisions, and as well as capture the power bestowed on local institutions. Such diversions of local authority can then be used to harm governance and promote self-interested motives such as corruption and rent-seeking that run contrary to aggregate societal welfare (Miller, 2002). After examining the incidence of capture and misallocation of public resources by local elites in their study, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) reports that the capture of local institution by local interest groups is easier under decentralization. Non-elite members of the public are given little or no voice in local decisions as their preferences and needs are overlooked. If the local elites do not use the public schools in an area, for instance, they are likely to lobby that public resources allocated for the purpose of use in public schools be used differently. Empirical evidence by Jones (2013) from the Philippines shows that it does not stop at that. Local elites can also influence the procurement of allocations and engage in over-pricing the provision of public goods in jurisdictions where they have financed election campaigns for an incumbent. They may also resist the establishment of a strong subnational government in order to protect their local influence (Besley et al. (2003). Miller

(2002) argues that elite capture occurs for two main reasons in decentralized systems. First, at the local level, it is easier to organize and establish collusion between powerful groups and individuals residing in small geographical areas. Unlike in a centralized system, where the influence of local elites is minimized due to numerous small elite groups competing against each other and counteracting one another's influence, a decentralized governance structure reinforces elite cohesion and local capture. Second, the probability of detecting and sanctioning elite capture is low in decentralized systems, as civic organizations may not be present across all local units in a particular country.

Anti-governance theorists have also adduced the argument that decentralization decreases the performance of governance by sparking conflicts and tension across different tiers of government, which hinders the capacity for effective governance (Tendler, 1997). Inter-governmental conflict can arise from decentralization because of bureaucratic resistance to accept change, ambiguity concerning the functions and rights of public officials operating at the different levels of government, or disagreement about which level of government should receive credit or blame for policy outcomes (Wilson, 2006). Empirical evidence from Italy (Redoano *et al.*, 2015) and Argentina (Ardanaz *et al.*, 2014)¹³ also show that decentralization generates conflicts within a government when local jurisdictions, whose leaders are aligned with the ruling party at the central level, receive higher amounts of discretionary grants than local units under the control of officials from the opposition. Again, decentralization often involves *a territorial distribution of power* in order to reconfigure political, fiscal and administrative arrangements existing between different groups, most of which possess conflicting or contrasting objectives and preferences. But it has been observed that, in several developing countries, deep social, political, and economic divisions dividing countries before the implementation of decentralization do resurface within local government units after decentralization. In Uganda, for example, while decentralization have helped reduce conflict on the national level, it has nonetheless replaced it with local-level conflict due to struggles over district leadership positions and the altering of power dynamics between local ethnic groups (Sujarwoto, 2017).

Another anti-governance argument, mostly advanced in economics literature against decentralization, is that it decreases the output of governance by causing a reduction in the quality of public policies and a decrease in economies of scale. With regards to the quality of public policies, proponents of this view normally point to the fact that the level of technical and administrative expertise at the local level is low, and that this manifests itself in poorly designed public policies (World Bank, 2011). Yilmaz *et al.* (2003) believes that, in comparison to the central government, local units in a decentralized system do not have the absorptive capacity to budget the significant resources at their disposal and implement sustainable and pro-poor projects with them due to limited human capital. With regards to economies of scale, an empirical study of Nigeria by

¹³ Redoano *et al.* (2015) report that local jurisdictions in Italy, whose leaders support the political party at the center, receive higher financial support than jurisdictions whose leaders stand in opposition to the central government. A similar thing occurred in the case of Argentina where Ardanaz *et al.* (2014) showed that local units that voted in favor of bills proposed by the federal government received more revenues than local units that did not.

Daniel (2014) shows that the provision of public goods such as infrastructure is more cost-effective when undertaken by the central government due to the central government's ability to pool more resources together and purchase raw materials in bulk at a reduced cost. As subnational units in decentralized systems purchase production inputs in smaller quantities, inefficiency and decrease in economies of scale are bound to happen because of increase in overhead cost per production unit. Similarly, Burki et al. (1999) find that decentralization can lead to increased fiscal deficit and imperil macroeconomic stability because, under financial stress, rather than increasing the robustness of local taxation, local governments increase their demands for more revenue on the central government instead (Wibbels, 2005).

Lastly, scholars who argue against decentralization have highlighted decentralization's ability to widen inter-regional inequalities as a reason it decreases governance output. Given the differences in initial conditions such as resource endowment, geographical location, income levels, and human development indicators (health, education, and literacy levels), some subnational units are always likely to be in a stronger position to generate more local taxes than others, and therefore able to provide higher quality services. This creates, therefore, uneven development across jurisdictions. Baiocchi and Bardhan's (2007) study on regional inequality in Brazil supports this argument. Using data from 2000, Baiocchi and Bardhan find that fiscal decentralization is associated with increased regional inequality in Brazil. Another empirical study from Barako and Shibia (2015) in Kenya also supports the claim by showing that local counties located in urban areas perform relatively better than those in the rural areas. Barako and Shibia explain that the differences hinge on the fact that urban areas are able to generate more funds through formal property rights, well-identified market prices, which can be used for property valuation, as well as high administrative capacity in terms of enforcing tax payment.

3.3 Why Decentralization Improves and does not improve Governance

All in all, the arguments for and counterarguments against decentralization, supported with empirical evidence, point to one single fact: decentralization does not always improve the outcome of governance. Now the question is: "why does decentralization, for instance, reduce political and ethnic instability in some countries, while at the same time help in the resurfacing of social, political, and economic divisions in another country?" In other words, "why does decentralization improve the outcome of governance in some countries and work less so in other countries?" Several studies have identified some channels determining the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of decentralization for improving governance output. The central logic of the studies has always been that, in the absence of the conditions they identify, decentralization would overturn its advantages, and deliver counteractive side-effects like elite capture, localization of corruption, and soft-budget constraints. A selected sample of these studies includes:

1. Olowu and Wunsch (2004), who argues that, in order to improve the output of governance, decentralization must be supported by (1) effective local authority and autonomy, (2) sufficient resources for localities, (3) effective institutions of collective action, and (4) open and accountable local political processes;
2. Sharma (2014), who summarizes the eight preconditions for reaping the advantages of decentralization as: (1) social preparedness and mechanisms to prevent elite capture; (2) strong administrative and technical capacity at the higher levels; (3) strong political commitment at the higher levels; (4) sustained initiatives for capacity- building at the local level; (5) strong legal framework for transparency and accountability; (6) transformation of local government organizations into high-performing organizations; (7) appropriate reasons for decentralization; and (8) effective judicial system, citizens' oversight, and anti-corruption bodies to prevent decentralization of corruption;
3. Saito (2001, 2005) and Sorens (2009), who contend that the success of decentralization is dependent on some underlying factors of the society such as socio-economic and sociocultural. Sorens (2009) specifically suggests that sociocultural conditions and social cleavages arising from ethnic and minority-related issues are also influential on adjusting the share of responsibilities between central and local authorities;
4. Hankla (2009), who outlined nine conditions for a successful decentralization: (1) subnational governments are delegated specific and important responsibilities (2) subnational governments enjoy sufficient expenditure freedom and administrative capacity to perform their responsibilities (3) subnational governments possess the ability to tax or receive steady and unconditional transfers (4) subnational institutions are democratically elected (5) subnational political institutions are designed to encourage the provision of public goods (6) the national government employ monetary transfers to regions to ensure regional equality (7) the central government use well-targeted and matching grants to promote core objectives and encourage the provision of public goods with positive spillovers at the subnational level (8) reformers design subnational political institutions to maximize national unity and protect minorities, and; (9) the central government protects microeconomic stability of the country;
5. Nannyonjo and Okot (2012), who explains that the underscored imperatives for reaping the benefits of decentralization include: (1) sufficient human capital, (2) means of collecting information, (3) financial capacity, and (4) the capacity to ensure proper policy design and implementation, and;
6. Hartmann and Crowford (2008), who outlined nine issues that may adversely affect the advantages of decentralization, namely: (1) shortfalls in the legal framework for decentralization, (2) absence of a clear division of responsibility between local and central government, (3) lack of local government capacity, with inadequate financial and human resources, (4) weak and ineffective legislative bodies, (5) limited participation opportunities for the citizens, or a lack of information about the opportunities being made available, or a weak civil society, (6) lack of strong accountability mechanisms, (7) a lack of political will on the part of national elites to seriously implement devolution, (8) local

elite capture, and (9) lack of local democracy and the existence of a local democratic deficit.

To synthesize these numerous contributions, I identify, in accordance with Sujarwoto (2017) and Azfar et al. (1999), six streams of literature: (1) those that focus on the structure of political institutions, particularly democracy, as a necessary condition for effective decentralization; (2) those that stress the capacity of local government's management and administration to respond to demands as condition of effective decentralization; (3) those that believe that the success of decentralization is determined by the structure of society itself, and the action of citizens rather than political and administrative structures; (4) those that stress on the degree of institutional authority as sine qua non for a successful decentralization; (5) those that emphasize the importance of citizen participation, and; (6) those who focus on transparency of government actions. For the rest of this chapter, I will situate my research within the landscape of these streams of literature, while expanding on the literature a little bit.

3.3.1 Structure of Political Institutions

Some researchers, majority of which are political scientists, focus on the structure of political institutions as a necessary condition for improving governance performance through effective decentralization. The scholars argue that for decentralization to result in improved governance, it requires the existence of democratically functioning local governments as well as strong institutional constraints that hold politicians to account (Agrawal & Ribot, 2000; Ostrom, 2000; Anderson, 2003; Rodden *et al.*, 2003). In a well-functioning democratic system, citizens can exert pressure on locally elected representatives to provide improved governance. Where local elections are competitive and opposition party members have a real opportunity to win positions of authority, incumbents are motivated to prove their competence in the management of public affairs and seek to find new ways of addressing real problems. Competitive and contestable local elections also serve as institutional mechanisms for countering corruption and preventing the capture of local politics by local elites (Rondinelli *et al.*, 1989; Manor, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 2000). In fact, this stream of literature generally suggests that any decentralization reform without accompanying changes (such as the establishment of competitive elections at the grassroots level) simply increases the power of local political elites rather than improve the quality of local governance (Prud'homme, 1995; Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999).

For most scholars who support this argument, it is obvious that competitive and contestable elections are sacrosanct for the effectiveness of decentralization, and there is no arguing the question that competitive and contestable elections thrive most in democratic systems. Yet for others, competitive and contestable elections are not enough for an effective system of checks and balances against the government. For the citizens to monitor local government performance effectively and react appropriately to that performance, these other scholars argue that a system of accountability, made available and known to the citizens, is also required within the government ranks (Azfar et al., 1999; Meagher, 1999A). A clear system of accountability will stipulate an

efficient division of responsibilities among different levels of government, defining who has authority, and who should be held accountable for failures or underperformance regarding specific functions. These set of rules are explicit and transparent, and mostly spelled out, under democratic systems, in the national constitution. They lead to laws and regulations covering specific implementation of the fiscal system and public goods delivery. The constitution and national laws may also define situations in which subnational governments can be investigated or disciplined by arms of the national government (Meagher, 1999).

3.3.2 Citizen Participation

The argument that decentralization results in allocative efficiency, quality service delivery, cost recovery, and reduction of corruption relies heavily on the assumptions of responsiveness and accountability: It is assumed that subnational governments have better information about the needs and preferences of the local population than the central government, and that the citizens are more aware of the actions of their subnational government than that of their central government. But this not always true.

The scholars who contend that citizen participation is sacrosanct for an effective decentralization argue that subnational governments do not automatically have better information about user preferences than the central government. Their sheer physical proximity to the citizens does not guarantee this unless they make an effort to elicit it. Whether subnational governments have information about the preferences of the citizens depends critically on the existence of certain mechanisms that allow the local population to participate in decision-making concerning public services (Litvack & Seddon 1999). Only when the citizens participate in decision-making concerning public services can information flow between government and local population, thereby reducing asymmetric information and promoting government accountability.

The case of Colombia demonstrates this point. There, Fiszbein (1997) found that community participation increased demands for effective local governance and necessitated government accountability. Citizen participation made local authorities in Colombia more accountable to the citizens by increasing the political costs of inefficient and inadequate public decisions. As a result, local governments started changing their personnel to make local governments more effective. Also, Putnam's (1993) study of Italian regional governments shows that governments more open to constituent pressure during participation manage and deliver public services more efficiently.

But what is meant by the word *participation* here? Actually, the modern usage of the word tallies with what the European Economic Commission called "the democratic imperative", that is, the principle that the citizens substantially affected by decisions made by social and political institutions must be involved in the making of those decisions. So, participation essentially means three things: (1) people's involvement in decision-making process for programs that affect them; (2) people's sharing in the benefits of development programs; and (3) people's involvement in the efforts to evaluate such programs. Citizen participation can be direct or indirect. It is direct, when

citizens - individually or in various forms of self-organization - actively engaged in the decision-making processes on matters affecting them, and indirect, when citizens express their preferences through elected officials (Nkunika, 1987).

No matter the form participation takes, one thing is certain: it improves governance outcome by means of two mechanisms: vote and voice (Kauzya, 2007). Vote is the means by which citizens select their representatives at the local level, whereas voice is the means by which the citizens make their preferences known to their representatives. While vote can be facilitated by putting in place structures that allow citizens to exercise their voting power with limited ‘interference from the central government, voice can be facilitated by transferring power and authority for socio-politico-economic decision-making from the central government to local government and communities (Kauzya, 2007). Theory suggests that the benefits of citizen participation are optimized when both vote and voice mechanisms are institutionalized in a society (Azfar, et al., 1999). But practice indicates the opposite. In fact, practice shows that the mere existence of voice and vote is fundamental, but even more crucial, is who has access to these mechanisms and whose voice eventually influences decisions. These factors determine whose interests the government will eventually serve. So, in order to realize the advantages of decentralization in a country through citizen participation, access to voice and vote must be broad-based in a sense that includes all intended beneficiaries of government projects. Otherwise, more powerful groups with narrow interests may capture the resources and hijack government projects and policies. As Schönwalder (1997) puts it:

...even decentralization initiatives that are in fact designed to devolve power to regional and local governments can have unintended effects, in the sense that they strengthen traditional local elites who have no interest in furthering the participation of the poor. Thus, decentralization may lead to a decrease in the political clout of the lower strata. Local elites, local governments and other actors operating on the local scene, such as political parties and even some NGOs, have often been prone to co-opt popular movements in order to further their own agendas... (Schönwalder, 1997: 754)

3.3.3 Government Transparency

Another set of literature points to the fact that government transparency is necessary for improving governance outcome of decentralization. Authors whose work fall under the category argue that access to information on the actions and performance of government is critical for the effectivity of citizen participation (Darbishire, 2010; Daruwala & Nayak, 2007), but unless the public knows what goods and services are provided by the government, how well they are provided, who the beneficiaries are, and how much they cost, the citizen cannot demand effective government. It is only when the citizens are informed that participation can provide an avenue for the public to react to and influence government actions and policies. But access to information for the citizens does

not just happen like that, it requires, among other things, transparency on the part of the government, particularly with regards to fiscal information.

For Cucciniello and Nasi (2014) transparency can be split into four different dimensions: institutional (mission and operations), political (information on political representatives), financial (budget and solvency) and service delivery (performance of government). For Heald (2012), it includes five attributes: information released with discipline; comprehensive information; a link between capacity issues and structuring political incentives; an independent scrutiny capacity, and finally; public audit plays a crucial role in public expenditure. In the same vein, Van Dooren et al. (2012) emphasizes that systematic and timely release of data, an effective role for the legislature, and civil society are key elements of transparency.

When a government is transparent, it promotes overall government accountability (Mabillard & Zumofen, 2017; Meijer, 2014), which obviously effects the output of governance. For a government to be transparent, budgets and expenditure programs need to be disclosed to the public. Another mechanism that also promotes transparency, and thereby accountability, is periodic public sector audit. In fact, in an audit system, the existence of physical audit requirements, sanctions for late submission or manipulations, and especially the requirement of making audit reports available to the public or at least to an independent body capable of following up any problems is critical for restraining corruption.

3.3.4 Fiscal Decentralization

A body of research focuses on the degree of institutional authority available to subnational governments as a determinant of effective decentralization. The scholars who subscribe to this view generally argue that governance outcome of decentralization varies across countries because decentralization is rarely complete in some countries (Rondinelli *et al.*, 1989). These scholars, therefore, contend that, for decentralization to improve governance performance, its frameworks must link, at the margin, local financing and fiscal authority to the service provision responsibilities and functions of the local government. They claim that, in many countries, where decentralization does not perform well, responsibilities for public services are given to local governments without an accompanying fiscal authority either to raise revenue or to exercise discretionary power over spending decisions (Dillinger, 1995; Seabright, 1996; Agrawal & Ribot, 2000).

These points sound convincing except that the link between decentralization, fiscal responsibility and efficiency actually relies on a complex array of financing, spending, and resource allocation relationships¹⁴ between a central and local government instead. One way researchers have used to model the relationship is as a game being played by two or more levels of government, in which all have real fiscal authority to tax generation and spending (Dixit & Londregan, 1998; Boadway,

¹⁴ A fundamental decision in resource allocation relationship between a central and subnational governments, for example, has to do with whether the transfer of responsibilities for revenue collection and expenditure to these subnational governments should be accompanied with greater political self-determination or not.

Marchand & Vigneault, 1998). As it is often the case with game theoretic modeling, the results of this relationship may depend on the order of the moves (whether the central or local government sets tax rates first) and on other details that have no clear real-world parallels (see Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000).

3.3.5 Capacity of Subnational Governments

Besides the structure of political institution, citizen participation, government transparency, and degree of autonomy granted to subnational governments, the literature also stress that the capacity of local governments to respond to public demands is crucial for effective decentralization. Scholars who subscribe to this view argue that differences exist in the governance outcome of decentralization because some subnational governments severely lack training and basic administrative infrastructure than others, and, in some cases where training and administrative structures across subnational governments are comparable, the resources available to some of the units, in comparison to others, may not allow for effective response to the need of the citizens (Larson, 2002; Deininger & Mpuga, 2005; Grindle (2007). The scholars contend that subnational governments may even have similar access to financial resources, but unless they have the capacity to do the work, decentralization is likely to produce undesired or lesser results. In Mexico, for instance, Grindle (2007) finds that the existence of ideas, leadership skills, and good strategic choices at the local units of government play a central role in effective decentralization and improvement of peoples' well-being.

Three key factors can influence government capacity and, indirectly, the effectiveness of decentralization, according to literature. These factors include: human capital, physical capital, and an incentive structure within government (Fiszbein; 1997; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Uphoff, 1997). Human capital represents the quality of civil servants, which is a function of their skills and knowledge, and the way these skills and knowledge are utilized within the government. Physical capital, on the other hand, refers to access to the necessary equipment and technology needed by the civil servants to carry out the necessary works. The argument is that insufficient human and physical capitals combine with an ineffective incentive structure for public officials to minimize the positive effect of decentralization on governance performance.

It is noteworthy to add at this point that the term “capacity” is used in this context to refer to the ability, competency, and efficiency of subnational governments to plan, implement, manage, and evaluate policies, strategies, or programs designed to impact on the social conditions of the citizens (Shafritz, 1986). Ingraham and Kneedler (2000) define it as the ability of the government to marshal, develop, direct, and control its financial, human, physical and information resources, whereas Eisinger (2002) and Goodman et al. (1998) entertainer a broader view of it. Eisinger (2002) defines it as a set of characteristics that help an organization to accomplish its missions whereas Goodman et al. (1998) defines it as the ability to carry out stated objectives. Chaskin (2001) describes capacity in an even more comprehensive way as any attribute that can promote or obstruct successes.

3.3.6 Social Structure

Lastly, a great number of researchers explain variation in the governance outcome of decentralization by focusing on the structure of society itself and the action of citizens rather than on any of the political or administrative factors described above. In doing so, these authors argue that certain features of the society can affect the citizens and their ability to push for improved governance. These types of social features include: (1) social heterogeneity, (2) economic heterogeneity, (3) lack of social trust among different groups making up a society, and (4) divisive cultural norms and traditions that affect societal cohesiveness. In what follows, I shall first explore, in one piece, arguments on how the last three societal features above explain differences in the governance outcome of decentralization. Thereafter, I shall turn my attention to arguments on how the first feature (social heterogeneity) also explains the differences, and then situate my research in the entire argument.

3.3.6.1 Economic Heterogeneity, Social Trust, and Cultural Norms

Some scholars argue that, in decentralized countries, economic heterogeneity of the local population with respect to income can distort the allocation of resource and efficiency of public service delivery because, when different economic groups vary in terms of income, they are likely to have varying bargaining power, and thus varying opportunities for participating in critical decisions on how resources and public services are distributed. The wealthier members of the community are often better connected and can use their money and influence to steer the public policy and resource allocation to their benefits (Schönwalder 1997, Tandler 1997). In certain cases, poorer members of the society would react against the actions of the elites by lobbying for special benefits such as contractual set-asides, or creating patronage networks that, for example, exchange votes in local elections for public employment and other favors that may help improve the prospects. Whether it results to elite capture by the rich or vote-selling by the poor, one thing is certain: economic heterogeneity would result in economic status or class becoming an organizing principle for political relations, and a polarizing factor among the citizens. When the citizens are polarized, it reduces the outcome of governance by reducing their ability to push for improved governance as a unified force.

Other scholars contend that lesser tradition of civic engagement can also produce a negative effect on public service delivery by reducing citizen's participation in service delivery. Citizen participation in service delivery is likely to be easier to organize and be accepted by both the citizens themselves (cooperation) and the government as well if it builds on a tradition of civic involvement in the public space. When social groups such as civil societies participate in service delivery, performance of government improves. In their participation, these social groups not only take an active role in monitoring the performance of elected and administrative officials, but they also provide models on how improvements can be made in service delivery and participate in decision-making and implementation processes. In countries without active civil societies, it has been shown, for instance, that governments are less likely to take on the difficult task of providing

better services, being innovative in their activities, or responsive to local needs. Putnam demonstrates this stand with an analysis of the impact of social capital and civil society on the performance of local governments in Italy (Putnam, 1993). Putnam posits that the degree to which devolution of authority leads to better local government performance in Italy is concomitant with the level of organization of civil society and the extent to which civil actors are able to participate in governance. The success of decentralization in Porto Alegre, Brazil and Ilave, Peru also illustrates the important role of civil engagement in ensuring a positive impact of decentralization on government performance (Heller, 2001; Faguet, 2001). The impact of civil society organizations on a broad array of democratic reforms and public services is further supported in Booth and Richard (1998) and Bowles and Gintis (2002).

