

Max Weber in the tropics: How global climate politics facilitates the bureaucratization of forestry in Indonesia

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Abstract

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is one of the most advanced global climate governance arrangements and we show that it contributes to the buildup of autonomous capacities and reliable procedures in areas of rather limited statehood. These partially unintended effects can be conceptualized as an increasing rational–legal bureaucratization, which has been initiated through both external and domestic actors as we illuminate in the case of Indonesia’s forestry sector in the period from 2007 until 2017. Our finding is that a bureaucratization of a new kind is increasingly strengthened in Indonesia’s forest despite enduring patterns of neopatrimonialism, emerging signs of new public management approaches, and the strengthening of functional equivalents such as community-based forest management. We thus claim that Max Weber’s perspective on the prospects and problems of rational–legal bureaucratization is still valuable, even when traveling to the tropics.

Keywords: areas of limited statehood, climate governance, Max Weber, public administration, REDD+.

1. Introduction

“Domination in everyday life is: administration”¹
(Weber (1920) 2013, §3)

Global governance in the field of climate politics has unintended consequences in countries of the global South. We analyze the consequences of one specific policy instrument, labeled Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), as this is one of the most advanced governance arrangements that the international community has set up within the last decade. Initially, REDD+ was perceived as a rather simple mechanism that would allow developing countries to receive financial flows for avoiding deforestation from global carbon markets as a low-cost option to mitigate climate change (e.g. Eliasch 2008). This carbon-centered approach has evolved into an instrument that is conceived to bring on various co-benefits, such as biodiversity or livelihoods (Visseren-Hamakers *et al.* 2012), and to approach land-use issues within a landscape approach (Turnhout *et al.* 2017). But what impact will REDD+ have in the end besides hopefully protecting tropical forests?

Our argument is that *one of the most important and partially unintended side effects of REDD+ is, at least for now, a move toward an increasing Weberian rational–legal bureaucratization of tropical forestry*. Of course, bureaucracies are nothing new in the tropics, and in some cases, these have been tremendously effective in fostering deforestation themselves. We claim, however, that the current globally induced trend toward bureaucratization is at least partially following a new rational–legal rationality to make jurisdictional REDD+ possible in the first place. It is thus often a new phenomenon in areas that have either hardly been governed at all or have been governed by neopatrimonial domination (Karsenty & Ongolo 2012), functional equivalents such as community-based forest management (CBFM) (Ostrom 1990), or private governance through certification (Pattberg 2005). We claim that to understand such developments, there is still no better starting point than Max Weber’s observations that the institutional core of modernization and the modern state is the setup of legal–rational bureaucracies, potentially leading to effective and legitimate results in a functionally differentiated world.

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Bureaucracies are, for better or for worse, the dominant actor of public and private affairs in the modern world. This has not only been supported by Charles Tilly's dictum that "[i]n one way or another, conquest entailed administration" (Tilly 1990, p. 20), which indicates that effective warfare and domination requires rule-setting, implementation, and effective financial management (see also Olson 1993). This claim is supported even by those analyzing nonhierarchical modes of steering like the use of market mechanisms, arguing that regulation through administrators is necessary for governance to be effective (e.g. Vogel 1996; Lederer 2012). Also the work on large business firms and on international nongovernmental organizations or multistakeholder partnerships has come to similar results (Beisheim *et al.* 2014; Seibel 2016, p. 52; Beisheim *et al.* 2018).

Administrative structures also travel and we have, for example, seen a diffusion of specific polices (Holzinger & Knill 2005) or of institutional innovations, like the setup of autonomous regulatory agencies (Levi-Faur & Jordana 2005). This has in many cases led to a rebureaucratization and restructuring of existing bureaucratic procedures often resulting in an "expansion in the regulatory capacities of the state" (Jordana *et al.* 2011, p. 1344), but also to local variation in the functioning of regulatory agencies in the global South (Dubash & Morgan 2012). Put in a nut-shell, contemporary governance implies the buildup and, in many cases, the locally adjusted transfer of administrative structures.

After several decades of being neglected, Weber is currently much *à la mode* in neo-institutionalist scholarship (e.g. Fukuyama 2014) and even in the field of International Relations (Lebow 2017). But Weber's insights are not much discussed within global environmental governance literature. Environmental scholarship has contributed strongly to institutionalist approaches, but it has been rather reluctant to focus on the state and what happens within public administrations (but see Hickmann *et al.* 2017; Höhne 2018; Höhne *et al.* 2018). Scholarship on forestry and REDD+ has not been completely blind to the role of public authorities. On the one hand, scholars rightly claim that "REDD will fail" because of "institutional constraints" (DeShazo *et al.* 2016, p. 86f) and the political economy and neopatrimonial structures in REDD+ host countries (Karsenty & Ongolo 2012). On the other hand, authors inspired by governmentality studies are taking the role of "administrative domains" much more serious than most mainstream approaches as titles like "Foucault in the Tropics" testify (Redfield 2005; Winkel 2012). Contributions in this tradition are often less Eurocentric than mainstream approaches, and they focus much more on how power is unfolding in these domains. They, for example, indicate that only through establishing bureaucratic domination can carbon stocks become manageable in the first place (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006; Lövbrand & Stripple 2011). Finally, some forest policy experts have described the trend toward more government involvement (Giessen *et al.* 2016) or how power has shifted to specific actors within the bureaucracy (Wibowo & Giessen 2015). Similarly, the influence of multilevel politics on domestic institutions and the resulting neglect of local actors has more recently been highlighted (Di Gregorio *et al.* 2019) as has been the degree of institutionalization in various REDD+ host countries (Ochieng *et al.* 2018). We build on these insights and add a Weberian perspective to underline that the development of Weberian bureaucracies for REDD+ is at the beginning of a long process that might evolve into effective rational-legal state structures in areas where statehood is extremely limited (see Risse *et al.* 2018 for "limited statehood").

We thus make use of an analogy applying Weber's categorization of bureaucratization – which is based on his insights derived from empirical material in 19th century Europe – on current developments in the global South. Although analogies are highly common in the historical and social sciences (e.g. the "analogy of the tragedy of the commons"), they are often criticized by positivists as being unscientific (e.g. King *et al.* 1994, pp. 212–213). However, we argue that analogies allow us to generate relevant knowledge when we are confronted with new material (Gentner *et al.* 1997, p. 4) and in cases in which one wants to explain strategies leading to major policy change (Khong 1992; Cornelissen *et al.* 2011, p. 10; Lederer & Kreuter 2018). Furthermore, every theoretical concept or categorization has been derived from geographically and historically contingent circumstances, and must be carefully applied when being used under other geographical or temporal conditions (see, for example, the discussion on contingent generalization as opposed to nomothetic laws in Pouliot 2007, p. 379). Hence, taking up Weber's typology and letting it "travel" makes us partially guilty of a certain degree of Eurocentrism, but we are not making a deterministic and linear-evolutionary argument in the line of modernization theory that claims that a country like Indonesia will without doubt bureaucratize its forests in a Weberian rational-legal fashion.

