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On the Design of Public Institutions: Evidence from Financial Supervision

Nitsch, Volker :
On the Design of Public Institutions: Evidence from Financial Supervision.
In: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics (221) ISSN 1438-2733
[Article], (2014)

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Item Type: Article
Title: On the Design of Public Institutions: Evidence from Financial Supervision
Language: English
Abstract:

This paper studies the allocation of the functions and responsibilities of prudential supervision on public authorities, including the central bank. In particular, it is argued that there are interdependencies in the design of institutions; political decisions on the supervisory structure are not taken in isolation. Analyzing a panel data set of prudential supervision regimes in 98 countries over the period from 1999 to 2010, I find that central banks play a smaller role in supervision and tasks are more decentralized if the central bank is independent and transparent. Measures of firm and fiscal decentralization are typically associated with a greater centralization of supervisory functions outside of the central bank.

Journal or Publication Title: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
Number: 221
Uncontrolled Keywords: Keywords: financial, prudential, supervision, institution, authority JEL Code: E58, G28, H83
Classification DDC: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
Divisions: 01 Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete > International Economics
01 Law and Economics > Volkswirtschaftliche Fachgebiete
01 Law and Economics
Date Deposited: 11 Dec 2014 15:08
Last Modified: 10 Mar 2016 10:53
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-47048
URI: http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/4704
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