In some quarters, lack of trust among the local population and between the citizens and government are considered to decrease the governance outcome of decentralization. Here, it is argued that people who lack trust in government may adopt non-cooperative strategies and even conflicting behaviors (Levi, 1996), which may lead to collective resistance action against the state and social instability (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). Among the citizens, lack of trust has been shown to affect service delivery by decreasing the cost of acting collectively (De Mello, 2004). In a broader perspective, La Porta et al (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) provide empirical support for the view that trust is associated with government performance. Both La Porta et al (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) use cross-country trust data from the World Values Survey. La Porta et al find the effects of trust on government performance, as measured by efficiency of the judiciary, corruption, bureaucratic quality, tax compliance, and civic participation, to be both statistically significant and quantitatively large. They also find that societies with high levels of trust have lower infant mortality rate than those with lower levels, controlling for income. Knack and Keefer (1997), on the other hand, conclude that trust is associated with confidence in governmental institutions. Trust, as used by La Porta et al (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997), is understood as the basis for successful social cooperation and effective governance. The greater the level of trust in a society, the greater the likelihood of cooperation within and across different social and economic groups ((De Mello, 2004).

3.3.6.2 Social Heterogeneity

Apart from economic heterogeneity, cultural norms, and social trust, the literature also links variation in the effect of decentralization on governance performance to social heterogeneity of a population. Here social heterogeneity is generally used to imply diversity in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion. However, the literature on the effect of ethnicity on governance often points to ethnic diversity when referring to social heterogeneity. One reason for this could be that, among all the dimensions of social heterogeneity, ethnic diversity has been shown to be of more relevant in predicting various economic outcomes, such as growth¹⁵ or the likelihood of civil conflicts

¹⁵ Social heterogeneity, or ethnic heterogeneity, has also been reported to hinder economic growth. For example, using a cross-country data set, Easterly and Levine (1998) find that ethnic diversity is correlated with slow economic

(Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). A second reason might be connected to the inclusion of the other aspects of social heterogeneity such as linguistic and religious diversities in the hermeneutics of ethnic diversity, giving rise to such coinages as ethno-linguistic diversity (Michalopoulos, 2012; Eberlea et al., 2020) and ethno-religious diversity (Timol, 2020; Jonsson, 2018).

The provision of public goods and services is one of the most important indicators of governance output that has been shown to reduce when ethnic diversity is combined with decentralization. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that lower spending on education, for example, at the subnational level of government is associated with ethnic diversity. Seidel (2020) also find that ethnic diversity has a negative impact on the supply of regional public goods worldwide. In their paper, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) argue that efficient provision of public goods and services, depends on the heterogeneity of a society. Their hypothesis relies on two reasons: First, on the reasons that, in heterogeneous societies, groups simply differ in their preferences regarding public goods (while Group A may prioritize Public Good X, Group B may prioritize Public Group Y instead); second, on the fact that the gains from using a public good decrease for a group if other groups also use it. Again, Habyarimana et al. (2007) suggest that ethnically homogeneous societies can provide public goods better than heterogeneous ones because ethnic groups possess both the cooperation-facilitating norms and networks required to sanction community members who fail to contribute to collective endeavors. A shared culture (in terms of language, experience, etc.) may make co-ethnics more effective than non-co-ethnics in communicating and working together (Kimenyi, 2006). Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) provided one of the first empirical evidences on the under-provision of public goods in decentralized regions with high levels of social heterogeneity measured in terms of ethnic fragmentation. After them followed other countless works like Khwaja (2009), which studied the effect of ethnic diversity on infrastructural development in decentralized Pakistan; Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2014), which studied the relationship between a range of public goods in Mexico and decentralization, and Alesina et al. (2017), which analyzed the link between forests as a form of public good and ethnic diversity in decentralized Indonesia.

A growing body of literature has shown that a society's level of corruption is another important factor of governance performance that increase in decentralized societies marked with ethnic diversity. D'Arcy and Cornell (2016) in their study of Kenya, one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, reports that decentralization increases corruption by facilitating patronage and rent-seeking along ethnic lines. Batubara (2016) studied the effect of decentralization on corruption at village government-level in 256 Indonesian communities and found that ethnic diversity at the village level is positively associated with corruption. It is understood that corruption occurs when the benefit of engaging in a corrupt practice outweighs the cost of corruption, that is the probability of being caught and the penalties therefrom (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Glaeser & Saks, 2006). Based on this understanding, scholars contest that

growth. Collier (1998), on the other hand, shows that ethnic diversity is not necessarily associated with slow growth, but that its impact on slow growth depends on the prevailing political system. His results suggest that slow economic growth is only likely to be associated with ethnic diversity in contexts where political rights are lacking.

ethnicity increases corrupt practices by reducing the popular will to oppose corrupt politicians (Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Banerjee & Pande, 2007). The argument is that, in ethnically diverse societies, people often derive self-esteem and other psychological benefits from supporting candidates from their own ethnic group, even if s/he is known to be corrupt (Dunning & Harrison, 2010), and by doing so decrease the cost of corruption (Burgess et al., 2009; Franck & Rainer, 2011). Isaksson (2013) highlights that support for a corrupt high-level co-ethnic politician can translate into the acceptance of corruption among lower-level public officials too, a mechanism through which the entire society can be infested with corruption.

3.4 Research Gap and Contribution

This dissertation aligns with the body of literature that argues for a link between ethnic diversity and variations in the governance outcome of decentralization. This is because, among all the factors known to orchestrate variations in the governance outcome of decentralization, existing literature points more to the centrality of ethnic diversity. For instance, Sujarwoto (2017) suggests that the governance outcome of decentralization still varies in contexts where even local government capacities and political structures are similar. In the same vein, there is a body of literature that de-emphasizes the importance of democracy for a positive effect of decentralization on governance performance by showing that decentralization can also produce positive effects even in non-democratic regimes (Kosec & Mogue, 2020; Pesqué-Cela, 2017; Qian & Weingast, 1997). There are also literature that link, with empirical evidences, ethnic diversity to other factors like fiscal decentralization (Dreher et al., 2018; Pickard, 2020) and citizen participation in government (Belletini, Berti Ceroni & Monfardini, 2017; Muller & Vothknecht, 2013) across countries; implying that ethnic diversity is also indirectly connected to the effects being attributed to both fiscal decentralization and citizen participation with regards to the governance outcome of decentralization.

As I illustrated in Section 3.2.1, one of the major arguments in favor of decentralization is that it improves the performance of governance by improving accountability (Pesqué-Cela, 2017; Smith & Revell, 2016; Smoke & White, 2005). In this argument, improved accountability is often positioned as a mechanism by which the positive effect of decentralization occurs. The result of this is the placement of accountability at the center of the discourse on decentralization and governance, so much so that Agrawal and Ribot (2000) name accountability as one of the three underlying dimensions of decentralization. But, regardless of the central positioning of accountability in the theme of governance and decentralization, none of the previous literature has approached the issue of variation in the governance outcome of decentralization strictly from the perspective of accountability. Instead, previous approaches have dwelt more on the impact of the divisiveness of ethnic pluralism on the coordination of state governance. Even in the argument concerning corruption, a close but different concept to accountability, the effect of ethnic diversity is structured through its divisive impact on citizen coordination (Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Banerjee & Pande, 2007) and not from the point of view of citizens' accountability behavior.

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the problem with this approach is that it leaves little or no room for policy-driven solutions against governance problems in ethnically diverse societies. In a more elaborate way, it leaves policy-makers with little or no handle for mitigating ethnicity's impact on governance through public policies. Since the property of divisiveness or otherness belongs to the essence of ethnicity as a concept, policy-makers have no choice but to look on and wait for the completion of the gradual and more difficult process of identity change and/or assimilation, an approach that can set a society further behind and even worsen an already critical situation.

It is on this note that my dissertation contributes to literature. It does so in two folds: First, unlike existing works on the topic, it primarily approaches the relationship between governance performance, decentralization, and ethnic diversity from the prism of ethnicity's negative effect on citizens' accountability behavior (NAB). I find this approach policy-friendlier, as it creates better room for impactful policy interventions. Second, with the help of some classical theories of behavior, my dissertation proposes the existence of another variable that functions as a mechanism between ethnic diversity and citizens' accountability behavior – state exploiting mentality (SEM). If the existence of both SEM and NAB is confirmed in Chapter 6, then the policy stalemate, which has been necessitated by the existing approach, can be mitigated, as policy-ethnicallymakers can specifically target the two mechanisms while designing policies intended to improve governance. Again, considering that governance and development are positively related (Ukwandu & Jarbandhan, 2016; Mills, 2010), my contribution has a huge potential for redefining the focus of development strategies in ethnically diverse societies. In short, if the relationship between governance performance and decentralization is sensitive to SEM and NAB as I think, then, my research would have highlighted two new areas to emphasize on while approaching development issues in decentralized democratic states plagued by ethnic pluralism.

4.0 Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa


Sub-Saharan Africa is probably the most ethnically diverse region on earth. This is one of the reasons I focus on the region in this dissertation. But, apart from its diverse ethnicity, the region is also renowned for its backwardness. In comparison to other regions, sub-Saharan Africa performs less impressively on many positive indices (such as economic development, security, democracy, human development, human rights, and even governance) and blazes the trail on many negative indices (such as poverty, corruption, and internal violence). The 2020¹⁶ Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report indicates, for instance, that 50 percent of sub-Saharan African countries have poverty rates higher than 35 percent (see Figure 2). Similarly, PovcalNet¹⁷ Report on Poverty published in March 2021 signals that 18 out of 20 poorest economies in the world are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other reports also show that the region belongs to one of the most turbulent places in the world. These include: a 2019 report from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which reports that at least 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are immersed in violent conflicts (SIPRI, 2020), and another report from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which shows that, through the impact of crime, jihadism, insurgency and communal violence, sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the most number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) on earth (IISS, 2019).

Although it hardly paints the entire picture, that ethnicity plays a role in the region's predicament is popular among experts (Ajide, Alimi, & Asongu, 2019; Noyoo, 2000; Deng, 1997). It is even claimed that the founding fathers of the region's constituent nations had anticipated this role, as they fought, with varied degrees of success, to suppress its influence in the early stages of their nation's independence: Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana; Houphouet-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire; Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Jommo Kenyatta in Kenya, Nnamdi Azikiwe in Nigeria, and a host of others (Welsh, 1996).

Before I move on with the rest of the dissertation, it is my intention to provide, in this chapter, some general contexts regarding ethnicity's role in sub-Saharan African polity. In doing so, I first highlight what I construe as *ethnicity* and *sub-Saharan Africa*, in other to avoid the terminological fuzziness often associated with the use of both concepts in social sciences. Thereafter, I also briefly x-ray the extent of ethnic diversity in the region, highlight its unique colonial origin, and finally illustrate how it has shaped the practice of decentralization in the region. I particularly highlight the colonial origin of the region's diversity in order to stress the impact of colonialism in the invention and systematization of ethnic groups and identities existing in sub-Saharan Africa today. My hope is that this chapter will provide a good background for understanding the arguments I present in the next chapters.

¹⁶ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity>

¹⁷ <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx>

Figure 2 Poverty Rate at the US\$1.90-a-Day Poverty Line, 2017 (Published 2020)

Source: PovcalNet (online analysis tool), World Bank, Washington, DC, <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/>.

Note: The map shows the lined-up poverty rates (at the international poverty line) for 2017 for economies with available data in PovcalNet.

4.1 Sub-Saharan Africa in Brief

Geographically and ethnoculturally, sub-Saharan Africa represents the area of Africa lying south of the Sahara Desert. According to the United Nations (2021), sub-Saharan Africa consists of all African countries and territories lying fully or partially south of the Sahara. In line with this definition, Sudan, which is included in the African Union's definition of the region, is excluded in the United Nations geoscheme for sub-Saharan Africa, whereas Mauritania, which is included in it, is excluded in the African Union's definition¹⁸. Sub-Saharan Africa contrasts with North Africa, which is frequently included within the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, and most of whose states are members of the Arab League (Barakat, 1993). Though Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros, and the Arab-majority Mauritania (and sometimes Sudan) are members of the Arab League, they are also geographically considered parts of sub-Saharan Africa as well. The United

¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sub-Saharan_Africa. Accessed 15 May 2021.

Nations Development Program (UNDP) considers 46 of Africa's 54 countries sub-Saharan, excluding countries like Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia that lie north of the Sahara.¹⁹ All in all, the countries involved when scholars refer to sub-Saharan Africa include: Angola, Gabon, Nigeria, Benin, Gambia, Rwanda, Botswana, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, Cameroon, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Lesotho, South Africa, Central African Republic, Liberia, South Sudan, Chad, Madagascar, Swaziland, Comoros, Malawi, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Togo, Republic of Congo, Mauritania, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Zambia, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Namibia, Ethiopia, and Niger (Tabutin & Schoumaker, 2020). I follow in this tradition by exclusively referring to the above-listed countries as sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 3 shows these countries and their locations on the map of Africa.

Population-wise, sub-Saharan Africa is home to over a billion people. According to the 2019 revision of the *World Population Prospects* (UN, 2019), the population of sub-Saharan Africa was 1.1 billion in 2019. Population growth in the region currently stands at 2.3%. The UN also predicts a population between 2 and 2.5 billion for the region by 2050, with a population density of 80 per km², in comparison to a population density of 170 km² for Western Europe, 140 km² for Asia, and 30km² for the Americas. Furthermore, countries from sub-Saharan Africa top the list of countries and territories by fertility rate, with 40 of the highest 50 countries located in the region, and all the countries in the region, except South Africa and Seychelles, having a total fertility rate (TFR) greater than the world's average (The World Bank, 2016). Currently, the region's high TFR represents one of its greatest competitive advantages, as it results in a large number of youth population²⁰ that is needed for economic development.

In terms of landmass, *Foresight Africa* reports that, at 200 million hectares, sub-Saharan Africa possesses nearly half of the world's uncultivated land (Foresight Africa, 2016). Natural resources, which land is a part of, dominate the structure of wealth in the region. In fact, the share of natural capital (such as oil, natural gas, etc.) in the aggregate wealth of the region remains the second highest in the world, after the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries. Oil accounts for 43.5 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's wealth; natural gas, less than 3 percent; forest, 7 percent; metals and minerals, 5 percent; coal, 4 percent; land, 35.5 percent, and; protected areas, 6 percent (The World Bank, 2018). Nevertheless, despite the region's huge portion of natural endowment, it is quite remarkable that its economic is not comparable to those of other rich regions. With an average score of 46.2, Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest global competitive index (GCI) score among all the regions of the world. It demonstrates the weakest average regional performance on 10 out of the 12 pillars of the index and exceeds the average score of 50 on only three pillars, namely: Labor market (53.8), Product market (50.4), and Business dynamism (51.1). The regions score on these pillars heralds its potentials to leapfrog other regions in the future if it adeptly taps more into digital

¹⁹ <https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/regioninfo.html>. Accessed 15 May 2021.

²⁰ To put this point into context, it might be necessary to cite that Nigeria, a country in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, has a large proportion of people aged below 15 (43% for women and 44% for men), and a very small proportion of people aged 65 and older (3% for both women and men) (The World Bank, 2016).

business models and private sector development. But digital transformation is impossible unless the region quickly improves on ICT adoption on which it scores a mere 29.6 currently (Schwab, 2018).

Figure 3 The Geographical Location of the 54 Sub-Saharan African Countries




Source: Tabutin & Schoumaker (2020).

4.2 The Extent of Ethnic Diversity in sub-Saharan Africa

It is difficult to estimate the extent of sub-Saharan Africa's diversity with certainty. But there are studies suggesting that the region is probably the most ethnically diverse in the universe. A study by Meur and Felix (2001), which pinpointed many of the most ethnically diverse countries on earth in sub-Saharan Africa, comes readily to mind. The study shows that 34 out of 50 most ethnically diverse countries in the world belongs to the region. Another study by Wee (2019) shows that Papua New Guinea is the only non-sub-Saharan African country in the top 10 most ethnically diverse countries on earth, with Tanzania, DR Congo, Uganda, Liberia, Cameroon, Togo, South Africa, Congo, and Madagascar all making the list (Wee, 2019). Figure 4, based on data from Alesina et al., (2003), Vanhanen (1999), Fearon (2003), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), is culled from Atlas & Boots (2016). Information presented in the figure corroborates with Felix and Meur (2001) and Wee (2019) by clearly showing that sub-Saharan Africa is clearly more diverse than the rest of the world in terms of ethnic diversity.

Figure 4 Ethnic Fractionalization - Sub-Saharan Africa and the Rest of the World



Source: Atlas & Boots (2016).

Again, what makes sub-Saharan Africa particularly interesting with regards to its ethnic composition is its unusually high regional-level and large internal variations. With regard to its high regional-level variation, previous attempts to explain global ethnic diversity still find a sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable to be statistically significant (Ahlerup & Olsson, 2009; Michalopoulos, 2008), and, with regard to its internal variation, the region's standard deviation in the number of ethnic groups per country is reported to be more than 35 percent higher than that of

any other region (Green, 2012; Fearon 2003). Another dataset from Alesina et al. (2003) corroborates with the above information from Green (2012) and Fearon (2003) by claiming that the standard deviation in ethnic diversity per country, as measured by the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index, is largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, it is also striking to find almost-homogenous countries like Burundi and Comoros in a region that contains countries like Liberia and Uganda, which have high levels of ethnic diversity.

4.2.1 Ethnicity: Theories and Meaning

Etymologically, the word *ethnicity* derives from the Greek word *ethnos*, which in the time of Homer (between 750 and 650 BC), was applied to various large, undifferentiated groups (of peoples and animals) to mean something like *throng* or *swarm*. Aristoteles (384–322 BC) used the term *ethnos* to distinguish alien or *barbarous* groups from groups that were part of the Hellenic civilization (Gabbert, 2006). In the Greek text of the New Testament, the word *ethnikos* referred to non-Christian or non-Jewish populations, which were accordingly designated as *pagan*, *heathen*, or *barbarian*. Because the term *barbarian* referred to all those who spoke unintelligible languages and lacked civilization, order, and decency (du Toit, 1978; Chapman et al., 1989), the word *ethnos* was also used in a way similar to the Latin word *natio*, which was exclusively applied to foreigners. The modern academic usage of *ethnos* began in the early 19th century in the form of *ethnic*, which was first applied in the 1830s and 1840s by the scientific *ethnological* societies in Europe and the USA. These societies were devoted to the study of the origin, characteristics, and progress of the world's different *peoples*, and they applied *ethnic* to indicate differences in religion, behavior, lifestyle or phenotype of different groups (Gabbert, 2006).

Although serious disagreements exist over fundamental issues (Comaroff, 1987) and assumptions relating to ethnicity (Safran, 1995), the concept remains one of the most discussed notions in social sciences today. The source of the controversy in theorizing ethnicity is twofold: first, what constitutes the characteristic markers of ethnicity; second, whether these characteristic markers are fixed or not, that is, whether ethnicity is primordial or subject to human agency (Zagefka, 2009). With regard to the characteristic markers of ethnicity, Cartrite (2003) reviews major works that have attempted to identify the necessary components of ethnicity such as Connor (1994), Eriksen (1992), Gellner (1983), Gurr (2000), Horowitz (1985), etc., and argues that markers of ethnicity can be group into two. The first group includes criteria like common culture, real or putative common descent, attachment to or claims of ownership of a certain territory, shared language, common history, *will* to be a group, existence of group symbols, mutual recognition of group membership, threat to cultural existence, common religion, economic ties, and *psychology*. These criteria are frequently mentioned in the literature. The second group consists of criteria that are not only frequently mentioned in the literature but are also singled out as more important than others. These include: myths of common descent, common culture, *will* to be a group, language, and symbols. Besides markers that were highlighted by Cartrite (2003), Phinney (1996) argues that a

number of others such as *cultural norms and values*, *cultural strength*, *cultural salience*, and *subjective meaning of ethnic identity* can also be detected in the literature.

Regarding whether ethnicity is a fixed concept or not, primordialism (often referred to as essentialism) and constructivism dominate the debate. Primordialists or essentialists maintain that ethnic groups have a certain *essence*, which determines their character and which, because it is inherited, must have a fixed biological (i.e., racial) basis. Biological essentialism constitutes the strongest form of essentialism. But other forms of essentialism such as cultural essentialism also exist, whereby the culture of different ethnic groups is presented as just as divisive, impermeable, and immutable as biological differences (Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1957), and whereby culture is presented as a reflection and expression of biological difference (Hopkins et al., 1997). Irrespective of the form essentialism assumes, for an essentialist, a person of German descent, for example, will be a German even if born and brought up in England, regardless of whether the person is unaware of their German descent and does not even speak German. This is because the inherited German essence within them, which cannot be eradicated, is anchored in seemingly objective empirical reality. The primordialist and essentialist position as held by Geertz (1963), Shils (1957) and others is known in ethnicity literature as the *sleeping beauty approach* to ethnicity (Suny, 2001).

Unlike primordialism or essentialism, constructivism insists on the constructed, fabricated nature of ethnicity. Scholars who subscribe to this idea of ethnicity argue that ethnic categories are social constructions rather than natural entities that are simply *out there* in the world (Waters & Eschbach, 1995; Laitin, 1998; Smith, 1998; Sternberg et al., 2005). The claims of the constructivists are supported by the outcome of genetics research, which finds that genetic variations within ethnic groups are much larger than variations between ethnic groups (Zuckerman, 1990; Bonham, Warshauer-Baker & Collins, 2005; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Similar to primordialists or essentialists, constructivists also vary greatly in their radicalism, which ranges from modernist to postmodernist paradigms: from those emphasizing construction to those emphasizing deconstruction, and; from those who believe only on discourse and fictive ethnicity to those who see identity choices as something restricted by ethnic history and political geography (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991; Laitin, 1998; Billig, 1995). In other word, there are constructivists who argue that ‘people are limited by, but are not prisoners of, their genes, their physiognomies, and their histories in settling their own identity’ (Laitin, 1998: 21) and those who argue that people’s range of choice of ethnic self-definition is constrained and restricted by societal definitions and perceptions of others (Phinney, 1996); those who argue that, although ethnic identities are malleable, they are not complete fabrications (Verkuyten, 2004) and those who contend that *voluntary ethnicity* is not an option most of the time because others within and outside the group are unlikely to accept very radical definitional and boundary changes as being proposed (Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Constructivists not only differ in terms of radicalism, but also on the assumed drivers of identity-construction process. While some constructivists emphasize the impact of communication network on the process (Deutsch et al., 1957), others emphasize instrumentalist concerns such as the rational workings of the world economy as well as the social and economic interests of individuals living

in a society (Brass, 1979; Hardin, 1995; Hechter, 1999). A third group of constructivists focuses on historical legacies and the constructions thereof as initiators of the process (Buruma, 1994).