Methodologically, our paper does not aim for either positivist explanation and prediction (e.g. King *et al.* 1994), nor for an exclusive interpretivist approach, which “seeks to explain events in terms of actors’ understandings of their own contexts” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012, p. 52). We, instead, try to contribute to contingent generalizations (in terms of time frame, cultural location, and issue topic) based on ideal-type categories and therefore engage in abductive reasoning (Pouliot 2007; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012, p. 28, 94, 113). In an iterative process and enlightened through both theory and field work, we have engaged in several adjustments of our theoretical lenses. Empirically, we primarily make use of 41 expert interviews with government officials, donors, NGO activists, business actors, and scientists (see Appendix), which provided us with a great variety of insider perspectives. Those interviews were conducted in 2016 and 2017 in Indonesia. Indonesia represents a critical case for efforts to reduce deforestation (for further explanations, see further in this article). We both triangulated those expert insights, where possible, among each other (e.g. insights by government official with insights by NGO activist) as well as with analysis from policy documents and secondary sources. We promised anonymity and therefore only indicate what kind of background the interviewee has in order to substantiate the arguments. We undertook a systematic content analysis on all primary and secondary sources based on our categories derived from Weberian rational–legal bureaucratization, new public management, neopatrimonialism, and governance by functional equivalence and investigated the period from 2007 until 2017.

To advance our argumentation, the paper proceeds in four steps: First, we describe Weber’s work on bureaucratization and distinguish his perspective from alternative forms of governing. Second, we discuss the evolution of REDD+ and show that substantial changes have been made, which now increasingly dominate the overall approach. Third, we focus on current REDD+ bureaucratization on the domestic level, focusing on Indonesia as a critical case. The country is so important because it holds the third largest tropical rainforest in the world and faces some of the highest deforestation rates globally, making Indonesia the fifth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter of the world and attracting numerous donors to engage with the country (Climate Watch 2019). Indonesia is also of special interest, as its forests have been exploited through informal networks of businesses, national politicians, and bureaucrats during the Suharto era, while after democratization and decentralization in 1998/1999, this practice has been shifted to the districts that legally or illegally continued to exploit forests through neopatrimonial practices (Ribot *et al.* 2006). If we can observe an increasing rational–legal, autonomous, and rule-bound bureaucratic domination in such a country (Von Soest *et al.* 2011), then we might be able to derive some more general conclusions for the group of REDD+ countries in total. Finally, the last section summarizes our findings on the increasing Weberian bureaucratization, resonating Weber’s own criticism of modernization, and we close by taking up contemporary institutionalist insights that might allow us to move beyond this impasse, reflect upon the normative change that will be needed to shift from exploitation to conservation, and indicate future research areas scrutinizing emerging hybrids of Weberian bureaucratization and non-Western forms of governance.

2. Max Weber and the rise of modernity

Max Weber’s interest in bureaucracies as the “mechanism that transforms public authority into concrete and visible social action” (Steffek 2017, p. 119) was historical, sociological, and practical. Weber famously described three ideal types (Mayntz 1965; Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §2) of legitimate domination (“legitime Herrschaft”): charisma, tradition, and legal–rationality. We are interested in the latter category and distinguish two indicators of Weberian legal–rational bureaucratization: First, Weberian legal–rational bureaucratization is based on the establishment of *autonomous capacity*, which is strongly linked to a state with a bureaucratic apparatus and technical expertise (the famous “Anstaltsstaat”²) (Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §4, p. 459). Administrations must be *autonomous* from clientelism and personal rule with the specialized bureaucrats acting impersonally, independently, nonarbitrarily, and based on technical expertise. For this to be possible, bureaucrats must be selected in a meritocratic fashion and their salary and pension must be high enough to make an independent living (Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §4; (1922) 2005, Ch. 1 Bürokratismus, A650f). In such a state, administrations are hierarchically ordered, functionally differentiated, and eligible to political control. Second, bureaucrats must work in highly formalized ways, setting formal rules relying on administrative law. In Weber’s own words “bureaucratic-monocratic

administration based on files and records” is, from a technical perspective, the most efficient and rational form of domination (Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §5). *Reliable legal procedures* are, thus, our second indicator.

Weberian bureaucratization in terms of regulating ever more domains of public and private life³ through bureaucracies with autonomous capacity and reliable procedures is the extension of technical state power in a legal-rational way and not simply the “illegitimate extension of the power of bureaucrats” (Olsen 2005, p. 3). Weber was quite aware that the evolution of such structures might come at the price of potentially oppressive routines, blind specialization, and bureaucracies that generate a life of their own (Weber (1922) 2005, Ch. 1 Bürokratismus, A 662, 669). Bureaucratization is, however, a necessary condition for mass democracies to exist (Weber (1922) 2005, Ch. 1 Bürokratismus, A 667), and is a *pars pro toto* for the processes of modernization, rationalization, and the development of capitalism within the Western world (Breuer 1994). Bureaucracies rationalize domination in the industrial age and the bureaucrats must give reasons for decisions made, generating general trust so that impersonal markets (Steffek 2017), but also development can evolve (Evans & Rauch 1999).

When analyzing Weberian legal-rational bureaucratization, we must keep in mind three potential alternatives, also in order to avoid too much of a Eurocentric and universal Weberian reading: First, rational-legal bureaucratization à la Weber must be distinguished from traditional domination and its subtype of patrimonialism, which is characterized by “all power relations between ruler and ruled [...being...] personal relations [without any] differentiation between the private and the public realm” (Erdmann & Engel 2007, p. 105). Since the 1970s, scholars have observed a shift from patrimonialism toward neopatrimonial structures with proponents of a hard version of neopatrimonialism claiming that bureaucracies are often only a “façade” behind which clientelistic structures prevail (see Olivier de Sardan 2014 for the distinction between the hard and soft version of neopatrimonialism). However, proponents of the soft version of neopatrimonialism underline that “two role systems or logics [of patrimonialism and rational legality] exist next to each other [and...] permeate each other” (Erdmann & Engel 2007, p. 105). Hence, these authors partially move beyond Weber and define neopatrimonialism in distinction from patrimonialism as being built on “the claim to legal-rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’ stateness [as] [f]ormal structures and rules do exist, although in practice the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed” (Erdmann & Engel 2007, p. 105). Thus, much of the criticism of neopatrimonialism is actually with regard to patrimonialism as scholars equate both concepts and thereby contribute to a “misreading of Weber” on patrimonialism who stressed that also patrimonial relations have some form of checks and balances (Pitcher *et al.* 2009, p. 125). We are thus in line with those critics that have pointed out that neopatrimonialism “can be used to describe different styles of exercising authority [...] and social practices within states” (Mkandawire 2015, p. 564), and build on the argument that there has so far been “no study that investigates thoroughly whether a form of domination [...] is actually neo-patrimonial or is better described another way” (Erdmann 2013, pp. 61–62). In a nutshell, despite its weaknesses in terms of definition, delineation, and operationalization, the concept of neopatrimonialism is still a useful heuristic to investigate the “interaction between formal institutions and informal behaviour and/or institutions in politics” (Erdmann 2013, p. 68).

Second, in the last decades, bureaucratic rulings were also regarded as harmful public intervention where non-state actors were better suited to do the job (Olsen 2005, p. 6). Empirically, scholars have shown that nonstate actors, for example, transnational companies, can, under certain conditions, become functional equivalents for providing various governance services (Hönke & Thauer 2014; Börzel & Deitelhoff 2018). Börzel and Risse (2016) also stress that local nonstate institutions can foster a minimum of generalized trust that allows the provision and upscaling of governance. We thus find various functional equivalents providing a shadow of hierarchy (Lake 2014). Particularly forestry has been a prime example of “governing the commons” (Ostrom 1990) through collective action institutions such as CBFM.