While emphasizing on instrumental concerns as drivers of an identity-construction process, the instrumentalists focus on the role of elites in the construction of ethnic identity. In doing that, they argue that ethnicity is a *resource* used by the elites to design group identity, regulate group membership and boundaries, make claims, and extract resources (Brass 1985; Glazer & Moynihan, 1976; Hardin 1995). Most important for my argument, however, is the instrumentalists' emphasis on the crucial role of the so-called *cultural entrepreneurs* in the process of identity construction. Cultural entrepreneurs are those who codify and standardize a language, create an ethno-centered historical narrative, and build a literary tradition for the emerging ethnicity (Young 2003). In Section 5.2.2, I shall particularly paint an image of the colonialists as cultural entrepreneurs, who played an active role in the formation of different ethnicities dotting the sub-Saharan African space today. I argue in particular that the colonialists were essential in the promotion, systematization, and invention of ethnic groups and identities as they are found today in sub-Saharan Africa.

I particularly agree with constructivists that ethnic groups are constructed instead of genetic. In other words, I contend that *constructions and choice* rather than *blood and inheritance* are the true natures of ethnicity (Laitin, 1998; Smith, 1998; Sternberg et al., 2005). But, because it is difficult to marry extreme constructivism with the tenets of quantitative inquiries (Brown & Langer, 2012), I adopt, similar to Root (1998), a moderate sort of constructivism, which acknowledges that ethnicity is something real despite its malleability. Root (1998) argues that ethnicity is real in the sense that it forms part of people's psychological realities and places practical limitations on people's choices of ethnic group membership to some extent. Root (1998) also contends that the construction of ethnic categories is limited by the existing ethnic constructions and to the extent people are likely to accept or reject a radical re-definition of ethnicity. I concur with Root's arguments, and define ethnicity therefore as

a phenomenon of social differentiation in which social actors use cultural or phenotypic markers or symbols to distinguish themselves from others and to organize themselves into several kin groups using a (socially constructed) common origin as its primary reference.

4.2.2 The Invention of Ethnicities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Scholars have proffered several theories in their attempt to explain the origin of sub-Saharan Africa's numerous ethnicities. Three of the most-often proffered theories have to do with: climate conditions in the region, slave trade, and colonialism. In this sub-section, I will focus only on the third explanation, colonialism, because it is much more related to my central argument than the other two. But before I do that, I shall provide a walkthrough to the content of the argument in favor of the other two theories.

Climate and Slave Trade as the Origins of Ethnicities in sub-Saharan Africa

Some scholars claim that the existence of high ethnic diversity in sub-Saharan Africa has a lot to do with the latitude and/or temperature of the region. These scholars argue that, since warm tropical environments are ideal for growing food and living, sub-Saharan Africa's climate resulted in a situation whereby its inhabitants became isolated. The comfortable climate created few incentives for the ancient inhabitants to migrate elsewhere or trade extensively with other human populations. This isolation then spurs the creation of new ethnic groups in very much the same way Darwin had proposed in the case of finch species in the Galapagos Islands (Ahlerup & Olsson 2009; Collard & Foley 2002; Sutherland 2003). In support of this argument, the proponents find a significant positive correlation between elevation and ethnic diversity (Sutherland, 2003), which is presumed to work along the same line of mechanism as that which encouraged isolation among the region's original inhabitant.

Alternatively, other scholars propose that sub-Saharan Africa's diversity is connected to slave trade (Green, 2012). One of these scholars, Nunn (2008), for instance, argues that slave trading may have weakened ties among aboriginal Africans, thereby inhibiting the development of broader ethnic identities among them. To back up his argument, Nunn (2008) shows that a significant and strong correlation exists between slave exports per area and contemporary ethnic fractionalization in sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from Nunn's evidence, a good number of other evidence exist in support of a possible relationship between slavery and ethnic diversity in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, the names of many African ethnic groups suggest a strong link between slave trading and ethnic diversity in the region: The Dioula of West Africa, whose name comes from the Mandingo word *gyo-la*, or "the land of the slaves captured through warfare," and their neighbors, the Gio, whose name possibly comes from the Bassa phrase *gii-o*, or "slave people" are few examples of these instances in West Africa (Holsoe & Lauer 1976). There are also historical evidences linking slave trade and ethnic diversity in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa: the data, from 1856, on freed slaves in what is today called north-west Mozambique, which lists at least 21 different ethnic backgrounds of the slaves (Isaacman 1972), and the story of the current Bantu ethnic minority in southern Somalia, who originated as slaves from southern Africa, being shipped along the East African coast in the 19th century by Zanzibari traders belong to this category (Webersik 2004).

The Colonial Origin of Ethnicities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Just like in the cases of climate conditions and slave trade, a plethora of evidence exists in support of the colonial origin of sub-Saharan Africa's ethnicities. Welsh (1996) argues that, before the advent of the colonial masters, the boundaries of the indigenous societies in sub-Saharan Africa were fluid and permeable, and that fission and fusion were also not uncommon. Similarly, Ekeh (1975) contends that, before colonialism, no ethnic group in sub-Saharan Africa existed in the form they do today, with the boundaries claimed for them and the royalty directed at them. What existed

were amorphous polities with no conceptions of the wider political entities within which they are implicated today. Many of those amorphous polities were in the form of organized city-states, others in the form of kingdoms and quasi-kingdoms, and yet others with the narrowness of villages (Ekeh, 1975). Even the languages by which some claim to identify the ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa today are, to a large extent, products of colonial activities (Ekeh, 1975)²¹. In support of Welsh's and Ekeh's arguments, Wolpe (1974) shows that the *Igbo* of Nigeria were a product of colonial boundaries and Ranger (1989) demonstrates that the *Manyika* of Zimbabwe were *created* by missionaries. Furthermore, Young (1976) traces the origins of the *Ngala* of present-day Congo to Stanley's misinformed labeling of the people he encountered on his river explorations and Gourevitch (1998) indicates that the emergence of *Hutus* and *Tutsis* as distinct ethnic groups in Rwanda was a product of Belgian administrative fiat.²²

The creation of ethnicities during the colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa occurred in two ways. One of the ways, as suggested by the literature, was through the system of *divide et impera* – divide and conquer (Berman 1998; Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001). It is on record that the colonists pitched tribes against tribes by giving accent to *inter-tribal* rather than *intra-tribal* struggles in their interpretation of political strife in the region. By pitching tribes against each other, the colonists had two things to gain. First, it created disharmony between groups in the colonial situation, a strategy they used to keep the chances of a unified revolution against them out of the equation. Second, the system portrayed the colonial masters in the image of benevolent interveners, who came to the region to establish order (Ekeh, 1975). Not only did the system of *divide et impera* help Europeans colonize sub-Saharan Africa, it also helped sharpen a sense of exclusive group-identity that never existed among sub-Saharan Africa people before colonization.

The other way, through which ethnicities in sub-Saharan Africa emerged during the colonial era, was the colonists' *cost-saving method of administration*. As at the time of its colonization, sub-Saharan Africa and indeed the entire Africa were relatively marginal to European economic

²¹ A typical example of this claim by Ekeh (1975) can be seen in Posner's (2003) account of how three colonial era forces - missionary activity, colonial education policies, and labor migration – consolidated Bemba (Chiwemba), Nyanja (Chichewa), Tonga (Citonga), and Lozi (Silozi) as the four languages being spoken by 78.8 percent of the Zambian population today as either their first or second languages as of 1990. Posner (2003) noted that at the beginning of the colonial era, Zambia (called Northern Rhodesia at the time) was a Babel of more than fifty languages, and that no more than a quarter of the Zambian population spoke the four languages. However, by the end of the colonial era, patterns of language use had considerably consolidated in the form of these four languages. As early as the late 1940s, Hailey (1950) could report the emergence of a set of distinct regional languages in Northern Rhodesia: Silozi in the west, Chichewa in the east, and Chiwemba in the north. Although Hailey was silent on the extent of linguistic consolidation in the south, other scholars like Colson (1962), writing about that period, noted the emergence of Citonga as the dominant language in the south of Northern Rhodesia then (Posner, 2003).

²² The case of *Hutus* and *Tutsis* in Rwanda and Burundi is a clear case of ethnicity invention in sub-Saharan Africa that is worth highlighting. Before the Europeans arrival in Rwanda, the Hutus, comprising about 85 percent of the population, and the Tutsis, comprising about 14 percent, existed not as distinct ethnicities but as two status groups. The Hutus and Tutsis spoke the same language, have the same religion, and bear the same clan names. Prior to the colonial period, the social structure in Rwanda consisted of a quasi-feudal land-holding elite living in a symbiotic patron-client relationship with a peasantry. It was the idea of the colonial rulers to label the land-holders *Tutsi* and the peasants *Hutu*. Thenceforth, Rwandan citizens became categorized as either *Tutsi* or *Hutu* by paternal lineage and were obliged to carry identification cards to tell these two groups apart (Howard, 1995).

interests (Young, 1994), and the principle of colonial self-sufficiency meant that colonies had to pay for themselves, no matter how oddly shaped or small they were (Green, 2012). In order to create economies of scale and minimize bureaucratic costs, the Europeans had to create large states by lumping people, who previously had nothing to do with one another, together²³. The result of this till today is that the median former colony in Africa is 37 percent larger than the median former colony in Latin America and 74 percent larger than the median former colony in the Caribbean or Asia (Green 2012). as if that was not enough, the colonialists followed up the amalgamation of large areas in the region with the system of indirect rule through tribal chiefs, irrespective of whether their ostensible policy was that of *assimilation*, as with the French, or *indirect rule*, as with the British (Welsh, 1996). The tribal chiefs became useful intermediaries between the colonial administration and the colonized people and were commonly relied upon to help in preserving law and order, implementing customary civil law, squeezing their subjects for taxes, and providing men for the *corvée* and other labor requirements. In situations where colonized societies had no indigenous chiefs, the colonists, believing that all African peoples must have chiefs, created chiefs themselves²⁴ and endowed them with the above-mentioned functions²⁵. This colonial policy led to the creation of new ethnic identities, as colonists split up Africans into separate tribal areas with each tribe having their own tribal chiefdoms, thereby encouraging separation and ethnic difference. Also, the way the colonial rule restricted both migration and property rights to *natives* from each area only helped to encourage isolation and further fractionalization (Green, 2012).

4.3 Ethnicity and Modern Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa

Whether it was created in the process of colonizing the region or caused by climate conditions and slave trade, an undebatable point about ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa is that it foments varied political and social issues in the region today. I highlight and discuss a number of these issues in what follows.

4.3.1 Tribalism

Tribalism is a term used to denote animosities between members of different ethnic groups. By its nature, tribalism is a de-radicalized construct, which emerges in the spheres outside of a tribes'

²³ The average British district commissioner in the time of colonization was, for example, responsible for an area the size of Wales (Herbst 2000), while French colonial administrators are known to have created unusually large colonies in the more under-populated areas of Central and West Africa (Green, 2012).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ This practice went back a long time into the colonial history. In mid-nineteenth-century Natal, Theophilus Shepstone, faced with the problem of controlling a growing African population returning to their ancestral lands after the upheavals of the *Mfecane*, created a form of indirect rule as he regrouped people into his so-called *tribes* on reserves. Where he was unable to locate someone with an authentic claim to a chiefdom, Shepstone found suitably pliant individuals, from among his cooks and other retainers, and vested in them with powers equivalent to those of chiefs (Welsh, 1996).

control. That tribalism emerges in de-tribalized spaces means that it thrives in situations such the modern sub-Saharan African states; the kind of states Ekeh (1975) terms *the civic public*, which is actually considered as belonging to no tribe in particular. One encounters more tribalism in modern sub-Saharan Africa, the more they move from the spheres of the primordial public to that of the civic public, that is, to the situations where the influence of tribes and tribesmen are vanishing. That is why tribalism is robust in big cities with multiethnic characters but absent in the most hinterland villages. It flourishes in federal universities but is minimal in the secondary schools in the backwoods (Ekeh, 1975).

As one moves up from the primordial sphere to the state or civic sphere, the point of tribalism becomes synonymous to the proportionate sharing of the resources of the civic public to differentiated primordial publics. Members of the primordial publics attempt to channel as great a share of the resources from the civic public to individuals who are in the same primordial public as themselves. Confrontations also continually occur in the sub-Saharan African civic publics in matters regarding the appointment and promotion of public servants and officers. Competition for jobs and the frustration of failure tend to be seen in ethnic terms. With rapid growth in population, even admission to the educational system becomes more and more dependent on one's connection to their ethnic cycles within the education system (Walters, 1973). These sort of confrontations and malpractices in the civic space of sub-Saharan African countries lead to the inauguration of some counterproductive solutions like the so-called federal character arrangement²⁶, through which civil service positions are shared among individuals from different ethnicities (regardless of their competency), with the intention of providing equal opportunity to all ethnic groups within the state. At the end, the federal character arrangements ironically hurt the state, as efficiency and quality are sacrificed at the altar of carrying every ethnic group along (Ekeh, 1990). Tribalism in sub-Saharan African cities is being maintained by ethnic unions and affiliations (Walters, 1973).

²⁶ An example of such arrangements is the doctrine of federal character in the 1979 Nigerian constitution, which designed an elaborate formula for the *consociational* (Lijphart, 1969; 1984a; 1999; Horowitz, 1985; 2013) allotment of offices and other state resources on the basis of the ethnic composition of Nigeria (Ekeh & Osaghae, 1989). The Nigerian doctrine of federal character is an affirmation and recognition of ethnicity as an organizing principle, but it is also an attempt by the Nigerian state to blunt the divisiveness induced by the kinship ideology informing public affairs in Nigeria's postcolonial history, which has led to a fierce civil war in the late 1960s. The writers of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution defined the federal character doctrine as follows: "'Federal character' of Nigeria refers to the distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their desire to nourish and harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria" (Williams 1976:x). According to Ekeh (1990), this abridged definition of federal character was gathered from three separate points of views conceived as the proper ways of achieving the constitutional goal of the "promotion of national loyalty in a multi-ethnic society," which required: "fair and equitable treatment for all the component states and ethnic groups in the country"; "fair and just treatment for all ethnic groups within the area of authority of [any] government" in Nigeria; and the prevention of "the predominance in the Federal Government or any of its agencies of persons from some states, ethnic or other sectional groups to the exclusion of persons from other states, ethnic or other sectional groups, or the monopoly of the office of the President by persons from any state or ethnic groups" (Williams 1976:viii-ix).

4.3.2 Corruption

Another product of ethnic diversity in sub-Saharan Africa is corruption. No wonder the region is home to some of the world's most corrupt countries (Isaksson, 2013). Corruption is understood as the misuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Bardhan, 1997). Following this understanding, one can then assume that a public official weighs the benefits of a corrupt behavior against its costs, and then chooses to establish a corrupt relationship when the former outweighs the latter (Glaeser & Saks, 2006). While the benefits of corruption have to do with a public official's ability to extract resources for personal gain, which is in turn related to the size of the bureaucracy and the level of discretion they have over the provision of government goods, the costs of corruption originate in the probability of, and the penalties from, being caught (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). In line with these stipulations, Isaksson (2013) identifies two models by which ethnic diversity facilitates corruption. First, ethnicity reduces the popular will to oppose corrupt politicians (Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Banerjee & Pande, 2007). The argument is that the idea of redistribution across ethnic groups in multiethnic country (Burgess et al., 2009; Franck & Rainer, 2012) and social identity theory²⁷ (Liebermann, 2009; Dunning & Harrison, 2010) makes people support candidates from their own ethnic group, even if they are known to be corrupt. And by doing so, the people themselves help in decreasing the cost of corruption for those politicians. Isaksson (2013) argues that the acceptance of corruption among elected leaders could then translate into a greater acceptance of corruption among the citizens too, thereby transforming into a mechanism by which ethnic divisions infests a society with corruption.

A slightly different model from Isaksson (2013) relies on the fact that the likelihood of corruption incidence in a society is connected to the ability of the citizens to cooperate in sanctioning leaders who engage in corrupt practices. Isaksson (2013) argues that, in ethnically diverse societies, different cultures – languages, experiences etc. – may make people less effective in communicating, working, and establishing cooperative norms with one another, and that membership in different social networks may preclude people also from finding, and punishing corrupt politician (Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al., 2007).

Isaksson's (2013) models basically features, from a general point of view, the negative link between peoples' indifferent attitude to oppose corruption and corruption itself, and how ethnic diversity exacerbates this link. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, however, where most countries have been colonized, an added factor comes into play in this relationship. That is why Ekeh (1975) argues that *lack of popular will to oppose corruption* in sub-Saharan Africa is the acme of the dialectics between primordial and civic publics in the region. As I have written in Chapter 4, Ekeh (1975) insists that the *lack of popular will to oppose corruption* in sub-Saharan Africa arises from the amorality of the civic public and the need to seize largesse from the civic public for the benefit

²⁷ The social identification theory highlights that ethnic members derive self-esteem and other psychological benefits from knowing that their members fare well relative to the members of other groups (Liebermann, 2009) and are, therefore, more likely to attach positive attributes their co-members irrespective whether these attributes are merited or not.

the primordial public. This tendency not to oppose corruption ultimately leads to two forms of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa: (1) what is regarded as embezzlement of funds by the politicians, and; (2) the solicitation and acceptance of bribes from individuals seeking public services by those who administer the services on behalf of the state.

4.3.3 Civil Conflicts and Wars

Sub-Saharan Africa has been marred by conflicts that are remarkable in terms of their intensity, nature, and geographic distribution. In addition to the series of coups and countercoups in the region's immediate post-independence era and a handful of their consequent civil wars (Roessler, 2011; Wang, 1998), the region was particularly prone to conflicts in the 1990s, with the total number of its conflict-ridden countries averaging about 15, which amounted to about 35 percent of the total number of countries in the region²⁸. Following the decline in global conflict trend at the turn of the century, the average number of countries affected by conflict in sub-Saharan Africa dropped to nine between 2004 and 2012. However, that trend has reversed in recent years, with the number of countries in conflict in the region reaching a peak of 18 in 2016 (Fang et al., 2020) before returning back to 15 once again in 2019 (IISS, 2019).

Not only are conflicts rampant in sub-Saharan Africa, but they have also been particularly deadly. Estimates based on the GED²⁹ suggest that in the 1990s alone, verified conflict-related deaths totaled at least 825,000. The high death toll in that period was driven by the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda³⁰; the Ethiopian-Eritrean war; and protracted violence in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Fang et al. 2020). When several of these conflicts ended in the early 2000s, the number of deaths related to conflict fell considerably in the region, reaching its lowest level of about 2,400 deaths in 2010. A reappearance of violence in recent years, has resulted in an increase in conflict-related deaths, which is estimated at 14,000 a year since 2014 (Fang et al., 2020). This current rise in deaths related to conflict in the region is in tandem with the current global trend.

Horowitz (1985) considers ethnic diversity as a principal trigger of civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by linking the genocide in Rwanda, violent riots in the Democratic Republic of Congo, civilian mass killings in Burundi, army killings in Uganda and repeated hostilities in Chad to tensions arising from ethnic diversity. Authors like Gurr (2000) and Howard (1995) go on to elaborate on a few reasons ethnic diversity exacerbates conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. First, they contend that ethnicity gives rise to much conflict in sub-Saharan Africa because the ethnicities in

²⁸ See Fang et al. (2020).

²⁹ The GED, Uppsala Georeferenced Event Dataset, is a dataset on conflicts put together by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).

³⁰ This particular conflict remains the costliest in terms of human life among the bunch. The Rwandan constitution's claim that more than 1 million Tutsi perished in the genocide remains the foundation upon which a new Rwanda was built, but researchers argue that this number is scientifically impossible (Reydams, 2020; Meierhenrich, 2020). In fact, Guichaoua (2020) puts the number of Tutsis who died in the genocide at 206,000 – 800,000.

the region are often unbalanced in terms of populations and capacity of conquest, with one particular group almost always dominating over the others. It can be argued that the absence of serious ethnic conflict in Tanzania and Zambia since their independence, where ethnic groups share the territory, but no one large group dominates the others, gives credence to this claim (Howard, 1995).

Secondly, these authors explain that ethnic conflicts arise in the region when there is an attempt by the state to subordinate an indigenous pre-colonial imperial power like in the case of Uganda and Ghana. Before the colonialization of Uganda, the *Baganda* of Uganda were a very sophisticated, expansionist quasi-feudal kingdom. One of the complicating causes of the terrible violence that broke out in Uganda in the 1970s and 80s was the attempt of President Milton Obote, who was from a minority ethnic group in the north, to subordinate the *Baganda* by invading their *Kabaka's* palace and exiling the *Kabaka* to England. In the same vein, the communal conflicts in Ghana's post-independence may be better described as an aftermath of the Ghanaian state's attempt to subordinate the Ashanti, a pre-colonial imperial power, who enjoyed political influence too in the early days of Ghanaian independence (Howard, 1995).

Thirdly, Gurr (2000) believes that ethnicity fuels conflict in sub-Saharan Africa because politicians rely heavily on it. Political rulers in the region, with no capacity to either forge alliances with or buy off potential opposition or strengthen their political support, rely only on their ethnic members for support, often promoting their ethnic members to senior positions in both government and military and stirring up *tribal* hatreds to increase their kin's dependence on them. The cases of Idi Amin of Uganda, Samuel Doe of Liberia, and Macias Nguema buttress this point very well (Howard, 1995). These men oversaw the massacre of other ethnicities in their countries. The massacres were not caused by any pre-existing ethnic contentions as such but happened as a result of the consequences of politicizing ethnicity by politicians who lacked the capacity to engage in sophisticated political management.

Gurr (2000) also contends that ethnicity drives conflict in sub-Saharan Africa through ethnonationalism, which results in violent secessionist and irredentist movements. Considering the region's abundant economic resources, most secessionist conflicts there are being motivated by economic objectives (Howard, 1995). The historic secessionist efforts of the Katanga in Zaire and the Biafra in Nigeria are typical examples of this. In both cases, ethnic groups living in richer regions tried to secede from the poorer regions in order to secure the use of their land resources to themselves alone. Besides the encouragement of secessionism, ethnicity also fuels irredentist movements in sub-Saharan Africa. A perfect example of this can be seen in the case of Somalia's attempt to return ethnic Somali territories in Kenya and Ethiopia back to Somalia, in an unsuccessful attempt to engender in them a common sense of nationhood³¹.

³¹ Ibid.

4.4 Ethnicity and Decentralized Governance in sub-Saharan Africa

Apart from driving tribalism, corruption, and civil conflicts, ethnicity has also shaped the practice of decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa. I shall briefly dedicate myself to this theme in this subsection. But before, I do that I shall take a detour to discuss the historical evolution of decentralization in the region first.

The Historicity

Almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa today are decentralized. However, the journey to decentralization for the region was never a smooth ride (Erk, 2014). Stren and Eyoh (2007) identify three waves of decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa so far. The first wave, which occurred from the late 1940s through the early 1960s, came on the heels of almost half a century of uninterrupted period of centralized administrative rule by the colonists. It consolidated itself just before and at the point when most countries in the region were obtaining their independence, when local (and state) authorities were being established by mutual agreement between the nationalists and the departing colonial authorities. The establishment of local authorities represented the colonists' attempt at establishing institutions that are equivalent to today's local governments and communes in what were, essentially, one-party systems. So, after independence, the pressures associated with one-party system and the ideologies of central planning began to deprive the local government authorities of their powers and autonomy. At a point, it got so bad that the idea of strengthening the local authorities was perceived by politicians at the national level as being tantamount to reinforcing regional sentiments. This affected government performance, resulting to a reaction from the populace in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Kasfir, 1993).