Third, over the last decades, new public management and getting the “price right” were recommended as more important than building up bureaucracies (in the field of development, see Hönke & Lederer 2013, pp. 780–781; for public administration, see Seibel 2016, p. 154f). New public management approaches have promoted the shift toward goal-oriented actions by bureaucracies based on entrepreneurial practices and performance management and claimed that this would increase their efficiency and effectiveness (Parker & Bradley 2000, p. 131). They, furthermore, advocated the establishment of various small and autonomous agencies for performance improvements (Pollitt *et al.* 2001). The disillusionment with these approaches and the dismal record of structural adjustment programs led contemporary scholarship to a much more nuanced perspective, and even the

multilateral institutions are now aware of the need for capable administrations (e.g. World Bank 2002). Contemporary scholarship is thus much more nuanced, but also stressing distinct features of the regulatory state in the global South, such as pressure by transnational actors, the importance of distributional issues involving societal stakeholders, and limited domestic state capacities (Dubash & Morgan 2012). When it comes to the specific role of public administrations and institutionalist scholarship, Max Weber has, however, again become a standard reference (Seibel 2016).

We will keep these three alternative ways of ruling in mind when scrutinizing whether rational–legal bureaucratization has been advanced in our case study by REDD+. Before, we, however, provide a short overview of the evolution of forest governance and REDD+ on the global level to understand how this international mechanism came into being and how it travels to the nation-states.

3. REDD+: From a transaction cost approach to institutional strengthening

Forest reserves in the global South were nationalized under colonial rule despite previous ongoing forms of informal forest management by local communities (Arts 2014, p. 18). After decolonialization, forests were largely owned by central governments (Andersson *et al.* 2006, p. 576, 578), which have been accused of being bad managers of their forests by exploiting resources, accepting corruption, and lacking enforcement. Being confronted with pressures by stakeholders and fiscal deficits, central governments have initiated market approaches, CBFM, and forestry decentralization since the 1980s (Agrawal 2012, p. 314; Arts 2014, p. 18), moving partly away from Weber (Krott *et al.* 2014, p. 34). For example, CBFM is a functional equivalent to domination through forest administrations and is characterized by the assignment of property or management rights over forests to local communities (Andersson *et al.* 2006, p. 578), who have been perceived as being better equipped to manage forests effectively and sustainably. Specific design principles, such as clear resource boundaries, participation of local users in decisionmaking, local rules, monitoring and sanctioning of compliance, and conflict management are increasing the likelihood of better CBFM governance (Ostrom 1990; Arts 2014, p. 18). However, these design principles have been criticized for being so narrow that they would not apply in most forest–agricultural frontier areas with high deforestation (Wunder 2010, p. 335). Indeed, when other land uses provided higher benefits, local user groups have also opted for forest conversion (Tacconi 2007, p. 342, 343; Wunder 2010, p. 335). Deforestation rates are still high in most of the tropics, and the international community has started to engage the problem through the new governance arrangement REDD+.

The origins of REDD+ date back to the 2005 UNFCCC conference (COP) in Montreal (Pistorius 2012), when the *Coalition of Rainforest Nations*, led by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, proposed to reduce GHG emissions and protect tropical forests through results-based payment (Angelsen & McNeill 2012). In the beginning, highly optimistic projections were made that tropical forests could be saved with minimal transaction costs (Eliasch 2008). Thus, institutional aspects did not play much of a role. However, it soon turned out that the implementation of REDD+ projects was not only much more expansive than previously thought due to relatively high opportunity costs (IDEACarbon 2011), but also that the politics of national forestry have to be taken into account much more (Brockhaus *et al.* 2017). Several scholars have indicated that the political economy of forestry has not been well thought of in the general idea of REDD+. This is especially problematic in cases of neopatrimonial governments and bureaucracies in which vested interests by clientelistic networks of public and private actors are sticking to natural resource extraction (Karsenty & Ongolo 2012, p. 38, 44). Scholars have, therefore, claimed that we need to focus on the institutional settings in REDD+ host countries, where cross-sectoral coordination, multilevel governance, and “professional as well as financial capacity in forest administrations” are most often not adequate (Korhonen-Kurki *et al.* 2014, p. 173). This resulted in a debate whether REDD+ leads to a recentralization of forestry (Larson & Ribot 2009; Phelps *et al.* 2010; Hickmann *et al.* 2017), and it shows that the domestic political-administrative system has to be taken much more seriously than previously thought (Höhne *et al.* 2018). This also becomes visible when one looks at international REDD+ expenditures. Korhonen-Kouki *et al.*, (2014) have shown that the issue of institutional strengthening receives the second highest proportion of financial aid, and this is also what we would expect considering that almost all REDD+ countries are at the preparation stage and not yet receiving results-based payments. It underscores that those who claim that REDD+ is facing huge “institutional constraints” (Karsenty & Ongolo 2012) have a very valid point.

A second characteristic of contemporary REDD+ politics is that it is driven by a variety of actors, such as public authorities at different sectoral departments and governmental levels, various bi- and multilateral donors, nonprofit actors, and private corporations who are trying to regulate it. Both domestic actors and external actors thereby follow formal/explicit and informal/implicit purposes in international cooperation activities (for a categorization of formal and informal interests of donors, see e.g. Rahman & Giessen 2017; of domestic bureaucracies see Sahide *et al.* 2016a). From 2008 onward, international organizations have set up new programs to prepare countries for REDD+, such as UN-REDD, the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), and the World Bank's Forest Investment Program (FIP). FCPF, FIP, and UN-REDD build upon the bureaucratic structure, the material resources, and the knowledgeable personal of its international carrier organizations, such as World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, and FAO (Rosendal & Andresen 2011, p. 1908, 1909). These institutions have introduced bureaucratic routines to manage REDD+ and have engaged with domestic governments on this basis when they applied for funds and technical support. The FCPF, for example, keeps a public scorecard showing the overall procedural process of its engagement with partner countries, which follows the Weberian rationale. It further justifies its actions through various forms of communication (FCPF 2018).

These multilateral funds and bilateral donors like Norway engage in the proliferation of UNFCCC's REDD+ norms and rules as well as their own additional standards to countries of the global South in order to prepare the ground for large-scale global REDD+ implementation (see UNFCCC Secretariat 2016 for COP decisions on REDD+). For example, UN-REDD is checking the progress of its participating 23 countries, which received US\$ 87 million in total, against UNFCCC's REDD+ Warsaw Framework of 2013 (UN-REDD 2016, pp. 1–2, 19). The FCPF also requires its members to streamline its forest governance and its Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) procedures based on various frameworks, templates, and guidelines (FCPF 2017). By end of 2016, it had allocated US\$ 148 million for REDD+ readiness preparation in 39 countries (FCPF 2016, p. 16, 33). Other topics of engagement have been the recognition of free, prior and informed consent by local communities and indigenous people. By advancing these issues in participating REDD+ nations, these programs and facilities contribute to an increasing Weberian bureaucratization of tropical forest areas. How this plays out at the domestic level can be seen in our case study of Indonesia, in which we apply the two indicators of autonomous capacity and reliable procedures, but also indicate where different developments with regard to neopatrimonialism, new public management, and governance by functional equivalents occur.

4. Domestic bureaucratization facilitated through REDD+: The case of Indonesia

“The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, economic enterprises, interest group” (Weber (1922) 2005, p. 223) and of the world's tropical forests...

Indonesia is a presidential republic with a three-tier political system (including provinces and districts) that was decentralized through the Regional Governance Law of 1999. The country hosts the third largest tropical forests in the world, but its high rates of deforestation make it also the world's fifth largest GHG emitter (Climate Watch 2019), resulting in the decline of the forest cover from 65 to 50 percent from 1990 to 2015 (World Bank 2016). The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 determines that land and their natural resources shall be under state control. The *Forestry Law of 1967* then defined three quarters of Indonesia's territory (i.e. 143 million ha) as “state forest” (Brockhaus *et al.* 2012; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 534), which in the following decades were exploited by neopatrimonial networks of politicians, bureaucrats, and business actors (Ribot *et al.* 2006). During President Suharto's authoritarian regime of “New Order” (1966–1998), decisionmaking on forestry was centralized in Jakarta (Ardiansyah *et al.* 2015, p. 4); being largely under the control of the Ministry of Forestry (Brockhaus *et al.* 2012, p. 32) and the neopatrimonial network around President Suharto's family and friends based on a government regulation in 1970, while illegal logging occurred locally as well (Dauvergne 1998, p. 16; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, pp. 534–535). From 1967 until 1982, the national focus was on the export of raw logs, followed by industrial processing of plywood and sawn timber until 1990, leading to an increasing engagement in pulp and paper processing since the mid-1990s (Brockhaus *et al.* 2012, p. 32). The expansion of palm oil

plantations beginning in the mid-1980s then also contributed to tremendous deforestation (Dauvergne 1998, p. 15). After democratization in 1998, districts were granted the authority to manage their forest resources by the decentralization law of 1999, which led to extensive legal and illegal logging driven by district governments and their neopatrimonial networks (Ardiansyah *et al.* 2015, p. 6–8). Hence, rent-seeking by an economic oligarchy and collusive governments and bureaucracies has continued after democratization in a more decentralized way (Brockhaus *et al.* 2012, p. 32; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 532, 538). Due to an inconsistent national legal framework, local deforestation occurred under conditions in which “the distinction between legal and illegal became increasingly blurred” (Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 536). As a response to that, the central government has increasingly recentralized forestry since 2002, with local (il)legal logging continuing anyhow (Barr *et al.* 2006, p. 88; Indrarto *et al.* 2012; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 536). Furthermore, since the 2000s, we can see a shift toward more governance engagement by NGOs and market-based certificates such as FSC as well as (incentive-based) bilateral and multilateral cooperation to fight illegal logging (in the case of EU’s FLEGT) and to additionally reduce legal logging (in the case of REDD+) (Luttrell *et al.* 2011, p. 1; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 531).

With the 2007 COP held in Bali and the leadership of the then President Yudhoyono (in power from 2004 to 2014) (Höhne 2018), climate policies started to gain momentum in Indonesia, which was supported in the forest sector by donors’ financial and technical assistance for preparing REDD+ in the country (Ardiansyah *et al.* 2015, p. 13). Norway pledged up to US\$ 1 billion for verified emission reductions and signed a *Letter of Intent* with Indonesia in May 2010, comprising the measures to be adopted by the Indonesian government to receive 20 per cent of the money for preparation activities and the rest for verified emission reductions (Luttrell *et al.* 2014, pp. 67–68). Indonesia also started to engage with multilateral REDD+ donors like FCPF, FIP, and UN-REDD. Following decisions made on REDD+ related standards within the UNFCCC, these donors worked together with the Indonesian government to advance Weberian bureaucratization as autonomous capacity was raised and reliable procedures were introduced.

4.1. Autonomous capacity: Establishing new institutions and units

REDD+ promoters have worked on strengthening autonomous capacities through various means. We focus on the establishment of REDD+ institutions and the setting up of Forest Management Units (FMUs) as subnational forest administrations as these are paradigmatic examples of how not only new institutions but also a new mode of administrating were introduced.

4.1.1. The establishment of REDD institutions

When REDD+ emerged internationally in the UNFCCC, the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry was known for its vested interests in forest exploitation and what Weber would have called its “sultanistic,” highly clientelistic, practices besides lower levels of formalized practices (Indrarto *et al.* 2012, p. 21; Resosudarmo *et al.* 2013, p. 81; Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 272). This has partially changed due to two interrelated processes. On the one hand, a small group of people in the ministry considered REDD+ as an opportunity to reform forest governance and to shift the focus to conservation in the run up to the Bali COP in 2007. They developed a report on REDD+ (GI-BI-22082017; GI-NI-06102017, see Annex), but “were struggling in the ministry as most people thought timber [production] is [the] most important thing” (GI-NI-06102017), and ministers regarded climate change as very peripheral. On the other hand, outside actors brought in a new dynamic, which was used by the President’s Office for a forest governance reform agenda. Following the negotiations of the President’s Office and the National Council on Climate Change (DNPI) with the Norwegian government, President Yudhoyono signed the Letter of Intent on the REDD+ partnership with Norway in 2010. Based on that agreement the President established the REDD+ Task Force in 2010 and replaced it by the REDD+ Agency in 2013 as an organization with an autonomous capacity working on REDD+ issues (Agung *et al.* 2014, p. 755; Resosudarmo *et al.* 2013, pp. 77, 79–80). Many Indonesian proponents in the President’s office wanted to directly influence the process, regarded REDD+ as a cross-sectoral approach on natural resources and did not have much confidence in the *Ministry of Forestry* due to its enduring neopatrimonial structures with forest exploitation businesses and focus on forest exploitation (Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 269; Bibby 2016). The belief of proponents of the extra-governmental REDD+ Task Force/Agency was that it will provide change from outside of the Ministry of Forestry on forest governance (DI-

15082017; GI-DI-08082017; GI-BI-22082017; Rakhman & Sekarsari 2015; Kaisa *et al.* 2017, p. 67), which was regarded as one of the “most corrupt ministries” (GI-DI-08082017; see also Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 269).

The *REDD+ Task Force* was created within the President’s Office to prepare the ground for the establishment of the *REDD+ Agency*. It was staffed with officers from governmental organizations, such as the Ministries of Forestry, Environment, Finance, and National Planning and from the Land Agency. The *REDD+ Task Force/Agency* was supported by consultants and directly coordinated by the head of the President’s office (GI-DI-08082017; GI-08082017; Lang 2012b). Both institutions reinforced the *REDD+* and forest governance autonomous capacities on the national level. The *REDD+ Task Force/Agency* used its position in the President’s Office to advance *REDD+* related issues nationally by developing the national *REDD+* strategy, starting an initiative to develop a one-map that includes all tenure claims in Indonesia, and preparing a forest moratorium on new forest concession among others (GI-08082017; Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 269). The *REDD+ Agency* was, furthermore, meant to challenge and reform all laws on natural resources, such as forestry, agriculture, and mining, through the development of an umbrella Natural Resource Development Law. *REDD+* was, hence, seen as an opportunity to reform forest and land use governance (Indonesian *REDD+ Task Force* 2012, pp. 6, 17–18; Bae *et al.* 2014, p. 1348; GI-BI-22082017), and to receive external funding for it (Lang 2012b).