The reaction of the people in 1970s and 80s eventually led to what Stren and Eyoh (2007) called *the second wave of decentralization*, when, in a response to overcentralization and problems with local project implementation, central governments throughout the region started looking for administrative means of relocating development committees, technical ministries, and even large projects to the district level and "closer to the people." The second wave of decentralization lasted until the early 1980s, eventually becoming a precursor to the third wave which started around the same period. The third wave of decentralization did not initially spread to all the sub-Saharan African countries as most of them were still under military regimes. However, the situation improved dramatically by the late 1980s and early 1990s, allowing a great number of states in the region to undertake decentralization measures (Stren & Eyoh, 2007). Within a decade or so, almost the entire sub-Saharan Africa became decentralized (Erk, 2014: 535). The third wave of decentralization is still on till today, and scholars would attribute its successes to two factors: the growth of civil society in the region, and the concurrent *wave* of democratization and re-democratization that started in the region around the 1980s³².

³² Ibid.

Ethnicity and the Practice of Decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa

Most ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa are regionally concentrated. In Nigeria, for instance, the *Igbos* live in the southeast, the *Yorubas* in the southwest, and the *Hausas* in the north (Lewis, Simons, & Fennig, 2016). This aspect of ethnicity shapes decentralization practices in sub-Saharan Africa in two contrasting ways. First presuming that members of a homogenous group are most likely to participate in improving governance in their subnational jurisdiction (Isaksson, 2013; Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al., 2007), subnational boundaries in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa are drawn along ethnic lines in the process of decentralization. An example with Kenya can help buttress this point more. In Kenya, subnational units are clearly coterminous with identifiable ethnic concentrations (Barkan, 2004; Fearon, 2003): the *Kwale* County (one of Kenya's 47 counties), for example, constitutes of four constituencies (*Msambweni*, *Matuga*, *Kinango*, and *Lunga Lunga* constituencies) which are variably dominated by different ethnic groups. The *Digos* are the majority in *Msambweni*, *Lunga Lunga* and *Matuga*, the *Durumas* in *Kinango*, and the *Kambas* in *Msambweni*. Similarly, the population of *Kitui* County in the same Kenya is mostly made up of people of the *Akamba* ethnicity with only a patch of *Tharaka* and Somali people.

On the other hand, contrary to the assumption that ethnic homogeneity increases participation in governance, some countries in the region draw their subnational boundaries in a way that reduces ethnic homogeneity within subnational units. These countries follow such an arrangement in order to curtail secessionist tendencies within their border (Baskaran & Blesse, 2019). Prior to January 1, 2006, for example, Rwanda was composed of 12 ethnic provinces. Today, the current 5 provincial boundaries in Rwanda are deliberately drawn to reduce the degree of within-province ethnic homogeneity. Rwanda did this, in an attempt to address issues that arose from the Rwandan genocide. The new provinces are intended to be *ethnically diverse administrative areas* (Law, 2016).

In using the phrase “decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa” in this work, I do not distinguish between these two opposite practices. In fact, as by-effects of ethnic diversity on decentralization in the region, I consider both of them relevant for my objective – to understand whether and how ethnicity plays a role in the varied outcome of governance in decentralized sub-Saharan African states.

5.0 Theoretical Foundation

As I stated in Chapter 3, I approach ethnicity's role in the varied outcome of governance in decentralized sub-Saharan African states from the perspective of its effect on citizens' accountability behavior. In doing this, I employ the mechanistic framework of analysis, and focus on three major variables: ethnic diversity, citizens' behavior/action towards accountability, and governance performance. I employ the mechanistic framework for two reasons: First, because, in arguing in favor of decentralization, *improved accountability* is often positioned as a mechanism by which the positive effect of decentralization on governance occurs. Second, because my variables of interest (ethnic diversity, citizens' behavior/action towards accountability, and governance performance) are a mix of macro- and micro-level phenomena: governance performance and ethnic diversity are both macro-level phenomena whereas citizens' behavior towards accountability is a micro-level phenomenon. In social science research, relating macro-level phenomena to a micro level property, as I do here, represents a typical scenario for a mechanistic relationship, in which a micro-level property serves as the mechanism explaining the relationship between two or more macro level observations (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010).

In what follows, I first illustrate, with the help of some general ideas, how I apply the concept of mechanism in modelling my analysis. Thereafter, I apply Ekeh's (1975) Theory of the Two Publics and the pragmatic theory of human behavior on the mechanistic framework to develop nuanced hypotheses about the relationship between ethnic diversity, citizens' accountability behavior and government performance.


5.1 Mechanistic Model

It is difficult to propose a definition of mechanism that would be both informative and representative of its available variations in the literature. So, instead of trying to define the concept of mechanism, I simply go straight to an explication of how I use the concept in modelling my analysis. First, in using the concept of mechanism, I subscribe to the causal notion of mechanism, which states that a mechanism can be identified by the kind of effect or phenomenon it actually produces, that a mechanism is always a mechanism of something (Darden, 2006). However, there are some scholars, who overstretch this causal notion by characterizing mechanism as an entity that is sufficient to produce the outcome of interest (Mahoney, 2001). I do not subscribe to this notion of mechanism as a sufficient cause. Instead, I subscribe to the idea that a mechanism involves irreducibly stochastic elements, and as such can affect only the probability of a given effect.

Unlike scholars like Opp (2005), who conceive mechanism as just an intervening variable, I understand and use the word mechanism as an explanation that breaks up an explanation-seeking why-question into a series of smaller questions about causal process. In doing so, I argue that the idea of a mechanism as an intervening variable is somewhat true but misses an important point about the structural nature of a mechanism that is often disclosed when a mechanistic explanation opens the black box of a social phenomenon (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Thus, similar to Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) again, I understand and use a mechanistic explanation as, not just

an intervening variable, but as the type of explanation that renders the black box of social phenomena transparent by making visible how the participating entities and their properties, activities, and relations produce the effect of interest.

Figure 5 Coleman's Boat/Bathtub



Source: Hedström & Swedberg (1998)

When speaking of mechanism as a black-box-opener, James Coleman (1990) is one of the renowned authors, whose contribution particularly became prominent in the context of analytic sociology (Hedström & Ylikoski 2011) and later in political science (Beach & Pedersen 2013; Rohlfing 2012) for representing and analyzing micro-macro phenomena. The illustrations shown in Coleman's boat (see Figure 5) would clearly indicate that opening up the black box of a social phenomenon entails the opening up of micro-level realities that generate the macro-level observations that social scientists are often interested in. It involves: the identification of the *situational mechanisms*, by which social structures constrain individuals' action and in which cultural environments shape their desires and beliefs (arrow 1); the description of the *action-formation mechanisms*, according to which individuals choose how to act (arrow 2), and; the singling out of *transformational mechanisms*, by which individuals, through their actions and interactions, generate various intended and unintended macro-level outcomes (arrow 3)(Coleman, 1990; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010: 59). For Coleman, one can

therefore say that opening up the black box of a social phenomenon entails consistent reference to the actions of intentional individual agents.

My use of a mechanistic explanation in this research conforms to Coleman's theory because of its emphasis on the actions of intentional agents. But unlike Coleman's theory, which has been criticized on many grounds, especially regarding its affiliation to methodological individualism³³, the mechanical explanation I speak of here does not imply any commitment to the doctrine of methodological individualism but rather to the doctrine of structural individualism. While methodological individualism speaks of the action of intentional individual agents as mutually independent actions performed by atomistic individuals, the mechanical explanation of which I speak and use conceives the action of intentional individual agents in terms of their properties and social relationship with one another (Udéhn, 2001).

Finally, though my notion of mechanism speaks of the action of intentional individual agents in terms of their relationship with one another, it is important to also note that it does not necessarily conform to the doctrine of the rational choice theory because of that (Abbott 2007, Gross 2009). In fact, Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) has it that there is nothing in the idea of a mechanistic explanation that requires an explanation articulated in terms of rational choice theory. The single prerequisite that a mechanistic explanation must cite the actual cause of the phenomenon it attempts to explain makes it the diametric opposite of a rational choice explanation, which basically can be built on implausible psychological and sociological assumptions.

5.2 Applying the Mechanistic Explanation

Since mechanistic explanations dwell on the actions of rational human agents to explain a social phenomenon, studying the effect of ethnic diversity on governance performance in decentralized societies with a mechanistic framework, as I do, would entail laying emphasis on the roles of human agents and their connection with one another in the relationship spanning between diversity and government performance. Furthermore, since I study the effect of ethnic diversity on government performance also from the perspective of accountability, the requirement to focus on the actions of rational human agents, while using the mechanistic framework, would effectively translates into an emphasis on the citizens' action/behavior towards accountability. This is the major theoretical reason I have been using citizens' accountability behavior instead of accountability when referring to the mechanism spanning from ethnic heterogeneity to governance performance.

While emphasizing on the role of *citizens' behavior towards accountability* in the analysis of the link between ethnic diversity and governance performance, I find two theories very sacrosanct: Ekeh's theory of the two publics and the pragmatic theory of action. I shall discuss these two theories as well as the concept of accountability below. Thereafter, I shall further state my theoretical projections regarding the association between ethnic diversity and governance performance based on the two theories.

³³ For a detailed account of the merits and demerits of Coleman's theory, please confer Ylikoski (2016).

5.2.1 The Concept and Types of Accountability

In its broadest form, accountability is “associated with the process of being called ‘to account’ to some authority for one’s actions” (Mulgan 2000: 555). Kearns (2003) defines it as providing an account of one’s activities with respect to an agreed-upon performance standards or outcomes. Lindberg (2009) identifies more than a hundred subtypes and usages of accountability whereas Hyden (2010), Stepenhurst and O’Brien (2019), and BBC Media Action (2012) identify just a few types, including: bureaucratic accountability, political/representational accountability, citizen accountability, professional accountability, diagonal accountability, social accountability, and financial auditing.

According to Fukuyama (2011), accountability in the political context can be formal or informal. It is formal when the citizens (that is, the principals of accountability) possess a binding right to demand accountability from political agents, and; informal in the absence of such rights, when political accountability occurs from the benevolence of the agent of accountability (the political agents). In a democratic system, political accountability is always formal as the citizens are at least constitutionally (*de Jure*) empowered to hold government responsible for their actions and decisions³⁴. Besides being formal, political accountability in a democratic context can as well be classified as vertical or horizontal. It is vertical when the demand for accountability comes from the governed to the elected, and horizontal when the demand is intra-governmental, that is., between different branches of government (O’Donnell, 1999; Staphenhurst & O’Brien, 2009). A strong institution, which includes the judiciary, senate, national assembly, state houses of assembly or their equivalents in a parliamentary system, embodies the principals of horizontal accountability (Hyden, 2010).

Normatively speaking, the idea of accountability in a society comprises of both vertical and horizontal accountability. But, since my analytical framework focuses on the actions of intentional individuals (and not institutions) towards accountability, I shall focus my analysis on vertical accountability alone, and then later, during the quantitative analysis, control for the effect of horizontal accountability using *quality of institution*.

5.2.2 Pragmatist Theory of Action

Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) recommend that, when using the mechanistic framework for empirical analysis, an account of human action, based on the findings and theories of psychological and cognitive sciences, should be used in place of some preconceived ideas about human motivation or cognitive processing. One theory of psychological or cognitive science that fit this bill, in my opinion, is the so-called pragmatist theory of action. I explain it briefly below.

³⁴ As a matter of fact, it is important to highlight that the constitutional rights of the citizens, not only in terms of holding the government accountable, but also in general, vary from place to place. The existence of democracy does not actually guarantee them, but what it does is at least provide the citizens with the legal basis upon which the realization of the de facto rights can happen.

The concept of pragmatism has been used in so much diverse settings that it can cause one to question “whether the label serves any real purpose” anymore (Haack 2004, p.5). But despite this, there are certain philosophical principles shared by most pragmatists. One of such principles is that of the basic nature of human activity vis-à-vis the social and natural worlds (Joas, 1996). Rejecting the Cartesian view that thought and action, mind and body, are ontologically distinct, most pragmatists agree that humans are problem-solvers, and that the function of *thought* is to guide action in the service of solving practical problems arising in the course of life. The main way humans solve problems, the pragmatists held, is by enacting habits - those things learned through social experience or from previous individual efforts at problem-solving (Gronow, 2012). By habits, the pragmatists do not mean rote behavior though, but “acquired predisposition[s] to *ways* or modes of response” (Dewey 1922:42), of which actors are typically not conscious in the moment they are being used. Pragmatists also believe that it is only when preexisting habits fail to solve a problem at hand does an action-situation rise to the forefront of man’s consciousness as problematic, and that it is also only then that man’s innate capacity for creativity comes into play, as they dream up possible solutions to the problem that will later be integrated into their stocks of habit for use on subsequent occasions. In other words, pragmatists believe that humans alternate between habituality and creativity in an action-situation.

Blumer (1969), in formulating his program of symbolic interactionism, downplays this alternation between habituality and creativity upheld by other pragmatist, and correctly adds that meaning is also central to a pragmatist view of action. Blumer argues that problem-situations present themselves to humans through the lenses of the cultural environments in which they are immersed. Such environments give meaning to and help provide the content of the goals, orientations, identities, vocabularies of motive, and other understandings of the action-situation that humans come up with. Such environments also provide the basis for intersubjective judgments about the adequacy of problem-solutions. In other words, all human habits are enacted on the basis of culturally mediated interpretations of the situation humans face (Alexander, 1988).

Gross (2009) would insist that social mechanisms that affect collective human actions (in places like firms, states, or organizations) can be analyzed in pretty much the same way scholars like Blumer (1969) and Alexander (1988) have done. This means that collective actors in places like states, organizations, and even business firms also respond to problem-situations in habit-bound, culturally mediated ways. Most importantly, the contribution from Alexander (1988) and Gross (2009) implies that social mechanisms involving collective actors consist of chains or aggregations of such habit-bound and culturally mediated responses.

5.2.3 Ekeh’s Theory of the Two Publics

When speaking of context and how it helps shape things like the content of peoples’ goals, orientations, and identities, the theory of Ekeh (1975) readily comes to mind. In his *Theory of the Two Publics*, Ekeh (1975) argues that the experiences of colonialism have led to the emergence of a unique historical configuration in ethnically diverse colonized countries - the existence of two

publics, instead of one. Ekeh starts his theory by distinguishing between what he calls *the private realm* and *the public realm*, and by also claiming that a society's generalized morality informs both realms. Ekeh builds on the assumption that, in a normal society, what is considered morally wrong in the private realm is also considered morally wrong in the public realm, and that what is considered morally right in the private realm is also considered morally right in the public realm. He argues further that, for centuries, generalized Christian beliefs have provided a common moral fountain for the private and the public realms in western societies. However, when one moves from the Western society to ethnically diverse colonized societies across Africa and Asia, one observes the total extension of the Western conception of politics in terms of what occurs within a monolithic public realm, morally bound to the private realm, can only be made at both conceptual and theoretical perils.

For sure private realm exists in ethnically diverse colonized societies. But what is significant and different about them, in comparison to the private realm in Western societies, is that this private realm is differentially associated with its corresponding public realm in terms of morality. Put differently, Ekeh theorizes that, unlike in Western societies, two public realms with different types of moral linkages to the private realm exist in colonized ethnically diverse societies. At one level of the public realm is a public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual's public behavior. Ekeh calls this type of public realm *the primordial public*³⁵ because, not only is it closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities that nevertheless impinge on the public interest, it is also moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. At the other level of the public realm is another public realm that is historically associated with colonial administration and a state's popular politics. This public realm is based on civil structures: the military, the civil service, the police, etc. However, Ekeh claims that its chief characteristic is that it has, unlike the primordial public, no moral linkage with the private realm. Ekeh call this type of public realm *the civic public* and claims that it is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm as well as in the primordial public. He also claims that the most outstanding characteristic of modern politics in ethnically diverse colonized countries is that the same political actors, who operate in the primordial publics, also operates simultaneously in the civic publics, and that the dialectics between the two operations foment the unique political issues that have come to characterize politics in this kind of societies.

Ekeh explains that the emergence of the two publics in ethnically diverse colonized societies can be traced back to the ideological formulations intended to legitimate the rule of the colonial administrators, who were mostly drawn from the rising bourgeois class of Europe, as well as the

³⁵ The word *primordial* in this context is just a name used by Ekeh to distinguish between this kind of public from the civic public; it does not mean that Ekeh conceptualizes the ethnic publics in colonized countries as primordial in nature. Quite on the contrary, Ekeh do believe that ethnic publics in most colonized countries today are not fixed but rather are products of the ideologies and myths invented by the bourgeoisies in their attempt to consolidate parcels of influence in the newly independent nations.

takeover by the bourgeois class of the colonized lands, which was born out of the colonial experience itself.

Ideologies of Legitimizing the Rule of the Colonial Administrators

Ekeh (1975) contends that, through a number of colonial ideologies jointly wrought with Christian missionaries, the colonizers persuaded the colonized to accept European rule as beneficial. One of the most successful ideologies they invoked was placing a heavy emphasis on the so-called backwardness of the past of the colonized, and how blessed the colonized were to have received the opportunity to be saved from these evil past of theirs by the colonizers and missionaries (Khapoya, 2012; Crowder, 1962; Vaillant, 1990). Ancestor-worship was demonized, important city-state civilizations were defamed, whereas the achievement of colonialism was exaggerated (Ekeh 1975: 97; Kaoma, 2016). Another related ideology employed by the colonizers consisted of downgrading the contributions of the natives to history and the building of their societies. The colonial history was used to exaggerate the importance of the European intervention and emphasize that the contribution of the natives in building their societies derives its relevance only when viewed from the prism of the more important contribution of the European colonizers (Makuvaza, 2008). School children read in history books how their societies and their important landmarks and waterways were discovered by European explorers (Ekeh, 1975).

The colonial administrators also employed ideological distortions in the characterization of political life in pre-colonial societies by making the concept of tribe against tribe a common theme in colonial account of political strife among the colonized natives. Inter-tribal rather than intra-tribal strives were given the accent in the interpretation of political struggles in the colonized societies (Morrok, 1973; Ali, Fjeldstadz, Jiang, & Shifa, 2015). By carefully emphasizing on inter-tribal disharmonies in pre-colonial societies, European colonial administrators had two things to gain at once. First, the principle of *divide et impera* was effectively employed to create disharmony between groups in colonized societies. Secondly, the emphasis on inter-tribal disagreements gave the colonial administrators the image of benevolent interveners, who came to those societies because they wanted to establish order (Ekeh, 1975).

Another strategy employed by the colonizers to legitimate their acts was their emphasis on the benefits of colonization to the colonized (Khapoya, 2012). A similar tactic can be seen in their deliberate misrepresentation of the cost of colonization. While the cost of colonization was deemphasized to the government and taxpayers in the big cities of Paris, London, and Brussels (O'Brien, 1988; Fitzgerald, 1988), for instance, it was exaggerated in Lagos, Accra, and the entire colonies (Ekeh, 1975). Thus, the colonized were, overall, manipulated into believing that they were gaining a lot in the colonial arrangement, while giving too little for the massive benefits.

The colonizers also promoted their legitimacy through an ideological distinction between *the natives* and *the westernized natives*. The so-called westernized natives consisted of natives with western education. Most colonized people were sold the idea that the European was a man blessed

with much, who did nothing than acquired literary education to earn such a luxury. Therefore, to become a Western educated native in the colonial situation was perceived by local people as an avenue for escaping hard work, which was meant for only the illiterate natives (Ibid.).

Ideologies of Legitimizing the Takeover by the Bourgeois Class of the Colonized Lands

Ekeh (1975) argues that there was considerable variation in the spread of the effects of the ideologies legitimating the colonial rule on the natives. The Western educated natives, Ekeh claims, were the greater victims of these ideologies than the illiterate natives. The greater acceptance of the colonial ideologies among the educated natives led to the creation of *anti-colonial ideologies* and *post-colonial ideologies* by this bourgeois class of the colonized lands (Crossen, 2017). These ideologies were formed to achieve two interrelated goals: the anti-colonial ideologies were intended to serve as a weapon for replacing the colonial rulers, whereas post-colonial ideologies were intended to serve as mechanisms for legitimating their hold on their own people after replacing the European colonizers.

The expression *anti-colonialism* as was used by the bourgeois class in colonized lands did not actually mean opposition to the ideals and principles of western colonization (Ekeh, 1975). On the contrary, a great deal of their so-called *anti-colonialist act* was predicated on the manifest acceptance of the colonial ideals and principles, which they justified with the logic that conformity with colonial ideals indicated a level of achievement that earned them the right to leadership in their various countries. The educated natives, for instance, bent over backwards to only show that they are equal, but never the better, of the former colonizers in terms of education and administration. After their takeover from European colonizers, they made no effort at bettering the socio-economic conditions of their societies than what was obtainable in the capitals of the former colonizing nations. Their high standard was instead defined in terms of the standards obtainable in the former colonizing nations. By drawing comparison with former colonizers, the educated natives were simply emphasizing to the masses that they have attained the level of colonizers and, therefore, can replace them permanently. They did not think it was necessary to prove themselves better than the former colonizers before replacing them because the behaviors of the former colonizers represented the very best in the view of the colonized masses.

The struggle of the educated natives to dislodge and takeover power from the European colonizers (Khapoya, 2012) entailed the use of a destructive strategy: the sabotaging of the administrative efforts of the colonizers. In their effort to replace the colonizers, the educated natives encouraged workers to be late to work or go on strikes for flimsy reasons. The ordinary native who evaded tax was hailed by them as a hero; the native-laborer who beats up his European employer was given extensive coverage in the newspapers, and so on. With these practices, the common man was encouraged to shirk his duties to the state or at least define them as burdens and, at the same time, demand lots of rights from the same state (Ekeh, 1975). The irony of it was that the ordinary man took the principals involved in such activities quite seriously to the extent that the promise of independence raised the hope of the ordinary citizens in two ways. First, independence meant for

the common man an increase to benefits characterized by extravagance. Second, it meant for them the lowering of colonial burden, which, in the language of the common man, implied taxation. Such promises were generalized by the common man to mean that in the new nations, the rights of the citizens shall be abundant whereas their duties, meager. And they carried this generalization into the newly independent states.