The establishment of the *REDD+ Agency*, however, was only partially following the classical Weberian notions of a bureaucracy as two central differences indicate. First, it was set up outside of the line Ministry of Forestry (Resosudarmo *et al.* 2013, p. 80). It was planned to work for 5–7 years (GI-DI-08082017), and was not accountable to the forestry minister, but to the President (Sari 2014). Both Norway and its president and his staff wanted to circumvent the Ministry of Forestry and to break down neopatrimonial practices. Based on new public management ideas of a goal-oriented, flexible, business-like organization and with the direct backing of the president, the *REDD+ Task Force/Agency* was able to determine the national agenda and to trigger various national initiatives. However, this new public management-like organizational setup contributed to an institutional turf war on *REDD+* between the *REDD+ Task Force/Agency*, the *Ministry of Forestry* and the *Ministry of Planning* (BAPPENAS) that weakened the advancement of *REDD+* (Resosudarmo *et al.* 2013; Agung *et al.* 2014). In the process, the Ministry of Forestry made sure that the powers of the *REDD+ Agency* were limited (GI-08082017); resisted the forestry reform process of the *REDD+ Task Force/Agency* (Kaisa *et al.* 2017, p. 67); ignored all *REDD+* related issues, which were also not liked by big private actors; and continued to allow the provision of permits, which all indicate enduring influence of neopatrimonial structures (GI-BI-22082017; GI-DI-21082017; GI-NI-06102017). The president allowed this development and did not push the minister, as he needed political support for his broader agenda (GI-BI-22082017). Thus, the *REDD+ Task Force* did not issue the *REDD+ Strategy* in 2012 as presidential decree as it feared a watering down by the Ministry of Forestry in the process of inter-ministerial consultations and only published it as a Task Force document to share its ideas with the public (GI-08082017). The *REDD+ Agency*, hence, lacked a bureaucratic home and faced problems, such as the lack of an autonomous budget, and missing influences on ministerial decrees and implementation when it came to shifting issues from the agenda to the policy decision or even implementation phase, making it dependent on the cooperation with the Ministry of Forestry, which still represented business interests (GI-DI-08082017; GI-05082016; RI-08082016; DI-10082016; DI-16082016; Kaisa *et al.* 2017, p. 67).

Second, it was only partly staffed by government bureaucrats, but mostly by experts from the civil society, which also resembles the envisioned organizational culture of new public management. This approach helped in the collaboration with NGOs, which had been ignored by the Ministry of Forestry (NI-16082017; NI-02082016; Kaisa *et al.* 2017, p. 67). And while they brought in important expert knowledge and a strong motivation to shake up the entire forest governance sector, they also lacked bureaucratic knowledge, which hampered their coordination with line ministries (GI-05082016; RI-08082016; DI-10082016; DI-16082016).

Only in the beginning of 2015, the newly appointed President Joko Widodo curbed the institutional turf war at the national level by dissolving the *REDD+ Agency* and integrating its task into the new *Ministry of Environment and Forestry* (Anderson *et al.* 2016, p. 33). The new president had a lean bureaucracy agenda and abandoned extragovernmental agencies in other policy fields as well. He is, thus, less oriented toward new public management, which might support increasing Weberian bureaucratization through the implementation of the *REDD+* reform agenda in the ministry (RI-01082016; RI-08082016). Within the new *DG Climate* of the new

ministry, a subunit is now working on REDD+ issues and the *DG Climate* and *REDD+ unit* heads are very keen to advance REDD+ (NI-15082016; DI-16082016; GI-3-16082017; Kaisa *et al.* 2017, p. 67). However, staff from the REDD+ Agency was not hired for the REDD+ unit in the ministry leading to an initial loss of knowledge and capacity, and a yearlong gridlock (NI-2-10082017; DI-11082017; GI-BI-22082017; GI-DI-08082017; GI-08082017). Furthermore, the REDD+ subunit is in some aspects in a much more difficult situation than the REDD+ Agency. While it now has an own budget and the power to regulate and implement, it has a much weaker position in relation to other line ministries, which need to be on board when it comes to reforming the land-use pattern in Indonesia (GI-08082017; Bell 2015; Kaisa *et al.* 2017, p. 67). The previous head of the REDD+ Agency was at ministerial level with four deputies and 60 staff members (Sari 2014), now the REDD+ unit head leads only five people within the *Directorate of Mitigation* in the *DG Climate Change* (GI-08082017; GI-DI-08082017; DI-11082017). However, this small unit can involve other DGs for their work on reforming the forest governance (GI-3-16082017; DI-21082017). Several observers have indicated an increasing importance of conservation and management instead of exploitation focus in the forestry wing of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry due to the influence of the DG Climate Change and the Environment wing, pointing to decreasing neopatrimonial practices (DI-15082017; GI-3-16082017; GI-DI-08082017; DI-21082017; Jong 2018).

4.1.2. *The setting up of Forest Management Units: Ruling the forest carbon stock on the ground*

One central sign of the strengthening of the autonomous capacity of the state is the establishment of rational-legal bureaucracies in the form of FMUs, which are modeled on the German “Forstamt” (DI-01082016; GI-DI-09082017; Ardiansyah *et al.* 2015, p. 7, 35; Anderson *et al.* 2016, pp. 31, 37–38; Sahide *et al.* 2016a, p. 13). While they have been discussed by Indonesian forest bureaucrats since 1999 with a government regulation deciding upon their formation in 2007 (Bae *et al.* 2014, p. 1347), the REDD+ involvement of the country accelerated, pushed, and supported the establishment and operationalization of FMUs (GI-DI-21082017; SGI-25092017; DI-21082017; DI-01082016; DI-10082016; Bae *et al.* 2014, p. 1348; Sahide *et al.* 2016a, pp. 16–17) as a part of the REDD+ preparation process laid down in the National REDD+ Strategy (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force 2012, p. 36). The FMUs shall be a part of reforming the forest governance and represent the change from a permit-based forest exploitation regime to a management system with increasing conservation elements (DI-21082017; GI-DI-21082017). The current goal is to set up about 600 FMUs by 2020 to establish legal-rational and autonomous bureaucratic domination in the forests and to end the neopatrimonial mode of local forest governance (DI-01082016; DI-03082016). FMUs envisaged tasks are manifold, including monitoring forest concessionaires, REDD+ implementation, controlling of CBFM, preventing forest fires, reducing deforestation, and earning funds themselves through forest management, ecotourism, or nontimber products (GI-2-16082017; GI-3-16082017; DI-21082017; SGI-15092017; BI-19092017; DI-22092017; SGI-25092017).

In the early stages, the establishment of FMUs was supported by donors like GIZ, the FIP, and UN-REDD as decentralized approach to forest management at the district level. But FMUs ended up on the provincial level with some control by the central government after the enactment of the Regional Governance Law of 2014 (UN-REDD 2010, p. 6; Climate Investment Funds 2012, p. 7, 11; Sahide *et al.* 2016a, p. 17). Donors, such as World Bank, continued to provide funding for FMUs to close the financial gap due to decreasing budgets from the central government (DI-21082017; DI-1-14082017). Since the recentralization, the central government has provided program funding for patrolling and forest fire prevention and gives policy and technical guidance, while the provincial government has provided salaries and administrative guidance through the provincial Forestry Agency (SGI-15092017; DI-22092017).

FMUs, thus, represent one of the clearest examples of the increasing Weberian rational-legal bureaucratization of forests in Indonesia even though they have not been completely set up and are not yet fully functional as many enduring problems show, such as insufficient funds leading to weak monitoring, patrolling, and controlling, and insufficient capacities for REDD+ implementation (RI-24082017; SGI-15092017; BI-19092017; DI-22092017; Bae *et al.* 2014, p. 1351; Kim *et al.* 2016, p. 74). In 2016, only about 10 FMUs were already working as intended (NI-02082016). Also human capacity is still a major issue (Sahide *et al.* 2016a, p. 17), and it will supposedly take 10 years to train 40,000 foresters who will eventually staff the FMU (DI-01082016). Furthermore, the shift of responsibility from districts to provinces led to initial confusion and institutional reconstruction, which hampered the setting up of FMUs (SGI-25092017). However, FMUs are supposed to eventually manage and rule the state

forests in a more effective way and could then evolve as strong supporters for REDD+ on the subnational level and for mainstreaming forest policies (RI-12082016).

FMUs bear some elements of new public management as well. While FMUs are currently financed by government budget mostly coming from the central government, they are supposed to be financially independent by raising their own revenues and providing them to the provincial government, which may lead to conflicting interests between sustainable forest management and exploitation (SGI-15092017; DI-1-14082017). Financially and operatively, they will continue to depend on external cooperation and support by donors and NGOs (DI-22092017). Only when being operative, it will become clear to what extent the FMUs are able to break through the partly enduring patterns of neopatrimonialism in Indonesia's forests. In the end, they will be needed to enforce the standing of forests when REDD+ payments have been made.

4.2. Reliable procedures: Clarifying authority and knowing the objects and subjects of rules

As a second element, we focus on reliable procedures, as they have been advanced by the REDD+ process through the clarification of public forest authority and of the objects and subjects of rules.

4.2.1. Clarifying public forest authority?

After the decentralization in 1999, the excessive legal and illegal issuance of overlapping logging permits by district governments, which were part of neopatrimonial networks (Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 265), made it necessary to clarify public forest authority and motivated the central government to limit the authorities of districts (NI-1-10082017; NI-2-10082017; GI-06102017). In 2014, the Regional Governance Law took forestry powers away from districts and handed it to the central and provincial governments (Ardiansyah *et al.* 2015, p. 7; Anderson *et al.* 2016, p. 31). While REDD+ has not initiated the recentralization of forestry in Indonesia, it has contributed to it by raising awareness on resource extraction by districts (Höhne *et al.* 2018). The goal was to “decrease deforestation by changing the authority for forestry” (GI-06102017). However, it has also been the former Ministry of Forestry that had made small-scale logging possible through conducive standard setting and through the issuance of permits for large-scale logging (Barr *et al.* 2006, pp. 92–93; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 535). Nevertheless, the ministry's bureaucrats now aim to increase their control on the subnational government to end the practice of overlapping permits by establishing more reliable procedures (GI-06102017). With governors acting as representatives of the central government, provinces were regarded by the Ministry of Forestry to be much easier to be controlled as districts (GI-07082017; BI-09082017; NI-1-10082017; NI-2-10082017; DI-21082017; Sahide *et al.* 2016a, p. 18).

In response to the neopatrimonial structures in the forestry sector and the continuous deforestation, NGOs like Walhi have demanded a forest moratorium for more than 25 years (Lang 2012a). In the bilateral REDD+ negotiations with Norway, DNPI included that idea in the Letter of Intent (GI-BI-31082017). Subsequently, the REDD+ Task Force drafted the presidential regulation on new forest concessionaires, departing from the idea of NGOs, which demanded a moratorium of forest conversion, including already issued permits (GI-BI-22082017; NI-1-10082017). The moratorium was only focusing on logging, not touching upon the conversion of forest and peat lands for oil palm or mining (DI-15082017; Coalition of Civil Society Organizations 2011, p. 4). It was issued in 2011 and was also supposed to contribute to the clarification of authority by reviewing all existing forest licenses and reforming the underlying procedures. But, the progress in this regard is unclear (Anderson *et al.* 2016), with some observers claiming that no reviewing and revoking of overlapping and conflicting permits have happened (NI-1-02102017) and others indicating the “massive renegotiation of permits” and even that “a lot of permits got confiscated” (GI-BI-22082017). The moratorium process further pushed the advancement of the one map initiative of 2010, which has aimed to end the practice of overlapping maps of different ministries and to clarify who has authority over which area, including ending tenure conflicts (DI-15082017; GI-08082017; Wibowo & Giessen 2015, p. 135). It has not been finalized so far due to different ministries not relating to each other (NI-16082017), and the opposition of the Ministry of Industry and of palm oil, logging, and mining businesses (NI-2-10082017), indicating enduring neopatrimonial structures. Furthermore, the success of the moratorium itself remains limited due to the resistance of the Ministry of Forestry. Aiming to protect the private sector and responding to the lobbying pressure (Indrarto *et al.* 2012, p. 67; Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 271; NI-1-02102017), the Ministry of Forestry reduced the targeted area from the proposed 90 million ha of primary and

secondary forests by the REDD+ Task Force to only 64 million ha of primary forests during the inter-ministerial consultations (GI-08082017; GI-NI-08082017). In addition, the implementation of the moratorium was weak as there were, for example, a lot of violations in Kalimantan (NI-1-02102017), and many illegalities including the backdating of permits (DI-15082017; NI-1-02102017). During the presidency of Yudhoyono, the amount of licenses for plantation, mining, and forests even went up as he did not push the responsible ministries to follow his lead (GI-NI-06102017). This indicates the enduring importance of neopatrimonial structures (Indrarto *et al.* 2012, p. 67; Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 271; 2016, p. 33).

4.2.2. *Knowing and clarifying the objects and subjects of rules*

For ruling the carbon stock effectively, forest bureaucrats must first gain knowledge on how they can measure the amount of carbon that is actually stored. Supported by consultants and external donors like FCPF and Norway (DI-10082016), the Indonesian government has, therefore, strongly advanced the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of the forest carbon stock in the country (FCPF 2016; Kingdom of Norway, Republic of Indonesia 2010). In the beginning, these activities were primarily motivated to assure that reduced deforestation would qualify as carbon credits for a global carbon market. But it turns out that MRV contributes to the rational-legal domination of forests as in order to govern the forests in a results-based manner, one has first to know what is actually there. The establishment of such a MRV system, however, is still in the preparation phase as the verification part has not yet been completed (DI-1-14082017). In this context, the UNFCCC requires to develop a forest reference emission level by each REDD+ country, which functions as the baseline against which all future GHG emission reductions can be measured and which was submitted by Indonesia to the UNFCCC in 2016. The UNFCCC Secretariat approved it even though critics emphasized its qualitative weaknesses (GI-05082016; NI-09082017). For example, it initially did not address forest fires and peat degradation and still does not incorporate afforestation and sustainable forest management (GI-DI-21082017; DI-15082017). Overall, we see, however, an increasing move toward establishing Weberian reliable procedures to know and clarify the objects of rules. This process might, furthermore, increase the accountability of the government toward its people (RI-08082016; Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 272). It, however, further supports a new public management perspective in bureaucracies as well, as their performance in terms of avoiding deforestation will become much more measurable in the process.