So, Ekeh (1975) claims that the bourgeois class fought colonizers on the basis of the criteria introduced by colonizers themselves. However, the colonizers responded by introducing divisions between the bourgeois class and the traditional rulers, on one hand, and within the bourgeois class itself, on the other hand (Ali, Fjeldstadz, Jiang, & Shifa, 2015). As a result of the division introduced between the bourgeoisies and the traditional rulers, the former needed to legitimate their threatened status in the society as against the traditional rulers. To achieve legitimacy, the bourgeois class then promoted two sets of ideologies. The first ideology promoted *education as a guarantee for success*, rather than as *an avenue for success*, as it is the case in many human societies. Technically speaking, to say that education is an avenue for success is to invite the beneficiary of the educational system to earn their success by treating their educational achievement as a baseline for advancement, whereas to treat education as a guarantee for success is to invite the benefactor of the educational system to demand advancement once they have successfully achieved the requisite standard of education. Ekeh (1975) states that the ideology of education as a guarantee for success enabled the bourgeoisies to successfully legitimate their takeover of power against the traditional rulers, who were almost all literate at that point. The second ideology used by the bourgeois class was the ethnic ideology. Thus, while successfully demoting tradition as a source of legitimacy and insisting that western education (which they possessed) provides legitimacy instead, the bourgeois class divided the societies into their domains of influence along ethnic lines and, at the same time, sidelined the traditional rulers. Ekeh argues that this outcome greatly helped in the emergence of today's primordial publics in the former colonies³⁶.

5.2.4 Hypotheses on the Relationship Between Ethnic Diversity, Citizens' Accountability Behavior, and Governance Performance

I highlighted, in Section 5.2.3, Ekeh's proposition that the ideologies of legitimation for colonialism and post-colonial successions gave birth to the existence of the two publics in ethnically diverse colonized lands. I have also highlighted his claim that the dialectics between these two publics (the primordial and the civic public publics) were responsible for the issues attendant to politics in colonized countries today. This linkage between the dialectics of the two publics and issues attendant to modern politics in the colonized countries is pivotal for the formulation of my theoretical hypotheses. I shall discuss this later as I develop my argument. For

³⁶ Please confer Chapter 4, on the historicity of modern-day ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa.

now, I would first like to draw attention to the adaptations I made to Ekeh's theory in the process of developing my theoretical projections.

In theorizing the link between the dialectics of the two publics and the problems of modern politics in the former colonies, Ekeh speaks of ethnic diversity and colonialism, implying that these two variables or conditions are necessary for his argument. This can be demonstrated, for instance, by the fact that the emergence of the two publics (which connects colonialism to the present political conditions in the ex-colonies in Ekeh's theory) is technically inconceivable without the existence of multiple ethnicities in the societies he studied; that is, that the existence of the two publics, to which Ekeh attributes modern political conditions in colonized countries, cannot happen unless a society has at least two different ethnic groups. In applying Ekeh's theory, I retain the link he established between the dialectics of the two publics and modern political climate in the ex-colonies, but do not concentrate on both ethnic diversity and colonialism like Ekeh did. Because I am mainly interested in ethnic diversity in this research, I focus solely on ethnic diversity instead, and then control for the role of colonialism in Ekeh's entire theoretical build-up by using colonialism as a situational variable. By adapting Ekeh's theory in this way, I am able to use ethnic diversity as an independent variable, while employing the rest of his argument.

With colonialism as a situational variable and ethnic diversity as the focus-variable, I reframe Ekeh's stipulations as follows: in the context of postcolonialism, ethnic diversity plays a significant role in the emergence of problematic politics like tribalism, corruption, etc., in colonized countries. Using this reframed-argument, I now develop my argument further by employing the pragmatic theory of action. If ethnic diversity, in the context of postcolonialism, is responsible for the emergence of problematic political situations in colonized countries, I argue that these problematic situations confront the citizens of these countries in their daily transactions and relations with one another and the state. In line with the stipulations of the pragmatic theory of action, that all human habits are enacted on the basis of socially mediated interpretations of situations faced by humans (Alexander, 1988), it is my contention that, in response to their daily encounter with tribalism, corruption, etc., in their country, the citizens will develop, irrespective of the presence of decentralization and democracy in their societies, a habitual parasitic mentality with which they go about their relations with the state. This mentality consists of the logic "if everyone exploits the state for their private gain and that of their ethnic group, then, I will definitely join", and shapes in turn the citizens' accountability behavior. I call this habitual mentality state-exploiting mentality (SEM) and define it as a mentality that justifies the material exploitation of the state as a public realm belonging to all and to none at the same time, and whose existence is meant for the exploitation of the constituting ethnicities. It is important to reiterate that, since SEM occurs irrespective of democracy and decentralization, I also include democracy and decentralization as the background conditions for my theory.

Now, factoring in the pursuit of exclusive group interests, which is often the case in pluralistic societies, it is only logical to claim that ethnic groups sustain SEM by encouraging and, sometimes, pressurizing their members to steal more from the state for the common interest of the group. Since ethnicities sustain SEM in an attempt to secure their interests, it further makes sense to argue that

SEM will increase as the number of ethnic groups existing in a society also increases. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: In colonized, democratically decentralized countries, ethnic diversity positively correlates with state-exploiting mentality (SEM)

SEM, in line with Coleman's concept of mechanistic explanation, constitutes *the action-formation mechanism*, which in turn affects *the transformational mechanism* or citizens' action, in my basic theoretical setup. As SEM, as a result of its nature, is more likely to wire nonchalant attitude into the citizens' response to state affairs, I equally expect that a nonchalant action³⁷ towards accountability, which I call *negative accountability behavior*, will emerge as the transformational mechanism. Not only that, I also expect that this nonchalant behavior emerging from SEM will accordingly increase as SEM also increases:

Hypothesis 2: In colonized, democratically decentralized countries, state-exploiting mentality (SEM) correlates positively with negative accountability behavior.


In line with Coleman's concept still, I argue that the transformational mechanism (negative accountability behavior) affects the dependent variable (governance performance), which also happens to exist at the macro-level. To theorize the relationship between negative accountability behavior and governance performance, I shall depend on abundant empirical evidence that connect accountability to governance performance. I have already highlighted the content of those evidence in Section 3.3.6.2. However, for the sake of focus, I recap that those evidence in Chapter 3 show a direct positive link between accountability and governance performance. The implication of this is that governance outcome should improve when citizens actually hold their representatives accountable. But since I refer to negative accountability behavior in this context, I contend that the outcome of governance will degenerate as negative accountability behavior increases. Thus, I hypothesize:

³⁷ The notion of *action*, as I use it here, is neither synonymous with the concepts of *movement* (McGann, 2007) nor *instinct* (Engel et al., 2013). I use this concept in the augmented sense of 'intentional action', which implies "that actions (i) are driven by goals and that they can reach these goals or fail to do so; (ii) often involve some degree of volitional control; (iii) require planning and decisions among alternatives; (iv) involve prediction or anticipation of an intended outcome; (v) are often, albeit not always, associated with a sense of agency, that is, the agent's conscious awareness of carrying out the particular action and of its goals" (Engel et al., 2013: 203).

Hypothesis 3: In colonized, democratically decentralized countries, governance performance negatively correlates with negative accountability behavior.

Figure 6 illustrates this set of relationships (from ethnic diversity through SEM and NAB to governance performance) in the form of a Coleman's boat diagrammatically. I shall test the ensuing hypotheses subsequently in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 6 The Link Between Ethnic Diversity, SEM, NAB, and Governance Performance



Source: Adapted from Coleman (1990).

Having outlined my theoretical arguments here, I now turn to the empirical assessment of my core question of interest in the next chapter: Why does variation in governance performance exist in decentralized countries? Or, differently put, why does decentralization increase the performance of governance more significantly in some countries than in others? The empirical results will allow the benchmarking of my theoretical claims in this chapter against empirical realities from sub-Saharan Africa.

6.0 The Relationship Between Ethnic Diversity and Governance Performance in sub-Saharan Africa: An Empirical Assessment

This chapter is all about shedding light on whether and how ethnic diversity is associated with the outcome of decentralized governance in sub-Saharan Africa, in the context of democracy and postcolonialism. That is to say, the chapter focuses on testing, with the help of empirical facts, whether it really makes a difference (in terms of governance outcome) when countries in the region, which are democratized, decentralized, and colonized, are also characterized with different degrees of ethnic diversity, and on finding out the mechanism(s) behind the difference, if it does occur.

The chapter unfolds as follows: first, I present my research design by describing the research techniques in detail (Section 6.1). Second, the theoretical hypotheses from Chapter 5 call for the operationalization of seven key variables, namely: ethnic diversity, state-exploiting mentality (SEM), negative accountability behavior (NAB), governance performance, decentralization, democracy, and postcolonialism. Thus, I dedicate myself to this task in this chapter as well. Since governance performance, state-exploiting mentality (SEM), and negative accountability behavior (NAB) together with ethnic diversity, represent the core variables I work with, I also operationalize the control variables for governance performance, SEM and NAB. The choices I made in the operationalization of both the core and control variables are elaborated below in Sections 6.1.1 to 6.1.5. Third, I present a detailed description of the processes I used in preparing one of the datasets - Afrobarometer Round 6 - for the analyses (Section 6.2). Finally, with the hypotheses I proposed in Sections 5.2.2 as my reference points, I run a mediational analysis to estimate the direct and indirect effects of ethnic diversity on governance performance. I present the core results of my analyses in Section 6.3 and validate them with a number of statistical tests in Section 6.4.

6.1 Research Design and Data

As my theoretical hypothesis in Chapter 5 indicate, I am interested in examining the association between ethnic diversity and governance performance in sub-Saharan African states characterized by democracy, decentralization, and postcolonialism. From the way I structured the hypotheses, it is necessary to check for the unmediated effect being directly transmitted from ethnic diversity to the performance of governance, as well as the indirect effects³⁸ being transmitted from ethnic diversity through state exploiting mentality (SEM) and negative accountability behaviors (NAB) to governance performance. Checking the direct relationship between ethnic diversity and governance performance is also a necessary foundation for checking the mediated effect, which I

³⁸ I do not employ *effects* in this dissertation as all-exhaustive *explanadas*. When I refer to 'mediated effect' and 'direct effect', I do so rather in the parlance of mediational analysis literature, where the term *effect* does not connote a strict sense of causality but some kind of statistical association between two or more variables. Since, it is basic knowledge that statistical methods cannot determine causal relationship, and I use mediational analysis, which is a statistical method, as my analytical method, there is no way I can even attempt to lay claim on causality.

achieve by conducting a mediational analysis using Zellner's (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method as well as Sobel's Product of Coefficients Approach. As the name suggests, Sobel's Product of Coefficients Approach uses the path coefficients (the beta weights) from linear models to determine the indirect effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable. In examining the relationship between ethnic diversity, SEM, NAB, and governance performance, I rely on an effect-focused approach (Agler & De Boeck, 2017) to test only the relationships that are supported by existing theories.

Agler and De Boeck (2017) explain that an effect-focused approach, in which one focuses on testing the effects of interests, can be employed in a mediational analysis, when the use of a global model that can test all possible relationships among the variables is less important. Here in my context the use of a global model is made less important or even irrelevant for lack of corresponding theoretical underpinnings with which to support other possible connections (which I have not considered in my analysis) that might exist among the variables. For instance, I did not toy with the idea of testing an effect being transmitted from ethnic diversity through NAB to governance performance (without going through SEM), as it is completely impossible to imagine a direct connection between ethnic diversity and people's accountability behavior (human actions) in real life without some sort of backing from a psychological theory (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). Similarly, it is also unrealistic to start looking for a connection running from ethnic diversity to SEM and from SEM directly to governance performance (without going through NAB), as the only connection there could exist between SEM and governance performance can only stem from the action or inaction of human actors possessing this mentality, SEM, and not from SEM itself.

So, for the regression models yielding the coefficients I require, I fit and readapt the following model specification accordingly:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{INDVAR}_i + \text{CAPVAR}_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where y_i represents the dependent variable in country i , INDVAR_i is a measure of the independent variable in country i , CAPVAR_i is a vector of ethnic diversity and other variables lying on the causal path between ethnic diversity and y_i , and X_i denotes a vector of variables controlling for potentially confounding variables of y_i . The last part of the model ε_i is the random error term, whereas the primary coefficient of interest β_1 captures the association between the dependent and independent variables in each of the regression analyses.

6.1.1 Main Dependent Variable: Governance Performance

To measure governance performance, I draw on a quantitative dataset on the state of governance in Africa – the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) – compiled by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF). Established in 2007, the IIAG have been providing an annual assessment of the quality of governance in 54 African countries since over 10 years. Compiled by combining over 100 variables from more than 30 independent African and global institutions, the IIAG is the most comprehensive collection of data on African governance, providing specific scores and trends at African continental, regional, and national level, on a whole spectrum of thematic governance dimensions, from security to justice to rights and economic opportunity to health. The IIAG also provides a framework and dashboard for assessing the delivery of public goods and services and public policy outcomes in Africa. Since it is based on a definition of governance that focuses on the outcome and output of government policy, the framework of the IIAG is made up of four categories of variables, namely: Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, and Human Development.³⁹

As citizens are the recipients of public leadership and governance, the assessment of governance performance used in composing the IIAG is rooted on results of governance for citizens and not on official and expert assessment data alone. It is on this note that the IIAG represents a perfect fit for the assessment of governance performance in my analysis, which also heavily reliant on data from Afrobarometer’s public attitude survey. In fact, since the IIAG's inception, MIF (the institution that compiles the IIAG) has been working with and supporting Afrobarometer, the leading pan-African research institution conducting public attitude surveys on the continent. The latest IIAG was launched in 2020. However, in order to ensure temporal conformity between the IIAG and the dataset from afro-barometer, I use the 2016⁴⁰ version of the IIAG to estimate performance of governance in this research.

Control Variables: Governance Performance

In my regression model that uses governance performance as the dependent variable, I plug in horizontal accountability, country size, and economic development as alternative predictors of government performance (Bueno de Mesquita & Root, 2000; Demsetz, 1967; North, 1981; La Porta et al., 1999). I specifically control for horizontal accountability because my argument focuses only on citizen’s negative behavior towards accountability as a determinant of governance performance.

³⁹ Please confer the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s website for a detailed account of how the IIAG is being computed: <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag>.

⁴⁰ In order to ensure temporal conformity with the variables derived from the Afrobarometer, I measure other analysis variables using their 2016 versions. This decision was necessitated by the fact that one of the major contribution of this dissertation centers on the mediated effect of ethnic diversity on government performance, which makes the roles of NAB, and SEM in this research a very important one. However, at the time when this analysis was started, the most recent dataset with which one can measure NAB and SEM in sub-Saharan Africa is contained in the 2016 round of the Afrobarometer survey.

Now, since the idea of accountability comprises of both vertical and horizontal accountability, and citizens' action represents just vertical accountability, horizontal accountability would constitute the most potent covariate of governance performance capable of jeopardizing the reliability of my result (Signé & Korha, 2016).

To control for horizontal accountability, I use institution quality as a proxy. Given that governance performance also depends on the quality of state agencies, which are legally enabled and empowered and factually willing and able to take actions, spanning from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment, in relation to unlawful actions or omissions of other state agents or agencies (O'Donnell 1999, Escorba-Lennon, 2013), I expect quality of institution to be positively associated with the performance of governance. In the same way, because rich countries can afford to provide the good and services used in computing the IAG to their citizens better than poor countries (Todaro & Smith, 2011; Treisman, 2002), I also expect economic development, measured in terms of gross national income per capita (henceforth GNI), to positively affect the performance of governance.

Country size can also affect the output of governance. Regarding the relationship between country size and governance performance, I expect the size of country to negatively affect its IAG score, as a large population can adversely affect the extent a country can provide its citizens with some composite factors of the index such as education, healthcare, and infrastructures. Besides affecting a government's capacity to provide for all its citizens, Bueno de Mesquita and Root (2000) also show that a country's small size renders corruption and patronage less attractive, as politicians would end up including a larger part of the country in their network should they engage in patronage. This finding implies that a large country size can affect a country's performance as well by encouraging political corruption and patronage.

To measure institution quality, country size, and economic development, I draw from *the Libertad y Progreso's* 2016 Institutional Quality Index, World Population Review' report from 2016, and World Banks' World Development Indicators, respectively.

6.1.2 Main Independent Variable: Ethnic Diversity

Ethnic diversity constitutes my main independent variable of interest. Until the turn of the 21st century, nearly all studies investigating the impact of ethnic heterogeneity have followed Easterly and Levine (1998) in employing a measure of ethnic fractionalization called Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF). This was probably because of the popularity and influence of moderate constructivism in conceptualizing ethnicity, and the fact that fractionalization indexes are generally more suitable for the measurement of ethnicity conceived in moderate constructivist terms (Brown & Langer, 2012).

But the big concern is that ELF itself has problems with its measurement indices (Chandra 2001; Green, 2004; Laitin & Posner, 2001; Posner, 2004) which renders it inappropriate for testing

hypotheses involving a measure of ethnic diversity (Posner, 2004). Laitin and Posner (2001) point out, for instance, that the ELF is actually predominantly based on linguistic categories, and that it therefore misses multiple dimensions of ethnic identity in all countries it covers. Similarly, Posner (2004) also argues that the ELF is not only out of date, and thus unrepresentative both of demographic changes over the past four decades and the realignment of country boundaries over the same period, but also suffers from a number of basic coding inaccuracies. Because of this deficiency, scholars have widely been applying an alternative index, the Ethnic Fractionalization Index from Alesina et al's (2003), instead as a measure of ethnic heterogeneity. I follow in that tradition in this research.

Alesina et al's Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI) combines language variable with information about physical characteristics such as skin color to determine the level of ethnic diversity in 190 countries. More information on the EFI is presented in Alesina et al. (2003). However, it may be important to also state here that the EFI classifies groups as different based on data from the Encyclopedia Britannica (2000), CIA World Factbook (2000), Levinson (1998), and Minority Rights Group International (1997), which covers about 650 different ethnic groups all together.

6.1.3 Decentralization, Democracy, and Postcolonialism

The context of my analysis is sub-Saharan Africa, but not all of it. Based on the background conditions (that is, the situational mechanisms) incorporated into the formation of my hypotheses, I included only sub-Saharan African countries that are characterized by decentralization, democracy, and postcolonialism in my analysis. What follows thereafter explains the standards I employed in selecting the countries.

Decentralization

To determine a decentralized country, I rely on Ndegwa (2002), who created a composite index for ranking overall decentralization status of countries in Africa on a scale of 0 to 4, taking into account structural and performance factors. Ndegwa's index consisted of twelve distinct indicators used in the analysis of components of decentralization. In line with the way I conceptualized decentralization in Section 3.1, Ndegwa measures decentralization to reflect three defining aspects: political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization. The index for political decentralization is computed from the mean of the following indicators: the number of elected sub-national tiers, the score for the existence of direct elections for local governments, and the score for turnout and fairness of such elections. Administrative decentralization is tracked in the index using the mean of three indicators, namely; the clarity of roles for national and local governments provided by the law, the clarity of where the actual responsibility for service delivery resided, and the clarity of where the responsibility for (hiring and firing) civil servants resided. Finally, Ndegwa measured fiscal decentralization using two indicators: the score given for the arrangements for fiscal transfers

from the central government to localities, and; the score corresponding to the proportion (offered as a range) of public expenditure controlled by the localities. At the end, a country's overall index of decentralization is computed by converting its overall scores on the indicators of political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization to a scale of 0 to 4, with 0 indicating the lowest level of decentralization and 4 the highest possible level.

Considering that sub-Saharan Africa has a moderate degree of decentralization in general, I include only countries with a composite index of 0.8 and above as decentralized and drop the rest. Among the countries I drop are also countries for which data on decentralization is not complete.

Democracy

To determine countries that are democratic in sub-Saharan Africa, I use Center for Systematic Peace's Polity Score Index (PSI) as a yardstick. The POLITY 4 score is computed by subtracting the score for a country's autocracy from the score for its democracy, with the resulting unified polity scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The original theory upon which the polity index is grounded posits that autocratic and democratic authority are distinct patterns of authority, elements of which may co-exist in any particular regime context. The inclusion of this variable in the data series should not be misconstrued as an acceptance of the counter-proposal that autocracy and democracy are alternatives or opposites in a unified authority spectrum, even though elements of this perspective may be implied in the original theory.

Though the POLITY 4 index provides a convenient avenue for examining general regime effects in scientific analyses, there is a caveat about the middle of the implied polity spectrum. In using the polity 4 dataset, researchers should note that the middle of the implied POLITY spectrum is somewhat muddled in terms of the original theory, masking various combinations of DEMOC and AUTOC scores with the same POLITY score. As a result, investigations involving hypotheses of varying effects of democracy and/or autocracy should employ the original Polity scheme and test DEMOC and AUTOC separately (Marshall & Gurr, 2020).

Considering that many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are still evolving in terms of democracy, I include only the countries with the polity scores above 1.0 in the analysis.

Postcolonialism

Around the world, a handful of countries were not subjected to Western colonization. Outside Africa, these countries include: Turkey, Iran, China, and Japan (Olsson, 2009). In Africa, they include two countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia and Liberia (Ertan et al., 2016). The rest of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa were colonized and are therefore included in my analysis.

Generally speaking, countries avoided colonization for a number of reasons like: having longer histories or higher levels of development prior to 1500, the long navigation distance from northwestern Europe to the country, and long overland distance for landlocked countries or countries that required a land passage to reach (Ertan, 2016). In the case of Ethiopia and Liberia, however, Bertocchi and Canova (2002) argue that their location, economic viability, and unity played an important role in helping them avoid colonization. Italy actually did attempt to invade Ethiopia, but their defeat in the ensuing battle at Adwa with Ethiopia led to an official recognition of the country as an independent state in 1896. Italian would later achieve a brief occupation of the country during the Second World War between 1936 and 1941. As Italy never established a colonial control over Ethiopia in this period, that occupation is generally not considered colonization (Olsson, 2009; Ertan et al., 2016). The occupation started as a result of Benito Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia on Oct. 3, 1935, in order to rebuild his nation's (Italy's) prestige that was lost in the Battle of Adwa. Italy succeeded in annexing Ethiopia on May 9, 1936. On June 1 of that same year, the country was merged with Eritrea and Italian Somalia to form *Africa Orientale Italiana* (AOI or Italian East Africa). The occupation eventually came to an end following the restoration of Haile Selassie to the Ethiopian throne on the 5th of May 1941 (Olsson, 2009).

Liberia's uncolonized status is much more debatable than that of Ethiopia, as the country was founded by Americans in 1821 and remained under American control for over 17 years before achieving partial independence through the declaration of a commonwealth on April 4, 1839. From the middle of 1400s through the late 17th century, Portuguese, Dutch, and British traders had maintained lucrative trading posts in the region that became known as the "Grain Coast" at that time because of its abundance of malagueta pepper grains. However, The American Society for Colonization of Free People of Color of the United States (known simply as the American Colonization Society, ACS) eventually created the *Cape Mesurado* Colony on the Grain Coast on Dec. 15, 1821, as a place to send its free Black residents. This was further expanded into the Colony of Liberia on Aug. 15, 1824. By the 1840s, the colony had become a financial burden on the ACS and the U.S. government. And, because it was neither a sovereign state nor a recognized colony of a sovereign state, the colony faced political threats from Britain at that time, prompting an ACS order to Liberians to declare independence on July 26, 1847 (Buddy-Evans, 2020). Thus, the fact remains that, despite being founded by the United States and remaining under the control of the US for more than 17 years, many scholars maintain the view (and I subscribe to it) that Liberia was never colonized after gaining its full independence (Ertan et al., 2016; Olsson, 2009).

6.1.4 State-Exploiting Mentality and Negative Accountability Behavior

In my hypotheses, SEM and NAB are positioned as mechanisms by which the effect ethnicity transferred on governance performance. As a result of this, both variables serve as the independent variables of my interest in the second and third regression models.

To measure SEM and NAB, I use survey items drawn from the Round 6 of the Afrobarometer. I operationalize SEM with one of its (if not the only) obvious manifestation, civic normlessness, and measure it with the following items: ‘In the past 12 months have you had contact with a public school? *[If yes]* How easy or difficult was it to obtain the services you needed from teachers or school officials?’ (Q55A); ‘And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a teacher or school official in order to get the services you needed from the schools?’ (Q55B); ‘In the past 12 months have you had contact with a public clinic or hospital? *[If yes]* How easy or difficult was it to obtain the medical care you needed?’ (Q55C); ‘And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a health worker or clinic or hospital staff in order to get the medical care you needed?’ (Q55D); ‘In the past 12 months have you tried to get an identity document like a birth certificate, driver’s license, passport or voter’s card, or a permit, from government? *[If yes]* How easy or difficult was it to obtain the document you needed?’ (Q55E); ‘And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a government official in order to get the document you needed?’ (Q55F); ‘In the past 12 months have you tried to get water, sanitation or electric services from government? *[If yes]* How easy or difficult was it to obtain the document you needed?’ (Q55G); ‘And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a government official in order to get the document you needed?’ (Q55H); ‘In the past 12 months have you requested assistance from the police? *[If yes]* How easy or difficult was it to obtain the assistance you needed?’ (Q55I); ‘And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a police officer in order to get the assistance you needed, or to avoid a problem like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest?’ (Q55J); ‘In the past 12 months have you had contact with the courts? *[If yes]* How easy or difficult was it to obtain the assistance you needed from the courts?’ (Q55K) and; ‘In the past 12 months have you had contact with the courts? And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a judge or court official in order to get the assistance you needed from the courts?’ (Q55L). I then averaged the response scales from these questions to create a new scale for SEM

To assess NAB, I use the following survey items: ‘Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Joined others in your community to request action from government’ (Q27A); ‘Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Contacted the media, like calling a radio program or writing a letter to a newspaper’ (Q27B); ‘Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are dissatisfied

with government performance. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Contacted a government official to ask for help or make a complaint' (Q27C) and 'Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Participated in a demonstration or protest march' (Q27E). In Afrobarometer Round 6, these items are framed in such a way that they measure the opposite of NAB, that is, positive accountability behaviors, with the maximum valid value assigned to the response indicating the most extreme opposite of NAB. To still measure NAB with these items, therefore, the order of the values assigned to the valid responses in the items is reversed, and then averaged to create a scale.

6.1.5 Predictors of State-Exploiting Mentality and Negative Accountability Behavior as Outcome Variables

Because SEM and NAB also serve as outcome variables in first and second regression models, I control for the effect of their alternative predictors, by including these predictors in the corresponding regression models. In what follows, I discuss these predictors as well as their expected relationship with SEM and NAB in detail.

6.1.5.1 Predictors: State-Exploiting Mentality (SEM)

The degree of civic normlessness (used for estimating SEM) reported by a respondent is potentially subject to the influence of their affiliation to the ethnicity of the person at the apex of a country's political leadership. Ethnic solidarity logic (Tajfel, 1974; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) suggests that a respondent, who is from the same ethnic group with a country's highest political leadership, is likely to report a lesser degree of civic normlessness, as a way of showing solidarity to their co-ethnic. Following this prompting, I expect co-ethnicity with a country's leadership to be negatively associated with reported civic normlessness. Similarly, support for the ruling political party in a country can impact on reported civic normlessness. A respondent who supports the party of their head-of-state would want to identify with this political party by underreporting the extent of civic normlessness in their country at that time. So, I do expect support for the head-of-state's political party to be negatively associated with reported civic normlessness as well. To account for the effect of co-ethnicity, data are collected - from a combination of books and diverse online sources - on the ethnicity of all the head-of-states of the studied countries at the time Afrobarometer Round 6 dataset was collected (Hughes, 2010; Koter, 2016; Mckenna A. , 2018; Wikipedia, 2019; Pham, 2015; Mckenna A. , 2017; Nthakoana Says, 2015; Johnson, 2014; Wikipedia , 2019; Wikipedia, 2019; EPR Atlas, 2018; Tarawalie, 2012; Al Jazeera and agencies, 2010; Swantz, 2016; Jones, 2009; Fabricius, 2016; South Africa History Online, 2017). Then, using the question 'Let us get back to talking about you. What is

your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?’ (Q87) from the Afrobarometer dataset, a new variable, ‘preseth’, is created by recoding all responses corresponding to the ethnicity of the head-of-state of a correspondent at that time as 1 and the responses not corresponding to them as 0. In the same way, I check for the effect of respondents’ membership in the president’s political party by first determining the ruling political parties in the studied countries at the time Afrobarometer Round 6 was collected. Then, after that, using the question ‘Which party is that?’(Q90B) (referring to the political party which the respondent feels close to) in the dataset, ‘presparty’ is created by recoding political parties tallying with those of the head-of-states as 1 and those inconsistent with those of the head-of-states as 0. Data for determining the ruling political parties at the time of collecting Afrobarometer Round 6 is culled from online sources as well (Topona, 2019; Ngatane, 2019; Wikipedia , 2018; Ross, 2019; refworld, 2019; Mckenna A. , 2017; Radebe, 2019; Wikipedia , 2019; Ahmed, 2016; Lusa, 2019; Saunders, 2018; Eldridge, 2019; Africa confidential, 2012; Mules, 2018; Collord, 2018; Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica , 2019; Mwila, 2017; Wikipedia, 2019).

Gender represents another factor that could affect the degree of normlessness reported by respondents (Finifter, 1970). Those who are politically less engaged are likely to experience lesser normlessness in their society than those who are politically more engaged. Since women are generally less privileged in terms of the opportunities to engage more in politics than men in many societies, women are likely to report less normlessness than men. This is even more so in sub-Saharan Africa, where the tradition of entrusting women with little or no responsibilities in the public sphere is still strong. So, I expect womanhood to be negatively associated with the degree of reported civic normlessness in the studied countries. To measure the effect of gender, I use the item ‘Respondent’s gender’ (Q101) from Afrobarometer Round 6. Unfortunately, item ‘Respondent’s gender’ is coded Female = 2 and Male = 1 in the dataset, which will make it difficult to interpret the regression coefficients at the end. For a clear interpretation, therefore, conventional empirical research usually codes gender Male = 1 and Female = 0, which can be reversed depending on the researcher’s interest. Since I check for the effect of being female in this instance, I reverse the coding to Female = 1, and Male = 0, and name the resulting new variable ‘gender’.

Literacy is another predictor of reported civic normlessness (Finifter, 1970). UNESCO defines it as “the ability to use language, numbers, images, computers, and other basic means to understand, communicate, gain useful knowledge, solve mathematical problems and use the dominant symbol of a culture” (UNESCO, 2006). The implication of this definition is that, through their additional ability to use the media, the computer, and the Internet, for example, literate people, unlike illiterates, encounter civic normlessness not only through personal encounter but also through other means (Marien et al., 2010). This is even more so nowadays when political parties, civil society organizations, and social movements all make their own expertise and educational material available to the citizens for free (Morse, 1993). Since educated people encounter more civic normlessness than the illiterate, they are likely to report more of it in their survey responses than the illiterates. Because of this, I expect a positive relationship between literacy and reported civic

normlessness. To measure literacy, a new variable, ‘literacy’ is created from the survey item ‘Education condensed’ (EDUC_COND) by recoding primary education and above as 1 and other responses 0.

6.1.5.2 Predictors: Negative Accountability Behavior (NAB)

Apathy toward politics, socioeconomic status, and the extent of political operation in a country can affect the degree of NAB reported by a respondent. Political apathy is defined by Fox (2015) as a lack of a desire, or motive, to take an interest in politics. In this sense, political apathy is an attitudinal orientation against politics, which should not be confused with the concept of lack of political participation. When people naturally possess an attitudinal orientation against politics, they are likely to exhibit negative accountability behaviors too. Hence, I expect a positive relationship between political apathy and negative accountability behavior. Data on political apathy is collected using a scale comprising of items ‘How interested would you say you are in public affairs?’ (Q13) and ‘When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters’ (Q14) from Afrobarometer Round 6 dataset. Because these items are originally structured to measure interest in politics, instead of political apathy, their value order are reversed accordingly in order to measure political apathy and then used in creating a scale for apathy towards politics.

Socioeconomic status is a powerful predictor of negative behavior toward government accountability as well because the poor, in their struggle for survival, are less likely to participate in the behaviors that encourage government accountability. Since previous studies (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003; Ploubidis et al., 2014) associate higher level of education to higher economic status, I therefore use level of educational attainment as a proxy for socioeconomic status, expecting that a respondent with a lower level of education will exhibit a higher degree of NAB than a respondent with a higher level of education. I determine levels of education using the item ‘Education condensed’ (EDUC_COND) in the dataset.⁴¹ In doing this, I distinguish between literacy and education, following the absolute education model (Nie & Stehlik-Barry, 1996) and the relative education model (Campbell, 2009; Tenn, 2005; Persson, 2011), which maintain that educated individuals possess greater level of personal development than those who are just literate.

Finally, besides political apathy and socioeconomic status, other possible predictors of NAB include age and employment in a pro-governance NGO or civil society. Generally, the

⁴¹ I have previously employed the item ‘Education condensed’ in measuring literacy by converting the responses to the question into binary scores, 0 and 1. In this case however, I use the same item to determine level of education by retaining all the original responses and values originally assigned to the question. Though I measure both variables with the same item, they nevertheless refer to two different concepts (literacy and education) which have different implications for my analysis: while I use the variable ‘literacy’ to basically classify the respondents into two categories (literate and illiterate), I use the proxy ‘level of education’ to grade those who are literate among the respondents into different levels of all-round development of a human personality, which corresponds with socioeconomic status (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003; Ploubidis et al., 2014).

consciousness of one's capability to influence one's political system increases with age (Sulitzeanu-Kenan & Halperin, 2013). At the same time, working for an NGO also presumes the existence of the belief that governance outcome can be influenced by the citizens. Since a 'positive accountability behavior' is not possible without the belief that one's actions can produce a decisive effect, I expect that older individuals and those who are under the employment of NGOs and civil society organizations are likely to possess greater feeling of internal political efficacy necessary to propel someone to a 'positive accountability behavior'. Therefore, these group people have the propensity to report lesser NAB in their respective countries. Age is estimated with item 'Age condensed' (AGE_COND). To account for employment in an NGO or civil society, a new dummy variable 'ngo_civilso' is created using item 'Do you work for yourself, for someone else in the private sector or non-governmental sector, or for government' (Q96B). In the creation of this new variable, only the response 'Non-governmental organizations or civil society sector' in item Q96B is recoded 1. The rest of the responses are recoded 0.

Having operationalized the seven key variables of my analyses above, I move on to present in the next section the process I took to prepare the data I culled from Afrobarometer Round 6 for the purpose of my analyses. This step is sacrosanct as it helps to remove extraneous data, fill in missing values, and most importantly, allow for efficient analyses.

6.2 Data Preparation and Screening

Non-substantive responses, that is, the type of response researchers do not wish to record, are pervasive in survey research (Dillman et al., 2002; Little & Rubin, 2002), and Afrobarometer Round 6 is no exception to this. Precisely, the information I require from Afrobarometer Round 6 contains a number of standard non-substantive responses such as 'Don't know' and 'Refused to answer'. In addition to these, it also contains other types of responses I personally consider non-substantive with regards to the research objective. These other types include: 'No contact', 'Related to age', 'Related to class', 'Related to gender', 'Related to occupation', 'Related to political partisan affiliation', 'Related to race', 'Related to regional origin', 'Related to religion', 'Other', 'National identity only', and 'Doesn't think of myself in those terms'.

In handling both types of non-substantive responses, the items containing them are individually considered, using context and the information being aimed at as a yardstick. In situations where context and the objective of the question show that a non-substantive response implies any of the valid responses provided for a question, the non-substantive response is recoded with the value of that corresponding valid response. However, where the implication of a non-substantive response is not clear or did not fit into the mold of any of the provided valid answers, the non-substantive response is recoded as a missing value, to be subsequently assessed with an adequate technique for handling missing values (Little & Rubin, 2002).

To put the above criteria in context, let us first consider non-substantive responses in ‘preseth’ and ‘presparty’. Both variables contain non-substantive responses transferred to them from the items ‘Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?’ and ‘Which party is that?’ respectively, which do not imply any of the valid answers provided. Specifically, the item ‘Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?’ contains the following non-valid responses: ‘Refused to answer’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘Related to age’, ‘Other’, ‘Related to class’, ‘Related to gender’, ‘Related to occupation’, ‘Related to political partisan affiliation’, ‘Related to race’, ‘Related to regional origin’, ‘Related to religion’, ‘National identity only’, and ‘Doesn’t think of myself in those terms’. The aim of the question is to ascertain the ethnicity of the respondents in order to derive whether they belong to the same ethnicity with their country’s head-of-state. With regards to the aim of the question, the non-substantive responses listed above do not offer much contribution, as none of them represents a valid ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa. Applying context to the non-substantive responses does not help either, as there is no way to clearly link any of them to any valid ethnicities known in the region. Based on these two criteria, therefore, non-valid responses in this item are all recoded as missings. Now, let us consider the questions ‘Which party is that?’ as well, which has the following non-valid responses: ‘Refused to answer’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘Other’, and ‘Not applicable’. The question itself is structured to elicit information on a respondent’s political affiliation, in order to ascertain if they belong to the political party of their head-of-state. However, just like in the item inquiring about respondents’ ethnic affiliation, neither of the invalid responses in the item provides this information nor can be interpreted in the light of any of the provided valid answers. So, they are all recoded as missing values as well.

Invalid responses in items measuring SEM, NAB, education/literacy, political oppression, and apathy towards politics follow a similar trajectory as those described in ‘presparty’ and ‘preseth’ above. They neither provide nor can be contextually interpreted in the light of the required information. Therefore, they are all recoded as missing values as well.

6.2.1 Assessment of Missing Data

Complete data are available for all variables required in the analysis model, except for SEM, NAB, and their alternative predictors – that is, variables that are measured with survey items from Afrobarometer Round 6. Multiethnicity, government performance, and the alternative predictors of government performance have no missing values. Table 2 shows the frequency and percentage of missing values for the items used in estimating variables SEM, NAB, and their predictors. The table indicates that only 2.62% of 33,562 respondents has data available for all the items required to measure these variables; meaning that 97.38% of the respondents have missing outcome data for one item or the other that measures SEM and NAB.

It should be noted that *missing data* as employed here and henceforth in this dissertation entails not just the original missing values contained in Afrobarometer Round 6. Rather, it represents a

combination of both the original missing values and the missing values resulting from the recoding of non-substantive responses in the same dataset. Of the total missing data, original missings from Afrobarometer Round 6 constitute 1.4%, whereas missings resulting from the recoding of non-substantive responses constitute 98.6%.

Table 3 provides a closer look at the missing data in each of the items measuring SEM, NAB, and their alternative predictors. It summarizes the total missing observations (Obs=.) and non-missing values (Obs<.) for each of the items⁴². The right most part of the table indicates how the expectation and satisfaction data are coded. As can be seen from the table, while a good number of the items has more than a 1,000 missing values, the item ‘In the past 12 months have you had contact with the courts? And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a judge or court official in order to get the assistance you needed from the courts?’ (Q55L) has the highest number of missing values (30,292), corresponding to 10.3% of the entire missing values. The only completely observed data (that is, without missing data) is the item ‘Gender of respondent’ (Q101). The item does not appear in Table 3 for this reason.

Having noted the points above, I now discuss the method with which I handle the missing data. The most common way of handling missing data is called list-wise deletion. In this method, researchers delete cases (or rows/lists) containing missing values, and run a model, using the dataset containing no missing values (known as complete case analysis). Another common practice is pair-wise deletion, which usually involves statistics performed on pairs of points, like correlation analysis. For example, in analyzing the correlations among a, b, and c, we may be missing some data for each variable. Missing a value for a in some cases still allows one to use b and c from those cases. Pair-wise deletion can often be noticed by seeing that there are different sample sizes for different correlations. Researchers also use a method called proration when confronted, as it is the case here, with item-level missing data. In using proration, scales are computed by averaging the available items that measure a single construct (that is, if a participant answers three out of four items measuring a scale, the prorated scale score is the average of the three responses). Besides pair-wise deletion, list-wise deletions, and proration, another method which has become popular for handling missing data in empirical studies is multiple imputation (MI), which consists of using an imputation model that is based on the observed data to obtain multiple complete datasets.

⁴² It should be noted that, at this point, *literacy* and *gender* are respectively still being represented by the labels of their parent items, ‘Education condensed’ and ‘Gender of respondent’, until the process of handling of missing data is completed in the next section. At the end of the process, both variables will be derived in accordance with the descriptions presented in Section 6.1.5.1.

Table 2 *Pattern of Missingness in the Items Measuring the Variables in the Analysis Model*

No of missing items per respondent	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
0	878	2.62	2.62
1	486	1.45	4.06
2	1050	3.13	7.19
3	672	2.00	9.19
4	1937	5.77	14.97
5	1203	3.58	18.55
6	3286	9.79	28.34
7	2240	6.67	35.02
8	3884	11.57	46.59
9	2993	8.92	55.51
10	3504	10.44	65.95
11	2928	8.72	74.67
12	3901	11.62	86.29
13	3409	10.16	96.45
14	801	2.39	98.84
15	186	0.55	99.39
16	79	0.24	99.63
17	47	0.14	99.77
18	43	0.13	99.90
19	21	0.06	99.96
20	10	0.03	99.99
21	2	0.01	99.99
22	2	0.01	100.00

Of the three methods discussed above, I use the MI method for handling incomplete data in this work. This is because my assessment of the missing data suggests that MI is the most appropriate technique to use in the context of my data. First, it is clear from Table 1 that a substantial amount of data I require for the analysis is missing, with nearly all items measuring variables in the analysis model being incompletely observed. A complete case analysis involving either list-wise or pair-wise deletion would discard a whopping 97.38% of the entire sample (leading to a huge lost in statistical power), and proration would result in a biased outcome even under a missing completely at random (MCAR) mechanism⁴³ (Schafer & Graham, 2002; Graham, 2009; Enders, 2010; Mazza et al., 2015). But MI, on the other hand, can use partially-observed data from the incomplete cases to produce valid analytic results. Even at 97.38% missing data, Madley-Dowd et al. (2019) show that unbiased results can still be obtained with MI, provided the imputation model is properly specified and data are at least missing at random (MAR) or better missing completely at random (MCAR). A classic way of ascertaining MCAR is by conducting Little's MCAR test, which was done, and whose result indicated that, though my data is not MCAR (that is, not missing completely at random), it is very close to MCAR. Since there is no standard way of establishing whether a dataset is at least MAR (that is, missing at random) or not, based on the observed data (Little & Rubin, 2002; Nguyen et al., 2017), the challenge of having a dataset close to MCAR is usually handled by adjusting for the non-random impact of the missing data on the imputation model. This is mostly achieved by first assuming that such dataset is at least MAR, and then including other variables from the dataset on which the missing data is not random in the imputation model (van der Heijden et al., 2006).

Again, when using the MI method, missing data can be handled for both single-item and scale measures. Here, in this research, I am faced with a combination of both. While SEM, NAB, and political apathy are scale measures, comprising of multiple items, the rest of the variables taken from Afrobarometer are single-item measures⁴⁴. In handling missing data for scale measures, experts recommend that researchers first impute missing data at the item level before deriving the scale to be used in the analysis of interest (Eekhout et al., 2014; Simons et al., 2015), as doing so improves the precision of parameter estimates. Since I work with a combination of single-item and scale variables, I comply with this recommendation by applying MI at the item level for all variables, before going on to compute the scale variables.

⁴³ Methodologists particularly warn against proration's bias propensity even under MCAR or MAR mechanisms by arguing that it inflates estimates of internal consistency reliability under an MCAR or MAR condition (McDonald et al., 2000; Sijtsma & van der Ark, 2003; Enders, 2003). Schafer and Graham (2002) pinpoint that "averaging the available items is difficult to justify theoretically either from a sampling or likelihood perspective" (p. 158) whereas authors like Mazza et al. (2015) explain that proration redefines a scale such that it is no longer the sum or average of the k items comprising the scale. According to them, the definition of a scale after proration will vary across participants, depending on the missing data pattern and rate in the sample.

⁴⁴ I considered single-item measures in this case because: (a) the variables under consideration are sizably unambiguous concepts (Freed, 2013; Sarstedt & Wilczynski, 2009), (b) there is an availability of a fairly large sample for these variables (Sauro, 2018), and (c) single-item measures have been found to perform good as well under conditions (a) and (b) (Postmes et al., 2013; van Doorn et al., 2010).

Table 3 Number of Missing and Non-Missing Observations (from the Unimputed Dataset) for Each of the Items Measuring the Variable in the Analysis Model.

Variable	Obs<.			Unique values	Min	Max
	Obs=.	Obs>.	Obs<.			
Q27A	368		33,194	5	0	4
Q27B	453		33,109	5	0	4
Q27C	388		33,174	5	0	4
Q27E	645		32,917	5	0	4
Q55A	18,428		15,134	4	1	4
Q55B	18,870		14,692	4	0	3
Q55C	12,428		21,134	4	1	4
Q55D	12,963		20,599	4	0	3
Q55E	19,126		14,436	4	1	4
Q55F	19,421		14,141	4	0	3
Q55G	26,041		7,521	4	1	4
Q55H	26,250		7,312	4	0	3
Q55I	25,740		7,822	4	1	4
Q55J	25,924		7,638	4	0	3
Q55K	30,232		3,330	4	1	4
Q55L	30,292		3,270	4	0	3
preseth	1,443		32,119	2	0	1
presparty	13,427		20,135	2	0	1
EDUC_COND	77		33,485	4	0	3
AGE_COND	201		33,361	6	1	6
ngo_civilso	2,140		31,422	2	0	1
Q13	261		33,301	4	0	3
Q14	311		33,251	3	0	2

Note: Obs =. denotes the number of total missing observations for each item whereas Obs<. signifies the total number of non-missing observations.