Clarifying who the forest belongs to cannot only be achieved through the one-map-policy but also through recognition of informal community-based and indigenous peoples' forest management. Formal management rights for CBFM and even ownership rights for indigenous peoples have been increasing in the last years. The REDD+ process raised the issue of their rights and many donors focused on community and indigenous peoples' empowerment (GI-07082017; NI-2-02102017; N-1-02102017; Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 272). This is most visible in the case of indigenous rights, which had been included in the Letter of Intent negotiations by Norway. The indigenous peoples' NGO AMAN supported the REDD+ partnership as President Yudhoyono, in return, committed himself to recognize indigenous peoples' rights. But the allocation of ownership rights to indigenous peoples only started after the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 2012/13 on the lawsuit filed by AMAN which received REDD+ funding during that process from Norway (NI-16082017) and was celebrated as one of the major successes by the Norwegian Development Cooperation Agency NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense) (2016, pp. 31–32). The REDD+ Agency has also supported that process through lobbying and the support of AMAN in mapping their territories (DI-21082017) and President Yudhoyono subsequently instructed the Ministry of Forestry to implement the court decision (Anderson *et al.* 2015, p. 268), which has only slowly progressed (Mongabay 2017). Hence, indigenous rights were recognized for the first time in Indonesia through the REDD+ process (DI-15082017) as it helped to raise awareness for indigenous peoples as “the guardians of the forest” (NI-16082017) who have campaigned for many years on “no rights, no REDD” (NI-16082017). Thus the REDD+ process resulted in an increasing Weberian bureaucratization and legalization of functional equivalents. The implication of the REDD+ process for CBFM rights are less obvious. But government and NGO representatives have claimed that the allocation of 12.7 million ha management rights to communities for 35 years by the Jokowi administration is seen as a contribution to climate change mitigation and REDD+ advancement besides other goals (GI-1-16082017; GI-2-16082017; NI-1-10082017; Republic of Indonesia 2016, pp. 2–3), such as balancing decreasing wood supply by forest companies (DI-21082017; N-1-02102017). Even though CBFM was

already introduced as a legal scheme in 1995, it has rarely been implemented until recently, but its advancement was accelerated through the REDD+ process (DI-21082017; GI-1-16082017).

However, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry is only slowly implementing these programs. It has only allocated 1 million ha of CBFM rights so far (DI-21082017). While the forestry wing in the ministry is happy to provide these management rights, it is very reluctant to recognize ownership rights of indigenous peoples (DI-2-14082017), and will probably informally continue to aim for retaining state control over forests (Sahide *et al.* 2016b, p. 91). So far, only 10,000 ha have been allocated as ownership rights to indigenous peoples, who claim to have rights for 8.2 million ha (GI-2-16082017; NI-16082017). Furthermore, the Forestry Law has not yet been changed to comply with the ruling of the Constitutional Court as business actors and parliamentarians are not interested in the recognition of indigenous rights (NI-16082017), indicating the legacy of enduring neopatrimonial structures in the forestry sector.

5. Discussion and conclusion: Moving beyond Weber

In our study, we find evidence for an increasing bureaucratization of forests in a Weberian ideal-type manner of a legal-rational and autonomous bureaucratic domination. However, we also find signs of other developments, which point to the importance of new public management ideas of goal-oriented actions toward results-based payments, continuous influences of neopatrimonial domination based on clientelism and informal networks besides formalized practices, and yet no signs of crowding out of functional equivalents such as community-based or indigenous peoples' forest management, but even their strengthening or legalization.

We looked at autonomous capacity and reliable procedures to operationalize the bureaucratization of forestry in a Weberian manner by the domestic REDD+ process. We find many instances of both elements (see Table 1). First, autonomous capacities have been increased by the establishment of REDD+ institutions as well as by the setting up of FMUs. These new organizations have been established to overcome still partially dominant neopatrimonial practices, and have been influenced by new public management ideas. In very adverse conditions, it seems that it might be necessary to move outside of the regular government structure to overcome neopatrimonial structures within existing bureaucracies. However, establishing extragovernmental institutions, such as the REDD+ Agency, are highly vulnerable to changing political leadership and are hampered in their reform engagement through enduring neopatrimonial structures in regular ministries.

Second, the target to provide more reliable procedures has led to the ambition to clarify public forest authority through the moratorium on new forest concessions, the one-map policy, and the Regional Governance Law of 2014. These processes are mostly under way and are partly hampered by enduring neopatrimonial structures. Providing reliable procedures, it was also necessary to improve the knowledge about the objects of rules, the forests, through introducing a MRV system and a forest reference emission level which produces data on which bureaucrats can rely upon when taking decisions on administering the forest. As it measures performance, the system bears elements of goal-oriented new public management approaches. Lastly, the REDD+ process provides more reliable procedures as it aims to clarify the subjects of rules through the one map process and the recognition of forest management by communities and indigenous peoples, who have informally managed the forests for centuries and were criminalized through the declaration of state ownership by the Forestry Law of 1967. In

Table 1 The relevance of different administrative approaches for the Indonesian REDD+ process

	Weberian bureaucratization	New public management	Neopatrimonialism	Functional equivalents
Establishment of REDD+ institutions	+	+	+	
Setting up of FMUs	+	+		
Clarifying public forest authority	+		+	
Knowing and clarifying the objects and subjects of rules	+	+	+	+

“+” indicates the relevance of the respective approach for understanding the Indonesian REDD+ process. *Source:* Own compilation.

consequence, we see that increasing Weberian bureaucratization must not be in conflict or contradiction with enduring or extending forms of functional equivalents. In contrast, we observe the legalization and increasing Weberian bureaucratization of functional equivalents, even though implementation is still lacking behind.

All these steps toward increasing Weberian bureaucratization are still in the process and are in many cases far away from implementation. Autonomous capacities are still lacking and are still in question due to their capture through private interests on different governmental levels. The success of FMUs will be decisive to end neopatrimonialism and destruction in Indonesia's forests. Even though a process toward Weberian reliable procedures in bureaucracies was started with the forest moratorium as well as the disempowerment of deforesting and clientelistic districts, it seems that progress toward reliable forestry procedures has so far been limited. It also remains unclear whether the recentralization will limit the authority struggles between the governmental tiers.

Bureaucratization of forestry through the initiation of REDD+ is happening, at least to some extent and at least in Indonesia. But why should we bother? Let us recall that Weber argued that the development of modern markets depended on a specific rational-legal bureaucratic setup of the capitalist state (Lebow 2017, p. 3). We claim that REDD+, particularly if it should ever turn into an international market mechanism, will have to be domestically bureaucratized because only a public bureaucracy can establish the kind of general trust and set up the rules that ultimately even the (international) invisible hand needs. But even if the political decision is made not to employ markets, forest administrations will be needed and will – most likely – be more accepted and be more effective if they take on the form of a bureaucracy that legitimizes itself through rational-legal means. This is very much in line with others who have also claimed that we do not (always and everywhere) live in a completely unrestricted neoliberal world but that rather in many instances, new institutions are effective “instruments of regulation” (Levi-Faur & Jordana 2005) and that administrative reforms are a sign of “regulatory capitalism” (Levi-Faur 2005, p. 14). Thus, once the political will is given, only a nonarbitrary and competent administration might be capable of ending neopatrimonial structures fueled by strong economic incentives that currently shape the political economy of tropical forestry. Simply paying off soy farmers in Brazil or palm oil plantation owners in Indonesia will not work by itself. Our analysis, therefore, suggests that either REDD+ becomes a full-fledged project of bureaucratization or it will indeed fail.