6.2.1.1 Multiple Imputation: Model and Execution

After assessing the missing data and deciding that MI at the item level is an appropriate method of doing my analysis, I move to the next important step in handling missing data, namely, the development of the imputation model. In order to obtain valid results, the generation of a model for multiple imputation most follow a sensible process (Nguyen et al., 2017). I ensure that this condition is met in this context through the following critical decisions. First, based on recommendations in MI literature (White et al., 2011; van Buuren, 2012), I ensure that the items measuring all variables in the analysis model are included in the imputation model, in order to guarantee that the imputation model preserves the micro-level relationships between my items of interest (Schafer, 1997; Moons et al., 2006). Thus, I include the following items in the imputation

model: Q13, Q14, Q27A-Q27C, Q27E, Q45, Q55A-Q55L, Q101, preseth, presparty, and EDUC_COND.

Repeated measurements for the same individuals from other survey waves would have been good candidates for use as auxiliary items in the imputation model, as they usually are highly correlated with incomplete items (Graham, 2012; Collins et al., 2001). However, this is not possible here, as Afrobarometer is not a longitudinal study; access to repeated measurements of the items for the same individuals over a period of time does not exist in the Afrobarometer.

To improve the plausibility of the Missing at Random (MAR) assumption, which is the backbone of the MI method (Schafer & Olsen, 1998; Sterne, et al., 2009), I adjust for the non-random impact of the missing data on the imputation model by including the predictors of missingness found in the dataset in the imputation model (van der Heijden et al., 2006). To determine these predictors (that is, the items on which the missing data is not random), I use series of χ^2 -tests to assess the correlation between the pattern of missingness in the items that measure the variables in the analysis model and other (mostly demographic) items present in the dataset. At the end of the test, six items emerge as possible predictors of missingness, namely; items 'Employment status' (Q95), 'Religion' (RELIG_COND), and 'How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Members of Parliament?' (Q59A), 'How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Local government councilors?' (Q59B), 'In your opinion, how often, in this country: do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?' (Q51A), and 'Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Refused to pay a tax or fee to government' (Q27D). They all show significant relationship with the pattern of missingness in the items that measure the variables in the analysis model and are consequently included in the imputation model as predictors of missingness. The inclusion of these seven items, essentially, makes for an imputation model, consisting of all items used for measuring the variables in the analysis model and seven predictors of pattern of missingness in the dataset.

So, having decided on the constituents of the imputation model, I move to the next step – the execution of the multiple imputation. The items to be imputed are basically of different types: binary and ordered categorical. Binary items include preseth, presparty, and Q101, whereas ordered categorical items include Q27A - Q27E, Q95, Q59A, Q59B, Q55A - Q55L, EDUC_COND, AGE_COND, RELIG_COND, Q13, Q14, Q45D, and Q51A. Since this is the case, multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) is used here. Missing values are imputed using a series of univariate conditional imputation models (van Buuren, 2007; Raghunathan et al., 2001): Binary variables are imputed using logistic regression models, whereas ordered categorical variables are imputed using ordered logistic regression models. MI is implemented using the `mi impute chained` command in Stata software version 16.

Based on the rule of thumb that the number of imputations should be at least equal to the percentage of incomplete cases (White et al., 2011) - which in this case is 97.38% -, the number of imputations is set at 98. The tracefile, a dataset in which `mi impute chained` stores information about the imputation process, is also included in the imputation command, in case specific information regarding the imputation process is required as the analysis develops. Finally, a seed with 5 random digits is set in order to forestall the obtainment of different results when running the imputation command several times. For the purpose of setting this seed, I choose 23456 before running the imputation. After running the imputation, a total of 98 imputed (complete) datasets ($m = 1$ to $m = 98$) were generated from the original (unimputed) dataset ($m = 0$) for the main analyses. Table 4 summarizes the output.

Because estimated results will differ in each of the 98 imputed datasets as a result of the variations introduced in the imputation of the missing values, I pooled the results from the 98 datasets together, using Rubin's rules, to produce an overall estimated association between my variables of interest (Rubin, 1987; Sterne, et al., 2009). In many statistical software like STATA, SPSS and R, the process of pooling results from individual datasets using Rubin's rules is mostly part of the same analysis step. In STATA, for instance, I achieved this process by using the `mi estimate` command, which not only runs the analytic model of interest within each of the imputed datasets but also combines all the results (coefficients and standard errors) across all the imputed datasets.

Table 4 Summary of the Imputation Output

Multivariate imputation	Imputations =	98
Chained equations	added =	98
Imputed: $m=1$ through $m=98$	updated =	0
Initialization: monotone	Iterations =	980
	burn-in =	10

Variable	Observations per m			Total
	Complete	Incomplete	Imputed	
preseth	32119	1443	1443	33562
presparty	20135	13427	13427	33562
ngo_civilso	31422	2140	2140	33562
Q27A	33194	368	368	33562
Q27B	33109	453	453	33562
Q27C	33174	388	388	33562
Q27D	32383	1179	1179	33562
Q27E	32917	645	645	33562
Q59A	31891	1671	1671	33562
Q59B	30144	3418	3418	33562
Q55A	15134	18428	18428	33562
Q55B	14692	18870	18870	33562
Q55C	21134	12428	12428	33562
Q55D	20599	12963	12963	33562
Q55E	14436	19126	19126	33562
Q55F	14141	19421	19421	33562
Q55G	7521	26041	26041	33562
Q55H	7312	26250	26250	33562
Q55I	7822	25740	25740	33562
Q55J	7638	25924	25924	33562
Q55K	3330	30232	30232	33562
Q55L	3270	30292	30292	33562
EDUC_COND	33485	77	77	33562
AGE_COND	33361	201	201	33562
Q13	33301	261	261	33562
Q14	33251	311	311	33562
Q51A	32802	760	760	33562
Q95	33385	177	177	33562
RELIG_COND	33483	79	79	33562

(complete + incomplete = total; imputed is the minimum across m of the number of filled-in observations.)

6.2.1.2 Checking the Imputation Model

Though a useful initial check may involve the exploration of the imputed values in the imputed datasets, the real concept of checking the imputation model basically has to do with comparing both the imputed and observed datasets for resemblance. For the purpose of ensuring unbiased regression coefficients at the end of the analysis, this procedure is of paramount importance. One of the commonly recommended diagnostics is internal check by means of graphical comparison (White et al., 2011; van Buuren, 2012). It is called internal check because the data are being assessed with respect to the available data (Abayomi et al., 2008). Recommended graphics for internal checks include histograms (Su et al., 2011), boxplots (White et al., 2011), density plots (Abayomi et al., 2008), cumulative distribution plots (Eddings & Marchenko, 2012), strip plots (van Buuren, 2012) and quantile–quantile plots (Stuart et al., 2009). However, when working with a multitude of incomplete items (as it is the case here), it is not always feasible to perform a graphical comparison of all items in the observed and imputed datasets. Therefore, an alternative approach used by scholars in such situations is to tabulate a summary statistic of the observed and imputed data (Nguyen et al., 2017), and then compare how similar the observed and imputed datasets are in terms of mean and standard deviation. Here, in this research, I follow this recommended alternative in checking the imputation model. Table 5 below tabulates the summary statistics of the observed and imputed data for the imputed items.

As can be seen from Table 5, all variables in the observed and imputed datasets have similar means and standard deviations, with negligible discrepancies. Basically, there's no formal test to determine what constitutes an acceptable level of similarity between the observed and the imputed datasets (Nguyen et al., 2017). However, standard literature on model checking after multiple imputation suggests that slight discrepancies between the observed and imputed data are not necessarily problematic (Abayomi et al., 2008; Stuart et al., 2009; Su et al., 2011). In fact, it is recommended in the literature that one should expect a level of discrepancy between the observed and the imputed data, as such differences are consistent with the MAR assumption. In essence, therefore, the little discrepancies in the two datasets presented in Table 5 are expected and raise no serious doubt on the plausibility of the multiple imputation result.

Table 5 Summary Statistics for the Observed and Imputed Datasets

Imputed datasets (pooled)						Observed data only					
	N	Mean	SD	min	max		Mean	SD	min	max	N
Q27A	3251808	1.258693	0.985004	0	4	Q27A	1.266287	0.99067	0	4	33562
Q27B	3251723	0.90745	0.749661	0	4	Q27B	0.914949	0.758568	0	4	33562
Q27C	3251788	1.01172	0.806358	0	4	Q27C	1.019571	0.814614	0	4	33562
Q27D	3250997	0.376413	0.712727	0	4	Q27D	0.384299	0.722918	0	4	33562
Q27E	3251531	0.572938	0.781528	0	4	Q27E	0.581726	0.791937	0	4	33562
Q59A	3250505	0.758289	0.859617	0	3	Q59A	0.759823	0.859001	0	3	33562
Q59B	3248758	0.946811	0.930755	0	3	Q59B	0.947405	0.929407	0	3	33562
Q55A	3233748	2.084885	0.903643	1	4	Q55A	2.084221	0.902289	1	4	33562
Q55B	3233306	0.192102	0.588409	0	3	Q55B	0.197952	0.595047	0	3	33562
Q55C	3239748	2.324433	0.969222	1	4	Q55C	2.322943	0.968145	1	4	33562
Q55D	3239213	0.207073	0.615725	0	3	Q55D	0.212915	0.621856	0	3	33562
Q55E	3233050	2.409816	1.012624	1	4	Q55E	2.409133	1.010234	1	4	33562
Q55F	3232755	0.266802	0.6422	0	3	Q55F	0.272441	0.648519	0	3	33562
Q55G	3226135	2.571727	0.975241	1	4	Q55G	2.567935	0.973712	1	4	33562
Q55H	3225926	0.252461	0.665094	0	3	Q55H	0.258214	0.670861	0	3	33562
Q55I	3226436	2.477333	0.984286	1	4	Q55I	2.477294	0.98271	1	4	33562
Q55J	3226252	0.374808	0.772945	0	3	Q55J	0.38086	0.77917	0	3	33562
Q55K	3221944	2.49867	0.969627	1	4	Q55K	2.497819	0.968187	1	4	33562
Q55L	3221884	0.327017	0.730001	0	3	Q55L	0.333583	0.737231	0	3	33562
preseth	3250733	0.172323	0.377661	0	1	preseth	0.170939	0.376461	0	1	33562
presparty	3238749	0.571706	0.494832	0	1	presparty	0.569398	0.495162	0	1	33562
EDUC_COND	3252099	1.431816	0.956427	0	3	EDUC_COND	1.438965	0.957398	0	3	33562
AGE_COND	3251975	2.68178	1.433679	1	6	AGE_COND	2.679516	1.431274	1	6	33562
ngo_civilso	3250036	0.018901	0.136177	0	1	ngo_civilso	0.019119	0.136944	0	1	33562
Q13	3251915	1.609042	1.087769	0	3	Q13	1.613917	1.086125	0	3	33562
Q14	3251865	0.870937	0.707327	0	2	Q14	0.875518	0.70652	0	2	33562
Q51A	3251416	1.870548	1.113379	0	3	Q51A	1.86657	1.112987	0	3	33562
Q95	3251999	1.339821	1.216727	0	3	Q95	1.346594	1.21712	0	3	33562
RELIG_COND	3252097	1.452649	0.667764	1	3	RELIG_COND	1.451662	0.665259	1	3	33562

6.2.2 Reliability Test and Fallacies Attendant to Multi-Level Data

Having obtained 98 complete datasets, and confirmed the plausibility of the imputed values, there are still a couple of steps to go before the data is ready for use in the analysis. These include: (a) checking for the reliability of the multi-item (or scale) measures used, and (b) ensuring that the fallacies attendant to the use of multi-level datasets for scientific generalizations are avoided. To examine how reliable the scales are, I use Cronbach's alpha (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). According to the result, the scale for measuring political apathy has Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.68$; the scale for measuring SEM, Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.81$, and; the scale for capturing NAB, Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.70$. Based on this result, the scales are all reliable in terms of their internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2013; Nunnally, 1978).

Though I am interested in country-level outcomes, the data available comprises of a mixture of country- and individual level datasets: data for multiethnicity, government performance, and their predictors exist at the country-level, whereas data for SEM, ELOAC, NAB, and their predictors are collected at the individual level. To avoid the fallacies associated with using this sort of multi-level data in generalizing scientific findings at one particular level (Hannan, 1971), the variables whose multi or single-item measures are collected at the individual level are transformed into country-level ones. To transform an individual-level variable into a country-level one, its individual-level observations are first grouped according to countries. If the variable is measured with multiple items, its individual-level observation will represent the summation of a respondent's score in all the items constituting the variable. After grouping the individual-level observations into countries, the observations in each country are aggregated to represent the *observed country mean* \bar{M}_i for each of the countries. Next, following Croon and van Veldhoven (2007), who demonstrate that regression analyses carried out with observed country means result in biased parameter estimates, the *observed country mean* \bar{M}_i for the variable in each of the countries is further employed in calculating the *adjusted country mean* \tilde{M}_i for the variable in the countries. At the end, the *adjusted country mean* \tilde{M}_i is then taken as the country-level measure for that particular variable in the countries, and is used to represent it in the regression analyses as either y_i , $INDVAR_i$, $CAPVAR_i$, or X_i , as the case may be.

The *adjusted country mean* \tilde{M}_i for a variable is given as

$$\tilde{M}_i = (1 - w_i) \mu_\xi + w_i \bar{M}_i$$

where w_i represents the variable's weight for a particular country i , μ_ξ is a measure of its overall mean in the entire dataset, and \bar{M}_i denotes its observed country mean.

6.3 Result

Baron and Kenny (1989) state that, for a mediation effect to be supported, it is sacrosanct to establish the existence of a significant relationship between the dependent and the independent variable: otherwise, no mediation could be said to have occurred. In my case, governance performance constitutes the main dependent variable and ethnic diversity, the main independent variable. A direct relationship between these two variables was not explicitly captured in my hypotheses, as I was more interested in capturing on the mediated effect of ethnicity on governance performance. But in order to ascertain the existence of Baron and Kenny's condition for a mediation in this case, I first test whether the relationship between governance performance and ethnic diversity is significant or not. The result (see Table 6) shows that, in the context of democracy, decentralization, and postcolonialism, a negative and statistically significant direct relationship exists between ethnic diversity and governance performance, thereby setting a solid empirical foundation for conducting a mediation analysis. Besides establishing a valid foundation for a mediation analysis, the third regression model also reveals two other important information necessary for my analysis. First, it shows that a negative and significant relationship does exist between NAB and government performance, as I projected in my hypotheses. Second, the third regression model also supports the existence of a partial mediation between ethnic diversity and government performance. A partial mediation is usually supported if the coefficient of the independent variable remains significant after controlling for the mediators (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Hayes, 2013). This is exactly the situation in the third regression model; that is, even after the inclusion of SEM and NAB in the model, the coefficient of ethnic diversity, as already reported, remains significant. To be doubly sure, I check whether the association between ethnic diversity and governance performance in the absence of SEM and NAB is significantly smaller than the association observed when SEM and NAB are included in the model. For mediation to be supported, the association between the two variables without SEM and NAB should be significantly smaller than the association observed when SEM and NAB are included in the equation. As can be seen from Tables 6 and 7, this condition is met: the association between ethnic diversity and governance significantly reduces from -4.24 in Table 7⁴⁵ to -2.98 in Table 6

⁴⁵ In Table 7 is shown the relationship between ethnic diversity and governance performance when the two mediator variables, SEM and NAB, are included in the model. It should be noted that this model represents the third model, which has as its objective as the estimation of the relationship between NAB and governance performance. Ethnic diversity and SEM are included in the model as they both constitute part of the causal path leading to governance performance through NAB.

Table 6 Association Between Ethnic Diversity and Governance Performance in the Absence of SEM and NAB

Governance Performance	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
Ethnic diversity	-2.984	0.100	-29.95	0.000	-3.179 -2.789	***
IQI	55.502	0.164	339.28	0.000	55.182 55.823	***
Country size	0.002	0.000	4.60	0.000	0.001 0.003	***
GNI	0.000	0.000	-30.44	0.000	0.000 0.000	***
Constant	38.793	0.067	576.54	0.000	38.661 38.925	***

Note: Asterisks denote significance levels (*** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1)

Having established a solid empirical ground for a mediation analysis, I move on to testing the indirect effect of multiethnicity on government performance through SEM and NAB. As I already described in the methodology chapter, I employ Sobel Product of Coefficients Approach (Sobel, 1982) for the calculation of the indirect effect. Sobel’s approach basically requires the estimation of the individual causal paths leading from the independent variable to the dependent variable first, and then multiplying the path coefficients. In the context of my analysis, the approach implies the estimation of the causal path from ethnic diversity to SEM, from SEM to NAB, and from NAB to government performance (a total of three causal paths) and multiplying the path coefficients together. In estimating these causal paths, I fit three corresponding regression models. In what follows, I discuss the outcome of the remaining two models. In the first model, where I estimate the causal path from ethnic diversity to SEM, the output shows that SEM is positively and significantly related to ethnic diversity. A similar outcome is observable in the second model, where I assess the causal path from SEM to NAB. It turns out that NAB possesses a statistically significant coefficient with a positive sign, indicating that a higher degree of NAB is associated with a higher level of SEM as I projected in my second hypothesis. Finally, the third regression model, estimating the association between NAB and governance performance, shows that a significant and negative relationship exists between the two variables. Table 1 below summarizes the output of the three regression models.


Table 7: Association Between Ethnic Diversity, SEM, NAB, and Government Performance: SUR Model

Variables	(1) SEM	(2) NAB	(3) Government performance
SEM		0.186*** (0.042)	15.051*** (1.580)
Ethnic diversity	0.259*** (0.010)	0.034** (0.015)	-4.235*** (0.283)
Apathy		-0.040*** (0.010)	
Education		0.210*** (0.007)	
NGO/civil society organizations		-6.681*** (0.271)	
Age		0.044*** (0.001)	
Literacy	-0.055*** (0.017)		
Gender	2.549*** (0.136)		
Head-of-state's political party	-0.347*** (0.027)		
Head-of-state's ethnicity	-0.007 (0.015)		
NAB			-3.319*** (0.302)
IQI			56.726*** (0.481)
Country size			-0.014*** (0.002)
GNI			0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	0.105 (0.068)	1.019*** (0.085)	28.760*** (2.320)
Observations	33,562	33,562	33,562

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1)

The application of Sobel’s Product of Coefficients Approach on the results presented in Table 7 returned a negative coefficient as expected, indicating that the indirect effect of ethnic diversity on the performance of government is negative. Specifically, this outcome means that the effect of ethnic diversity being transmitted via NAB and SEM on a country’s performance is negative. Figure 7 provides an illustration of the association between all variables in my regression models. The causal path d' (in bracket) represents the estimated indirect effect, that is, the product of causal paths a , b , and c . The causal path d is the direct effect of ethnic diversity on the performance of a government.

Figure 7 Direct and Indirect Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Government Performance



Mediation models seek to identify and explain the mechanism or process underlying a relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable via the inclusion of a mediator variable (MacKinnon, 2008). Since I have identified that the SEM and NAB play a role in the relationship between ethnic diversity and government performance, I look at how the causal relationship/process represented in Figure 7 relate to the overall relationship between ethnic diversity and government output. To find out, I calculate the total effect of ethnic diversity on the performance of government, which is given as the sum of direct and indirect effect (Baron & Kenny, 1989; Hayes, 2009; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). As, according to the third regression model, the direct effect of ethnic diversity on government performance is negative, adding the extra negative effect being transmitted through NAB and SEM on top of that ultimately reinforces the negativity of the effect. This shifts the point of discussion from the direction of the effect to the magnitude of the effect. Figure 7 depicts this beautifully well. It shows the direct effect of ethnic diversity on government performance, d , as -4.235 . But when the indirect effect, d' , being transmitted via SEM and NAB are taken into consideration, the magnitude of the effect increases from -4.235 to -4.396 . I will expand on the theoretical implications of this observation in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, suffice it to say that the outcome of my analysis supports the projected hypotheses.

6.4 Statistical Test

In this section, I assess the validity of my result. To ensure that my result is not built on incorrect assumptions, is occasioned by chance, or is affected by the positive skewness or kurtosis of the indirect and total effects, I use a number of statistical test and a method. Collectively, these tests and the method offer strong evidence for the proposition that, under the conditions of democracy, postcolonialism and decentralization, ethnic diversity constrains the performance of government through SEM and NAB.

6.4.1 Independence of Error Terms

It is obvious that my analysis involves a set of three linear regression equations/ models. Peripherally, running the models separately and summing up their coefficient to obtain the indirect effect seems like a sensible thing to do. But on the contrary, it is a methodological suicide. The problem lies on the fact that an equation-by-equation estimation requires the independence of error terms assumption in order to be valid. The independence of error terms assumption entails that the error terms across the equations are uncorrelated. But in models containing a number of linear equations (just like mine), the correctness of this kind of assumption is quite unrealistic to expect. Therefore, to avoid risking the consequences of a result built on incorrect assumptions, I run the three equations together using Zellner's (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. The SUR method relaxes this assumption through a unique feature called the contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation, and as well as allows for greater efficiency.

The results presented in Table 7 are the products of the SUR method whereas the result displayed in Table 8 is the outcome of an equation-by-equation estimation of the three models using standard ordinary least squares. A comparison of both results indicates differences in the parameter estimates. The relationship between ethnic diversity and SEM remains roughly consistent in terms of direction and significant levels in both methods. However, a substantial increase in parameter estimates is observable in the relationship between ethnic diversity and government performance, as well as in the relationship between NAB and government performance. The parameter estimate for the association between diversity and performance decreases from -5.144 in the equation-by-equation model to -4.235 in the SUR model. In the same way, the estimated parameter for the relationship between NAB and performance also drops from -4.249 in the equation-by-equation model to -3.319 in the SUR model. The most remarkable difference in the outcome of the two methods can be observed, however, in the relationship between SEM and NAB. There, the parameter estimate shifts drastically from utter insignificance in the equation-by-equation model to significance at over 95 percent confidence interval in the SUR model. According to literature, these differences may be attributed to the efficiency of the SUR method and its ability to allow for contemporaneous cross-equation error correlation (Greene, 2012).

Table 8 Association Between Ethnic Diversity, SEM, NAB, and Government Performance: Equation-by-equation Model

VARIABLES	(1) SEM	(2) NAB	(3) Government performance
SEM		0.016 (0.037)	18.543*** (1.520)
Ethnic diversity	0.257*** (0.010)	0.075*** (0.014)	-5.144*** (0.300)
Apathy		-0.023** (0.009)	
Education		0.196*** (0.006)	
NGO/ Civils society organizations		-6.242*** (0.260)	
Age		0.042*** (0.001)	
Literacy	-0.051*** (0.015)		
Gender	1.987*** (0.122)		
Head-of-state's political party	-0.245*** (0.021)		
Head-of-state's ethnicity	-0.032** (0.014)		
NAB			-4.249*** (0.317)
IQI			56.257*** (0.481)
Country size (in millions)			-0.015*** (0.002)
GNI			0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	0.333*** (0.063)	1.264*** (0.075)	27.795*** (2.547)
Observations	33,562	33,562	33,562

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1)

6.4.2 Statistical Significance

In addition to using the SUR method, I test for the statistical significance of both the indirect and total effect of ethnic diversity on government performance as calculated above. Currently, two general approaches are available for doing this – the bootstrap method (occasionally called "nonparametric resampling") and the Monte Carlo method (also called "parametric resampling"). Software for testing indirect effects using the bootstrap methods offer two options – the percentile bootstrap, and the accelerated bias-corrected bootstrap. The former uses usual sampling distribution cutoffs for confidence intervals, without explicit bias corrections, whereas the later corrects for bias in the average estimates and in the standard deviations across potential values of the indirect coefficient (Preacher & Kelley, 2011). The Monte Carlo approach, on the other hand, involves the computation of the indirect effect and the standard error estimates for the separate coefficients for the full sample and, then using resampling to estimate the standard errors for the indirect effects using the obtained values (Biesanz et al., 2010; Fritz et al., 2012).

The use of the bootstrap method is often recommended in the literature for mediational analysis as the best practice for testing the significance of an indirect and total effects (Rilstone & Veall, 1996; Freedman & Peters, 1984). For multiply imputed data, bootstrapping is possible by means of a computationally intensive process (Little & Rubin, 2002), and can also be applied after using a SUR estimation command (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). However, it seems currently impossible to use the bootstrap method after applying a SUR command on a multiply imputed data. Where both conditions (multiply imputed data and SUR) apply, the standard practice, therefore is to determine the significance of the direct and total effects by computing the significance level for non-linear combinations of the parameter estimates.⁴⁶

The computation of the non-linear combination of the parameter estimates in this case will return, among other values, the z-score and p-values, which are in turn used for the estimation of statistical significance of an effect. For my analysis, I use a 95 percent confidence level, for which the critical z-scores are between -1.96 - +1.96, and the critical p-value <0.05. So, the combination of a z-score falling outside the -1.96 to +1.96 range and a p-value lesser than 0.05 would indicate that the estimated effects are statistically significant. As can be seen in Table 9, the indirect effect is statistically significant with a z-score of -3.600 and a p-value of 0.000. The total effect is significant as well, with a z-score of -15.350 and a p-value of 0.000.

⁴⁶ Cf. for example <https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/faq/how-can-i-compute-indirect-effects-with-imputed-data-method-1/>.

Table 9 Significance of the Indirect and Total Effects of Ethnic Diversity on Government Performance

	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95%Conf. Interval]
Indirect effect	-0.159	0.044	-3.600	0.000	-0.246 -0.073
Total effect	-4.395	0.286	-15.350	0.000	-4.956 -3.834

Table 10 Skewness/Kurtosis tests

Variable	Pr(Skewness)	Pr(Kurtosis)	Chi2(2)	Prob>chi2
SEM	0.000	0.000	4.10	0.000
Ethnic diversity	0.000	0.000	5.99	0.000
Literacy	0.000	0.000	6.34	0.000
Gender	0.000	0.000	2.15	0.000
Head-of-state's political party	0.000	0.000	3.18	0.000
Head-of-state's Ethnicity	0.000	0.000	2.92	0.000
NAB	0.000	0.000	7.95	0.000
Apathy	0.000	0.000	8.49	0.000
Education	0.000	0.000	1.25	0.000
NGO/Civil society organization	0.000	0.000	7.69	0.000
Age	0.000	0.000	3.39	0.000
Government performance	0.000	0.000	8.20	0.000
Quality of institution	0.000	0.000	2.96	0.000
Country size	0.000	0.000	1.72	0.000
GNI	0.000	0.000	1.03	0.000

6.4.3 Positive Skewness and Kurtosis

A crucial assumption underlying the validity of the z-scores and p-values employed in testing statistical significance is the normality of the indirect and total effect estimates. Basically, estimates that are not normally distributed stem from skewed and kurtotic data, and it is incorrect to trust their estimated z-test and p-values. Therefore, to probe the trustworthiness of the scores I obtained above, I test for skewness and kurtosis. Standardly if the corresponding skewness and kurtosis values are 0.000 respectively, it is said that it is normally skewed and non-kurtotic; if the values are between the range of +1 and -1 respectively, it is said to be moderately skewed and kurtotic; and if the values are greater than +1 or lower than -1 respectively, it is said to be severely skewed and kurtotic (Curran et al., 1996; Hair et al., 2017). The figures in Table 10 above show that the data is neither skewed nor kurtotic, meaning that the z-test and p-values above can be trusted. In other words, Table 10 also indicates that both the indirect and total effects of ethnic diversity on government performance are truly significant.

6.5 Interpretation and Judgement of Findings

6.5.1 Interpretation of Results

I carried out a seemingly unrelated regression regarding the association between ethnic diversity, state exploiting mentality (SEM), negative accountability behavior (NAB), and governance performance. The result points to a primary finding: in democratic decentralized countries, the performance of governance is associated with the level of ethnic diversity through the mediation of SEM and NAB. This finding suggests that, with regards to governance performance in general, we should expect countries that are ethnically more heterogeneous to be less successful, even when they are democratic and decentralized. By the same token, countries with the same decentralized and democratic conditions that are ethnically more homogenous would experience more success in terms of government output. The result also suggests that the citizens of countries that are ethnically more diverse are more likely than the citizens of more homogenous countries to engage in acts of civic normlessness geared towards the exploitation of the state and as well as shy away from using available accountability mechanisms for bringing their politicians to book.

The result confirms Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 which assumes that ethnic diversity constrains the performance of governance in democratically decentralized countries through a process involving SEM and NAB.

To be specific, regarding the ethnic diversity-SEM hypothesis, the result shows that the inclusion of one more ethnic group in a country is associated with 0.26 increase in SEM. As such, the result of this estimation confirms Hypothesis 1, which suggests that a country's ethnic heterogeneity is positively associated with its level of SEM. The same type of relationship is observed between SEM and NAB: the result indicates that a unit increase in SEM is associated with a 0.19 increase

in NAB in a democratic decentralized country. The relationship takes the opposite direction in the case of NAB and governance performance: the result shows that a unit increase in NAB is associated with 3.32 decrease in a country's governance performance.

In fact, studying the relationship between decentralization and governance performance in ethnically decentralized settings in sub-Saharan Africa highlights a number of notable lessons. First, in relations to the hypotheses I set in Chapter 5.3.3, the result seems to teach us that the role of ethnic diversity concerning variations in the outcome of decentralization across the world remains constant, even when this relationship is considered, as I did here, from the point of view of ethnicity's effect on accountability and accountability mechanisms. As I highlighted in Chapter 3, there is already an existing scholarship on the negative relationship between ethnic pluralism and governance performance that unfortunately allows an extremely constrained space for policy intervention by dwelling on the impact of the divisiveness of ethnic pluralism on the coordination of state governance as a mechanism for explaining the situation. My result not only confirms the findings of this previous scholarship, it also adds the extra knowledge that this relationship can also be transmitted through the link between SEM and citizen's accountability behavior. Also, when one considers citizens behavior towards accountability as a form of citizen participation in politics, then, this result also ties in with current scholarship on the relationship between citizen participation and governance performance, where citizen participation is understood as a key factor for improving governance and service delivery (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Michels, 2012; Robinson, 2007).

Second and most importantly, the result also seems to say that the association between ethnic diversity and governance performance increases through a process that is mediated by SEM and NAB. This is observable by considering the magnitude of the beta coefficient of the direct effect of ethnic diversity on governance performance as well as the beta coefficient of the total effect of the same relationship. According to the results (see Table 7 and Figure 7), the effect of ethnic diversity on governance performance increases from -4.239 to -4.395 with SEM and NAB are thrown into the model as mechanisms. The difference (that is, the indirect effect being transferred from SEM and NAB to governance performance) stands at only 0.16. But it is understood in the literature for mediation analysis that not all process has results of a substantial size; that even an extremely small indirect effect can be meaningful as the indication of a process. (Agler & De Boeck, 2017; Kenny & Judd, 2014). Walters (2019) would list five reasons mediation effects can be so small, but yet important. Two of these conditions are present in my analysis. One of them is the presence of multiple mediators. Walters would explain that, to the extent that precursor measures and control variables often account for a large chunk of the variance in an outcome or dependent variable, the amount of variance available to multiple mediators, once the precursor and control variables have been controlled for, is often constrained. As mediators compete for the restricted range of free variance available after the precursor and control variables have been accounted for, the proportion of variance each mediator is capable of explaining diminishes each time a new mediator is added to the model. The other condition for a small but important mediation effect according to Walter (2019) is when the mediator variables possess opposite signs. Other authors further explain that this condition, in worse case scenarios, can even lead to suppressor effects, in which an indirect effect has a sign quite opposite to that of the total effect (MacKinnon

et al. 2000). Thus, although the indirect effect being transferred from SEM and NAB to governance performance amounts to 0.16, I nevertheless consider it important in the process leading from ethnic diversity to reduced governance outcome.

Third, the result pinpoints the most important predictors of SEM, NAB, and Governance performance among the control variables. All control variables⁴⁷ for SEM has significant effect on SEM, but the magnitude of their influence varies. According to the result presented in Appendix 1, when the model containing SEM as the dependent variable is re-run without the control variables one after the other, it becomes clear that, among the control variables, literacy has slightly more influence on the main coefficient of interest, β_1 , than the rest; seconded by the Head-of state's political party. When the model is re-run either without literacy or head-of-state's political party, the coefficient of SEM in relation to ethnic diversity increases more than it does when the model is re-run without any of the other control variables. Thus, my result teaches us that literacy and Head-of-state's political party explains SEM better than gender and head-of-state's ethnicity. In the same way, the result of my analysis informs us that education and NGO/civil society organization explain NAB better than the other control variables. To be specific, Appendix 2 shows that, in comparison with apathy and age, education and NGO/ Civils society organizations are the most important predictors of NAB: while the coefficient of NAB significantly reduces when re-running the model without education, the coefficient almost doubles when NGO/Civils society organizations is excluded from the model. Appendix 3 tells the same story in relations to the best predictor(s) of governance among other control variables. It shows that institution quality (IQI) followed by country size are the most important predictors of governance performance. When the model is re-run in exclusion of IQI, the NAB-governance performance coefficient increases more than 3 times in magnitude; and when it is re-run without country size, it drops almost half of its magnitude.

6.5.2 Judgement of Result

While the results are largely robust, the SUR regression faces some issues that make it difficult to confidently establish true causal links between ethnic diversity, SEM, NAB, and governance performance. First, I ran into the difficulty of testing the significance of the indirect path from diversity to SEM, from SEM to NAB, and from NAB to governance performance with the state-of-the art approaches. As I mentioned in Section 6.4.2, two general approaches are available for testing the statistical significance of indirect and total effect currently – the bootstrap method (occasionally called nonparametric resampling) and the Monte Carlo method (also called "parametric resampling"), with the bootstrap method often being recommended (Rilstone & Veall, 1996; Freedman & Peters, 1984). However, although bootstrapping is possible for multiply imputed data (Little & Rubin, 2002), and can also be applied after using a SUR estimation command (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), it seems currently impossible to use it after applying a SUR

⁴⁷ It should be noted that, just like in the main analyses, the control variables being referred to here are used in their *adjusted country mean* format, according to the formula stipulated in Section 6.2.2.

command on a multiply imputed data. And as long as this is so, there remains some residual of doubt that the results are actually statistically significant.

In addition to not being able to apply either the bootstrap or Monte Carlo methods, there are also some potentially omitted determinants that would have otherwise explained differences in the main coefficients of interest that I cannot account for in the estimations. Those might more or less be tied to some historical factors that determine present-day individual-state relationships and governance outcomes. However, as outlined elsewhere, it was not my main interest to predict governance outcome. Instead, I was only interested in obtaining an accurate estimate of β_1 in the association between ethnic diversity and SEM, SEM and NAB, and NAB and governance performance. Potentially omitted variables might make the estimation regarding the strength of the association less precise.

Again, after cleaning the dataset from Afrobarometer, I was left with a huge amount of missing data. Despite meticulously following the multiple imputation process and becoming, as result of that, 98 imputed datasets that mirror the original dataset ($m=0$) when pulled together (see Table 5), the high percentage of missing data might not go down well in the eyes of some critics. Madley-Dowd et al. (2019) found that large proportion of missing data does not matter in multiple implication so long as the dataset is MAR and the fraction of missing information is used to guide the selection of auxiliary variables.

Irrespective of these difficulties, the findings of this research have several implications for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. I shall dwell on them in the next chapter.

7.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

In this dissertation, I investigated why and how differences in the governance outcome of decentralization occur. Particularly, I examined the effects of ethnic diversity on the governance outcome decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa, under the preconditions of democracy and postcolonialism, by combining the implications of Ekeh's (1975) Theory of the Two Publics and some classical theories of behavior. I argued that, under the said conditions, ethnic diversity (which classifies as a dimension of social networks and groupings) represents one of the social structures upon which the governance outcome of decentralization depends; and that this dependence occurs through the negative impact of ethnic diversity on the citizens' behavior toward accountability (Norris, 2008; Fisman & Gatti, 2002). In addition, I also contended that another variable, which I call *state-exploiting mentality* (SEM), exists as a mechanism between ethnic diversity and citizens' negative accountability behavior (NAB).

7.1 Theoretical and Policy Implications

Irrespective of the difficulties I stipulated in Chapter 6, the findings of this work have several implications for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Theoretically-speaking, the results of my quantitative analyses confirm my arguments in Section 5.2.4 above: I was able to empirically show that state-exploiting mentality increases as ethnic diversity increases. Not only that, I was also able to demonstrate that increase in state-exploiting mentality is positively connected with negative accountability behavior of a citizenry, and that this connection ultimately reduces the outcome of governance. Regarding the question "why does decentralization increase the performance of governance more significantly in some countries than in others?", this result therefore shows that ethnic diversity constitutes one of the fundamental factors responsible for the difference in outcome, at least in sub-Saharan Africa.

Not only these, the result also beckons on scholars of decentralization to start paying attention to historical contexts while studying the subject and the best ways of implementing it in reality. Beside decentralization, my general research design included two other contextual variables (democracy and postcolonialism) in other to control for their effect in the analysis: democracy, to ensure that SEM's effect on NAB is uniform across the countries in my sample, and; postcolonialism, as a condition in the emergence of SEM. Often historical contexts receive less attention than socio-economic factors in social sciences. I am sure that, if not for my heavy reliance on Ekeh's Theory of the Two Publics, I would have not considered this aspect of sub-Saharan African history in my analysis. And as the result eventually shows, this omission would have drastically blurred or turned the outcome of this research in the opposite direction.

Policy-wise, the result also has lots of implications for sub-Saharan Africa. As I already mentioned in Chapter 3, there exists a policy stalemate on how to tackle detrimental effects of ethnicity within the region. Regarding the challenges the region faces in the area of governance coordination, the result indicates that policy-makers can break the stalemate by targeting SEM and NAB in their policy formulation. If the degrees of SEM and NAB in sub-Saharan Africa could be reduced, there

is a big chance that the outcome of governance would also appreciate in the region. Also, considering that governance and development are positively related (Ukwandu & Jarbandhan, 2016; Mills, 2010; Adetoye & Omilusi, 2016)⁴⁸, establishing the importance of the indirect effect from SEM and NAB to governance performance in my analyses has a huge potential for redefining the focus of developmental strategies in the region. By showing that the relationship between governance performance and decentralization is sensitive to SEM and NAB, my findings particularly highlight two new areas of emphasis for approaching development issues within the region.

7.2 Recommendations

This work was conceived as a response to a nagging need for more empirical research clarifying the varied outcome of decentralization on governance. What I did here was to satisfy this need using the sub-Saharan African context. Based on that reason, one cannot easily claim that my result and its implications can be extended to countries outside the region, even when they exhibit similar characteristics as the ones included in my analysis. At the same time, it might also not be overly smart to completely write off the possibility of my result being valid outside of the region. As such, it would be interesting to have future studies test the theories I expanded here in other regions.

I did mention that the outcome of this research can help policy-makers tackle the negative effects of ethnic diversity in sub-Saharan Africa by developing policies targeted at SEM and NAB. What I did not mention, however, was how this could be realized. I find that this aspect does not fit well into my research objective, and that it is an area future scholars should study in detail. Similarly, since governance performance is empirically linked with development, future studies should also look into how development experts could capitalize on SEM and NAB to enhance development in sub-Saharan Africa.

⁴⁸ See also Chapter 3

Appendix 1 Association Between Ethnic Diversity and SEM Without the Control Variables

SEM (1)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
Ethnic diversity	0.264	0.010	25.59	0.000	0.244 0.285	***
Gender	2.559	0.136	18.86	0.000	2.290 2.828	***
Head-of-state's political party	-0.359	0.027	-13.23	0.000	-0.412 -0.305	***
Head-of-state's ethnicity	0.014	0.015	0.92	0.361	-0.016 0.043	
Constant	0.055	0.065	0.85	0.397	-0.074 0.184	

SEM (2)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
Ethnic diversity	0.249	0.010	24.07	0.000	0.228 0.269	***
Literacy	-0.059	0.016	-3.74	0.000	-0.090 -0.028	***
Head-of-state's political party	-0.212	0.025	-8.32	0.000	-0.262 -0.161	***
Head-of-state's ethnicity	-0.077	0.014	-5.48	0.000	-0.105 -0.049	***
Constant	1.337	0.022	60.74	0.000	1.294 1.381	***

SEM (3)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
Ethnic diversity	0.256	0.011	24.28	0.000	0.235 0.277	***
Literacy	-0.074	0.016	-4.62	0.000	-0.105 -0.042	***
Gender	1.723	0.126	13.71	0.000	1.474 1.972	***
Head-of-state's ethnicity	-0.077	0.014	-5.54	0.000	-0.105 -0.050	***
Constant	0.354	0.069	5.15	0.000	0.218 0.490	***

SEM (4)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
Ethnic diversity	0.259	0.010	25.10	0.000	0.239 0.280	***
Literacy	-0.053	0.016	-3.24	0.002	-0.085 -0.020	***
Gender	2.572	0.128	20.14	0.000	2.319 2.825	***
Head-of-state's political party	-0.355	0.025	-14.19	0.000	-0.405 -0.306	***
Constant	0.095	0.064	1.49	0.138	-0.031 0.221	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1). SEM (1) = model without literacy, SEM (2) = without gender, SEM (3) = without head-of-state's political party, SEM (4) = without head-of-state's ethnicity.

Appendix 2 Association between SEM and NAB Without the Control Variables

NAB (1)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
SEM	0.174	0.041	4.24	0.000	0.093 0.256	***
Ethnic diversity	0.028	0.015	1.92	0.058	-0.001 0.057	*
Education	0.207	0.007	30.32	0.000	0.193 0.220	***
NGO/ Civils society organizations	-6.563	0.256	-25.59	0.000	-7.071 -6.054	***
Age	0.043	0.001	46.69	0.000	0.041 0.045	***
Constant	1.023	0.084	12.16	0.000	0.857 1.190	***

NAB (2)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
SEM	0.033	0.046	0.73	0.468	-0.057 0.124	
Ethnic diversity	-0.032	0.010	-3.20	0.002	-0.052 -0.012	***
Apathy	0.056	0.008	7.01	0.000	0.041 0.072	***
NGO/ Civils society organizations	-3.384	0.178	-18.96	0.000	-3.737 -3.030	***
Age	0.023	0.001	35.99	0.000	0.022 0.024	***
Constant	2.164	0.077	27.97	0.000	2.011 2.317	***

NAB (3)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
SEM	0.366	0.041	8.97	0.000	0.285 0.447	***
Ethnic diversity	0.085	0.008	10.36	0.000	0.069 0.101	***
Apathy	0.083	0.009	9.08	0.000	0.065 0.101	***
Education	0.079	0.004	18.39	0.000	0.070 0.087	***
Age	0.034	0.001	39.40	0.000	0.032 0.036	***
Constant	1.005	0.078	12.82	0.000	0.850 1.160	***

NAB (4)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
SEM	-0.148	0.041	-3.61	0.000	-0.229 -0.067	***
Ethnic diversity	-0.206	0.013	-16.28	0.000	-0.231 -0.181	***
Apathy	0.131	0.010	13.82	0.000	0.113 0.150	***
Education	0.051	0.005	9.75	0.000	0.040 0.061	***
NGO/ Civils society organizations	-4.844	0.290	-16.71	0.000	-5.419 -4.269	***
Constant	3.253	0.053	60.99	0.000	3.148 3.359	***

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (*** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1). NAB (1) = model without Apathy, NAB (2) = without Education, NAB (3) = without NGO/ Civils society organizations, NAB (4) = without Age.

Appendix 3 Association Between NAB and Governance Performance Without the Control Variables

Governance Performance (1)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
NAB	-10.982	0.394	-27.88	0.000	-11.759 -10.206	***
SEM	2.457	4.068	0.60	0.547	-5.613 10.528	
Ethnic diversity	11.787	0.412	28.62	0.000	10.973 12.600	***
Country size	-0.083	0.004	-22.96	0.000	-0.090 -0.076	***
GNI	0.003	0.000	18.06	0.000	0.003 0.004	***
Constant	75.954	5.486	13.85	0.000	65.076 86.831	***

Governance Performance (2)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
NAB	-2.221	0.264	-8.41	0.000	-2.743 -1.699	***
SEM	11.198	1.253	8.94	0.000	8.714 13.683	***
Ethnic diversity	-5.341	0.295	-18.12	0.000	-5.925 -4.757	***
IQI	59.045	0.453	130.39	0.000	58.148 59.942	***
GNI	0.000	0.000	-3.05	0.003	0.000 0.000	***
Constant	30.552	2.097	14.57	0.000	26.396 34.709	***

Governance Performance (3)	Coefficient	Standard Error	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf. Interval]	Sig
NAB	-3.343	0.272	-12.29	0.000	-3.882 -2.805	***
SEM	12.692	1.039	12.22	0.000	10.633 14.752	***
Ethnic diversity	-4.544	0.300	-15.17	0.000	-5.137 -3.951	***
IQI	57.952	0.520	111.36	0.000	56.921 58.983	***
Country size	-0.010	0.001	-13.50	0.000	-0.012 -0.009	***
Constant	32.004	1.630	19.64	0.000	28.775 35.233	***

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***) = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.1). Governance performance (1) = model without IQI, Governance performance (2) = without Country size, Governance performance (3) = without GNI.

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