But what are the consequences of this process of bureaucratization? In this final part, we try to provide some initial answers to these questions moving beyond Weber in four respects. First, Weber was not a full-fledged supporter of modernization, stressing that once in place, bureaucratic structures with their strong focus on rules are hard to abandon, putting a strain on individual freedom and coming at the potential price of sclerosis (Lebow 2017, p. 2). In this context, Weber claimed that modernization can hardly coexist with traditional forms of living. He argued that traditional domination can no longer be the basis of legitimacy in the modern capitalist state machinery if we want to overcome sultanistic practices where only the personalized access to somebody in power is of importance (Guliyev 2011). What he could not foresee was that traditional forms of living can be legitimized through rational-legal bureaucracies set up in the process of modernization. What we currently witness in Indonesia is the bureaucratization of traditional forms of living in the form of community-based and indigenous peoples' forest management. Potentially, this might lead to hybrids of traditional and modernist practices but we would suspect that there is at least a risk that rational-legal bureaucratization and some traditional forms of governance are incompatible.

Second, Weber's anxiety about the hegemonic character of bureaucracies should not be dismissed, as bureaucratization might evolve into an end by itself leading in the long term even to the end of politics and the domination of the occupational specialist through routines that are more and more outside of the political process (Lebow 2017, p. 2). Even autonomous and capable bureaucrats have to be checked by political procedures in order to establish inclusive institutions. Weber's thoughts on bureaucracy have strongly influenced current neo-institutionalist scholarship, so that authors like Acemoglu, Robinson, and Fukuyama stress that these bureaucracies must not only be capable and autonomous but also be checked. Thus, on the one hand, Weberian bureaucratic administrations must have some form of power in order to effectively take over the provision of specific governance services, something we labeled autonomous capacity above. On the other hand, some form of control must be given that the very same institution is not turning into a machinery for a small elite that dominates the institution. Such inclusive institutions are, however, historically the exception and are mostly related to Western-inspired forms of statehood (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012) and require some form of democratic control

(Levi-Faur 2005). And even when these checks-and-balances exist, the danger of decay is given as we are currently witnessing in the US political system (Fukuyama 2014). It will be a tremendous task of the REDD+ community to walk this thin line of strengthening state institutions and at the same time establishing checks and balances and some openness of the evolving institutions. For example, the REDD+ Task Force/Agency (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force 2012, p. 7), bilateral donors such as Norway (Kingdom of Norway, Republic of Indonesia 2010), and multilateral donors such as World Bank and UN-REDD have all focused on involving stakeholders in the process (UN-REDD 2010, p. 9), which has been a revolutionary step from the perspective of many NGO activists that had previously been excluded in forest policymaking by the Ministry of Forestry (NI-02082016; RI-08082016). This might result in an overall rather inclusive but nevertheless effective process in forest governance in the future, and is also in line with the “regulatory society” in the global South (Dubash & Morgan 2012) or with Pitcher *et al.*'s (2009) description of accountable neopatrimonialism in Botswana.

Third, the increasing bureaucratization is characterized by a growing autonomous capacity from neopatrimonial practices and by more reliable procedures, but it does not yet determine to what ends it will serve. This becomes especially important as neo-institutionalists such as Fukuyama underline that it is also important to analyze the output and outcome dimension, that is, whether a bureaucracy is actually able to formulate policies and implement them in a meaningful way. But what the output or outcome will be is foremost decided in the realm of politics. If the political leadership directing the bureaucrats is focusing rather on resource exploitation instead of saving forests, then the destruction of forest will continue anyhow or will even become worse through more effective bureaucracies. Without global REDD+ financial funds flowing, politicians and bureaucrats will lack economic incentives to change their behavior. Only when ideas and norms about a different perspective on forests spread, they will start to use the bureaucratization of their tropical forests to keep them safe instead of cutting them down.

Fourth, we claim that future scholarship has to try to reconcile the use of Western concepts like bureaucratization with an understanding of non-Western domestic politics. We approached this problem by looking for transformative rational–legal bureaucratization keeping enduring patterns through neopatrimonial practices or the legalization of functional equivalents in mind. Future research should build upon it in further developing appropriate concepts which take empirical results in the global South into account and acknowledge the local reshaping and reconstruction of global norms (Acharya 2004) or of external institutional models (Dubash & Morgan 2012).

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Notes

- 1 Own translation.
- 2 Translations include “agency state” as well as “institutional state.”
- 3 Weber did not only see bureaucratization as a characteristic of the modern state but also of the modern company.

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A. APPENDIX

A1. Interviewees

- DI-01082016: Donor interviewee, 1 August 2016
- RI-01082016: Research Interviewee, 1 August 2016
- NI-02082016: NGO interviewee, 2 August 2016
- DI-03082016: Donor interviewee, 3 August 2016
- GI-05082016: Government Interviewee, 5 August 2016
- RI-08082016: Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016
- DI-10082016: Donor Interviewee, 10 August 2016
- NI-15082016: NGO Interviewee, 15 August 2016
- DI-16082016: Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016

GI-07082017: Government interviewee, 7 August 2017
GI-DI-08082017: Ex-government, donor interviewee, 8 August 2017
GI-08082017: Ex-government interviewee, 8 August 2017
GI-NI-08082017: Ex-government, NGO interviewee, 8 August 2017
BI-09082017: Business interviewee, 9 August 2017
GI-DI-09082017: Ex-government, donor interviewee, 9 August 2017
NI-09082017: NGO interviewee, 9 August 2017
NI-1-10082017, NGO interviewee, 10 August 2017
NI-2-10082017: NGO interviewee, 10 August 2017
DI-11082017: Donor interviewee, 11 August 2017
RI-12082016: Research Interviewee, 12 August 2016
DI-1-14082017: Donor interviewee, 14 August 2017
DI-2-14082017: Donor interviewee, 14 August 2017
DI-15082017: Donor interviewee, 15 August 2017
NI-16082017: NGO interviewee, 16 August 2017
GI-1-16082017: Government interviewee, 16 August 2017
GI-2-16082017: Government interviewee, 16 August 2017
GI-3-16082017: Government Interviewee, 16 August 2017
GI-DI-21082017: Ex-government, donor interviewee, 21 August 2017
DI-21082017: Donor interviewee, 21 August 2017
GI-BI-22082017: Ex-government, business interviewee, 22 August 2017
GI-RI-23082017: Government and research interviewee, 23 August 2017
RI-24082017: Research interviewee, 24 August 2017
GI-BI-31082017: Ex-government, business interviewee, 31 August 2017
SGI-15092017: Subnational government interviewee, Central Kalimantan, 15 September 2017
BI-19092017: Business interviewee, 19 September 2017
DI-22092017: Donor interviewee, 22 September 2017
SGI-25092017: Subnational government interviewee, East Kalimantan, 25 September 2017
NI-1-02102017: NGO interviewee, 2 October 2017
NI-2-02102017: NGO interviewee, 2 October 2017
GI-06102017: Government interviewee, 6 October 2017
GI-NI-06102017: Ex-government, NGO interviewee, 6 October 2017